Why did WWII happen ?

I think the author should have said: Hitler lost the war when he invaded Russia. As far as I know Stalin never provoked Hitler. But he might have done so as the years would have passed and he would have felt strong enough.

(But one could argue that the re-organization of the army and the designing of the T34 was due to Germanies invasion. No invasion, no adaptations, no strong Red Army. What was first; the chicken or the egg?)
 
redcoat said:
Kindly explain how coming to a secret agreement with Germany on the carve up of Eastern european nations, 'provoked' Hitler.
If you read Mein Kampt, you would realise he didn't need any provoking.

The secret protocol made the German invasion of Poland possible. The political agreement therefore helped spark WWI.

Hitler was of course ideologically motivated. But ideology did not override basic strategic considerations. Mein Kampf is like the Bible (sorry for the analogy). You find whatever you want. Hitler also wrote for example that he wanted to avoid a two-front war at all costs.

[In any case, Hitler later regretted writing Mein Kampf...in jail, pissed off, with a potentially bleak future ahead of him. He even considered suicide. The book represented a bitter attack against Weimar more than anything else. He should have killed himself.]
 
Ted said:
I think the author should have said: Hitler lost the war when he invaded Russia. As far as I know Stalin never provoked Hitler. But he might have done so as the years would have passed and he would have felt strong enough.

(But one could argue that the re-organization of the army and the designing of the T34 was due to Germanies invasion. No invasion, no adaptations, no strong Red Army. What was first; the chicken or the egg?)
Well y'see Hitler didn't lose the war when he invaded Russia, he merely started a new one. This was a war that was winnable by Hitler, contrary to what many people seem to think or believe. There are 2 factors that may have changed this for Hitler, these being namely the diverting of the German schwerpunkt from Moscow to Kiev in August 1941 and possibly the initial planning for a one season campaign. Either of these factors may have allowed Hitler to snatch a defeat from the jaws of victory.

The other point I will make is that a reorganisation of the Red Army was already ongoing when Hitler invaded. Moreover, the T34 owed nothing to the German invasion as it was already in production with the Red Army. The Soviet tank designers at that time were the most advanced in the world, ahead of even German designers.
 
Doppleganger said:
Moreover, the T34 owed nothing to the German invasion as it was already in production with the Red Army. The Soviet tank designers at that time were the most advanced in the world, ahead of even German designers.

Correct as usual, Doppleganger. Being tired and sort of irritated at the moment, I will be defiant for a change. (Everyone laughs). I am growing tired of the idea that the wartime Allies only developed their weapons or even built these armaments because of "Hitlerian" aggression in 1939 or 1941. I would just love to see the evidence that leads to this hypothesis. Is there any?

Think about the following (and there are a million more):

(1) The B-17 first flew in the mid-1930s. The development of such an advanced weapon owed nothing to the German bombing of Warsaw, Rotterdam or London five years later. British and American military thinkers developed strategic bombing immediately after 1918 for reasons of their own. German wartime bombing acted as an excuse to unleash a weapon that consumed a healthy chunk of prewar military spending.

(2) The T-34 was part of a long development program stretching back to the early 1920s. Hitler's crazed party did not influence 1920s weapons development in the Soviet Union. German industry did, however. The 1922 Rapallo Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union diverted German technology to the Bolsheviks in exchange for bases where the Germans could test new designs. (Tanks, aircraft, artillery, etc.) [Hitler's defeat in 1945 can be directly attributed to this policy...unless, of course, 1930s German military technology was dependent on 1920s testing in the Soviet Union. Rapallo would cancel itself out if this were true].

(3) The French military had more tanks and trucks than Hitler's armies in 1940. The tanks were also of superior design to everything but the Pzkw IIIs & IVs. French industry did not build them in a day.

Weapons development normally represented a long process. (I am not talking about Eisenhower's military-industrial complex...so no cheap comments about the sinister American or German mechants of death. Please.) The general staff of the 1930s had to think about their strategic reason for being, think about their needs, and develop a list of requirements. Governments set the fiscal policies and diverted public funds to armaments development and procurement. Industry stepped in to design and produce these weapons systems. All of this demanded an extreme amount of work and resources. No major government, not even the United States, went into the war in a state of complete military virginity.
 
Correct as usual, Doppleganger. Being tired and sort of irritated at the moment, I will be defiant for a change. (Everyone laughs). I am growing tired of the idea that the wartime Allies only developed their weapons or even built these armaments because of "Hitlerian" aggression in 1939 or 1941. I would just love to see the evidence that leads to this hypothesis. Is there any?
Your statements, however logical they may sound, are just as circumstantial as mine. We will never know for sure will we? May point is that the outbreak of the war served as a gigantic catalyst. Never had an economy been so stretched to it's utter limit. Everybody and I do mean everybody was making the effort everywhere. I dare say (but can't prove it) the the involved MIC's everywhere greatly speeded up their developmental projects due to the war.

And just a slight note: the use of "only" in your statement is the end of that statement at the same time. Nobody claims this was the case and I reckon the almost 100% of the forum members are aware that the American and English MIC was operational before 1939. So I see no need to grow tired over that idea, dismissing it would be so much easier.
 
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Ted said:
Your statements, however logical they may sound, are just as circumstantial as mine. We will never know for sure will we? May point is that the outbreak of the war served as a gigantic catalyst. Never had an economy been so stretched to it's utter limit. Everybody and I do mean everybody was making the effort everywhere. I dare say (but can't prove it) the the involved MIC's everywhere greatly speeded up their developmental projects due to the war.

And just a slight note: the use of "only" in your statement is the end of that statement at the same time. Nobody claims this was the case and I reckon the almost 100% of the forum members are aware that the American and English MIC was operational before 1939. So I see no need to grow tired over that idea, dismissing it would be so much easier.

Sorry, but I have no idea what you are talking about.

My three points are basic "facts" and not circumstantial evidence. They are not even hypotheses. The military structures of all countries (then and now) are subject to quantitative and quantitative analysis. The Americans built B-17s for strategic bombing (See Weigley, The American Way of War). The Soviets built literally thousands and thousands of tanks. (The Germans counted the KIAs in 1941). As far as the French, the same thing. None of this development had anything to do with the specific outbreak of war in 1939. All of these programs preceded the war by decades. If you think about the historiography, the notion of Allied "strategic virginity" stands out for everyone to see. It is as plain as day. (I am not sure of the forum members...I do not share your mind-reading skills).

Think of the following:

(1) There are few historians who concentrate on the American mobilization plans at the end of the 1930s and suggest that the strength of dual-use industry cancelled out the immediate problem of insufficient armaments production. I do not know of any. Why? Because most of the works I have looked at are too busy explaining the poor American military position. These historians lament the American stance in 1939. In this case, Hitler's actions in Poland and elsewhere helped divert funds to the military. But the plans and basic designs or design concepts already existed. (This includes mobilization tables and the entire infrastructure necessary for armaments procurement).
(2) Strategic bombing was the brainchild of American-British military planners. Two men in particular, Hugh Trenchard and Billy Mitchell, pioneered the use of strategic bombing against what amounted to civilian targets and what later became known as terror bombing. (See Charles Webster and Noble Frankland). In the 1920s, British aircraft even gassed Turkish troops and civilians as part of their "air control" strategy. This policy offered the British government a cheap alternative to traditional ground and naval forces in policing the empire. (See Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) pp. 22-23). Strategic bombing has nothing to do with Hitler. Nor did Hitler inspire the saturation bombing of German cities during the war. Try to find historians who do not state that Warsaw, Rotterdam and London (ie. German actions) led directly to Allied strategic bombing development and policy. Good luck.
(3) As far as the Soviets were concerned, we know that Stalin implemented his economic plans in order to industrialize the Soviet Union and boost his dual-use capacities. Soviet armaments output in the late 1920s and early 1930s, again predating Hitler, was astronomical. The same situation existed in the late 1940s (about 20,000 tanks in both cases). In the late 1940s, the American War and later Defense Deparment used the mere existence of Soviet tanks to surmise an aggressive posture that rationalized the "Truman Doctrine", NATO and the general military preparations typical of the early Cold War. Stalin simply did not demobilize in the manner expected. Why did Stalin build the world's largest military in the 1920s/1930s. Why? World domination. The commies said it themselves.
(4) Most of the historical works that I have looked at trumpet Nazi rearmament and the idea that Hitler created the largest military machine of the period. What a farce! The table below demonstrates my point. If you add Soviet strength, or general Allied naval power, the German numbers look pathetic. Why did the Allies maintain such significant military reserves? Why do we define Hitler's preparations as belligerent when the French (and especially Soviet) forces outnumbered those of Germany?
----------
Battle of France 1940: Relative Strength of the Major Combatants
----------
Germany France Britain Allied*
Divisions 143 114 15 152
Artillery 7,500 10,700 1,280 13,974
Airplanes 3,500 3,000 1,850 4,850
Armour 2,493 3,254 640 3,894

*The number of divisions and artillery pieces includes forces from Belgium and Holland.

[Franz Halder, "Taktische und Strategische Erwägungen zum kommenden Krieg gegen Polen", p.490; Klaus A. Maier (et al.), Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europaischen Kontinent, p. 282 and Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg–Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940, p. 41.]

By the way:

(1) The military-industrial complex first develops in the United States during the 1950s. The procurement systems that predated the MIC were not the same thing. Not by any stretch of the imagination.
(2) I wrote the post in a couple of minutes. The use of "only" is exaggeration. I am not writing essays for publication. This is an anonymous internet forum. I nevertheless stand by my choice. You have to look at the literature. The general historiography (ie. books relating to WWII origins like Bell's classic) clearly points out that German rearmament precipitated an arms race and that Hitler maintained a vastly superior Wehrmacht. Most of the arguments that I have looked at stress that the Allies (including the Soviet Union) were unprepared or even slightly surprised in 1939, 1940 and 1941. What a farce.
(3) Weapons do not just materialize. Conscious political/ economic/ industrial choices are made over an incredibly long period of time.
 
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Ollie Garchy said:
(2) Strategic bombing was the brainchild of American-British military planners. Two men in particular, Hugh Trenchard and Billy Mitchell, pioneered the use of strategic bombing against what amounted to civilian targets and what later became known as terror bombing.
No
It was the Germans in WW1 who pioneered the use of strategic bombing.
With their bombing campaign against the British mainland from 1915, using firstly Zeppelins and later Gotha bombers.
It was in reaction to this that the British set up their 'Independent Bomber Force' in late 1917/18, to bomb targets in Germany. The Independent Bomber Force became post-war , Bomber Command.

In the 1920s, British aircraft even gassed Turkish troops and civilians as part of their "air control" strategy. This policy offered the British government a cheap alternative to traditional ground and naval forces in policing the empire. (See Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) pp. 22-23).
It was Iraq, not Turkey

Strategic bombing has nothing to do with Hitler. Nor did Hitler inspire the saturation bombing of German cities during the war. Try to find historians who do not state that Warsaw, Rotterdam and London (ie. German actions) led directly to Allied strategic bombing development and policy. Good luck.
Frederick Taylor in his book, Dresden Febuary 13th 1945, points out that in 1939 at the outbreak of war, after a plea from the US president, Britain and France agreed not to use their bombers against civilian targets. Hitler also agreed a few weeks later (after he had finished bombing Polish civilians in their towns and cities). This agreement held until May 1940, when in conjunction with the attack in the West, the Luftwaffe bombed towns and cities in Norway, Belguim, Holland, and France. With these attacks, the British and French governments gave their air forces permission to attack military related targets in Germany.

In late 1940 the Luftwaffe introduced a new tactic in its night bombing campaign. The targeting of city centers using pathfinders marking with flares and incendiaries, followed by bombers bombing the area marked, using a mix of HE and incendiaries. After a number of raids on British cities( ie. London, Coventry, Belfast) using this tactic, the RAF was so impressed with the results, that it abandoned its own practice of only bombing military related targets ( which they had discovered was totally ineffective) and copied the Luftwaffe tactic, 'area bombing'.
 
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Ollie Garchy said:
By the way:

(1) The military-industrial complex first develops in the United States during the 1950s. The procurement systems that predated the MIC were not the same thing. Not by any stretch of the imagination.
(2) I wrote the post in a couple of minutes. The use of "only" is exaggeration. I am not writing essays for publication. This is an anonymous internet forum. I nevertheless stand by my choice. You have to look at the literature. The general historiography (ie. books relating to WWII origins like Bell's classic) clearly points out that German rearmament precipitated an arms race and that Hitler maintained a vastly superior Wehrmacht. Most of the arguments that I have looked at stress that the Allies (including the Soviet Union) were unprepared or even slightly surprised in 1939, 1940 and 1941. What a farce.
(3) Weapons do not just materialize. Conscious political/ economic/ industrial choices are made over an incredibly long period of time.

Look Ollie, I agree with you on this! The only point I am stressing is that WWII was like a catalyst with regards to the production and development of weapons. Pre war industry or a complete industry churning out weapons does make a difference. I mean during the 30's the Germans had their Panzer I to Panzer IV, from '42 to '45 they developed revolutionary tanks like the Panther and Tiger tanks. This short time span is imo due to the war. It doen't rule out prior knowledge and engineering, but it is speeded up. That is what I am trying to say...
 
Ted said:
Look Ollie, I agree with you on this! The only point I am stressing is that WWII was like a catalyst with regards to the production and development of weapons. Pre war industry or a complete industry churning out weapons does make a difference. I mean during the 30's the Germans had their Panzer I to Panzer IV, from '42 to '45 they developed revolutionary tanks like the Panther and Tiger tanks. This short time span is imo due to the war. It doen't rule out prior knowledge and engineering, but it is speeded up. That is what I am trying to say...

OK. There can be little doubt on that one. I agree.

I just wonder how much of the Soviet economy was devoted to armaments during the 1920s and 1930s. Does anyone know? I have also had trouble finding info. relating to the Soviet OB in 1941. Anyone know a good link or citation?

Ollie Garchy
 
redcoat said:

My Quick Response:

(1) Strategic bombing refers to the independent use of airpower to defeat an enemy. The German high command in WWI/ WWII did not employ airships or bombers to force a military decision. The action was political. The Germans did NOT develop strategic bombing. There were no conceptions or weapon systems capable of decisively defeating the enemy. The bombing of Warsaw, Rotterdam or London (WWI/WWII) was a curious mixture of standard artillery conceptions and political terror. The Allies, on the other hand, aimed at a host of critical industrial nodes such as transportation targets, oil refineries, fixed nitrogen synthesis facilities, etc. in order to immobilize the war economy. Harris decided to attack German civilians (dehousing) primarily because of the failure of the RAF to stop production. Bomber Command had planned and carried out attacks on industry. Show me how the Germans developed and instituted a similar policy. [Not just raids against London by airships developed for a tactical role against the British Navy. That these attacks influenced Trenchard to pursue the development of strategic bombing cannot be doubted, however.]

(2) If you look at some of the books that I cited in a previous post, you will notice that terror or morale bombing occupied British and American thinking long before 1940. It in fact frightened the hell out of Americans and Europeans during the 1920s and 1930s. As part of the German rearmament plan, for example, a whole series of bunkers were constructed. I agree that the Luftwaffe introduced many of the night bombing techniques, but their strategic conceptions were far more primitive than those of Britain and the United States...even prior to the war. The German developments related to the speed with which the German general staff and operational planners reacted to changing battlefield conditions. This speed should not be confused with responsibility. The British were just much slower.

(3) The argument of who "started" strategic bombing is seriously flawed. Frederick Taylor is just rehashing old arguments. The bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam (most other examples in fact) represented the extension of tactical bombing and were NOT strategic in nature. Warsaw was turned into a fortress by the Poles and bombed in a manner akin to artillery. Rotterdam sat astride the German line of advance. [The order to recall the bombers came too late, unfortunately] London was an expression of German general strategic failure and impotence. The original bombing of England represented preparations for the landing and were tactical in nature...like the transfer of Bomber Command/8th Air Force to the bombing of Normandy targets in 1944...Something the strategic bombing pundits considered a mistake at the time.

(4) The British launched a host of strategic attacks against German industry in 1939 and 1940. These attacks, most of which experienced extremely high attrition rates, were a total failure owing to German radar, etc. Ops were suspended and the pundits were forced to rethink strategy. This timelag/failure should not constitute an excuse for the "just war" theorists. Historians rarely mention these operations...oddly enough. It seems that they mix up city saturation bombing with strategic bombing [killing civilians is only one small part of the program]. The British strategic bombing program did not begin after mid-1940. It started immediately after the outbreak of war.

In any case, Hitler's bombing of London, as everyone knows, was a consequence of the BC attack on Berlin. Churchill had hoped to elicit precisely this response from Hitler. In any case, it does not matter who started what or when. Any attempt to answer this question will degenerate into an argument concerning the differences between tactical/strategic operations. MY POINT: The allies developed a strategic bombing force independently of Hitler or even Germany (technically...because the envisioned enemy always remained Germany]. This program called for the utilization of airpower to defeat industry. The Germans did not.

(5) It was Iraq of course...sorry.

(6) Roosevelt had no business interfering in European affairs. The American "Monroe Doctrine" held Europeans out of American affairs. The same should have been expected of the USA. The USA was in any case not a member of the League of Nations. If Roosevelt was so against strategic bombing, why develop the B-17 and Norton bombsight?
 
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.
(1) Strategic bombing refers to the independent use of airpower to defeat an enemy. The German high command in WWI/ WWII did not employ airships or bombers to force a military decision. The action was political. The Germans did NOT develop strategic bombing
Your definition is too narrow.
The aim of strategic bombing to undermine a nation-state's ability to wage war, historically as a part of a total war strategy. This is exactly the policy that Germany attempted to use in 1915-17 .
(4) The British launched a host of strategic attacks against German industry in 1939 and 1940. These attacks, most of which experienced extremely high attrition rates, were a total failure owing to German radar, etc. Ops were suspended and the pundits were forced to rethink strategy. This timelag/failure should not constitute an excuse for the "just war" theorists. Historians rarely mention these operations...oddly enough.
Thats because there were no attacks on the German mainland until May 11/12 1940, before then the only attacks on German territory had been against the German fleet at Wilhelmshaven, and even with these, the pilots were instructed not to bomb if the ships were too close to land for fear of causing civilian casualties, and on occasion, they did return without bombing due to this.



There were no conceptions or weapon systems capable of decisively defeating the enemy. The bombing of Warsaw, Rotterdam or London (WWI/WWII) was a curious mixture of standard artillery conceptions and political terror. The Allies, on the other hand, aimed at a host of critical industrial nodes such as transportation targets, oil refineries, fixed nitrogen synthesis facilities, etc. in order to immobilize the war economy.
Only after the German attack on Rotterdam. Before then they had been forbidden to attack targets within Germany,
Harris decided to attack German civilians (dehousing) primarily because of the failure of the RAF to stop production. Bomber Command had planned and carried out attacks on industry.
Only in Mid 1942 , when he took command of Bomber Command, long after the London Blitz which had been an attempt to force the British to surrender through air attack alone.


In any case, Hitler's bombing of London, as everyone knows, was a consequence of the BC attack on Berlin. Churchill had hoped to elicit precisely this response from Hitler
No. Churchill ordered the bombing of military related targets around Berlin as a public relations exercise for the benefit of the British public. To show that if they bombed our capital, we would bomb theirs.



MY POINT: The allies developed a strategic bombing force independently of Hitler or even Germany (technically...because the envisioned enemy always remained Germany]. This program called for the utilization of airpower to defeat industry. The Germans did not.
MY POINT .
The allies, especially the British, developed strategic bombing as a direct result of the German bombing of Britain in WW1
. If Roosevelt was so against strategic bombing, why develop the B-17 and Norton bombsight?
The original idea behind the B-17 in the early 30s was as a long range bomber to attack any naval forces threatening to attack American shores, not strategic bombing
 
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Ollie Garchy said:
OK. There can be little doubt on that one. I agree.

I just wonder how much of the Soviet economy was devoted to armaments during the 1920s and 1930s. Does anyone know? I have also had trouble finding info. relating to the Soviet OB in 1941. Anyone know a good link or citation?

Ollie Garchy

I will ask my Russian friends if they know any such sites.
However, I should warn that the Soviet statistics was a very tricky animal
 
redcoat said:
Kindly explain how coming to a secret agreement with Germany on the carve up of Eastern european nations, 'provoked' Hitler.
If you read Mein Kampt, you would realise he didn't need any provoking.

I don't have a book, but from memory, I could recall Suvorov's logic as such:

1. Stalin has offered his help to Hitler which may pushed tha later to the brink of the World War. In the same time, being, in fact, an ally of Hitlerite Germany, the USSR has nominally remained as the ENEMY of Axis(aka Anti-Comintern Pact). This, as well as conspicious 17 day delay in invading Poland) has helped Stalin to avoid being painted as agressor and initiator of the WWII. All infamy has been left to Hitler....
2. According to Suvorov, Stalin have had total confidence that the war between Germany and the USSR was imminent. But he didn't want to fight it alone. He needed the West to help him, which was unthinkable in the 1930s. How to achieve this goal - to make them fight each other. And join the fight on his own terms... The last provision has not happened - Hitler had striken first, but just the fact that Germany had to fight on 2 fronts was a huge achievement for Stalin. In this sense, the Grat Patriotic War has been won in winter 1941 - where the Germans have been repelled from Moscow AND the USA have joined the Allies
 
A CHANGE OF OPINION: [I looked at Terraine's "A Time For Courage".]

(Thanks guys for the good comments! Also, please remember that most of my posts are written using my increasingly bad memory. I do not want to waste time checking everything.)

A SERIES OF OBSERVATIONS:

(1) SIMULTANEOUS GER/BR INTEREST IN TACTICAL NIGHT OPS: Night operations began to interest Bomber Command after December 1939. The "success" of No. 4 Group in dropping propaganda leaflets at night, low losses that stood in stark contrast to those groups operating in daylight against the German fleet on the coast, convinced BC to rethink policy. This rethinking was undertaken. German night actions, such as the bombing of Scapa Flow, helped influence the change.

(2) BOMBER COMMAND OPS AGAINST GER FLEET: Bomber Command operated moreorless exclusively against coastal targets in 1939/early 1940. John Terraine points out that the quasi-gentleman's agreement not to bomb cities helped save BC from a repeat of the "charge of the light brigade". That is, BC still focused on the "knockout blow", but the bombers were held back by a list of constraints.

(3) EARLY BR SUPPORT FOR STRAT BOMBING: The British Cabinet decided to initiate strategic air attacks against the Ruhr during the German invasion of France. A passage from John Terraine's book on BC is appropriate:

"It remained only for Churchill to sum up what was evidently a united Cabinet opinion in delivering a hard blow at Germany:

'He considered that the proposed operations would cut Germany at its tap root, and was hopeful that they might even provide an immediate contribution to the land battle. They should dispel French doubts about our willingness to suffer and also have a salutary effect on Italy. Finally, he considered that this was the psychological moment to strike Germany in her own country and convince the German people that we had both the will and the power to hit them hard. He accordingly suggested that operations should be carried out that evening.'

Pausing only to ask Duff Cooper to arrange that 'discreet reference should be made in the press to the killing of civilians in France and the Low Countries' by the Germany -- without, of course, any reference to the possibility of British retaliation, Churchill then steered the War Cabinet

'to authorize the Chief of the Air Staff to order Bomber Command to carry out attacks on suitable military objectives (including marshalling yards and oil refineries) in the Ruhr as well as elsewhere in Germany; and that these attacks should begin at night with approximately 100 heavy bombers.'

For the RAF representatives, this was a moment of consummation; Ironside tells us:

'I never saw anything so light up as the faces of the RAF when they heard that they were to be allowed to bomb oil refineries in the Ruhr. It did one good to see it. They have built their big bombers for this work and they have been keyed up for the work ever since the war began. Now they have got the chance'." (Terraine, p. 143)

AN IMPORTANT POINT: BC began it's "private war" against German industry that evening. It is yet another horrific example of how the British government abandoned the French state. Instead of tactical daylight or night attacks against German troop concentrations, supply lines, etc., Churchill's government redirected the bombers to pursue a longterm strategy of industrial attrition. There should not be any doubt here. Terraine clearly explains that the Ruhr campaign did not influence the fighting in France. The cabinet's illusions were only feable excuses...excuses that surface time and time again.

This brings up another point. The French government influenced the British decision to hold the bombers. The French reasoning was simple. The Luftwaffe could have retaliated by sending the bomber streams against Paris...a logical action if we regard the experiences of 1871/1914. The abandoning of their French ally allowed Britain to ignore this constraint. The timing of Churchill's decision (prior to the French surrender) was extremely cynical.

(4) CHURCHILL & MORALITY: Churchill had no illusions of the nature of strategic bombing. The prime minister argued in 1940 for a "knock-out blow" (the concept developed during the 1930s) using "absolutely devastating, EXTERMINATING attack". (emphasis mine) (Terraine, p. 260.) This philosophy cannot be reduced to the simple formula of "Germany started it".

(5) OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY: In leafing through Terraine's book, I do not get any indication of the "morality game"...ie., the attempt to place blame on either side for initiating the terror bombing of civilians. Instead, Terraine hints that the plans to kill women and children (on both sides) developed from a complex mixture of prewar planning, wartime events, and crude and escalating demands for retaliation. Seen in this way, the brutality of terror/ strategic bombing is similar to other darker episodes of WWII like the killing of POWs on the eastern front. [Doctrine or ideology combined with actual experience to increase the willingness to commit atrocities].

CONCLUSION: This framework fits well with my previous comments concerning the murky origins of WWII. I therefore retreat from any impressions that Britain alone held responsbility for the outbreak of terror bombing. Both sides used the other's bombing raids to justify their actions...actions that were intended from the outset. That the German Luftwaffe did not develop an adequate strategic bombing doctrine or capable weapons systems should not deflect attention from the desire to terrorize civilians and force the enemy to surrender. Nor should anyone hold Warsaw, Rotterdam or Coventry as events that fundamentally altered Bomber Command's "private war". Bomber Command clearly upheld a doctrine of saturation or carpet bombing that did not distinguish between military and civilian targets. Civilian targets (like marshalling yards, rail stations, and houses) in fact formed the basic target.
 
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IN RESPONSE TO REDCOAT:

The argument that Britain developed strategic bombing because of German WWI bombing is a poor one. This logic has no validity because it is extremly general and could be applied to every weapons system. Did the Germans develop battleships because of the "Dreadnought"? Sure. But technological developments are a part of life. Did the Americans and Soviets develop rocket technology because of Wehrner von Braun and Germany? Sure. But rockets were a good weapons system and could not be ignored. Did the Germans develop tanks because of British efforts during WWI. Sure. But none of this has any moral dimension. Furthermore, doctrine is another matter altogether.

The causal relationship between WWI Germany and WWII bombing is correct but useless in explaining anything other than an utterly ridiculous concept of moral responsibility. It is like saying that the Romans are to blame for slavery or the chinese for using gunpowder.

I am not sure, but I think that you are trying to suggest that the terror bombing of Germany can be attributed to WWI German air operations. I disagree. German WWI air operations can themselves be indirectly attributed to pre-20th Century artillery bombardment. Cities suffered under siege conditions. "Softening" up a target, or terrorizing the civilian population is a traditional method of war as old as war itself. The Germans only "enhanced" the concept in WWI. I am going to look into this subject. I suspect that Allied air operations on the western front (ie. in Alsace-Lorraine) probably targetted German villages and towns and therefore predate the German attacks against Britain. [The same could be true for Belgium/France in relation to the Germans] It is possible that the German high command adopted the viewpoint of Bomber Command in WWI...ie. we have to hit Britain and demonstrate defiance.

And, after reading Terraine, the British attacks against the German coast (which included such targets as the airfields at Wangerooge and not just naval vessels] led to civilian deaths because of the nature of strategic bombing. I, however, want to avoid the whole argument for the reasons stated in the previous post.

[I could mention a lot more. In reference to the B-17, you just have to account for doctrine. Billy Mitchell's work (that was similar to Trenchard and Douhet regarding terror) mattered. The "naval issue" helped the bombing pundits generate popular, political and fiscal support for bombers. The military has to justify expenditures and they develop a range of ideas for these purposes. This last point is hotly debated in connection to post-1945 developments...ie. what and who caused the Cold War].

[Lastly, the view in connection to British strategic bombing doctrine is just plain impossible to defend. You state: "Only after the German attack on Rotterdam. Before then they had been forbidden to attack targets within Germany". The attack on naval/ air targets in 1939/1940 refutes this point. You mention that yourself. There were more operations than just Wilhelmshaven...which is on the German mainland.]
 
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boris116 said:
I will ask my Russian friends if they know any such sites.
However, I should warn that the Soviet statistics was a very tricky animal

Thanks Boris! And by the way, I appreciate the point concerning Soviet stats. They really are a "very tricky animal".
 
Ollie....Your post of the 29/3/06
[1] Germany did start the terror bombing campaign with the Zeppelin Airships in WW1 which flew at such a height that fighters of the day could reach them at first.
[2] The German development on bombing techniques was pioneered by the Germans who would send out radio wave from to different radio transmitters, when the bombers found a change in the pulses coming from their radios they knew that they were over the target. This system was used on the Coventry raid with great success. After this raid Britain learnt how to bend those radio waves so that the bombers would mis their target.
[4] In 1939 and the early part of 1940 Britain had no bomber of any note, raids were carried out using the Bombay and the Whitley. The fast light bomber like the Blenheim had already been shot to pieces trying to do daylight raids and it was not until the mid 1940 did the Wellington bomber start coming on line and we did not have any four engine bombers at this stage. Churchill ordered the bombing of Berlin after the Luftwaffe had bombed London.
[6] Why shouldn't America design and build weapons that could be used for both defence and attack, or are you suggesting that they should have just sat their and done nothing until it was to late.
 
Ollie Garchy said:
Thanks Boris! And by the way, I appreciate the point concerning Soviet stats. They really are a "very tricky animal".

Оllie et al,

here are the numbers I have promised. They have been taken from the article by Dr. Mikhail Mukhin "Evolution of the Soviet Military Industry in 1921-1941 and the change of it's priorities"

http://www.rkka.ru/analys/oboronka/oboronka.htm

Here is my translation of the excerpt:

"From the moment of her creation, the Soviet Union had been preparing for the Big War. which neccesitated the permanent development and expansion of the Soviet military industry. Over time, the "oboronka"(defense industry) has become a huge industrial complex. In the end of the 30-s - early 30-s it was consuming up to 9-10% of GDP.
By the late 30-s it's share was about 30% of GDP"
 
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