GuyontheRight said:According to Alan Clarke, who was the leading historian on Barbarossa In the decade or two after It happened, the real importance of lean-lease came through trucks to mechanize the Infantry. The Soviet Infantry was behind the rest of the world In the first phase of the war, and this Is why you saw German encirclements so successful, because their operational maneuverability was so poor. The Mech Infantry allow the Soviets to push the advantage after Kursk, and did not allow time for Hitler to coordinate a strong defensive line, or rebuild up his forces like he did after Stalingrad. But this is not a Russia vs. Germany discussion, it's a turning point discussion.
Remember though that it wasn't just the Red Army that suffered from a lack of mechanization. The Wehrmacht too never fully achieved Guderian's ideal of fully motorized Panzergrenadier battalions that drove alongside the Panzers. As you probably know the German Army took over 600,000 horses with them into the Soviet Union in 1941. Therefore you can't just put down the Red Army's appalling losses to their lack of mechanization as other factors were far more important. It's important too to recognize that Germany's initial stunning successes in Russia were as much due to the brilliance of some of her frontline commanders and strategists (Guderian, Hoth, Manstein, Bock et al) and the revolutionary nature of Blitzkrieg and combined arms as it was due to any failings in the Red Army.
Trucks were obviously very important to the Soviet Union's war effort but it was locomotives and not trucks that brought Zhukov's 25 Siberian divisions to the rescue and played a very decisive role in winning the Battle of Moscow for the Red Army.
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