perseus said:This is my suggested list for the British mistakes during WW2. Perhaps it is because they were in the longest and had a lot of influence they made the most mistakes and well as many victories
Surely this point applies to a number of countries. Particularly German against the Russian, or just about any slavic country.perseus said:Institutional
Overconfidence and feeling of national superiority (especially relative to Japan)
The Ten Year Rule was a British government order, under Winston Churchill as Secretary of State for War, of August 1919 to the armed forces that they should draft their estimates 'on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years'.perseus said:Political & economic
Trusting Germany not to expand the Reich
Chronic under-funding of military between the wars (perpetuation of the 10 year rule)*
The above point contains part if not all of the answer to this point.perseus said:Failure to adapt to modern manufacturing methods and retain key engineering capabilities
Britain implemented the convoy system at the start of WW2. I dont think Britain could have afforded to have enough escorts at the start of WW2. Would the British have performed any worse than say America if the roles had been reversed. One of main problems in defence of convoys was air cover, this was only resolved later in the war with escort carriers and long range aircraft. The filure to develop long range aircraft early in the war was not only a British issue.perseus said:Navy
Failure to prepare for defence of convoys
Later in the war the use of submarine hunting groups was found to be highly effective.perseus said:Initial tendency to seek and destroy U boats rather than waiting in convoy
I assume you are referring to Prince of Wales and Repulse? If so the battle group would have had carrier support from HMS Indomitable, unfortunately it ran aground. Should the ships have been sent to Singapore without a carrier? Difficult question - failure to send ships would have been badly received by Australia.perseus said:Employing commanders of battle groups without understanding of air warfare*
I understand the reasoning behind the attack, whilst sad it was I believe necessary. The Germans attempted to caputre the French fleet in 1942. I think the link below gives an interesting precise of the eventsperseus said:Alienating French navy by trying to destroy them at Mers-El-Kebir*
Ollie Garchy said:the German "navy" never really existed in the first place.
Reiben said:I understand the reasoning behind the attack, whilst sad it was I believe necessary. The Germans attempted to caputre the French fleet in 1942. I think the link below gives an interesting precise of the events.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mers_El-Kebir
perseus said:The failure to develop long range aircraft early in the war was not only a British issue.
I don’t agree with this statement, many of the Japanese naval aircraft of the period had an impressive range. Take some of the aircraft which attacked force Z, the ‘Betty’ for example (I am not sure which version was used but take you pick, G4M1 3,130 miles, G4M2 2,980 miles, G4M3 2,262 miles) The German FW Condor also had an impressive range (2,210 miles / 2,760 miles) . Surely aircraft with substantial range was an obvious requirement for a maritime nation?
perseus said:Employing commanders of battle groups without an understanding of air warfare I assume you are referring to Prince of Wales and Repulse? Yes, but there was a big gun mentality in the Royal navy, hence the obsession with attempting to sink the Bismarck by shelling. Another example of inappropriate use of air power (which did nothing to dispel this myth) was the aircraft carrier Glorious when returning from the Norwegian campaign. She had posted no lookout and no aircraft at instant readiness and was subsequently sank by the Scharnhorst. Are not carriers supposed to surprise battleships, not the other way round?
Ollie Garchy said:As far as the German Navy was concerned, the existence of a few ships does not constitute a navy. The German "fleet" was nothing in comparison to the other navies of the day. Raeder was in no way capable of emulating Tirpitz' "risk theory". How was the German fleet a threat? Only isolated raiders sailed the high seas...and, incidentally, were blown to pieces.
Ollie Garchy said:Nor was the German u-boat arm spectacularly large. It was much smaller than that of Britain and France. German production after 1939 turned the u-boat arm into a "menace". The u-boats were nevertheless backward and outdated...more submersible coffin than modern weapons system. The decision to employ bombers against German kids and not against the u-boats permitted the German pieces of junk some measure of success. Hence Perseus' comment.
Ollie Garchy said:It is not enough to make the argument that the very existence of a small German navy represented a "threat" to British interests and therefore a factor in the declaration of war. This is imperialist logic. If you use this logic, then virtually every aspect of modern states (from population to steel production) follows a similar pattern.
The British government under Specifications P/13/36 and B/12/36 for four- and two-engined bombers developed a series of long range bombers noteably in terms of range the Wellington (range 2,200miles) and Stirling (range 2,330miles). There was also the Short Sunderland (range 3,000miles).
The German commander was removed from command for disobeying orders and endangering his ships by attacking an old carrier.
I am interested in the assessment of British history of combined ops. Dieppe on its own isnt proof. Some more example please to support your case.
perseus said:The Sunderland certainly had an impressive range in theory, so I stand corrected on this one. However, coastal command constantly stressed the need for long-range aircraft, so this did not seem to meet their full needs, despite being a specialised maritime aircraft.
The Wellington's theoretical range of 2,200 miles was achieved at a sacrifice in bomb load (only 1,500 lb). The Wellingtons in fact had an effective outward range of only 400 miles with 2 hours on station resulting in a large air gap in the Atlantic. As a consequence a squadron of consolidated B-24 liberators were used in 1941 which could provide protection to convoys for up to 750 miles. The Very Long-Range (VLR) Liberator closed the vital Atlantic Gap and was the only aircraft with the range to do so.
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Consolidated+B-24+Liberator
However, there were too few of these made available and the ability to carry a decent load over the mid Atlantic and remain on station for a useful time remained a problem until the later stages of the war.
The need for a decent maritime fighter (or fighter of any type) with suitable range was a constant handicap for the British, so they were totally outclassed by the Zero. Japan also had more modern carrier capacity and could also rely on island hopping in the West Pacific, so it was less critical for them anyway.
perseus said:Norway was a botched combined operation, but I was also thinking of the pre WW2 historic pretexts, such as Gallipoli. Now I wonder who was behind this one?
We agree then that there were too few, not that there were none.
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