deerslayer
Milforum Swamp Dweller
I'm working on a paper right now which uses thermodynamics to help understand how an operating doctrine can be developed. It's only partially completed, but I'm looking for input from a military-oriented community.
First, what would you consider most important in responding to a terrorist attack within the first few hours? Days? etc.
Second, what current methodology or theory (Clausewitz, Boyd, Sun Tzu, etc) would you consider best adapted for homeland defense, and which methodology would be best suited to actively combatting a fourth-generation threat?
Here's a look at the paper in its beginnings-
Perpetuating Destruction: Application of Thermodynamics to
Fourth Generation Warfare- Definition of Operational Theory And Methodology
In “The Bureaucratic Bungle” I tackled the task of expounding on the current accepted views and theories of “Fourth Generation Warfare”, or 4GW. As this previous paper stated, 4GW remains a looming nonlinear threat, which can be combated with relative diplomatic immunity by a stable and sound government with level-headed leaders. However, previous works and further research into the subject found that a clear operating methodology or “Standard Operating Procedure” for dealing with 4GW was almost nonexistent. Rather than having a clear, concrete definition of dealing with the proliferation of guerilla or low-intensity conflict (“L.I.C.”). The purpose of this paper is to define, using an easily understood scientific concept, an SOP for the current guerilla or extremist threat.
Thermodynamics refers to the scientific study of the relations between mass and energy conservation. Its two most basic concepts are those of “mass conservation” (the Law of Conservation of Mass) and “entropy” (the Law of Entropy). Thermodynamics provides such a good reference and analogy to 4GW because it defines an almost perpetuating system whose concepts refer to both constant variables and changing ones.
The Law of Conservation of Mass states that matter can neither be created nor destroyed. The amount of matter at the beginning of Earth has remained constant throughout its approximate 4.6 billion years of existence. The analogy can be made, therefore, that guerilla conflict has been in use since the existence of mankind; we are only seeing a greater proliferation of it in recent times and in developing or lower socioeconomic-class countries. From the standpoint of an industrialized nation, L.I.C. does not “add up”. Speaking in generalities, we do not understand the extremist or liberationist mind-set. This concept has been stated in “The Bureaucratic Bungle”.
Entropy is a somewhat more difficult concept to grasp, maybe more so in the analogy used in this paper. However, for the sake of connecting to the previous analogy, entropy describes the loss of functionality in a system due to usable energy being lost as heat.
As the above graphic illustrates, the quality and success of any military operation in a fourth-generation environment are inversely proportionate to the amount of friction and entropy within the system. It is possibly best to gather these internal and external frictions under an umbrella acronym which is easily recognizable, OPSEC.
OPSEC, or OPerational SECurity, is used to describe the overall protection and security of an internal process, be it in business, conventional or unconventional warfare.
OPSEC is essentially an umbrella term under which both external and internal frictions of conflict are grouped. It can be defined as the ultimate depository for all Clausewitzian frictions. Think of OPSEC as a machine operating on basic mechanical principles of kinetic and potential energy While taking into account the extraordinary amount of potential energy (friction) it must expend a much larger amount of kinetic energy (process of action) to keep friction at a manageable level.
In this perpetuating action, we see a great deal of wasted or lost energy and initiative. This is what is meant by entropy. OPSEC therefore has three distinct functions in the warfare community: Friction control, energy expenditure and conservation, and keeping entropy at manageable and semi-efficient levels. Refer back to the military as a system. This system can either be open (a high-profile/publicized/funded/self-perpetuating- the basis of the military in general) or closed (smaller organization, more agile decision making, complete or partial loss of internal sanctioning- a field unit or special-operations detachment). Therefore, in this context, we see an increase of entropy and friction as the system opens itself upward through the chain of command.
Friction and entropy control is the basis of this paper- Clausewitz defined it in his own time, but as warfare gradually changes and the fourth-generation mind-set is gradually realized within our own government, his thinking will probably be pushed more towards a “homeland defense” connotation. As a result, new methodologies must be developed from scratch or adapted from previous works. Sun Tzu’s use of friction against the enemy is probably most suited for this purpose. In his “Art of War”, Sun Tzu adheres to the best defense being a good offense. Keep at the enemy, overpower him militarily, politically, and attempt change in his thinking, and he will be deterred from acts of violence. President Bush seemed to understand this in the initial days leading to war, but initiative has been lost as public disdain for warfare and a slew of scandals and economic problems have arisen. In short, friction has overwhelmed our home support for war.
Note that in all graphics, friction is inversely proportionate to its counterpart of security.
Having defined the main Clausewitzian influence in this writing, the major use of Clausewitz as a driving force in offensive doctrine will no longer be mentioned, except for defining the enhancement of operational security. But to offer background to the uninitiated, Clausewitz’s ideas form the backbone of U.S. military fighting doctrine. His principles are based around a balance of political force and military muscle. As stated earlier, he wishes to diminish his frictions as much as possible. Certainly, these ideas are wonderful when writing methodology for a concrete, declared opponent. However, political expediency and balance in a conflict such as Afghanistan has little room for application.
Wait just a minute, thinks the reader. Clausewitz, the greatest influence on our military doctrine and operational methods, was incorrect? Not quite; while his ideas will be criticized and critiqued throughout this writing, his main ideas will be retained when creating a theoretical operating system for fourth generation warfare. More specifically, his ideas will be retained while adding core concepts of his counterparts in the field of military theory, chiefly Sun Tzu. In order to design or assemble any new doctrine, key requirements (a sort of doctrinal TO&E) must be assembled. They are as follows:
Definition of Requirements in a Stable SOP
Requisite # 1: Time
In the third generation of conflict, we see a particular influence in battle through the concept of time. Recall that fourth generation conflict is nonlinear in regards to both geographics and time. Sensibly, then, time should not be an essential factor in the conduct of a fourth generation war, should it? The answer is no. On the contrary, time is a key factor in the success of a fourth generation mission, chiefly because of socio-political factors. Henceforth, public opinion and redundant bureaucratic actions become Opponent # 1, because they conflict with the first requirement of this doctrine. By keeping public support for war in manageable and sustainable limits, it is possible to have the support base to both keep morale high and maintain a healthy image of military life for future recruitment opportunities.
In responding to an outside threat or stimulus, the factor of time is the most critical asset. At the very least some form of intelligence, at least RUMINT, should start being dissected within the first few hours.
First, what would you consider most important in responding to a terrorist attack within the first few hours? Days? etc.
Second, what current methodology or theory (Clausewitz, Boyd, Sun Tzu, etc) would you consider best adapted for homeland defense, and which methodology would be best suited to actively combatting a fourth-generation threat?
Here's a look at the paper in its beginnings-
Perpetuating Destruction: Application of Thermodynamics to
Fourth Generation Warfare- Definition of Operational Theory And Methodology
In “The Bureaucratic Bungle” I tackled the task of expounding on the current accepted views and theories of “Fourth Generation Warfare”, or 4GW. As this previous paper stated, 4GW remains a looming nonlinear threat, which can be combated with relative diplomatic immunity by a stable and sound government with level-headed leaders. However, previous works and further research into the subject found that a clear operating methodology or “Standard Operating Procedure” for dealing with 4GW was almost nonexistent. Rather than having a clear, concrete definition of dealing with the proliferation of guerilla or low-intensity conflict (“L.I.C.”). The purpose of this paper is to define, using an easily understood scientific concept, an SOP for the current guerilla or extremist threat.
Thermodynamics refers to the scientific study of the relations between mass and energy conservation. Its two most basic concepts are those of “mass conservation” (the Law of Conservation of Mass) and “entropy” (the Law of Entropy). Thermodynamics provides such a good reference and analogy to 4GW because it defines an almost perpetuating system whose concepts refer to both constant variables and changing ones.
The Law of Conservation of Mass states that matter can neither be created nor destroyed. The amount of matter at the beginning of Earth has remained constant throughout its approximate 4.6 billion years of existence. The analogy can be made, therefore, that guerilla conflict has been in use since the existence of mankind; we are only seeing a greater proliferation of it in recent times and in developing or lower socioeconomic-class countries. From the standpoint of an industrialized nation, L.I.C. does not “add up”. Speaking in generalities, we do not understand the extremist or liberationist mind-set. This concept has been stated in “The Bureaucratic Bungle”.
Entropy is a somewhat more difficult concept to grasp, maybe more so in the analogy used in this paper. However, for the sake of connecting to the previous analogy, entropy describes the loss of functionality in a system due to usable energy being lost as heat.
As the above graphic illustrates, the quality and success of any military operation in a fourth-generation environment are inversely proportionate to the amount of friction and entropy within the system. It is possibly best to gather these internal and external frictions under an umbrella acronym which is easily recognizable, OPSEC.
OPSEC, or OPerational SECurity, is used to describe the overall protection and security of an internal process, be it in business, conventional or unconventional warfare.
OPSEC is essentially an umbrella term under which both external and internal frictions of conflict are grouped. It can be defined as the ultimate depository for all Clausewitzian frictions. Think of OPSEC as a machine operating on basic mechanical principles of kinetic and potential energy While taking into account the extraordinary amount of potential energy (friction) it must expend a much larger amount of kinetic energy (process of action) to keep friction at a manageable level.
In this perpetuating action, we see a great deal of wasted or lost energy and initiative. This is what is meant by entropy. OPSEC therefore has three distinct functions in the warfare community: Friction control, energy expenditure and conservation, and keeping entropy at manageable and semi-efficient levels. Refer back to the military as a system. This system can either be open (a high-profile/publicized/funded/self-perpetuating- the basis of the military in general) or closed (smaller organization, more agile decision making, complete or partial loss of internal sanctioning- a field unit or special-operations detachment). Therefore, in this context, we see an increase of entropy and friction as the system opens itself upward through the chain of command.
Friction and entropy control is the basis of this paper- Clausewitz defined it in his own time, but as warfare gradually changes and the fourth-generation mind-set is gradually realized within our own government, his thinking will probably be pushed more towards a “homeland defense” connotation. As a result, new methodologies must be developed from scratch or adapted from previous works. Sun Tzu’s use of friction against the enemy is probably most suited for this purpose. In his “Art of War”, Sun Tzu adheres to the best defense being a good offense. Keep at the enemy, overpower him militarily, politically, and attempt change in his thinking, and he will be deterred from acts of violence. President Bush seemed to understand this in the initial days leading to war, but initiative has been lost as public disdain for warfare and a slew of scandals and economic problems have arisen. In short, friction has overwhelmed our home support for war.
Note that in all graphics, friction is inversely proportionate to its counterpart of security.
Having defined the main Clausewitzian influence in this writing, the major use of Clausewitz as a driving force in offensive doctrine will no longer be mentioned, except for defining the enhancement of operational security. But to offer background to the uninitiated, Clausewitz’s ideas form the backbone of U.S. military fighting doctrine. His principles are based around a balance of political force and military muscle. As stated earlier, he wishes to diminish his frictions as much as possible. Certainly, these ideas are wonderful when writing methodology for a concrete, declared opponent. However, political expediency and balance in a conflict such as Afghanistan has little room for application.
Wait just a minute, thinks the reader. Clausewitz, the greatest influence on our military doctrine and operational methods, was incorrect? Not quite; while his ideas will be criticized and critiqued throughout this writing, his main ideas will be retained when creating a theoretical operating system for fourth generation warfare. More specifically, his ideas will be retained while adding core concepts of his counterparts in the field of military theory, chiefly Sun Tzu. In order to design or assemble any new doctrine, key requirements (a sort of doctrinal TO&E) must be assembled. They are as follows:
Definition of Requirements in a Stable SOP
Requisite # 1: Time
In the third generation of conflict, we see a particular influence in battle through the concept of time. Recall that fourth generation conflict is nonlinear in regards to both geographics and time. Sensibly, then, time should not be an essential factor in the conduct of a fourth generation war, should it? The answer is no. On the contrary, time is a key factor in the success of a fourth generation mission, chiefly because of socio-political factors. Henceforth, public opinion and redundant bureaucratic actions become Opponent # 1, because they conflict with the first requirement of this doctrine. By keeping public support for war in manageable and sustainable limits, it is possible to have the support base to both keep morale high and maintain a healthy image of military life for future recruitment opportunities.
In responding to an outside threat or stimulus, the factor of time is the most critical asset. At the very least some form of intelligence, at least RUMINT, should start being dissected within the first few hours.
Preceding Phase- Time period occurring before actual threat becomes a reality. Can be measured in days, months, years, etc.