Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Financial Times
January 30, 2008 By Stephen Fidler, Demetri Sevastopulo and Jon Boone
Nato’s military operations in southern Afghanistan have come under intensified scrutiny this month. Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, said Washington’s Nato allies in Afghanistan “don’t know how to do counter-insurgency operations”, which was inferred as criticism of British, Canadian and Dutch forces. Then last week, Hamid Karzai, Afghan president, disparaged the performance of Britain’s 7,000 troops in Helmand province.
Britain rejected Mr Karzai’s accusations and Mr Gates later said that he was not singling out Nato’s forces in the south but referring to the Nato alliance as a whole.
The questions about Nato operations in the south arise because the insurgency there is raging, while the volatile east, where US forces are in control, is far more peaceful.
In the east, US and non-US experts agree, US forces have transformed their approach to insurgency, as they have in Iraq. The changes have been informed by the on-the-ground experience of colonels and other “middle managers” in the US military, and by a new doctrine, published in 2006 and co-written by General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq.
“The UK has an enormous amount of institutional memory on how to successfully fight a counterinsurgency war, but the US has not only now surpassed that, they have got the necessary resources to do it properly,” said Mark Lonsdale, director of Operational Studies, a US consultancy specialising in military and security matters.
The difference in resources is marked. US commanders on the ground, down to the rank of captain, have discretion to spend large sums of money, which, according to one officer, turns them into powers in their localities. The US spent $391min 2005 and 2006 to finance this Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, and sought budgets of more than $200m a year in 2007 and 2008.
Britain provides money to pay for so-called quick impact projects, approved monthly, on which $18m has been spent in the 18 months since its forces moved into Helmand. The UK is the second largest donor to Afghanistan, expecting to put in more than $200m of aid this year, but 80 per cent of it goes to the Afghan government, where London argues the aid is most effective.
A lack of resources has translated into insufficient equipment on the ground in the south and a shortage of troops – soon to be bolstered by 3,200 US marines. Canada’s armed forces, for example, have no heavy helicopters. A lack of troops in the south means, in the words of one US officer, “there are barely enough troops to stabilise the area”, an essential condition for effective counter-insurgency operations.
This shortage encourages risk aversion among Nato forces, making them more likely to call in air support, thereby risking Afghan lives and undermining counterinsurgency efforts.
Higher troop density in the east changes the risk calculus. US officers say their forces operate in smaller groups, which is inherently more risky, but allows them to make more connections with Afghans. They say they also work more effectively with Afghan security forces, creating permanent presences that are crucial for providing security for the local population and for economic development.
Each US soldier is also on the ground longer, building up valuable practical experience: a typical US tour is 15 months, compared with six months or less for other Nato nations.
Yet much of the difference has nothing to do with the performance of the troops. The south – not the east – is the ideological heartland of the Taliban and pro-government Afghan politicians there are regarded as less competent and more corrupt than those in the east.
Moreover, US officers say the US has to bear responsibility for many of the problems in the south. Washington has concentrated its troops in the east since 2002, focusing on the pursuit of al-Qaeda, leaving the south with very few troops. When Nato forces moved into the region in 2006, they inherited a region where a classic insurgency had developed and the poppy economy was flourishing.
January 30, 2008 By Stephen Fidler, Demetri Sevastopulo and Jon Boone
Nato’s military operations in southern Afghanistan have come under intensified scrutiny this month. Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, said Washington’s Nato allies in Afghanistan “don’t know how to do counter-insurgency operations”, which was inferred as criticism of British, Canadian and Dutch forces. Then last week, Hamid Karzai, Afghan president, disparaged the performance of Britain’s 7,000 troops in Helmand province.
Britain rejected Mr Karzai’s accusations and Mr Gates later said that he was not singling out Nato’s forces in the south but referring to the Nato alliance as a whole.
The questions about Nato operations in the south arise because the insurgency there is raging, while the volatile east, where US forces are in control, is far more peaceful.
In the east, US and non-US experts agree, US forces have transformed their approach to insurgency, as they have in Iraq. The changes have been informed by the on-the-ground experience of colonels and other “middle managers” in the US military, and by a new doctrine, published in 2006 and co-written by General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq.
“The UK has an enormous amount of institutional memory on how to successfully fight a counterinsurgency war, but the US has not only now surpassed that, they have got the necessary resources to do it properly,” said Mark Lonsdale, director of Operational Studies, a US consultancy specialising in military and security matters.
The difference in resources is marked. US commanders on the ground, down to the rank of captain, have discretion to spend large sums of money, which, according to one officer, turns them into powers in their localities. The US spent $391min 2005 and 2006 to finance this Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, and sought budgets of more than $200m a year in 2007 and 2008.
Britain provides money to pay for so-called quick impact projects, approved monthly, on which $18m has been spent in the 18 months since its forces moved into Helmand. The UK is the second largest donor to Afghanistan, expecting to put in more than $200m of aid this year, but 80 per cent of it goes to the Afghan government, where London argues the aid is most effective.
A lack of resources has translated into insufficient equipment on the ground in the south and a shortage of troops – soon to be bolstered by 3,200 US marines. Canada’s armed forces, for example, have no heavy helicopters. A lack of troops in the south means, in the words of one US officer, “there are barely enough troops to stabilise the area”, an essential condition for effective counter-insurgency operations.
This shortage encourages risk aversion among Nato forces, making them more likely to call in air support, thereby risking Afghan lives and undermining counterinsurgency efforts.
Higher troop density in the east changes the risk calculus. US officers say their forces operate in smaller groups, which is inherently more risky, but allows them to make more connections with Afghans. They say they also work more effectively with Afghan security forces, creating permanent presences that are crucial for providing security for the local population and for economic development.
Each US soldier is also on the ground longer, building up valuable practical experience: a typical US tour is 15 months, compared with six months or less for other Nato nations.
Yet much of the difference has nothing to do with the performance of the troops. The south – not the east – is the ideological heartland of the Taliban and pro-government Afghan politicians there are regarded as less competent and more corrupt than those in the east.
Moreover, US officers say the US has to bear responsibility for many of the problems in the south. Washington has concentrated its troops in the east since 2002, focusing on the pursuit of al-Qaeda, leaving the south with very few troops. When Nato forces moved into the region in 2006, they inherited a region where a classic insurgency had developed and the poppy economy was flourishing.