Micha
Active member
I've been to a lecture on the war in Afghanistan from a Russian perspective. The speaker was a former Soviet intelligence officer who had served in Afghanistan in 1979-89.
NATO's action was obviously assessed and analyzed and then he came to this conclusion.
NATO's action was obviously assessed and analyzed and then he came to this conclusion.
"Based on my analysis, the IC should have a national perspective on the war and devise a strategy to halt the progress of the insurgency":
1) Stop focusing on the local leadership of the Taliban in Afghanistan and focus more on the central command in Quetta while pressuring Pakistan directly to take action there.
2) Focus new resources in places where the Taliban are still relatively weak:around Kabul and in the North to counter their strategy of geographical and ethnic extension of the war.
3) The current strategy of focusing the reinforcements in two provinces(Helmand and Kandahar) is risky. The lack of Afghan institutions condemnsthe IC forces to stay there indefinitely to prevent the return of the Taliban, especially since the Pakistani sanctuary enables them to conduct hit-and-run operations. In addition, the insurgency could rapidly redirect its resources to the North. Finally, more reinforcements will be needed in 2010 if this “clean and hold” strategy is to be expanded to other provinces.
4) NATO mistakenly views the insurgency as a local or regional phenomenon and has organized its forces accordingly, thereby failing to develop an integrated,coherent national response. The offensive in Helmand, with its very local focus, is the latest example of this misguided strategy.
All in all it was a very interesting evening. And you can not help but think whether we should have taken a closer look at the lessons the Russians learned in Afghanistan.