Ted said:
Your statements, however logical they may sound, are just as circumstantial as mine. We will never know for sure will we? May point is that the outbreak of the war served as a gigantic catalyst. Never had an economy been so stretched to it's utter limit. Everybody and I do mean everybody was making the effort everywhere. I dare say (but can't prove it) the the involved MIC's everywhere greatly speeded up their developmental projects due to the war.
And just a slight note: the use of "only" in your statement is the end of that statement at the same time. Nobody claims this was the case and I reckon the almost 100% of the forum members are aware that the American and English MIC was operational before 1939. So I see no need to grow tired over that idea, dismissing it would be so much easier.
Sorry, but I have no idea what you are talking about.
My three points are basic "facts" and not circumstantial evidence. They are not even hypotheses. The military structures of all countries (then and now) are subject to quantitative and quantitative analysis. The Americans built B-17s for strategic bombing (See Weigley, The American Way of War). The Soviets built literally thousands and thousands of tanks. (The Germans counted the KIAs in 1941). As far as the French, the same thing. None of this development had anything to do with the specific outbreak of war in 1939. All of these programs preceded the war by decades. If you think about the historiography, the notion of Allied "strategic virginity" stands out for everyone to see. It is as plain as day. (I am not sure of the forum members...I do not share your mind-reading skills).
Think of the following:
(1) There are few historians who concentrate on the American mobilization plans at the end of the 1930s and suggest that the strength of dual-use industry cancelled out the immediate problem of insufficient armaments production. I do not know of any. Why? Because most of the works I have looked at are too busy explaining the poor American military position. These historians lament the American stance in 1939. In this case, Hitler's actions in Poland and elsewhere helped divert funds to the military. But the plans and basic designs or design concepts already existed. (This includes mobilization tables and the entire infrastructure necessary for armaments procurement).
(2) Strategic bombing was the brainchild of American-British military planners. Two men in particular, Hugh Trenchard and Billy Mitchell, pioneered the use of strategic bombing against what amounted to civilian targets and what later became known as terror bombing. (See Charles Webster and Noble Frankland). In the 1920s, British aircraft even gassed Turkish troops and civilians as part of their "air control" strategy. This policy offered the British government a cheap alternative to traditional ground and naval forces in policing the empire. (See Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) pp. 22-23). Strategic bombing has nothing to do with Hitler. Nor did Hitler inspire the saturation bombing of German cities during the war. Try to find historians who do not state that Warsaw, Rotterdam and London (ie. German actions) led directly to Allied strategic bombing development and policy. Good luck.
(3) As far as the Soviets were concerned, we know that Stalin implemented his economic plans in order to industrialize the Soviet Union and boost his dual-use capacities. Soviet armaments output in the late 1920s and early 1930s, again predating Hitler, was astronomical. The same situation existed in the late 1940s (about 20,000 tanks in both cases). In the late 1940s, the American War and later Defense Deparment used the mere existence of Soviet tanks to surmise an aggressive posture that rationalized the "Truman Doctrine", NATO and the general military preparations typical of the early Cold War. Stalin simply did not demobilize in the manner expected. Why did Stalin build the world's largest military in the 1920s/1930s. Why? World domination. The commies said it themselves.
(4) Most of the historical works that I have looked at trumpet Nazi rearmament and the idea that Hitler created the largest military machine of the period. What a farce! The table below demonstrates my point. If you add Soviet strength, or general Allied naval power, the German numbers look pathetic. Why did the Allies maintain such significant military reserves? Why do we define Hitler's preparations as belligerent when the French (and especially Soviet) forces outnumbered those of Germany?
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Battle of France 1940: Relative Strength of the Major Combatants
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Germany France Britain Allied*
Divisions 143 114 15 152
Artillery 7,500 10,700 1,280 13,974
Airplanes 3,500 3,000 1,850 4,850
Armour 2,493 3,254 640 3,894
*The number of divisions and artillery pieces includes forces from Belgium and Holland.
[Franz Halder, "Taktische und Strategische Erwägungen zum kommenden Krieg gegen Polen", p.490; Klaus A. Maier (et al.), Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europaischen Kontinent, p. 282 and Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg–Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940, p. 41.]
By the way:
(1) The military-industrial complex first develops in the United States during the 1950s. The procurement systems that predated the MIC were not the same thing. Not by any stretch of the imagination.
(2) I wrote the post in a couple of minutes. The use of "only" is exaggeration. I am not writing essays for publication. This is an anonymous internet forum. I nevertheless stand by my choice. You have to look at the literature. The general historiography (ie. books relating to WWII origins like Bell's classic) clearly points out that German rearmament precipitated an arms race and that Hitler maintained a vastly superior Wehrmacht. Most of the arguments that I have looked at stress that the Allies (including the Soviet Union) were unprepared or even slightly surprised in 1939, 1940 and 1941. What a farce.
(3) Weapons do not just materialize. Conscious political/ economic/ industrial choices are made over an incredibly long period of time.