BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
He's a complete and total idiot. Its a waste of time even attempting to discuss with him, he doesnt have a clue.
Enigma Machines
3 times wrong :
1) There was no Schlieffen plan in 1940 and the French did NOT expect such a plan : already in 1936 the French expected the main German attack to happen NORTH of the Ardennes :from the north of Holland to Liège,and they were right . The campaign would be decided in Flanders . And it was decided in Flander, not in the Ardennes .
2) NO : the Germans did not fall for Fortitude : 15 Army in the Pas de Calais was not sent to Normandy,because it could not be sent and because it would be useless in Normandy : I presume that you have heard of the Bodenständige divisions ?
3)NO : the mobile divisins were "given " to AGNU because AGNU needed them : there was a crisis there BEFORE Bagration .
5 june 1944 : 3 German operational PzD near Normandy, ONE near the Pas de Calais : conclusion : on 5 june the Germans did not think that the main attack would happen on de Pas de Calais .But,they also did not think that the main attack would happen in Normandy (although Hitler thought otherwise).
D Day + 7 : Normandy : 4 PzD (+ 1 moving) ;Pas de Calais : NOT ONE
D Day + 14 : Normandy 4 PzD ( +3 moving :1,9,10 SS) : Pas de Calais : NOT ONE
Conclusion : Fortitude had no influence on the German strategy .
D Day + 7 : Normandy : 4 PzD (+ 1 moving) ;Pas de Calais : NOT ONE
D Day + 14 : Normandy 4 PzD ( +3 moving :1,9,10 SS) : Pas de Calais : NOT ONE
Conclusion : Fortitude had no influence on the German strategy .
I have no idea how to even interpret this post or what it means?
You seem to be the only one who doesn't think Operation Fortitude wasn't a resounding success. One of the most brilliant intelligence success's in all history.
I's a fact that a much greater number of German forces remained stationed in the Pas de Calais region until after the invasion.
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I've already debated 2ce with you on this post about these 3 cases, it's pointless. You don't debate you dictate. Your not not willing to try and learn or observe the total viewpoint. Behaving instead as some kind of historic - political know it all. So you've read a few books that may or may not be in error. You are probably young, without time in service and worse of all totally unwilling to listen.
Which does not mean that this was caused by Fortitude :the mean reason that only few reinforcements were sent to Normandy was a shortage of transport capacity .
For a "normal " day 7 Army needed 3200 ton of transport capacity, for a "attacking " day :4500 ton,but on the average only 1300 ton was available .
No : you have been indoctrinated with the old stories of Fortitude, Hitler who slept till noon,etc,and you stick to these Hollywoof fairytales and refuse to consider other possibilities, and , as last refuge, you resort to the authorative argument : I have been in service, thus: shut up .
BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
It is very simple : after DDay, no reinforcements were sent to the Pas de Calais,it was the opposite : the only PzD north of the Seine was sent to Normandy : this proves that the Germans were not convinced that there would be a second landing on the Pas de Calais .
Hitler was convinced that the Normandy landing were a feint, the real landings were going to at the Pas de Calais. The only senior officer who was convinced that the Normandy landings were the real landings was Erwin Rommel.
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It is very simple : after DDay, no reinforcements were sent to the Pas de Calais,it was the opposite : the only PzD north of the Seine was sent to Normandy : this proves that the Germans were not convinced that there would be a second landing on the Pas de Calais .
It was not after D-Day, but before D-Day that hoax was perpetrated for. So that the 400 thousand some odd German combat troops in northern France would be delayed and not interfere with the landing, and for the most part they didn't. No Panzer divisions were even present at the landing and yes Hitler was asleep and this caused even further delays due to his micromanaging the German Army.
If you served why are you not proud enough of it to but it on your profile? Are you hiding something.
No ,he didn't : on 27 may he tolfd the Japanese ambassador that the allied landing would occur in Normandy or Brittany,he did not mention Pas de Calais .
Besides : for the Germans,it was irrelevant .
I said the Germans had ~ 400 thousand combat troops ready for operations in the North of France (including reserves). I said nothing about the Seine you did.
Yes Hitler did sleep, are you some kind of revisionist?
Allied intelligence and counterintelligence efforts were successful beyond expectations. The Operation Fortitude deception before the invasion kept German attention focused on the Pas de Calais, and indeed high-quality German forces were kept in this area, away from Normandy, until July. Prior to the invasion, few German reconnaissance flights took place over Britain, and those that did saw only the dummy staging areas. Ultra decrypts of German communications had been helpful as well.
German commanders failed at all levels to react to the assault phase in a timely manner. Communications problems exacerbated the difficulties caused by Allied air and naval firepower. Local commanders also seemed incapable of the task of fighting an aggressive defense on the beach, as Rommel had envisioned.
The German High Command remained fixated on the Calais area, and von Rundstedt was not permitted to commit the armored reserve. When it was finally released late in the day, any chance of success was long since passed by this time.
Overall, despite considerable Allied material superiority, the Germans kept the Allies bottled up in a small beachhead for nearly two months, aided immeasurably by terrain factors. This does not take away from the resounding success of Operations Overlord and Operation Fortitude.
I3BrigPvSk
The Viking
This seems to be too abstract for you to understand. The Germans didn't know where the invasion would occur. The Allied fertilized this further with fortitude, the intelligence service provides with information about your opponent and where he has his forces. The real intelligence work is to find out what he is up to. The intelligence work is usually divided into two fields, the tactical intelligence, but that is called reconnaissance most of the time. The other field is the strategical. This is the level where the intentions are very important, this is looking for the political will of using their military resources.
I don't think you have been in the military, if you were. You had been tossed out pretty fast. There is no place in the military for loose canons.
I don't think you have been in the military, if you were. You had been tossed out pretty fast. There is no place in the military for loose canons.
Revisionism
3 sources said that Hitler was not sleeping
von Below : Hitler's LW adjudant
Hubert Meyer: History of the HJ PzD : P97
Winston Ramsey : D Day Then and Now Volume II : P 316 :between 8 and 9 AM Hitler was in the hall of Berchtesgaden ready to leave for Schloss Klessheim .
About Rundstedt and the utilization of the OKW reserves : ONLY at 4.45 (when it was already almost day) did he ask to have 12 SS and PzL (without adding what he would do with them) : OKW (Jodl ) refused, because the situation was still unclear,and the refusal was justified : the 2 divisions could only move during the night and earlier, Rundstedt told the OKW that there was no proof for a big landing .
Whatever, OKW agreed to the request of Rundstedt at 14.32 and the 2 divisions moved to the front during the night of 6/7 june .
The whole story and its importance were invented for The Longest Day by Blumentritt ,chief of staff of Rundstedt ,and who had been proved before to be economical with the truth .
von Below : Hitler's LW adjudant
Hubert Meyer: History of the HJ PzD : P97
Winston Ramsey : D Day Then and Now Volume II : P 316 :between 8 and 9 AM Hitler was in the hall of Berchtesgaden ready to leave for Schloss Klessheim .
About Rundstedt and the utilization of the OKW reserves : ONLY at 4.45 (when it was already almost day) did he ask to have 12 SS and PzL (without adding what he would do with them) : OKW (Jodl ) refused, because the situation was still unclear,and the refusal was justified : the 2 divisions could only move during the night and earlier, Rundstedt told the OKW that there was no proof for a big landing .
Whatever, OKW agreed to the request of Rundstedt at 14.32 and the 2 divisions moved to the front during the night of 6/7 june .
The whole story and its importance were invented for The Longest Day by Blumentritt ,chief of staff of Rundstedt ,and who had been proved before to be economical with the truth .
"D-Day: June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II" by Stephen E. Ambrose
First, German surprise was complete. The Fortitude operation had fixed German attention on the Pas-de-Calais. They were certain it would be the site of the battle, and they had placed the bulk of their panzer divisions north and east of the Seine River, where they were unavailable for counterattack in Normandy.
Second, German confusion was extensive. Without air reconnaissance, with Allied airborne troops dropping here, there, everywhere, with their telephone lines cut by the Resistance, with their army, corps, division, and some regimental commanders at the war game in Rennes, the Germans were all but blind and leaderless. The commander who was most missed was Rommel, who spent the day on the road driving to La Roche-Guyonan -- another price the Germans paid for having lost control of the air; Rommel dared not fly. Third, the German command structure was a disaster. Hitler's mistrust of his generals and the generals' mistrust of Hitler were worth a king's ransom to the Allies. So were Hitler's sleeping habits.
BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
As usual you are wrong again.
http://www.news.com.au/world/did-a-...wake-him-on-dday/story-fndir2ev-1226945299516
IT’S a day that determined the direction of history, signalling the downfall of Hitler’s Germany.
But the Nazi leader could have been victorious — and the world would likely be a different, and much nastier place — if one seemingly ludicrous thing had been different.
His aides were too scared to wake him up.
Despite the overwhelming might of the combined forces of Russia, Britain and the United States, the outcome of World War II was a close-run thing.
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Decoder/2015/0606/D-Day-June-6-1944-How-did-Hitler-react-video
In the early days of June Germany’s Fuhrer was at The Berghof, his residence in the Bavarian Alps. Everyone there knew an invasion was likely in the near future, but the atmosphere was not nervous, according to contemporary accounts. To the contrary it was relaxed, and in the evening, almost festive. A group of guests and military aides would gather at the complex’s Tea House and Hitler would hold forth on favorite topics, such as the great men of history, or Europe’s future.
When Goebbels left for his own quarters, a thunderstorm broke, writes British historian Ian Kershaw. German military intelligence was already picking up indications of an oncoming Allied force, and perhaps landing troops, in the Normandy region. But Hitler wasn’t told. The Fuhrer retired around 3 a.m.
BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
There is so much evidence out there that proves numbnut is wrong.
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Decoder/2015/0606/D-Day-June-6-1944-How-did-Hitler-react-video
June 6 will forever be the anniversary of one of the most fateful days in modern history: the Allied D-Day invasion of Normandy. By day’s end American, British, and Canadian troops had breached Germany’s Atlantic Wall defenses and established a foothold in Western Europe. With Soviet armies rolling in from the east Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime was caught in a gigantic vise. Its defeat was now only a matter of time.
Considering the pivotal nature of June 6, 1944, how did Hitler react to the attack? Did he rant, did he rail? Did he move with focused calm to try and repel the invaders?
He did none of those things, at first. For D-Day’s opening act, Hitler slept.
In the early days of June Germany’s Fuhrer was at The Berghof, his residence in the Bavarian Alps. Everyone there knew an invasion was likely in the near future, but the atmosphere was not nervous, according to contemporary accounts. To the contrary it was relaxed, and in the evening, almost festive. A group of guests and military aides would gather at the complex’s Tea House and Hitler would hold forth on favorite topics, such as the great men of history, or Europe’s future.
When Goebbels left for his own quarters, a thunderstorm broke, writes British historian Ian Kershaw. German military intelligence was already picking up indications of an oncoming Allied force, and perhaps landing troops, in the Normandy region. But Hitler wasn’t told. The Fuhrer retired around 3 a.m.
German headquarters confirmed that some sort of widespread attack was in progress shortly thereafter. At sunrise, around 6 a.m., the defenders knew: Allied ships and planes were massed off the French beaches in astounding strength, and men were beginning to come ashore. It was a sight many would never forget.
Hitler snored on. He had previously insisted that any initial attack would be a decoy intended to divert forces to the wrong place. Given his tendency towards histrionics, no one wanted to tell Hitler what was going on until they themselves were certain.
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Decoder/2015/0606/D-Day-June-6-1944-How-did-Hitler-react-video
June 6 will forever be the anniversary of one of the most fateful days in modern history: the Allied D-Day invasion of Normandy. By day’s end American, British, and Canadian troops had breached Germany’s Atlantic Wall defenses and established a foothold in Western Europe. With Soviet armies rolling in from the east Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime was caught in a gigantic vise. Its defeat was now only a matter of time.
Considering the pivotal nature of June 6, 1944, how did Hitler react to the attack? Did he rant, did he rail? Did he move with focused calm to try and repel the invaders?
He did none of those things, at first. For D-Day’s opening act, Hitler slept.
In the early days of June Germany’s Fuhrer was at The Berghof, his residence in the Bavarian Alps. Everyone there knew an invasion was likely in the near future, but the atmosphere was not nervous, according to contemporary accounts. To the contrary it was relaxed, and in the evening, almost festive. A group of guests and military aides would gather at the complex’s Tea House and Hitler would hold forth on favorite topics, such as the great men of history, or Europe’s future.
When Goebbels left for his own quarters, a thunderstorm broke, writes British historian Ian Kershaw. German military intelligence was already picking up indications of an oncoming Allied force, and perhaps landing troops, in the Normandy region. But Hitler wasn’t told. The Fuhrer retired around 3 a.m.
German headquarters confirmed that some sort of widespread attack was in progress shortly thereafter. At sunrise, around 6 a.m., the defenders knew: Allied ships and planes were massed off the French beaches in astounding strength, and men were beginning to come ashore. It was a sight many would never forget.
Hitler snored on. He had previously insisted that any initial attack would be a decoy intended to divert forces to the wrong place. Given his tendency towards histrionics, no one wanted to tell Hitler what was going on until they themselves were certain.