@Sam
Here is something to think about.
Operational problems are usually the least interesting part of war. The saying is that amateurs talk about tactics but professionals talk about logistics. Battles, especially naval battles or air attacks, may be over in minutes, while many hours, days, weeks, or months may have passed in preparation. An interest in military history can begin at the opposite ends of tactics and strategy, but then as one moves towards the interface of the two, more and more operational details begin to get filled in. The level of detail in life can be almost infinite. Someone reads a map wrong and gets lost, a signal is misunderstood, etc., and the military advantage changes. Once an actual war starts many of the characteristics that make for success in peace quickly become either irrelevant or disastrous liabilities
To the historic dismay of many generals and admirals, it is not always one's strategy that brings on a battle. One or more side merely blunders into it, just because they happen to be in certain places at certain times. Of course, they are often in those places because they intend to be there for some strategic purpose. Or they may be there because they think they are someplace else, for some strategic purpose, but then happen to be there by accident or because they got lost. Such occasions of absurd mischance have often led to the most weighty and historic consequences. Strategy, therefore, is merely intention. All the strategic insight in the world will accomplish nothing without the operation to put it into effect. The operation, however, then takes on a life of its own. The ability to do all that one intends to do in a military operation is rarely possible, even for the most competent, disciplined, and well supplied armies and navies.