Structuring the Military

All this talk of breaking down teams into four man fire team, but do you have to plan for this, can't it just be done by Company Commander. Years back we would go out on any thing from 2 man patrols up to company strength, it all depends on your requirements of the day are. Are you all trying tell me that this can't be done in the American Army at the moment, are guide lines that rigid
 
Yeah, actually fireteams are integral to US Army doctorine. Obviously when you're under fire you get people to do a task regardless of the ostensive organization. But squad-level US Army Infantry tactics really does revolve around the use of fireteams.

It is set up much as at the squad level. The fireteam has its own section leader. There are two SAWs given to a squad; one SAW man is in fireteam A the other is in fireteam B. etc.

This is especially true in MOUT fighting where when you watch US Army practice footage you'll see 4 guys covering every angle, normally stacked up against a wall with 2 guys facing forwards, one guy watching the side and another watching the rear; that is a fireteam.

But of course the US Army has traditionally won engagements by its abilities to adapt. So the fireteam design is to give squad leaders much more powerful tactical options rather than to constrict them to a tight set of rules.

It is much the same thing as if you're a platoon leader defending a hill and you need to set up an obersation post you arn't going to send a whole squad up to the OP, you're just going to send two guys and leave the rest of the squad to dig in the defensive position.
 
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Other countries, like Spain, France and Italy have their semi-military, semi-police corps - called "Carabinieri", "Gendarmes", "Guardia Civile". They are trained to do both duties and some people say these organisations are very well suited for this new kind of warfare.
Can somebody from these countries give their opinion on this matter? Thanks!
 
WD I see what you are saying, and that is the type of thing that I mean. That small independantly acting unit is the type of unit I am referring to, but on a larger scale, it that makes sense.

These units make the tactical decisions on the battlefield, not so much choosing when and where to fight, but more so choosing how they fight. <At least this is my understanding of it>. The depend on their superior, distanced HQ's for stategic control, actually choosing when and where to strike.

THis is what I am talking about;
A) Reevaluate the current fireteam size/complement,
B) Restructure the hierarchy from fireteam up
1) Give more control to the small unit leaders
2) Reduce/Remove the bulky HQ, Depots, etc.
C) Restructure how post-conventional occupation(1) zones are held
1) Divide a conflict zone into sectors
a. NOT uniform system, flexible with needs of environment/enemy
2) Position the small-units within these sectors
a. Give them the ability to coordinate with other small units located nearby
b. Keep an HQ, not so much for DIRECTION, but more for COORDINATION, especially in operations requiring arty and air support
c. (IMO Most important) Keep these units roaming, rather than going back to a main base. Keep them well-supplied through a system of helicopter transports.

(1)occupation Given todays political situations, I choose my words carefully. I dont mean occupation with any negative connotation, I simply mean immediatly follwing the defeat of an enemies conventional force, and the reconstruction that follows.

I dont know if this makes much sense to those who see how the current structure works first-hand. If I am mistaken in some of my thoughts or ideas, I would appreciate being informed.
 
The Military is constantly evolving, the idea is to stay AHEAD of the learning curve. As to say we learned much from Nam, however LEARNED is the key word...hindsight.
Our current Forces MUST be proactive NOT reactive, You can train a monkey to react.
The original poster can rest assured that noncon warfare is a top training priority and will continue to be so as wars, conflicts and battles change.
The prevailing thinking and overall mindset within military, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency service communities may need more modification in order to meet and combat these newly and continuing evolving patterns involving non-state actors and asymmetric warfare. Conceptually, the preparations, tactics, and strategies for fighting numerous "brush fire" conflicts and larger numbers of small scale but high-impact terrorist incidents, could prove a major challenge for those with an entrenched large force "Cold-War" mentality.
Those that are still mired in fighting another "Desert Storm" or want to continue to live in the comfortable past of a largely bi-polar, superpower-driven global situation may be in for a rude awakening as the nature of asymmetric conflict unfolds in the coming decade. There are few, if any, countries that can militarily challenge the United States in open combat at the present time. Some seemingly astute assessments would suggest that China may become a future adversary with the industrial and conventional military power to eventually confront America and her allies, but they also point out that this capability is still evolving and that it may take China a minimum of three to five (3-5) years, or more, to become a major threat to the United States and overall world stability.
Instead, given a reasonably effective foreign policy, assessments would respectfully suggest that the near term threat to Americans and our country's security may bring more a confusing mix of "stateless actors," separatist and fringe "independence movements," insurgency operations, terrorist attacks, the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Information Warfare (IW), and other unconventional threats. The nature of our defense thinking, training, weapons, equipment, intelligence operations, and national emergency response systems must be redefined and redirected in order to meet these threats that are concurrently both devolving and evolving.
It should not be forgotten that our most important asset in our war with terrorists, and in our defense against other non-conventional threats, rests with the young men and women of our nation's national security and emergency service communities. While useful in more conventional circumstances, "Stand-off" missiles, ICBM's, Nuclear Weapons, and other theatre weapons are practically useless in our response to insurgents, revolutionaries, and terrorist threats. That responsibility will undoubtedly fall on smaller groups of highly trained, better-equipped, and highly motivated anti- and counter-terrorist operatives and agencies, who will monitor, infiltrate, close with and destroy those that would engage in this insidious type of future warfare. Our people will make the difference, if we give them the resources to accomplish the task.
 
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