That is someones opinion, all I did was deliver quotes. Those issues deal with the strategic level as well, we are talking tactics here.

Originally Posted by Wallabies

That is someones opinion, all I did was deliver quotes. Those issues deal with the strategic level as well, we are talking tactics here.

It happens to be the opinion of someone who was there.

Furthermore, someone who has read about and researched the war for a wider view than my own personal experience.

I suggest you read the following books for a different prospective:

"A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam" (1988) by Neil Sheehan, .

"STRANGE GROUND Americans in Vietnam 1945-1975 An Oral History" (1989) by Harry Maurer, ISBN 0380709317.

The latter was written by an admitted draft dodger and has the perspectives of many from generals to enlisted to diplomats during all phase of the war.

The first one will show how the US strategy changed over the long term of the war. It was not simply fought as you say in a WWII set piece strategy or tactics.

Please supply sources for your contention,"The jungle war in Vietnam was completely different to the battles in WW2".

It is my opinion. In WW2 it was armies vs armies, Vietnam was guerrilla. WW2 had some semblance of front lines, Vietnam didn't. And if you spent 4 years fighting jungle wars then you have no excuse for stuffing up Vietnam.

It happens to be the opinion of someone who was there. Were you? No, you are only 21, you weren't even born.

It was written by Albert Palazzo, a writer/researcher. And I don't even understand you saying that, if that is the case are we not to talk about any wars we were not in? That would leave the military history forums on this site pretty barren

It happens to be the opinion of someone who was there. Were you? No, you are only 21, you weren't even born.

Originally Posted by Wallabies

It was written by Albert Palazzo, a writer/researcher. And I don't even understand you saying that, if that is the case are we not to talk about any wars we were not in? That would leave the military history forums on this site pretty barren

Please review my edited post. Upon reflection I deleted that, and I apologize for it. This is a very sensitive subject for me.

Originally Posted by Wallabies

That is someones opinion, all I did was deliver quotes. Those issues deal with the strategic level as well, we are talking tactics here.

No, we are not just talking about tactics. The Topic is "Why Couldn't the US win the Vietnam War."

If we were, the source you used said," "Overall, the tactics used by the Australian Army in Vietnam were not successful."

As far as I am aware, Australian forces have performed well where ever they have served.

If wars were won are lost by tactics alone, the European Continent might be speaking German, if not for the ego of the "little Corporal".

Also from my previous post: On the Tet offensive.
"Although the offensive was a huge tactical failure which resulted in the decimation of whole units of Viet Cong, the end result was a moral victory for it broke the U.S. will to fight the war and public opinion in the U.S. turned against the government which resulted in the bombing of North Vietnam halted, and negotiations with U.S. officials opening as to how to end the war."
Battles may be won by tactics, wars are won by strategies. Even if it is just "outlast them".

If we were, the source you used said," "Overall, the tactics used by the Australian Army in Vietnam were not successful."

He may have used with word tactics, however what he said were not successful were strategic. And again stop referring to it as my source. I used it to get quotes, my sources are those who said them.

No, we are not just talking about tactics. The Topic is "Why Couldn't the US win the Vietnam War."

Yes, however you took what I said out of context, as the context was tactics.

wars are won by strategies. Even if it is just "outlast them".

Wasn't this the official US strategy? Attrition, guess who outlasted who.

The first one will show how the US strategy changed over the long term of the war. It was not simply fought as you say in a WWII set piece strategy or tactics.

I didn't say that.

The US military did not lose a single battle in Vietnam. The Vietnam war was lost in the end by the South Vietnam Army (ARVN) in 1975, 2 years after the last US combat troops left in March of 1973. You can say that US politicians lost the war, but do not say that the US military did. It just isn't so.

Well they certainly weren't winning it.

Ok well here, let me make a statement that will satisfy everybody and is as politically correct as you will get out of me.
The United States Military are experts at every aspect of warfare as long as the enemy is known to us and either wearing a uniform, or otherwiswe identified to us as a friendly.

That I can say is true and nobody can say its not cuase there have been many times we were told, " they might be friends, don't shoot till they shoot first"

Wolfen Said.....The United States Military are experts at every aspect of warfare as long as the enemy is known to us and either wearing a uniform, or otherwiswe identified to us as a friendly


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the wikipedia references to events in Phuoc Tuy Province following the Australian withdrawal are somewhat misleading. The insurgency quickly moved into the province but by 1972 the local force unit D445 had been effectively eliminated and would take a number of years to rebuild; one source states that by 1970 D445 had been reduced to the headquarters and political cadres. the regional unit was also heavily affected but by definition drew its forces from a larger area than just Phuoc Tuy.
Australian tactics were successful to the point Australian units could leave the province in significant numbers and for extended periods in order to take part in allied operations in other provinces without affecting the tactical situation in Phuoc Tuy.
Australian tactics were a development of British tactics used in Malaya, but also with a dose of US Marine procedures. the marines in IICorps essentially used similar tactics to the Australians but with less success because of the nature of the enemy effort in the area. it should be remembered that Phuoc Tuy province was not regarded as a vital area by the Viet Cong or North Viet Namese. once the initial effort to destroy the task force was comprehensively defeated at Long Tan the Australians mostly faced D445 and regional force units, neither to be compared with main force VC or regular NVA troops. the encounters with communist forces in the later stages of the deployment, when they decided, to quote one author, "to touch up" the departing Australians were against the tougher main force and NVA units where the commander of the platoon in the last serious encounter for the Australians, the aforementioned author, said that it was a close run thing between victory and massacre.
The American Army performed so poorly (possibly not the best word but i can't think of a better one) because it wasn't in Viet Nam for ten years; it was in for one year ten times. the operational and personnel experience was constantly being relearnt and a soldier returning even a year later would have been hard pressed to find significant change in the tactics or strategy of the American forces. add to this the loss of institutional experience engendered by each batch of conscripts being replaced. by the end of the war American tactics and strategy had changed, but not so much that a soldier in 1963 transported forward in time to 1973 would not have fitted in relatively easily. the same could not be said of the two world wars. ten years is a long time to be fighting without significant changes to the structure of the army, but by being forced to constantly relearn the basics it kept the institution in status quo. a more free flowing development of tactics by troops in longterm postings would have produced different results.
it is also a significant factor that at no point did the Viet Nam conflict significantly detract from American commitment to Europe and a potential conflict there. i might be mistaken, but i recall at least one source saying that more conscripts served in Europe over the course of those ten years than in Viet Nam. Westmoreland and Abrams were both highly regarded officers but it would be a bit of a stretch to compare their support to that of their counterparts in Supreme Allied Command Europe.
another factor that i don't think gets addressed in sufficient strength is the cause of the disillusionment; the constant promise of one last push to win the war. i think if the American government had left the conflict more of an open ended commitment and allowed for setbacks like Tet to upset the timetable the civilians and conscripts might have been far more patient and certainly more willing to accept political changes forced on the South Viet Namese in order to win the war. as it was any decision to change the government would only have further undermined confidence at home. the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan might be used as an indication of what it could have been like; there are hardly any protests and certainly no riots in America at the moment precisely because the military and politicians are saying that each could require a commitment of a decade or more, plus there is widespread acceptance of the need to replace Karzai in Afghanistan in order to win the war. of course the fact that these conflicts fall on a volunteer army might be a mitigating factor.