With the long-awaited Allied invasion at Nonnandy in June 1944, General Wietersheim dispatched a number of the division's officers north to observe how battle conditions differed from the Eastern Front. Their reports were analyzed and discussed in commanders' conferences, and tactical responses were improvised: Allied airpower was all-pervasive, as already demonstrated in North Africa and Italy.
What Luftwaffe remained was committed to defense of the Reich itself.
Therefore, standard vehicle road march procedures (a panzer battalion moving by day at 20 kmph and 50 meter intervals had a time length of about 30 minutes and a road space of some 8,000 meters) were now unrealistic.
Vehicles, well-camouflaged with nets and branches, with constant air lookouts, would have to "spring" from cover to cover in Einzelgruppen single groups of 3-5 vehicles. If attacked by the Jabos - Jagdbombers, or fighter-bombers, troops would pile out of the vehicles while crews would put up a barrage of fire.
Allied artillery had plentiful ammunition, and its effectiveness was enhanced by accurate observation and corrections from spotter planes aloft.
Panzer artillery fire control exercises emphasized coordination of artillery, rocket, and mortar fue on concentration points, and rapid displacement to avoid counter-battery fire.
Wire communication would be destroyed by shell fire and by bombing; radio would be the primary means of communication, recognizing transmission range limitations imposed by a topography of wooded hills.
American ground advances were, however, methodical and cautious, halting at any resistance, and as a rule ending at nightfall. The Amis lacked the grim stubbornness of the Tommys or the Ivans, preferring to call for artillery support.
Training by Major Heinz Bodicker's Pioneer (Engineer) Battalion 209 was emphasized for all units, as delaying tactics with mines and obstacles would further slow an enemy advance. Aggressive reconnaissance by all units would be important, not only for security, but also to take advantage of the occasional negligence of the more powerful enemy and launch surprise attacks.