Most decisive battle in WW2?
About the - 40: it is possible that one night some where in the SU,the temperature was going down to -40,but this is irrelevant for the claim that the 41/42 winter was very cold .
As usual,incompetence and laziness are ruling :
if on 12 january 2014 it was -30C in Helena (Montana),this proves nothing : it does not mean that it was cold in Springfield,it even does not mean that the winter in Montana was harsh .
Laziness : some one is claiming :it was -40,and every one is parotting him,without taking the time to look if the claim was correct and relevant .
An exemple of incompetence and laziness is Robert Kershaw who wrote in "War without Garlands" (P 495):temperatures slipped to -25C on 4 december and then to -35 and 38 the subsequent days.
But,these temperatures were night temperatures!
And,there is dishonesty : sone one claimed that von Bock did mention in his diary of 5 november a temperature of -30,and,of course,every one parotted him, till,some one sceptical at the WWII Forum was looking at the diary : and: the - 30 was an invention.
Seaton was claiming that the temperature on 24 november was -30,and again about Bock:it has been claimed that Bock mentioned a temperature of -45 on 30 november .
All Baron von Münchhausen tales .
As usual,incompetence and laziness are ruling :
if on 12 january 2014 it was -30C in Helena (Montana),this proves nothing : it does not mean that it was cold in Springfield,it even does not mean that the winter in Montana was harsh .
Laziness : some one is claiming :it was -40,and every one is parotting him,without taking the time to look if the claim was correct and relevant .
An exemple of incompetence and laziness is Robert Kershaw who wrote in "War without Garlands" (P 495):temperatures slipped to -25C on 4 december and then to -35 and 38 the subsequent days.
But,these temperatures were night temperatures!
And,there is dishonesty : sone one claimed that von Bock did mention in his diary of 5 november a temperature of -30,and,of course,every one parotted him, till,some one sceptical at the WWII Forum was looking at the diary : and: the - 30 was an invention.
Seaton was claiming that the temperature on 24 november was -30,and again about Bock:it has been claimed that Bock mentioned a temperature of -45 on 30 november .
All Baron von Münchhausen tales .
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brinktk
Active member
Maybe I can give a soldiers perspective on this... 0 degrees when I'm at home and 0 degrees when I'm in the field or deployed are VERY different things. Dealing with the weather on my terms makes it much more bearable...on the other hand, being forced to contend with it for months and months without a break is another thing entirely. Now, if it's -20 at night and I have to sleep on some hay, in a vehicle, or on the ground...it's absolute misery. ESPECIALLY if the wind is blowing. Wind makes everything harder and your misery much more pronounced.
I was in the field last month and myself and my fellow soldiers were convinced that on one of the days the temperatures reached no less than 85 F. We all got sun burnt and were sweating quite a lot...according to the local weather station it was a high of 69 F. I'm sure the air temp was 69 but the ambient temperature was definitely over 80! I've had the same thing happen to me overseas except it was 122 F and 145 F respectively.
With all that being said, I'm sure many of the soldiers on both sides believed they were in those conditions...because it felt like they were in those conditions...so let's not get too bogged down in simple statistics. No matter what anyone says, winter usually sucks for any grunt who has to endure it without the conveniences of a barracks, a home, or whatever.
I was in the field last month and myself and my fellow soldiers were convinced that on one of the days the temperatures reached no less than 85 F. We all got sun burnt and were sweating quite a lot...according to the local weather station it was a high of 69 F. I'm sure the air temp was 69 but the ambient temperature was definitely over 80! I've had the same thing happen to me overseas except it was 122 F and 145 F respectively.
With all that being said, I'm sure many of the soldiers on both sides believed they were in those conditions...because it felt like they were in those conditions...so let's not get too bogged down in simple statistics. No matter what anyone says, winter usually sucks for any grunt who has to endure it without the conveniences of a barracks, a home, or whatever.
The fact remains that Goebbels said that Barbarossa failed because of General Winter (always better to lose because of something supernatural than to be defeated by Untermenschen,otherwise people could ask questions)and that after the war,the generals said that it was all the fault of Hitler .(better to be defeated by the intervention of a corporal,otherwise people would ask questions)
The truth is that 90 % of the Ostheer was not hurt by the winter;there are 2 explanations : the winter was not that harsh (thus Dr Goebbels was telling,as usual,BS,)or 90 % of the Ostheer had winter clothing (and thus the generals were telling,as usual,BS) .A combination of both also is possible .
If it was cold on the German side,it was also cold on the Soviet side .
If no one received winter clothing,normally the Soviets had to be in Berlin inapril 1942.
The truth is that 90 % of the Ostheer was not hurt by the winter;there are 2 explanations : the winter was not that harsh (thus Dr Goebbels was telling,as usual,BS,)or 90 % of the Ostheer had winter clothing (and thus the generals were telling,as usual,BS) .A combination of both also is possible .
If it was cold on the German side,it was also cold on the Soviet side .
If no one received winter clothing,normally the Soviets had to be in Berlin inapril 1942.
brinktk
Active member
You're missing the point. Winter IS harsh under a soldiers circumstances regardless if it's unseasonably cold, warm, or in between. The soldiers on the ground still live a miserable existence. It slows EVERYTHING down. Even if guys are pulled off the line for frostbite, dysentery, typhoid, battle fatigue, minor wounds, whatever...every loss is felt on the line...especially when a majority of combat units at the front are operating at 50-60% strength anyways. It doesn't matter if those soldiers find their way back in a week, a month, or more...it takes a toll on the logistics of having to move these guys, treat them, feed them, bring them up to fighting shape, and then get them back...only to return to a unit they may not even recognize since the attrition is constant...This kills combat efficiency and morale...
"Only" 10% of the invasion force may have ended up casualties....but I guarantee a majority of those casualties were up on the line, both combat and non combat...which translates to huge percentages in the combat outfits in regards to casualties. Once an outfit drops below 40-50% of their original strength...they're essentially combat ineffective.
The story of Sorge is an other exemple of the hoaxes and myths that are swarming in the historiography of WWII.
1)It has been claimed that Sorge informed Stalin about Barbarossa,but that the stupid Jozef (observe the analogy with the stupid Adolf)refused to believe him .The truth is that Sorge (a civilian without military knowledge) only repeated the usual gossips,and that he was wrong for 99 %.
2)It has been claimed that Sorge informed Stalin that Japan had decided not to attack the SU,and that Stalin (meanwhile becoming intelligent) believed him and transferred the Siberian divisions to Moscow,where they stopped the Germans .The truth is that Japan never decided not to attack the SU,that Zhukov already in july transferred the Siberian divisions westwards,and that the Siberian manpower was only 5 % of the manpower the SU sent to the front in 1941.
3) It has been claimed that Sorge told Stalin about the Japanese decision to attack the US,that Stalin informed the White House,but that the traitor FDR kept secret this information to direct the US to the war .The truth is that Japan decided to attack the US on 30 november 1941,when Sorge already was in prison .
How to explain the Sorge hoax ?
It is very simple :in 1960,there was a struggle on live and death between Nikita K supported by the army and the Stalinists;on live and death,because both knew what to expect if the Stalin gang won . OTOH,people were beginning to ask annoying questions about the initial Soviet defeats in 1941 .
Nothing more natural of the Army to say : it was all the fault of Stalin,because "we" had a super spy (Sorge worked for the GRU)but the stupid Stalin refused to believe him and was thus responsible for the initial disasters .
1)It has been claimed that Sorge informed Stalin about Barbarossa,but that the stupid Jozef (observe the analogy with the stupid Adolf)refused to believe him .The truth is that Sorge (a civilian without military knowledge) only repeated the usual gossips,and that he was wrong for 99 %.
2)It has been claimed that Sorge informed Stalin that Japan had decided not to attack the SU,and that Stalin (meanwhile becoming intelligent) believed him and transferred the Siberian divisions to Moscow,where they stopped the Germans .The truth is that Japan never decided not to attack the SU,that Zhukov already in july transferred the Siberian divisions westwards,and that the Siberian manpower was only 5 % of the manpower the SU sent to the front in 1941.
3) It has been claimed that Sorge told Stalin about the Japanese decision to attack the US,that Stalin informed the White House,but that the traitor FDR kept secret this information to direct the US to the war .The truth is that Japan decided to attack the US on 30 november 1941,when Sorge already was in prison .
How to explain the Sorge hoax ?
It is very simple :in 1960,there was a struggle on live and death between Nikita K supported by the army and the Stalinists;on live and death,because both knew what to expect if the Stalin gang won . OTOH,people were beginning to ask annoying questions about the initial Soviet defeats in 1941 .
Nothing more natural of the Army to say : it was all the fault of Stalin,because "we" had a super spy (Sorge worked for the GRU)but the stupid Stalin refused to believe him and was thus responsible for the initial disasters .
And why were the Soviets not in Berlin in april 1942 ?
brinktk
Active member
I don't understand what point you're trying to make...
Doppleganger
Active member
It has to be remembered that temperatures will vary quite markedly over the Moscow battlefield area, as it's quite a big region, 500km from north to south. You will get quite a varied spread of temperatures over such a large area. From memory, I think that Panzer Armies 3 and 4 (northern pincer arm) were more affected by actual temperature than Panzer Army 2, which formed the southern pincer arm driving for Moscow. During November to January It's entirely possible that the temperature was -40C below on some days for some formations but closer to -10C for others.
It's also to be noted that the really heavy snowfalls did not start around Moscow until 4th December, at which point the battle was already lost for the Germans. Thus the weather factor was not decisive. The earlier Raspituta season had more of an impact on the Ostheer than the winter ever did.
It's also to be noted that the really heavy snowfalls did not start around Moscow until 4th December, at which point the battle was already lost for the Germans. Thus the weather factor was not decisive. The earlier Raspituta season had more of an impact on the Ostheer than the winter ever did.
Soviet Counter offensive
Dec 4th? The counter offensive didn't begin until December 5th? I think it's safe to say the Germans were in rough shape at this point be it a combination of weather and supply issues in late Nov - early Dec time frame. However the Germans were still advancing. Even if it was like a punch drunk boxer, right up until the counter offensive.
Dec 4th? The counter offensive didn't begin until December 5th? I think it's safe to say the Germans were in rough shape at this point be it a combination of weather and supply issues in late Nov - early Dec time frame. However the Germans were still advancing. Even if it was like a punch drunk boxer, right up until the counter offensive.
Because in post 365,you said at the end : once an outfit drops below 40/ 50 % of their original strength,they are essential combat ineffective .
As the Soviets were not in Berlin,the conclusion is that notwithstanding the winter,the Ostheer did not become combat ineffective ,the Ostheer survived the winter,which is indicating that the effects of the winter were not as harsh as is assumed .
It is not relevant that the Germans were advancing,because this was not the aim of Typhoon : the aim of Typhoon(as of Barbarossa) was NOT to advance,was NOT to conquer regins/cities,the aim was to eliminate the Red Army,the rest (=the collaps of the Soviet state )would follow automatically.
Doppleganger
Active member
To all extents and purposes Typhoon was over. On the evening of 4th December, Centre's formations had more or less shifted to the the defensive, as they were either out of supply or overextended in dangerously exposed conditions. Many divisional/corps commanders in exposed conditions were asking their superiors for permission to withdraw to more defensible positions as there was a real danger of encirclement by Red Army units. Without permission from Kluge, Guderian withdrew XXIV Panzer Korps back from the north of Tula and other army commanders must have been thinking the same. If there was any advance after 4th December, these would have been local counterattacks and would not have had any operational effectiveness whatsoever.
Typhoon was over.
Chance for victory in Russia was over.
Chance for ultimate victory in WW2 for Germany was over.
A true turning point in history.
brinktk
Active member
The same applies to the enemy too...
The Germans were at the end of their rope. They had to pull back to bring up their combat strength on the front.
You're assuming I meant EVERY formation was at 40-50%...that's not what I was saying.
Besides, usually when formations get to that level, higher headquarters usually start consolidating these spent units and rotating them to refit or mixing units to bring numbers up.
And you've never served have you?
my choice
I don't believe the war was lost outside of the gates of Moscow. The USSR won at Moscow for whatever reason “supply issue, possible winter hardships for an unprepared Osteer, Siberian reinforcements, etc.
The Reds were soundly defeated in the following winter offensive which resulted in the taking of hundreds of thousands of more Red army prisoners. In 42 the Osteer advanced hundreds of more miles into the USSR proving their still strong offensive capabilities. Operation Blau was hampered by the back and forthing of Army group A. It is a myth to think the Soviets gave up territory so as to lead the Osteer deeper into a trap. Say purposely stretch the supply lines. All the territory gained in the USSR by Germany was fought for tooth and nail from the Polish border to Stalingrad. The defeat at Stalingrad showed that the Germans could but not necessarily would lose the war. Although admittingly events were turning against them
The German Southern front collapsed during the following Soviet winter offensive of 43. However before the rasputitsa Manstein defeated the Soviets and retook the Kharkov, leaving both sides to ponder the upcoming summer of 43. Fortunately the Germans fell for Zhukov's trap at Kursk from which point the Germans lost the power for taking the initiative again on the eastern front and lost the war. They did have other options at this point and many on OKW felt they should go on the defensive that summer and wait for the Soviet offensive. Hitler grudgingly opted for the Kurst offensive. Also what else can you call for lack of a better word but trap (or they willingly let themselves fall into the Citadel). 9 concentric ring of land mines and anti tank defenses that took > 3 months to construct using 100’s of thousands of workers.
After Kursk virtual nonstop artillery and tank assaults closely followed by infantry tore the outnumbered German army to sheds. After Kursk the Soviets learned to attack on a narrow front and did a good job of not letting the Germans know where to expect the next offensive. This continued from (Orel and Belgorod) to Berlin. However not without some hiccups.
One must remember the forum ask the question “which was the most decisive battle”. Call me simple however studied I may be. This is poll for opinions. I to have read many books, etc. Note: Stalingrad received the most votes, followed by Kursk which is where I believe the war was lost. I also believe lend – lease was a contributor to the Soviet victory.
My 2 cents, I do find others opinions of interest.
I don't believe the war was lost outside of the gates of Moscow. The USSR won at Moscow for whatever reason “supply issue, possible winter hardships for an unprepared Osteer, Siberian reinforcements, etc.
The Reds were soundly defeated in the following winter offensive which resulted in the taking of hundreds of thousands of more Red army prisoners. In 42 the Osteer advanced hundreds of more miles into the USSR proving their still strong offensive capabilities. Operation Blau was hampered by the back and forthing of Army group A. It is a myth to think the Soviets gave up territory so as to lead the Osteer deeper into a trap. Say purposely stretch the supply lines. All the territory gained in the USSR by Germany was fought for tooth and nail from the Polish border to Stalingrad. The defeat at Stalingrad showed that the Germans could but not necessarily would lose the war. Although admittingly events were turning against them
The German Southern front collapsed during the following Soviet winter offensive of 43. However before the rasputitsa Manstein defeated the Soviets and retook the Kharkov, leaving both sides to ponder the upcoming summer of 43. Fortunately the Germans fell for Zhukov's trap at Kursk from which point the Germans lost the power for taking the initiative again on the eastern front and lost the war. They did have other options at this point and many on OKW felt they should go on the defensive that summer and wait for the Soviet offensive. Hitler grudgingly opted for the Kurst offensive. Also what else can you call for lack of a better word but trap (or they willingly let themselves fall into the Citadel). 9 concentric ring of land mines and anti tank defenses that took > 3 months to construct using 100’s of thousands of workers.
After Kursk virtual nonstop artillery and tank assaults closely followed by infantry tore the outnumbered German army to sheds. After Kursk the Soviets learned to attack on a narrow front and did a good job of not letting the Germans know where to expect the next offensive. This continued from (Orel and Belgorod) to Berlin. However not without some hiccups.
One must remember the forum ask the question “which was the most decisive battle”. Call me simple however studied I may be. This is poll for opinions. I to have read many books, etc. Note: Stalingrad received the most votes, followed by Kursk which is where I believe the war was lost. I also believe lend – lease was a contributor to the Soviet victory.
My 2 cents, I do find others opinions of interest.
The war against the SU was lost in the summer,Typhoon had no chance to succeed,and even in Moscow was captured,the result still would be the Red Flag hanging at the Reichstag .
And,Hitler knew it : in july 1941,he was panicking.
On 25 july 1941 von Bock wrote the following in his diary after a meeting with Keitel :
"The hope of the Führer that Japan will intervene does not seem to perform.Whatever,one can not expect a quick Japanese attack .But for Germany a quick collaps of the SU is necessary,because one can not conquer the SU.And the Führer is anxious and asks :how many time do I have to eliminate the SU,and how many time do I need ."
Questions :
1) Why was Hitler hoping on 25 july on a Japanese intervention ?
2) Why was he anxious ?
Answers :
1)Because on 25 july 1941 his only hope was Japan ;he must have been very desperate.
2)Because on 25 july he knew that he had failed .
And,Hitler knew it : in july 1941,he was panicking.
On 25 july 1941 von Bock wrote the following in his diary after a meeting with Keitel :
"The hope of the Führer that Japan will intervene does not seem to perform.Whatever,one can not expect a quick Japanese attack .But for Germany a quick collaps of the SU is necessary,because one can not conquer the SU.And the Führer is anxious and asks :how many time do I have to eliminate the SU,and how many time do I need ."
Questions :
1) Why was Hitler hoping on 25 july on a Japanese intervention ?
2) Why was he anxious ?
Answers :
1)Because on 25 july 1941 his only hope was Japan ;he must have been very desperate.
2)Because on 25 july he knew that he had failed .
Doppleganger
Active member
I don't buy this. We've already gone over this so I won't repeat the debate here. We both agree that the war was lost in 1941, just not on the details. Maybe that's all that matters.
This is the usual "father knows best argument" : I served,you didn't (which is wrong) ,thus : shut up .
While you can use your military experience in a discussion about today wars, your military experience is irrelevant in a discussion about fighting from 75 years ago .
2 points were discussed :
1) how harsh was the 41/42 winter ? the conclusion is that he was harsh,but not exceptional .
2) what was the influence of this winter on the fighting/on the outcome of the fighting ? the conclusion,based on simple historical facts is that the influence was marginal : the Ostheer survived the winter and the Red Army obtained only limited successes.
Reasons for the German survival are :
a) the winter was not that harsh
b) the German soldiers had winter clothing
BTW : no one said that the winter was not hurting the Germans,but,the spring,summer and autumn also were hurting the Germans .
brinktk
Active member
There's just some things that can't be explained. Being a soldier who has served in an operational environment puts things in context regardless of the time frame. If there is one thing I've learned, it's that things are never what they seem and nothing is black and white. A soldier lives in fear and misery when in combat...that is something that transcends time.
I asked because your responses are very rigid, uncompromising, and black and white, dismissing anyone and everyone who doesn't hold the same ideas you do... as if you're defending a thesis or something...