Enigma Machines

[lljadw]

A good source for those who are interested (thus probably no one) is : 10 myths of the Wehrmacht in Normandy .

 

[JOC]

by General Dwight Eisenhower, US Military records archive

When Rommel arrived in the area in early May, he was upset at the division’s dispositions and immediately ordered Kraiss to move more of his force up to defend the beaches. Supported by his corps commander, Lt. Gen. Erich Marcks, who had been one of the early planners for Operation Barbarossa, Kraiss ignored Rommel’s order. Of the 10 infantry and five artillery battalions that Kraiss had available, he placed only one artillery battalion and two infantry battalions along the Omaha Beach sector. This decision makes even less sense when one realizes that he deployed two-thirds of his force in reserve or in position to defend the western sector of his area of responsibility — where no amphibious landing could possibly take place.

 

[MontyB]

A good source for those who are interested (thus probably no one) is : 10 myths of the Wehrmacht in Normandy .

It is certainly an interesting document however it seems to contradict itself in places, for example in the beginning it says...

I want to examine is the myth that allied aerial interdiction attacks had effectively isolated the Normandy battlefields prior to D-Day. This assertion has been made so often by so many that it has become etched in stone. Unfortunately it is simply not true, Yes, allied air attacks prior to D-Day had disabled most of the bridges over the Seine and the Loire river but not all of them, simply because the Allies had elected to strike single track railway bridges deemed to be of too low capacity to be worthwhile destroying. Clearly, in retrospect, this decision was an error of judgement because, though the capacity of the single track line is obviously far less than that of the double track line, the Germans used every available rail line to get supplies to Normandy.

Indicating that supplies were getting through in sufficient volumes to negate the belief that the allies had isolated the beachhead.

However later he goes on to say...

In fact Allied air attacks hampered German gunners to an unprecedented degree as they harassed and suppressed German artillery fire. The air threat necessitated that guns relocate often and adopt elaborate camouflage & concealment.
The threat often forced the Germans to abandon mass fire, and instead resort to shoot-and-scoot tactics or random sprinkling fire, or roving fire involving individual guns. At the same time, ammunition shortages prevented the heavy barrages needed to repulse allied attacks. Massed fire was thus rare and gunners increasingly abandon counter battery fire entirely. The absence of strong artillery support compelled the German troops to rely heavily on mortars, which they used to great effect for fire sp in Normandy.

Attributing part of the artillery problems to "ammunition shortages".

Also...

The German fuel situation was even worse. Germans had seven to ten days worth of fuel available for their strategic reserves. Moreover allied air attacks had crippled the French rail net and forced the German supply operation on to the roads thereby further depleting German fuel stocks.

Indicating that allied air attacks had crippled the French rail networks including those in the Normandy area.

Overall I think it is a document worth reading as some of the myths mentioned need to be countered and dispelled.

 

[George]

Someone once said at some point that the benefit of reading the other side's mail is incalculable, therefore there is no actual answer to the question as far as a specific change of end date that was caused by Enigma intercepts.

 

[LeEnfield]

The Allies were reading the German orders for battle before they took place and if you think that does not give you an advantage I wonder what does. The Germans thought that this might be happening and dismissed the idea as impossible as they had complete faith in their Enigma machines. The U Boats did add an extra rota to the machine just in case and this caused the Allies a bit of a problem for a few months before that was overcome. The first electronic computer was also designed to read this messages which speeded things up no end.

 

[BritinBritain]

The Allies were reading the German orders for battle before they took place and if you think that does not give you an advantage I wonder what does. The Germans thought that this might be happening and dismissed the idea as impossible as they had complete faith in their Enigma machines. The U Boats did add an extra rota to the machine just in case and this caused the Allies a bit of a problem for a few months before that was overcome. The first electronic computer was also designed to read this messages which speeded things up no end.

Agreed 100%.

Good to see you back again Chum, it been awhile.

 

[JOC]

I don't why some buggers can't see it? To mention again ~ 10 % of the German code was deciphered from Bletchley Park. This was a game that all sides played in both theaters. It's just that with the various code machines and code breakers the British did a bang up job of it. :wink:

 

[MontyB]

I don't why some buggers can't see it? To mention again ~ 10 % of the German code was deciphered from Bletchley Park. This was a game that all sides played in both theaters. It's just that with the various code machines and code breakers the British did a bang up job of it. :wink:

Because like most people in this thread you are treating everything as black and white and it just isn't the case.

For example how much of that 10% was actually useful and how much was a breakdown of Rommels bar tab from the previous days SS vs Luftwaffe beach volleyball competition, if only 1% data deciphered was useful then it is a help but hardly decisive, would also argue that given the accuracy and capabilities of the instrumentation at the time even knowing the reported location of a U-Boat wasn't really that useful and could have been out by miles.

John Keegan wrote in his book Intelligence in War that cracking the code played a very large part in allowing the Allies to counter the U-boat menace and defeating the Luftwaffe but he does conclude that it was the skill of commanders "on the ground" so to speak, that played the largest role in defeating German forces. He argues that despite having cracked the code it was innovations in convoy procedures, depth charges, and aerial surveillance that really did the most damage to the U-boat fleet. Yes, Ultra and Bletchley Park played a large role and certainly saved lives through their efforts but most likely the war could have been won without them.

So on the whole I tend to lean towards Lljadw's point of view on this matter however as I have said there is a lot of black and white, all or nothing arguments going on here.

 

[JOC]

Because like most people in this thread you are treating everything as black and white and it just isn't the case.

For example how much of that 10% was actually useful and how much was a breakdown of Rommels bar tab from the previous days SS vs Luftwaffe beach volleyball competition, if only 1% data deciphered was useful then it is a help but hardly decisive, would also argue that given the accuracy and capabilities of the instrumentation at the time even knowing the reported location of a U-Boat wasn't really that useful and could have been out by miles.

John Keegan wrote in his book Intelligence in War that cracking the code played a very large part in allowing the Allies to counter the U-boat menace and defeating the Luftwaffe but he does conclude that it was the skill of commanders "on the ground" so to speak, that played the largest role in defeating German forces. He argues that despite having cracked the code it was innovations in convoy procedures, depth charges, and aerial surveillance that really did the most damage to the U-boat fleet. Yes, Ultra and Bletchley Park played a large role and certainly saved lives through their efforts but most likely the war could have been won without them.

So on the whole I tend to lean towards Lljadw's point of view on this matter however as I have said there is a lot of black and white, all or nothing arguments going on here.

You are off base here with how you interpret my statement. England did the best job of deciphering code of anyone in the European war. This helped provide much intelligence against the both the U-boats and Luftwaffe.
What has this got to do with the improved convoy procedures we were talking about code?

Of course the including of the mini aircraft carriers and accompanying destroyers, etc. were incredibly beneficial to the convoys and dramatically reduced losses.
Not to mention the brave - skilled pilots of the USA(air force) and RAF.

 

[MontyB]

You are off base here with how you interpret my statement. England did the best job of deciphering code of anyone in the European war. This helped provide much intelligence against the both the U-boats and Luftwaffe.
What has this got to do with the improved convoy procedures we were talking about code?

Of course the including of the mini aircraft carriers and accompanying destroyers, etc. were incredibly beneficial to the convoys and dramatically reduced losses.
Not to mention the brave - skilled pilots of the USA(air force) and RAF.

You may want to take it up with sir John Keegan as he wrote it I just copied and pasted, however I recommend using a good medium.

 

[JOC]

John Keegan wrote in his book Intelligence in War that cracking the code played a very large part in allowing the Allies to counter the U-boat menace and defeating the Luftwaffe. Yes, Ultra and Bletchley Park played a large role and certainly saved lives through their efforts but most likely the war could have been won without them.

You may want to take it up with sir John Keegan as he wrote it I just copied and pasted, however I recommend using a good medium.

I Fail to understand the logic in this duality? Observe my previous post which clearly indicates that Enigma was a tool used in the allied victory over Nazi Germany, not the sole reason for the victory.

During World War II, the Germans used the Enigma and Lorenz cipher machines, to develop nearly unbreakable codes for sending secret messages. The Enigma's settings offered 150,000,000,000,000,000,000 possible solutions, yet the Allies were eventually able to crack its code. Quite a feat in this pre-digital age.

It's been claimed that the work at Bletchley Park shortened the war by 2 years, which could have effected the wars outcome. Ref: Sir Harry Hinsley “The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War”

 

[lljadw]

As Hinsley worked in BP and was not a neutral observer, he is not a good source .

A lot of the German messages were sent by teleprinter and not by radio .And only a small part of the radio messages were intercepted and decrypted .

 

[MontyB]

As Hinsley worked in BP and was not a neutral observer, he is not a good source .

A lot of the German messages were sent by teleprinter and not by radio .And only a small part of the radio messages were intercepted and decrypted .

I think this is the important bit when talking about Enigma and code breaking, radio traffic was just one method of transmitting information and only a small portion of that subset was read.

Don't get me wrong the work that went into breaking the codes from the initial work done by the Poles to its conclusion at Bletchley Park was an impressive effort but in the end we can only say with certainty that it "might" have shortened the war but it definitely did not change the outcome.

 

[lljadw]

I think this is the important bit when talking about Enigma and code breaking, radio traffic was just one method of transmitting information and only a small portion of that subset was read.

Don't get me wrong the work that went into breaking the codes from the initial work done by the Poles to its conclusion at Bletchley Park was an impressive effort but in the end we can only say with certainty that it "might" have shortened the war but it definitely did not change the outcome.

An other point is that a lot (most ?) Enigma messages were useless,because to old :while between december 1942 and september 1943 the U Boat code was broken,messages older than 3 days could not be used in the field as the information was to old .

in december 1942 only during 5 days were U Boat codes broken in 2 days or less ;this means that Enigma was only useful during 5 days .

for january : 5 days

february :18 days

march : 8 days

april :12 days

may :9 days

june : 1 day

july :2 days

september : 3 days

If the Enigma messages were that important, we could expect that the merchant ship losses in september would be higher than those in february, but, if I am not wrong,that is not so .

Why ?

Successes of the U Boats depended mostly on chance, on the weather, on the number of available U Boats, on the number of convois, on the speed of the convois, on the strength of the excorts, and the information from Enigma was less important .

Very simply : in 1943 the U Boats were defeated because they were technologically obsolete surface ships .

Last point : what Hinsley said is nonsense : it is not so that without Enigma the war would have lasted til 1947 : the Soviets would have arrived in Berlin in may 1945 OR in august 1945 Berlin would have suffered the fate of Hiroshima .

 

[JOC]

An other point is that a lot (most ?) Enigma messages were useless,because to old :while between december 1942 and september 1943 the U Boat code was broken,messages older than 3 days could not be used in the field as the information was to old .

in december 1942 only during 5 days were U Boat codes broken in 2 days or less ;this means that Enigma was only useful during 5 days .

for january : 5 days

february :18 days

march : 8 days

april :12 days

may :9 days

june : 1 day

july :2 days

september : 3 days

If the Enigma messages were that important, we could expect that the merchant ship losses in september would be higher than those in february, but, if I am not wrong,that is not so .

Why ?

Successes of the U Boats depended mostly on chance, on the weather, on the number of available U Boats, on the number of convois, on the speed of the convois, on the strength of the excorts, and the information from Enigma was less important .

Very simply : in 1943 the U Boats were defeated because they were technologically obsolete surface ships .

Last point : what Hinsley said is nonsense : it is not so that without Enigma the war would have lasted til 1947 : the Soviets would have arrived in Berlin in may 1945 OR in august 1945 Berlin would have suffered the fate of Hiroshima .

Bletchley's work was essential to defeating U-bouts in the Battle of the Atlantic, and to the British naval victories in the Battle of Cape Matapan and the Battle of North Cape. In 1941, Ultra exerted a powerful effect on the North African campaign against German forces under General Erwin Romme. General Sir Claude Auchinleck wrote that were it not for Ultra, "Rommel would have certainly got through to Cairo". Prior to the Normandy landing on D-Day in June 1944, the Allies knew the locations of all but two of Germany's fifty-eight Western-front divisions.

You wrongly dismiss esteemed scientist and historian Sir Harry Hinsley. If lend lease had been effected - the Luftwaffe actions not foretold as they often were and allied intelligence wasn’t tipped off about German operations as it was in numerous cases the Soviets would have been slowed considerably. Point being the Reds would likely have been nowhere near Berlin in May of 45.

 

[lljadw]

Prior to the Normandy landing on D-Day in June 1944, the Allies knew the locations of all but two of Germany's fifty-eight Western-front divisions.


Point being the Reds would likely have been nowhere near Berlin in May of 45.

1) This is totally irrelevant for the success or failure of Overlord

2)This proves

a ) that your knowledge about the war in the east is serious lacking

b) that you are hibernating ,thinking that the Cold War is still going on .

 

[JOC]

1) This is totally irrelevant for the success or failure of Overlord

2)This proves

a ) that your knowledge about the war in the east is serious lacking

b) that you are hibernating ,thinking that the Cold War is still going on .

This is so preposterous as to not warrant further debate. I refuse to get into another name calling session with you.

 

[BritinBritain]

This is so preposterous as to not warrant further debate. I refuse to get into another name calling session with you.

I really don't know why you even try to debate with this clown, his views are extremely outlandish with the knowledge of a chocolate teapot.