Most decisive battle in WW2?

[JOC]

Deelusional

To deprive the Russians the resource would be the logical answer.
Reducing the ability of an enemy to make war is a viable strategy but in this case I do not believe the German supply of oil was actually enough given the supply lines they had to maintain therefore an oil source closer to the front would have benefited the German army in Russia.




Anyone that thinks there was any realistic chance of a fourth German army linking up with Army Group South in Russia is just plain delusional there is no way they could have resupplied an army over that distance.

Just for shits and giggles lets look at the numbers:
For argument sake I have chosen Stuttgart as the start point not sure why but it is place to start from:

Stuttgart - Tripoli -- 1115 miles
Tripoli - Cairo -- 1080 miles
Cairo - Baghdad -- 804 miles
Baghdad - Baku -- 573 miles
Total --- 3572 Miles

Alternative Route:
Stuttgart - Baku ---2056 miles.

Reality:
Stuttgart - Moscow --- 1283 Miles.

Now if the German logistics system could not maintain 3 Army Groups sufficiently to travel the 1283 miles to Moscow how do you think it would have maintained 3 Army Groups in Russia traveling 2000 miles to the Urals and one touring the Middle East for a further 3572 miles?

The reality is that Rommel was never going to go any further than Cairo and even that turned out to be too far.

The logistics are hypothetical because it didn’t happen. How did England maintain an empire where the sun never sets. My point is this was their ideal long term goal not that it would happen. Read below.

The Germans had logistics problems as did the Soviets on the way back and the Allies until they took Antwerp. That is often the nature of campaigns that travel very long distances. Had things been a bit different the thought is the Soviets would have surrendered before the Germans would actually have had to reach the Urals.

Rommel lines were stretched. However he lost in Africa by a very narrow margin. Had he been victorious he could have linked up with pro Germans Arabs in Palestine and Iraq. Turkey which stayed neutral would have likely joined in or at the least allowed movement of men and supplies at this point with a German victory pending.

 

[lljadw]

The distance Cologne -Alexandria was 4000 km :it was impossible for the Axis to transport and supply the forces needed to go to the Canal :
Cologne-Naples (via Switserland) : 1600 km,via Austria,the distance was longer .

Naples-Tripoli :900 km

Tripoli-Tobruk : 1250 km

Aboit the oil : here are the figures(1:German crude production,2 : synthetic production, 3 import)


1939 : O.9 million ton, 2.2 million ton, 5.2 million ton

1940:1.5, 3.3, 2.1

1941:1.6, 4.1 , 2.8

1942:1.7,4.9, 2.3


1943: 1.9, 5.7, 2.8

1944:1.7,3.9, 1.0


Conclusions:

1)There is no corelation between the oil production/import and the German successes/defeats :1940 total :6.9 million ton, 1943:10.4 million ton

2)During the war years,the synthetic production always was bigger than the imports

3) Germany did not need the ME oil,nor could it transport this oil back home,it also could not capture the ME oil fields.The ME oil also was irrelevant for the SU and for Britain,who used the oil from Central America : there was nothing in the ME that was indespensable for anyone .

4) Germany never could exploit/transport the oil of the Caucasus ,it only could try to deprive the SU of this oil,and,than,it is very questionable if this could have a decisive influence .

 

[lljadw]

[/FONT][/COLOR]

Rommel had no chance at all in NA : the only thing the Axis could do was to delay the inevitable loss of NA and meanwhile to tie as much allied forces .

It was impossible for Rommel to go to Baghdad .

 

[JOC]

The distance Cologne -Alexandria was 4000 km :it was impossible for the Axis to transport and supply the forces needed to go to the Canal :
Cologne-Naples (via Switserland) : 1600 km,via Austria,the distance was longer .

Naples-Tripoli :900 km

Tripoli-Tobruk : 1250 km

Aboit the oil : here are the figures(1:German crude production,2 : synthetic production, 3 import)


1939 : O.9 million ton, 2.2 million ton, 5.2 million ton

1940:1.5, 3.3, 2.1

1941:1.6, 4.1 , 2.8

1942:1.7,4.9, 2.3


1943: 1.9, 5.7, 2.8

1944:1.7,3.9, 1.0


Conclusions:

1)There is no corelation between the oil production/import and the German successes/defeats :1940 total :6.9 million ton, 1943:10.4 million ton

2)During the war years,the synthetic production always was bigger than the imports

3) Germany did not need the ME oil,nor could it transport this oil back home,it also could not capture the ME oil fields.The ME oil also was irrelevant for the SU and for Britain,who used the oil from Central America : there was nothing in the ME that was indespensable for anyone .

4) Germany never could exploit/transport the oil of the Caucasus ,it only could try to deprive the SU of this oil,and,than,it is very questionable if this could have a decisive influence .

No Germany desired the Soviet oil for itself. The synthetic oil was very expensive to produce and was done as a last resort as other supplies ran low. No body said the ME oil was indispensable.

 

[lljadw]

It is irrelevant that synthetic oil was very expensive,it is relevant that the Germans could produce synthetic oil .

 

[lljadw]

The logistics are hypothetical because it didn’t happen. How did England maintain an empire where the sun never sets. My point is this was their ideal long term goal not that it would happen. Read below.

The Germans had logistics problems as did the Soviets on the way back and the Allies until they took Antwerp. That is often the nature of campaigns that travel very long distances. Had things been a bit different the thought is the Soviets would have surrendered before the Germans would actually have had to reach the Urals.

Rommel lines were stretched. However he lost in Africa by a very narrow margin. Had he been victorious he could have linked up with pro Germans Arabs in Palestine and Iraq. Turkey which stayed neutral would have likely joined in or at the least allowed movement of men and supplies at this point with a German victory pending.

1)It did happen : supplies were going from Stuttgart /the Ruhr to Tobruk,and it took almost 2 months to transport them .

2)"had things" = IF,would ,could,should,: these things must not be used as an arguments : only facts please .

3)"Turkey would have likely joined" : idem,besides how do you know this ? And,have you explored the possibilities for the Germans to move men and supplies through Turkey ?I have seen this being investigated (on the Axis History Forum),and the conclusions were very negative .

 

[JOC]

Opinon

Lets get something straight. The tread is opinion that is why there are so many answers. I have often disagreed with your so called facts. At times they sound ridiculous, perhaps my posting have come across in a similar fashion to you? This matters not. However do not tell me how to post!

I see the menace the Nazi's presented and the fact that they actually stood a chance of winning. This is why the US shifted the bulk of the American resources into the war against Germany 1st, even though Japan attacked them and the American public was thirsty for vengeance against Japan. However Washington recognized the greater treat lie in Europe with Germany. I believe we can all be thankful to both the Allies and Soviets. It is clear from your viewpoint that you don't share this opinion.

I prefer not to go another round on this. I believe each others viewpoint has been repeated thru the treads so often we could start a book.

 

[MontyB]

Lets get something straight. The tread is opinion that is why there are so many answers. I have often disagreed with your so called facts. At times they sound ridiculous, perhaps my posting have come across in a similar fashion to you? This matters not. However do not tell me how to post!

I see the menace the Nazi's presented and the fact that they actually stood a chance of winning. This is why the US shifted the bulk of the American resources into the war against Germany 1st, even though Japan attacked them and the American public was thirsty for vengeance against Japan. However Washington recognized the greater treat lie in Europe with Germany. I believe we can all be thankful to both the Allies and Soviets. It is clear from your viewpoint that you don't share this opinion.

I prefer not to go another round on this. I believe each others viewpoint has been repeated thru the treads so often we could start a book.

Of course these replies are opinion but in order to take opinion seriously it must be a viable opinion, I have read arguments that Germany used the first atomic bomb, had a submarine base in the Antarctic and was building a moon base but:
- Given that Werner Heisenberg got his calculations entirely wrong and was completely shocked by the Allied atomic bombs it is safe to assume Germany wasnt an atomic power.

- The only German interest in the Antarctic was a whaling station in what they called New Swabia and no sign of any sort of base has been found in the 70 years since WW2 it is safe to assume that never happened either.

- I wont go into the moon base idea at all.

Now my guess is that Hitler probably said all these things were on the agenda but I also suspect that they were flights of fancy and they all knew it just as the the Middle East/Russia link up was.

 

[lljadw]

JOC is starting from the correct POV : Germany first ,but ,he is drawing the wrong conclusions .

1) Washington decided on Germany first,already BEFORE PH,not because Germany would "win" ,but,because,without the intervention of the US,Britain would give up,and Germany would dominate Europe .

2)JOC is also falling in the IF trap : one can not prove one' s rightness by if's,otherwise, I could argue that IF Britain had the A Bomb in 1940,the war would be over .

3) The facts are that Germany would lose against combinations of Britain + US, Britain + SU,US + SU (although such combination would be unlikely),even against the SU on its own .Would Germany lose in a duel with the US? Probably,although the problem for the US would be to attack Germany without a European base .
That's why Britain was indespensable : it was an unsinkable carrier .

Last point:stubbornly repeating old myths as the winter of 41/42,the Siberian divisions,the winter clothing is not helping one's cause .

 

[JOC]

answers

JOC is starting from the correct POV : Germany first ,but ,he is drawing the wrong conclusions .

1) Washington decided on Germany first,already BEFORE PH,not because Germany would "win" ,but,because,without the intervention of the US,Britain would give up,and Germany would dominate Europe .

2)JOC is also falling in the IF trap : one can not prove one' s rightness by if's,otherwise, I could argue that IF Britain had the A Bomb in 1940,the war would be over .

3) The facts are that Germany would lose against combinations of Britain + US, Britain + SU,US + SU (although such combination would be unlikely),even against the SU on its own .Would Germany lose in a duel with the US? Probably,although the problem for the US would be to attack Germany without a European base .
That's why Britain was indespensable : it was an unsinkable carrier .

Last point:stubbornly repeating old myths as the winter of 41/42,the Siberian divisions,the winter clothing is not helping one's cause .

I admit the Mideast _USSR hookup was very unlikely. However some Nazis actually considered this as a long term possibility. We must remember that in the Nazi party some were delusional.

I agree with you on Britain. I think we do differ as to the magnitude of the Nazi treat. I do believe the USSR could have lost and was not completely out of the woods until after Kursk. However you could see it coming after Stalingrad. I view this Soviet victory as showing that the USSR could beat Germany and likely would. However Kursk removed all dought.

I have read much and watched the documentaries about the Osteer outside Moscow in winter of 41 with 1000’s of men freezing to death and vehicles the couldn’t run for lack of cold weather lubricates as the temperature dropped to -40 F. Stalin keep the Siberian divisions in the far east so as to counter a Japanese treat. When informed by spy networks “Sorge being among them” that Japan didn’t desired war with USSR “but with the US” Stalin moved the Siberian divisions west to defend Moscow. They were fresh and well prepared for the Russian winter. They were combined with the overwhelmed forces already in Moscow to give the Germans a powerful counter attack. Hitler ordered a no retreat order as the offensive started to run out of steam. By this time the German army in the Moscow area was stabilized they were pushed back ~ 100 miles. Lead by von Bock and von Leeb who were relieved of their commands for the defeat. This is how I've come to understand the failure of Operation Typhoon.

 

[lljadw]

Several questionable things ,as :the harshness of the 41/42 winter,the impact of this winter on the war,the role of the Siberian divisions,the role of Sorge (an invention),the failure of TYphoon/

About the 41/42 winter: it was one of the coldest since 1881,but,the story of the -40 C can not be used to measure the harshness of the winter .

The following are the average temperatures at StPetersburg for the months december/january/february:

41:42 :-13.8
1892-93 : -13.3
1939/40: -11
1955/56:-11.9
1978/79:-10.4
196/66 and 67/68 : -10


The Bulletin of the American Meteorological society (P 623) is giving slightly different figures for St Petersburg :39/40:-11.7, 41/42:-14.6.
Given that the figures of the 19th century are not very reliable,one should say that 41/42 was one of the coldest,but the margin is small ,besides,the average temperature of december 41 was -11.8,of 15 -12.2,of december 55:-12.9,of december 78:-13.1.

About the -40C: I know the story,but the fact that during ONE night at an airfield at Army Group Center temperatures were down to -40,proves nothing .
Some years ago,we had in Belgium a very cold start of december,with temperatures of minus 10,and the result was a very warm winter .
Besides,the fact that someone was able to get out in such a cold to measure the temperature of -40 proves that the impact of such cold temperatures is much exaggerated .


Later more .

 

[JOC]

Interesting

Several questionable things ,as :the harshness of the 41/42 winter,the impact of this winter on the war,the role of the Siberian divisions,the role of Sorge (an invention),the failure of TYphoon/

About the 41/42 winter: it was one of the coldest since 1881,but,the story of the -40 C can not be used to measure the harshness of the winter .

The following are the average temperatures at StPetersburg for the months december/january/february:

41:42 :-13.8
1892-93 : -13.3
1939/40: -11
1955/56:-11.9
1978/79:-10.4
196/66 and 67/68 : -10


The Bulletin of the American Meteorological society (P 623) is giving slightly different figures for St Petersburg :39/40:-11.7, 41/42:-14.6.
Given that the figures of the 19th century are not very reliable,one should say that 41/42 was one of the coldest,but the margin is small ,besides,the average temperature of december 41 was -11.8,of 15 -12.2,of december 55:-12.9,of december 78:-13.1.

About the -40C: I know the story,but the fact that during ONE night at an airfield at Army Group Center temperatures were down to -40,proves nothing .
Some years ago,we had in Belgium a very cold start of december,with temperatures of minus 10,and the result was a very warm winter .
Besides,the fact that someone was able to get out in such a cold to measure the temperature of -40 proves that the impact of such cold temperatures is much exaggerated .


Later more .

So the overall temperature of the winter of 41-42 was only say 2 or 3 degrees colder, with perhaps a 1 day extreme of -40 degrees. That is interesting although I've never heard it described that way before. However it is believable since the average winter temperature of Moscow is nowhere near -40 degrees. What about the photos of the Ostheer all frozen and trying to warm their equipment with fires, even -13 degrees could be fatal without the proper attire?
I'm just repeating what I've read and seen on the documentaries.The pictures clearly show the soldiers of the Ostheer without heavy winter clothing, at least for the early part of the winter Late Nov - Dec, which is when the Soviet counter offensive took place "Dec 5th and 6th".

 

[lljadw]

About the impact of this winter :

1) there is no proof that general winter was hindering the Germans,it is the opposite : there was a lot of snow,which was hindering the advancing Soviets,while the Germans were retreating .

2) a lot of people are equalizing a harsh winter with a lot of additional non-combat losses = freezing cases.But,the number of additional non combat losses,which were NOT all freezings was very limited:in the autumn (september,october,november),the non combat losses were some 196000,while in the winter(december,january,february,march) they were some 366000 ,on a total of 4 million men = 9 %.And,most of them were freezings of the first degree,the number of amputations and deceases was less than 40000 = less than 1 % of the total of the Ostheer .

What was happening? If the Ostheer had to receive its winter clothing before the winter,the trains with winter clothing had to leave Germany at last in the second half of october .Due to Typhoon and other causes,they were to late,with as result that the Ostheer received its winter clothing to late,in january .But,because december was not that cold ,the late deliveries of winter clothing had not the catastrophic results a lot of people are claiming .Most of the freezings occured after december,when it was cold .Besides,even if every one had received winter clothing before the start of the winter,there still should be freezings .

Other point : -20 C was (and is) not uncommon in Germany and most soldiers had already winter clothing from home and knew how to protect against the cold .

The fact is that more than 90 % of the Germans were not hurt by the winter,which means that almost every one had winter clothing and that the impact of the winter was only marginal .

 

[JOC]

very interesting

About the impact of this winter :

1) there is no proof that general winter was hindering the Germans,it is the opposite : there was a lot of snow,which was hindering the advancing Soviets,while the Germans were retreating .

2) a lot of people are equalizing a harsh winter with a lot of additional non-combat losses = freezing cases.But,the number of additional non combat losses,which were NOT all freezings was very limited:in the autumn (september,october,november),the non combat losses were some 196000,while in the winter(december,january,february,march) they were some 366000 ,on a total of 4 million men = 9 %.And,most of them were freezings of the first degree,the number of amputations and deceases was less than 40000 = less than 1 % of the total of the Ostheer .

What was happening? If the Ostheer had to receive its winter clothing before the winter,the trains with winter clothing had to leave Germany at last in the second half of october .Due to Typhoon and other causes,they were to late,with as result that the Ostheer received its winter clothing to late,in january .But,because december was not that cold ,the late deliveries of winter clothing had not the catastrophic results a lot of people are claiming .Most of the freezings occured after december,when it was cold .Besides,even if every one had received winter clothing before the start of the winter,there still should be freezings .

Other point : -20 C was (and is) not uncommon in Germany and most soldiers had already winter clothing from home and knew how to protect against the cold .

The fact is that more than 90 % of the Germans were not hurt by the winter,which means that almost every one had winter clothing and that the impact of the winter was only marginal .

I find this very interesting. Perhaps the Nazi propaganda played up this winter thing to deflect the defeat? I must admit I have many books that claim the winter saved Moscow. This would be interesting if a Nazi myth has persisted to this day.

 

[lljadw]

It is obvious that the German propaganda was blaming the winter for the failure of Barbarossa ,they were following the exemple of Napoleon .

2 other points (source is German casualties in operation Barbarosa on the AHF)

1)The following figures are (first) the combat losses and second the non combat losses of the Ostheer in 1941


July : CL : 165000 / NCL:17000

August:190000 /34000

September:132000/57000

October:114000/66000

November :84000/73000

December:77000/91000

January:87000/128000

February:88000/85000

March :105000/63000


Comments : the months with the biggest losses were :august (224000) and january:215000

:there was not that much fighting in the winter:the CL of january and february were on the level of november


:the decisive month was august,when the Ostheer lost 190000 KIA/WIA and MIA


2)93% of the NCL were again fit for action after ONE month,which means that the importance of the freezing cases were marginal .


Only 56 % of the CL became again fit,and only after THREE months .

Simplified : of 10 WIA,only 6 returned to the front,after 3 months,while of 10 sick,after 1 month 9 returned to the front .

 

[Doppleganger]

I find this very interesting. Perhaps the Nazi propaganda played up this winter thing to deflect the defeat? I must admit I have many books that claim the winter saved Moscow. This would be interesting if a Nazi myth has persisted to this day.

It's not just a Nazi myth, it's been the assumption of lazy western historians, some of whom have been swayed by the romantic notion of the German professional soldier, fighting against the numberless Russian hordes. Thus it's a myth that's become fact over time. The memoirs of prominent Nazi generals such as Guderian and Manstein have also been a major propagator of these same myths.

Don't get me wrong. Conditions on the Ostfront once the Raspituta and then the ice/snow set in were often very difficult. Both armies were affected by it. The Raspituta probably had more impact on the Germans than the later wintry conditions did but neither weather condition had any decisive impact on the result of Typhoon. The Germans lost because their losses became unsustainable, they were running out of ammunition and especially fuel and as a result they were unable to knock out the Soviet Union quickly enough.

Stalin also saved Moscow. The city was in a state of virtual panic on October 16th and Stalin decided to stay and pull things together. Had he fled to the east then it's possible the Germans could have taken Moscow without a fight. Whether they still would have won the war is debatable but capturing Moscow, and most importantly, forcing an internal collapse of the government and state apparatus, was Germany's only key to victory.

http://ww2history.com/key_moments/Eastern/Panic_in_Moscow

http://books.google.se/books?id=ubW...EwBA#v=onepage&q=october moscow panic&f=false

http://books.google.se/books?id=l9w...EwBQ#v=onepage&q=october moscow panic&f=false

 

[JOC]

response

I just read "When Titans Clash" by David Glantz. A Slavic historian who presents the war from the Soviet viewpoint. He states as follows: “In December the snow and cold finally arrived with a vengeance. Both vehicle and aircraft engines had to be heated for hours before attempting to start them. By contrast the Red Air Force had heated hangers at permanent airfields. The Wehrmacht could do no more…” He does talk about the fact that the Germans had poor supply lines that did as much to defeat the Germans as did the Red Army. Now I could understand the Nazi’s using the cold thing as propaganda to excuse the defeat, however why would modern day historians do this?

Both armies were affected and I find the temperature data supplied by lljadw to be thought provoking, I have heard this -40 degree statement many times and can look at several references that state this figure without saying it was a single day low . The Soviets however were better prepared for the winter in other ways as well. T34 tanks could handle the weather better than the German armor, they had troops on ski’s.

One could add that while the Moscow defeat was going on Hitler was foolish enough to declare war on the US. I can understand the thought that winning a war against both these superpowers simultaneously was unlikely if not impossible.

As for Stalin, yes he presented a galvanizing influence by staying in Moscow. With his call "Death to the Nazi Invader" along with his centuries old call to defend the motherland. It should be noted that Moscow did have shelter in the newly completed underground railway stations. Note: He left himself an out in case the city fell.

BTW Monty but up a tread that might prove of interest? It explains that the Ride to Berlin was indeed a bumpy one: The Soviet-German War, 1941-1945: Myths and Realities info

I'll check out the URL's time permitting

 

[lljadw]

The following is from the AHF (early and harsh winter in 1941?)

Daytime temperatures on the Kalinin front (NW of Moscow)


November 1941

13:-18 C

14:-13 C

15:-7

16: -7

17: -6

18: -9

19:-7

20: -7

21:- 6

22 :-6

23: - 5

24:-5

25: -8

26: -10

27:--13

28:-8

29: - 3

30: -2

Thus,we have 4 days of exceptional cold that month, OTOH,I have read that at Moscow,in that month,the snow did not remain but was melting down .

On the average, november 1941 was cold,at Leningrad,the average temperature was -3.5,in 1940:+ 1.8,but, in 1921: -4.9

At Leningrad,between 1881/1940 (thus 60 years),there were 23 november months with a negative average temperature ,thus,as such,november 1941 was not that exceptional .


The temperatures for december will follow,but I can already say that the lowest was -29.

 

[JOC]

-40?

The following is from the AHF (early and harsh winter in 1941?)

Daytime temperatures on the Kalinin front (NW of Moscow)


November 1941

13:-18 C

14:-13 C

15:-7

16: -7

17: -6

18: -9

19:-7

20: -7

21:- 6

22 :-6

23: - 5

24:-5

25: -8

26: -10

27:--13

28:-8

29: - 3

30: -2

Thus,we have 4 days of exceptional cold that month, OTOH,I have read that at Moscow,in that month,the snow did not remain but was melting down .

On the average, november 1941 was cold,at Leningrad,the average temperature was -3.5,in 1940:+ 1.8,but, in 1921: -4.9

At Leningrad,between 1881/1940 (thus 60 years),there were 23 november months with a negative average temperature ,thus,as such,november 1941 was not that exceptional .


The temperatures for december will follow,but I can already say that the lowest was -29.

lljadw why then do the puplication state -40 degrees. I am not looking for a long drawwout depate it's just as with my prevoius posting my source's talk about the Ostreers winter issue in 41 during the counter attack.

 

[MontyB]

lljadw why then do the puplication state -40 degrees. I am not looking for a long drawwout depate it's just as with my prevoius posting my source's talk about the Ostreers winter issue in 41 during the counter attack.

My guess is they say -40 degrees because that fits the narrative as to why the Germans faltered and 70 years later it is repeated as fact without ever being verified.

As Goebbels said...If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.