At what point
RayManKiller3
Active member
Israel will attack Iran as soon as they get enough F-35's if they do not comply with the U.N speculators. That is my opinion anyways. They will make sure Iran can't even get a chance to enrich enough material to even make one single nuke. Can't say I will blame Israel on such a decision either. If you got nothing to hide then why not let speculators come in and confirm what your doing?
grey shadow
Banned
Israel would be hard-pressed to destroy all of Iran's best-known targets. What's more, Iran has had years in which to build up covert facilities, disperse elements of its nuclear and missile programs, and develop options for recovering from such an attack.
Israel has fighters, refueling tankers and precision-guided air-to-ground weapons to strike at all of these targets—even if it flies the long-distance routes needed to avoid the most critical air defenses in neighboring Arab states. It is also far from clear that any Arab air force would risk engaging Israeli fighters. Syria, after all, did not attempt to engage Israeli fighters when they attacked the reactor being built in Syria.
In August 2003, the Israeli Air Force demonstrated the strategic capability to strike far-off targets such as Iran by flying three F-15 jets to Poland, 1,600 nautical miles away. Israel can launch and refuel two to three full squadrons of combat aircraft for a single set of strikes against Iran, and provide suitable refueling. Israel could also provide fighter escorts and has considerable electronic-warfare capability to suppress Iran's aging air defenses. It might take losses to Iran's fighters and surface-to-air missiles, but such losses would probably be limited.
Israel would, however, still face two critical problems. The first would be whether it can destroy a hardened underground facility like Natanz. The second is that a truly successful strike might have to hit far more targets over a much larger area than the three best-known sites. Iran has had years to build up covert and dispersed facilities, and is known to have dozens of other facilities associated with some aspect of its nuclear programs. Moreover, Israel would have to successfully strike at dozens of additional targets to do substantial damage to another key Iranian threat: its long-range missiles.
At best, such action would delay Iran's nuclear buildup. It is more likely to provoke the country into accelerating its plans. Either way, Israel would have to contend with the fact that it has consistently had a "red light" from the Obama administrations opposing such strikes. Any strike that overflew Arab territory or attacked a fellow Islamic state would stir the ire of neighboring Arab states, as well as Russia, China and several European states.
Israel has enough strike-attack aircraft and fighters in inventory to carry out a series of restrikes if Iran persisted in rebuilding, but it could not refuel a large-enough force, or provide enough intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities, to keep striking Iran at anything like the necessary scale. Moreover, Israel does not have enough forces to carry out a series of restrikes if Iran persisted in creating and rebuilding new facilities, and Arab states could not repeatedly standby and let Israel penetrate their air space. Israel might also have to deal with a Russia that would be far more willing to sell Iran advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles if Israel attacked the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr.
Any Israeli attack on an Iranian nuclear target would be a very complex operation in which a relatively large number of attack aircraft and support aircraft would participate. The conclusion is that Israel could attack only a few Iranian targets—not as part of a sustainable operation over time, but as a one-time surprise operation.
The alternatives, however, are not good for Israel, the U.S., Iran's neighbors or Arab neighbors. Of course being attacked is not good for Iran. Israel could still strike, if only to try to buy a few added years of time. Iranian persistence in developing nuclear weapons could push the U.S. into launching its own strike on Iran—although either an Israeli or U.S. strike might be used by Iran's hardliners to justify an all-out nuclear arms race. Further, it is far from clear that friendly Arab Gulf states would allow the U.S. to use bases on their soil for the kind of massive strike and follow-on restrikes that the U.S. would need to suppress Iran's efforts on a lasting basis.
These problems are why a number of senior Israeli intelligence experts and military officers feel that Israel should not strike Iran, although few would recommend that Israel avoid using the threat of such strikes to help U.S. and other diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to halt.
Israel has fighters, refueling tankers and precision-guided air-to-ground weapons to strike at all of these targets—even if it flies the long-distance routes needed to avoid the most critical air defenses in neighboring Arab states. It is also far from clear that any Arab air force would risk engaging Israeli fighters. Syria, after all, did not attempt to engage Israeli fighters when they attacked the reactor being built in Syria.
In August 2003, the Israeli Air Force demonstrated the strategic capability to strike far-off targets such as Iran by flying three F-15 jets to Poland, 1,600 nautical miles away. Israel can launch and refuel two to three full squadrons of combat aircraft for a single set of strikes against Iran, and provide suitable refueling. Israel could also provide fighter escorts and has considerable electronic-warfare capability to suppress Iran's aging air defenses. It might take losses to Iran's fighters and surface-to-air missiles, but such losses would probably be limited.
Israel would, however, still face two critical problems. The first would be whether it can destroy a hardened underground facility like Natanz. The second is that a truly successful strike might have to hit far more targets over a much larger area than the three best-known sites. Iran has had years to build up covert and dispersed facilities, and is known to have dozens of other facilities associated with some aspect of its nuclear programs. Moreover, Israel would have to successfully strike at dozens of additional targets to do substantial damage to another key Iranian threat: its long-range missiles.
At best, such action would delay Iran's nuclear buildup. It is more likely to provoke the country into accelerating its plans. Either way, Israel would have to contend with the fact that it has consistently had a "red light" from the Obama administrations opposing such strikes. Any strike that overflew Arab territory or attacked a fellow Islamic state would stir the ire of neighboring Arab states, as well as Russia, China and several European states.
Israel has enough strike-attack aircraft and fighters in inventory to carry out a series of restrikes if Iran persisted in rebuilding, but it could not refuel a large-enough force, or provide enough intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities, to keep striking Iran at anything like the necessary scale. Moreover, Israel does not have enough forces to carry out a series of restrikes if Iran persisted in creating and rebuilding new facilities, and Arab states could not repeatedly standby and let Israel penetrate their air space. Israel might also have to deal with a Russia that would be far more willing to sell Iran advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles if Israel attacked the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr.
Any Israeli attack on an Iranian nuclear target would be a very complex operation in which a relatively large number of attack aircraft and support aircraft would participate. The conclusion is that Israel could attack only a few Iranian targets—not as part of a sustainable operation over time, but as a one-time surprise operation.
The alternatives, however, are not good for Israel, the U.S., Iran's neighbors or Arab neighbors. Of course being attacked is not good for Iran. Israel could still strike, if only to try to buy a few added years of time. Iranian persistence in developing nuclear weapons could push the U.S. into launching its own strike on Iran—although either an Israeli or U.S. strike might be used by Iran's hardliners to justify an all-out nuclear arms race. Further, it is far from clear that friendly Arab Gulf states would allow the U.S. to use bases on their soil for the kind of massive strike and follow-on restrikes that the U.S. would need to suppress Iran's efforts on a lasting basis.
These problems are why a number of senior Israeli intelligence experts and military officers feel that Israel should not strike Iran, although few would recommend that Israel avoid using the threat of such strikes to help U.S. and other diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to halt.
84RFK
Active member
I don't think I like the sound of that Grey Shadow.
The balance of terror (M.A.D.) theory worked throughout the cold war, but how will that scenario work on an enemy who is not afraid of death...
And I don't suppose we are likely to see a change of regime (to the better) in Iran anytime soon.
The balance of terror (M.A.D.) theory worked throughout the cold war, but how will that scenario work on an enemy who is not afraid of death...
And I don't suppose we are likely to see a change of regime (to the better) in Iran anytime soon.
A Can of Man
Je suis aware
The Iranians are afraid of death. They probably won't do anything that will ensure the destruction of their country, which would be the use of WMDs.
Yossarian
Forum Resistance Leader
All it would take, is either a miscommunication, either intentional accidental, or a moment of ideological madness.
Miscoummunication has almost destroyed our civilization as we know it before. And we can learn from those leasons.
As for the later example,...well
Miscoummunication has almost destroyed our civilization as we know it before. And we can learn from those leasons.
As for the later example,...well
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84RFK
Active member
The Iranian people are, their leadership isn't, and they don't care about the people...
grey shadow
Banned
From the Israeli viewpoint, an Iranian bomb will mean that for the first time an enemy country - and Iran is an enemy country by all definitions - will acquire the capability to inflict a very heavy blow on Israel. The more so since the formal Iranian position is that Israel should disappear from the map, that the solution of the Palestinian problem should be the establishment of a Palestinian state not alongside Israel but instead of Israel. No Arab government today holds such a position.
A nuclear Iran has to take into account certain important constraints. One is American deterrence. The Iranians have no doubt about the balance of power between themselves and the Americans. And if they had any doubts, the American conduct of the war in Iraq left no doubt about American capabilities. The Iranians must also take into account that if Iran uses a nuclear bomb against any of the allies of the U.S., especially against Israel, America will regard this as an attack against itself, and will react accordingly.
The bottom line is that to carry out such an attack is a huge mission. It may be necessary to repeat such an attack two or three times because one attack may not be enough. In my judgment, it's a matter for a superpower to consider, not a local power, even if its name is Israel.
A nuclear Iran has to take into account certain important constraints. One is American deterrence. The Iranians have no doubt about the balance of power between themselves and the Americans. And if they had any doubts, the American conduct of the war in Iraq left no doubt about American capabilities. The Iranians must also take into account that if Iran uses a nuclear bomb against any of the allies of the U.S., especially against Israel, America will regard this as an attack against itself, and will react accordingly.
The bottom line is that to carry out such an attack is a huge mission. It may be necessary to repeat such an attack two or three times because one attack may not be enough. In my judgment, it's a matter for a superpower to consider, not a local power, even if its name is Israel.
Yossarian
Forum Resistance Leader
Sometimes I think about the locking of interest that the U.S. and the USSR had in Middle Eastern affairs during the cold war, and how that could in itself had the possibility to put a freeze on situations like this.
But on the flip side of that coin, attempts to gain allies or at least freindly enemies in the Middle East also almost led both super powers then to an irreversable war path.
That was then,
What I think is now, what will world powers on both sides of the arguement will do if this situation becomes reality, and an skeptical approach to an Israeli attack, now becomes an practical approach, meaning they are now directly threatened, not theoreticly threatened.
I don't know what, or how other powers with interest in the region would react, powers such as the Russian Federation, and China, who both have their own interest and goals in the region.
And who should act? And what should they do? Who should be the mediator between Iran and Israel? Who should keep the back channels open to avoid calamity ?
The U.S.? The Russian Federation? China or the Arab League?
But on the flip side of that coin, attempts to gain allies or at least freindly enemies in the Middle East also almost led both super powers then to an irreversable war path.
That was then,
What I think is now, what will world powers on both sides of the arguement will do if this situation becomes reality, and an skeptical approach to an Israeli attack, now becomes an practical approach, meaning they are now directly threatened, not theoreticly threatened.
I don't know what, or how other powers with interest in the region would react, powers such as the Russian Federation, and China, who both have their own interest and goals in the region.
And who should act? And what should they do? Who should be the mediator between Iran and Israel? Who should keep the back channels open to avoid calamity ?
The U.S.? The Russian Federation? China or the Arab League?
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grey shadow
Banned
Iran knows that Israel will not wait passively as Iran develops a nuclear capability. Like several Arab states, Israel already is developing better missile and air defenses, and more-advanced forms of its Arrow ballistic missile defenses. There are reports that Israel is increasing the range-payload of its nuclear-armed missiles and is developing sea-based nuclear-armed cruise missiles for its submarines.
While Iran is larger than Israel, its population centers are so vulnerable to Israeli thermonuclear weapons that Israel already is a major "existential" threat to Iran. Moreover, provoking its Arab neighbors and Turkey into developing their nuclear capabilities, or the U.S. into offering them a nuclear umbrella targeted on Iran, could create additional threats, as well as make Iran's neighbors even more dependent on the U.S. for their security. Iran's search for nuclear-armed missiles may well unite its neighbors against it as well as create a major new nuclear threat to its survival.
But it is doubtful that Israel would break the nuclear taboo unless Iran first launched ballistic missile or air attacks with chemical, biological, or radiological weapons of mass destruction.
International Reactions to an Israeli Strike
Russia . Moscow would be the big winner of an Israeli-Iranian war. Russia has invested heavily in cultivating a strategic alliance with Tehran that has given it a lucrative export market for its nuclear, military, and other technologies and a useful ally for contesting American influence. Russia also stands to accrue substantial economic benefits from the spike in world oil prices that would accompany an Israeli-Iranian military crisis since its chief export is oil. But an Israeli-Iranian war would also pose risks for Moscow. Hundreds of Russian scientists and technicians work at the Bushehr nuclear complex and could become collateral casualties if Israel opts to destroy that facility. If any were killed it would be added incentive for Moscow to push hard at the U.N. Security Council for sanctions on Israel.
China . Beijing is likely to protect its growing economic, energy, and geopolitical investment in Iran by firmly supporting its ally at the Security Council and pushing for a denunciation and possible sanctions against Israel.
Arab states. Publicly, most Arab countries would denounce an Israeli preventive attack as further evidence of Israeli hostility to the Muslim world. But most, with the exception of Iran's ally Syria, would privately welcome the attack. Even if it did not permanently prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb, it could divert Iran from threatening its smaller Arab neighbors.
Europe . Most European states, with the possible exception of Britain and France, would likely criticize Israel for launching its attack. Many European states would suffer adverse economic consequences from the resulting spike in world oil prices.
While Iran is larger than Israel, its population centers are so vulnerable to Israeli thermonuclear weapons that Israel already is a major "existential" threat to Iran. Moreover, provoking its Arab neighbors and Turkey into developing their nuclear capabilities, or the U.S. into offering them a nuclear umbrella targeted on Iran, could create additional threats, as well as make Iran's neighbors even more dependent on the U.S. for their security. Iran's search for nuclear-armed missiles may well unite its neighbors against it as well as create a major new nuclear threat to its survival.
But it is doubtful that Israel would break the nuclear taboo unless Iran first launched ballistic missile or air attacks with chemical, biological, or radiological weapons of mass destruction.
International Reactions to an Israeli Strike
Russia . Moscow would be the big winner of an Israeli-Iranian war. Russia has invested heavily in cultivating a strategic alliance with Tehran that has given it a lucrative export market for its nuclear, military, and other technologies and a useful ally for contesting American influence. Russia also stands to accrue substantial economic benefits from the spike in world oil prices that would accompany an Israeli-Iranian military crisis since its chief export is oil. But an Israeli-Iranian war would also pose risks for Moscow. Hundreds of Russian scientists and technicians work at the Bushehr nuclear complex and could become collateral casualties if Israel opts to destroy that facility. If any were killed it would be added incentive for Moscow to push hard at the U.N. Security Council for sanctions on Israel.
China . Beijing is likely to protect its growing economic, energy, and geopolitical investment in Iran by firmly supporting its ally at the Security Council and pushing for a denunciation and possible sanctions against Israel.
Arab states. Publicly, most Arab countries would denounce an Israeli preventive attack as further evidence of Israeli hostility to the Muslim world. But most, with the exception of Iran's ally Syria, would privately welcome the attack. Even if it did not permanently prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb, it could divert Iran from threatening its smaller Arab neighbors.
Europe . Most European states, with the possible exception of Britain and France, would likely criticize Israel for launching its attack. Many European states would suffer adverse economic consequences from the resulting spike in world oil prices.
84RFK
Active member
In short: the best we can hope for in the Middle East is a small scale copy of the cold war?
What are the chances that the Arab states neighbouring Iran would interfer with or condemn the Iranian nuclear program, either by common sense or cultural (Persian vs Arab) differense?
The common sense aspect doesn't seem to have any major part in the history of the Middle-East, but even the most fanatic religious believer must surely realise that a full scale thermonuclear attack on Israel will render the area uninhabitable for all foreseeable future.
And what's the point of "liberating" the holy city and the Palestine if the Palestinians are erased by the same stroke?
Fiat justitia pereat mundi sounds good in philosophical terms, but it doesn't work in real life.
What are the chances that the Arab states neighbouring Iran would interfer with or condemn the Iranian nuclear program, either by common sense or cultural (Persian vs Arab) differense?
The common sense aspect doesn't seem to have any major part in the history of the Middle-East, but even the most fanatic religious believer must surely realise that a full scale thermonuclear attack on Israel will render the area uninhabitable for all foreseeable future.
And what's the point of "liberating" the holy city and the Palestine if the Palestinians are erased by the same stroke?
Fiat justitia pereat mundi sounds good in philosophical terms, but it doesn't work in real life.
84RFK
Active member
In lack of anything better....AMEN!
grey shadow
Banned
Some condemn Iran's nuclear programme, others defend it; some compare Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Hitler; others see him as the savior of Islam's honor. By and large, the Arab world and its press are split over Iran's nuclear ambitions.
For the Kuwaiti the "fear is not of the mere acquisition of nuclear weapons and atomic energy—since the European countries have such weapons, as do Russia and Israel. What they fear is that these weapons might fall into the hands of a truly unconstitutional and undemocratic dictatorship. In an editorial, the Egyptian government daily Al-Ahram warned that if the world did not respond appropriately to Iran's announcement, a nuclear arms race might result in the region. Also for Qatari daily Al-Raya, the Gulf region is in "great danger". "How can we be calm about Iran, when it still occupies the UAE's islands, and has a problem with every country in the region?"
I don´t think that Israel is the target. I think the scenario is much more frightening than that.
It is inconceivable, that Iran will drop the bomb on Syria and target Jordan or Egypt. It is incomprehensible that Iran will bomb Israel, which has a shield of missiles, tremendous firepower, and nuclear weapons sufficient to eradicate every city in Iran. In addition, any attack on Israel would mean the immediate, wide-scale destruction of the Palestinians. . . . This means that if this destructive weapon is used, the only option for a target is the Arab Gulf countries.
"Agnosco fortunam Cartaginis" I'm afraid.