Thoughts on the Russo-Ukranian War?

[MontyB]

Are there NATO members who spend 2 % of their GDP on defense ?

10 NATO members do currently or did in 2022 according to the NATO Defence Expenditure Report...
Greece, USA, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, UK, Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Croatia.
I have been a little generous to Romania as the only spent 1.99% instead of the required 2%.

France was 1.9% and the lowest was Luxembourg at 0.58%.

 

[MontyB]

Wouldn't we see the Russian using the T-54/55 before the T-34? But, the Russians are using the T-62 and the BMP1. I have also seen destroyed MTLBs and older versions of the BTRs and the BRDMs. I wouldn't be surprised to see assault vehicles such as the SU versions of AT-vehicles.

Czechoslovakia was still making the T-34 in 1958, the BTR-50 arrived in 1952 so there are more modern T-34s out there.

 

[I3BrigPvSk]

Czechoslovakia was still making the T-34 in 1958, the BTR-50 arrived in 1952 so there are more modern T-34s out there.

So we will see them pretty soon. Russia has lost a lot of vehicles when they begin to deploy vehicles that belongs in museums. But they are using their doctrine now and pay the price for it.

 

[lljadw]

10 NATO members do currently or did in 2022 according to the NATO Defence Expenditure Report...
Greece, USA, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, UK, Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Croatia.
I have been a little generous to Romania as the only spent 1.99% instead of the required 2%.

France was 1.9% and the lowest was Luxembourg at 0.58%.

Only 2 of these belong to the 12 founding members: US and UK ,the others are located in Eastern Europe .
And the 2 % that was spent by Britain has only a small result a regular army ( = ground ) force of 90000 of which only a small part is ready for service outside the UK .

 

[MontyB]

Only 2 of these belong to the 12 founding members: US and UK ,the others are located in Eastern Europe .
And the 2 % that was spent by Britain has only a small result a regular army ( = ground ) force of 90000 of which only a small part is ready for service outside the UK .

If we were honest the West has relied heavily on US defence spending and the "peace dividend" since the end of the cold war, I am not sure this view will be around in a few years as we readjust to the new cold war but it has seen countries like Germany let their military rot.

As for the Eastern European members they know what Russia is like first hand and seem to be operating accordingly.
I am surprised that Greece is in that group though.

 

[I3BrigPvSk]

Sweden joins the countries which are providing Ukraine with Leo2s and it seems to be the 122 version of the Leo, which is an upgraded version of the A5. The first Polish Leos are now in Ukraine.

 

[MontyB]

Sweden joins the countries which are providing Ukraine with Leo2s and it seems to be the 122 version of the Leo, which is an upgraded version of the A5. The first Polish Leos are now in Ukraine.

Indeed, Ukraine will have the tank with the most airbags in the western world.
Seems they are also getting a bunch of other gear as well...

https://news.am/eng/news/746792.html

I am starting to wonder what Russia has left, their current "offensive" seems anemic at best, artillery seems to be dropping off, there seems to be bugger all armour involved and it looks very infantry heavy.
It is almost as though they have very little mechanised capacity left and why are they attacking now at the end of winter and the start of the spring rainy season, did they learn nothing from last year?

 

[Tuan]

How far is Putin going to go?

Vladimir Putin's war against Ukraine devastates the country, its people, and even the world. How far will he go? Does it matter? What matters the most is how the US-led NATO responds to Putin.


Back in 1994, in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, Grant Hammond, Deputy Director of the Center for Strategy and Technology at the United States Air Force, summarised the following in one of his reports entitled "Paradoxes of War":

War is apt to defy its traditional image in the future. Suppose the end of past wars was to win by fighting better than one's adversary (violence marked by a hardware-driven, physical contest to destroy the enemy's means). In that case, the end of future wars maybe not be lost by not fighting an adversary (peaceful competition characterized by a software-driven, moral, and cerebral contest to change perceptions). This is not simply a choice between conventional and unconventional images of war. We must reinvent warfare by redefining its nature. Armed conflict, as it has been known, is beyond the capacity of most nations today. Military victory no longer enjoys the cachet that it once bore. By understanding the paradoxes of war, we will help ensure the Armed Forces' future success.

After almost 30 years since Hammond's reporting, even today, it still reiterates how we should fight future wars.

Hammond opened his argument by stating:

Sun Tzu argued nearly 2,500 years ago that war is based upon deception and that the acme of skill is to subdue enemies without fighting them.

Hammond concluded by saying:

To deceive enemies and not ourselves may or may not always be possible, but we must try. Not doing so is an admission of incompetence or acceptance of failure. Neither is a hallmark of our Armed Forces. As the Chief of Staff of the Air Force argues, ensuring they never occur changes our attitude and emphasis on thinking and imagination. Such a strategy must be based on a prerequisite of mental mobilization and an acceptance of the ancient injunction of Sun Tzu as a new paradigm for the American military: Subdue the enemy without fighting him. It may be the only way we can afford to compete in the future.

Therein, I believe, Air-Sea Battles and Dominance must shape future wars. It is an integrated battle doctrine developed as a critical element of the United States military strategy. This thinking became official in February 2010 and was renamed Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). Whoever controls and can maneuver Global Commons (maritime, air, space, or cyber) will dominate the planet as a hyperpower. This integrated modern warfare concept must be facilitated by technological intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), which can be effective even without troops since the superior forces can operate remotely.

​Besides, the US-led NATO must pledge robust psychological warfare projects (PSYWAR), or the fundamental aspects of modern psychological operations (PsyOp), including military information support operations (MISO), political and economic warfare, information warfare, counternarrative strategy, and media framing, whereby the US-led NATO could win hearts and minds. The U.S. is still prominent in all these domains, not Russia, China, or Iran. Hence, as Hammond puts it, the US-led NATO must reinvent the war by redefining its nature.

American political scientist Joseph Nye (2008) emphasized, "in the information age, success is not merely the result of whose army wins, but also whose story wins." Hence, America and other Western nations should not exclusively supply military hardware to the region. Instead, U.S.-led nations should turn the tables politically, economically, and diplomatically – via soft power measures – and strive to strengthen Ukraine with a more significant responsibility and leadership power to deal with the Russian masses and encourage them to revolutionize against Putin.

Here's the report: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA528718

 

[I3BrigPvSk]

Indeed, Ukraine will have the tank with the most airbags in the western world.
Seems they are also getting a bunch of other gear as well...

https://news.am/eng/news/746792.html

I am starting to wonder what Russia has left, their current "offensive" seems anemic at best, artillery seems to be dropping off, there seems to be bugger all armour involved and it looks very infantry heavy.
It is almost as though they have very little mechanised capacity left and why are they attacking now at the end of winter and the start of the spring rainy season, did they learn nothing from last year?

Why should the Russian learn from the last year when they haven't learned anything from the three wars in Chechnya and the war in Georgia. I'm still thinking from time to time what would Zhukov and/or Konjev say if they saw the Russian forces performance. They are still wasting military resources on non military targets.

Maybe the West should rethink the war. NATO and other countries should maybe give Ukraine more systems so Ukraine can take and keep the initiative to end the war. However, what would the Russians (Putin) do if they begin to losing Crimea. I doubt they will use nukes, but they might use chemical weapons

 

[MontyB]

Why should the Russian learn from the last year when they haven't learned anything from the three wars in Chechnya and the war in Georgia. I'm still thinking from time to time what would Zhukov and/or Konjev say if they saw the Russian forces performance. They are still wasting military resources on non military targets.

Maybe the West should rethink the war. NATO and other countries should maybe give Ukraine more systems so Ukraine can take and keep the initiative to end the war. However, what would the Russians (Putin) do if they begin to losing Crimea. I doubt they will use nukes, but they might use chemical weapons

I think Zhukov and Konev would say didn't I see that at Tannenberg?
My personal belief is that this war is nearing the conclusion of its first phase, I would like to see Ukraine recapture the southern regions but I think Crimea is too much of an ask and I believe the Russians can logistically hold the eastern regions.

Essentially it is now at a point where Russia is so inept it can't win and Ukraine has the ability to make a Russian victory too costly but lacks the ability to win itself.
I think the important aspect for the end of this will be how fast Ukraine can get NATO into the country at the conclusion of this round of hostilities and before Russia can rebuild and resume hostilities.

 

[lljadw]

If we were honest the West has relied heavily on US defence spending and the "peace dividend" since the end of the cold war, I am not sure this view will be around in a few years as we readjust to the new cold war but it has seen countries like Germany let their military rot.

As for the Eastern European members they know what Russia is like first hand and seem to be operating accordingly.
I am surprised that Greece is in that group though.

I am not surprised about Greece, given its relations with Turkey .
About Germany : politically it was impossible to continue spend the same amount of money,when the threat that was used as reason for spending this money, had disappeared .
Threat,that in my opinion,was much exaggerated ,as the Soviets did not attack when the Bundeswehr did not exist .

 

[MontyB]

Vladimir Putin's war against Ukraine devastates the country, its people, and even the world. How far will he go? Does it matter? What matters the most is how the US-led NATO responds to Putin.


Back in 1994, in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, Grant Hammond, Deputy Director of the Center for Strategy and Technology at the United States Air Force, summarised the following in one of his reports entitled "Paradoxes of War":



After almost 30 years since Hammond's reporting, even today, it still reiterates how we should fight future wars.

Hammond opened his argument by stating:



Hammond concluded by saying:



Therein, I believe, Air-Sea Battles and Dominance must shape future wars. It is an integrated battle doctrine developed as a critical element of the United States military strategy. This thinking became official in February 2010 and was renamed Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). Whoever controls and can maneuver Global Commons (maritime, air, space, or cyber) will dominate the planet as a hyperpower. This integrated modern warfare concept must be facilitated by technological intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), which can be effective even without troops since the superior forces can operate remotely.

​Besides, the US-led NATO must pledge robust psychological warfare projects (PSYWAR), or the fundamental aspects of modern psychological operations (PsyOp), including military information support operations (MISO), political and economic warfare, information warfare, counternarrative strategy, and media framing, whereby the US-led NATO could win hearts and minds. The U.S. is still prominent in all these domains, not Russia, China, or Iran. Hence, as Hammond puts it, the US-led NATO must reinvent the war by redefining its nature.

American political scientist Joseph Nye (2008) emphasized, "in the information age, success is not merely the result of whose army wins, but also whose story wins." Hence, America and other Western nations should not exclusively supply military hardware to the region. Instead, U.S.-led nations should turn the tables politically, economically, and diplomatically – via soft power measures – and strive to strengthen Ukraine with a more significant responsibility and leadership power to deal with the Russian masses and encourage them to revolutionize against Putin.

Here's the report: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA528718

I am not sure how to formulate a response to this as part of it I agree with and part I think is being proven wrong by the current conflict in Ukraine.
I think I need to read it a few more times.

I am not surprised about Greece, given its relations with Turkey .
About Germany : politically it was impossible to continue spend the same amount of money,when the threat that was used as reason for spending this money, had disappeared .
Threat,that in my opinion,was much exaggerated ,as the Soviets did not attack when the Bundeswehr did not exist .

While the threat may have been exaggerated as the Soviet results in Afghanistan would indicate I am not sure it ever truely disappeared as seen by Putin's threats and actions over the last 10 years.

It also seems like the Latvian delegation has an opinion on Russia.

Latvia being diplomatic

 

[Tuan]

I am not sure how to formulate a response to this as part of it I agree with and the part I think is being proven wrong by the current conflict in Ukraine.

I think I need to read it a few more times.

Monty, could you please elaborate more on which part has proven wrong in the current conflict and which has worked? I am interested to know your response. Thanks!

 

[MontyB]

Monty, could you please elaborate more on which part has proven wrong in the current conflict and which has worked? I am interested to know your response. Thanks!

I would like to but I am struggling to put what I want to say into words which generally means that I can't get the context right on the original text (essentially there is something in there nagging at me but I can't figure out what).

I will try and figure it out.

But off the bat I don't think this comment is standing up to scrutiny

War is apt to defy its traditional image in the future.

If anything it is reinforcing a very traditional image of a 1860-1918 war.

 

[lljadw]

I am not sure how to formulate a response to this as part of it I agree with and part I think is being proven wrong by the current conflict in Ukraine.
I think I need to read it a few more times.



While the threat may have been exaggerated as the Soviet results in Afghanistan would indicate I am not sure it ever truely disappeared as seen by Putin's threats and actions over the last 10 years.

It also seems like the Latvian delegation has an opinion on Russia.

Latvia being diplomatic

Before 1991 the Soviet army was at the border with West Germany, 30 years later it is at the border with Ukraine and to be at the border with Germany again, it has
first to defeat,occupy and pacify Ukraine, what it has failed to do
secondly to defeat,occupy and pacify Poland what it can't do .
And if it defeats, occupies and pacifies Ukraine and Poland, it will not have the strength to invade, defeat,occupy and pacify Germany .
Russian population : 140 million
Population of Ukraine, Poland and Germany : 160 million .
Kiev Russian border : 350 km
Kiev Berlin : 1350 km
Thus mission impossible.

 

[Tuan]

I would like to but I am struggling to put what I want to say into words which generally means that I can't get the context right on the original text (essentially there is something in there nagging at me but I can't figure out what).

I will try and figure it out.

But off the bat I don't think this comment is standing up to scrutiny

"War is apt to defy its traditional image in the future."

If anything it is reinforcing a very traditional image of a 1860-1918 war.

Come on Monty, we don't just cherry-pick just one sentence from the entire report and reject it outright. Please give it a full read and then tell us what your thoughts are.

 

[MontyB]

Before 1991 the Soviet army was at the border with West Germany, 30 years later it is at the border with Ukraine and to be at the border with Germany again, it has
first to defeat,occupy and pacify Ukraine, what it has failed to do
secondly to defeat,occupy and pacify Russia what it can't do .
And if it defeats, occupies and pacifies Ukraine and Poland, it will not have the strength to invade, defeat,occupy and pacify Germany .
Russian population : 140 million
Population of Ukraine, Poland and Germany : 160 million .
Kiev Russian border : 350 km
Kiev Berlin : 1350 km
Thus mission impossible.

I don't think anyone believes Russia could make it to Berlin even taking into account the current state of the German military, at this point I doubt they would make it past the Polish border and given their speed through Ukraine the Germans will have about 150 years to prepare and this doesn't take into account the Americans, Brits, French and numerous others joining in at some stage.

 

[MontyB]

Come on Monty, we don't just cherry-pick just one sentence from the entire report and reject it outright. Please give it a full read and then tell us what your thoughts are.

I have now read it half a dozen times and I am still not sure what to tell you, I have read many reports over the years and this is possibly the first one I cannot process, it is almost as though he was trying to rewrite Sun Tzu for millennials.
I think I will step back from this one as the fact that I can't process it really annoys me I will need to give it time and come back to it and I don't want to dismiss it because I can't make sense of it.

 

[Tuan]

I have now read it half a dozen times and I am still not sure what to tell you, I have read many reports over the years and this is possibly the first one I cannot process, it is almost as though he was trying to rewrite Sun Tzu for millennials.
I think I will step back from this one as the fact that I can't process it really annoys me I will need to give it time and come back to it and I don't want to dismiss it because I can't make sense of it.

If I summarize that report in one sentence, I would say, "Today's era is not an era of war." By the way, these are not my words, of course. This was a response to Putin from an influential world leader, Indian Prime Minister Modi.

India being diplomatic

I outlined in one of my articles what Modi was trying to say:

In higher academia, it is the Realist School of Thought that emphasizes hard power, especially the hard power of the state, while Liberal Institutionalist scholars emphasize soft power as an essential resource of statecraft (Wilson, 2008). Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2014) explain that Realism has been the dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of academic international relations. Realism has a long history in the works of classical political theorists, including Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau (Baylis et al., 2014). Realism argues that states find themselves in the shadows of anarchy and that their security cannot be taken for granted. Although we have seen heightened criticism of Realist assumptions since the Cold War, Realism continues to attract academicians and policy-makers at the dawn of the new millennium. Realism views the ‘international’ as an anarchic realm.

Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2014) argue that Liberalism is a theory of both governments within states and good governance between states and peoples worldwide. Unlike Realism’s anarchic realm, Liberalism seeks to project values of order, liberty, justice, and tolerance into international relations. The peak of Liberal thought in international relations was reached during the inter-war period in the works of idealists who agreed that warfare was an unnecessary and outdated way of settling disputes between nations. Liberals nonetheless disagree on fundamental issues, such as the causes of war and what kind of institutions are required to deliver Liberal values in a decentralized, multicultural international system (Baylis et al, 2014).

 

[Tuan]

By the way, I expanded my thoughts on the Russo-Ukarnian war and created a post on my blog. You can find it here:

https://projectofive.ca/2023/02/25/thoughts-on-the-russo-ukrainian-war/