How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror)

[VDKMS]

But that's the point isn't it. Of course they can't win decisively on the battlefield. If they could they wouldn't be fighting a guerrilla war in the first place. The key to winning an insurgency is causing your opponent to lose the will to fight any longer. They simply have to not lose to accomplish that point. One can never completely destroy the enemy in an insurgency with military might. It's virtually impossible. You have to defeat the will and the ideology. That's accomplished first by providing security to the locals. If they don't have to worry about getting intimidated into the service of the Taliban, Viet Cong, Hamas, whatever....the pool of recruits will dry up. After the locals feel secure, all of a sudden you'll start to get actionable intelligence. You can start forming informant networks. It gets much harder for the enemy to operate freely. The people start to see normalcy and that you're not such a bad dude...but most importantly...that you're winning.

People aren't dumb. Regardless of the regime that's backing whatever group...the people are going to back the side that is most likely to win. If they don't, then they get dead when that side eventually wins. The people mostly just want to live their lives without all the fuss about freedom or sharia...both sides are affecting that normalcy...they know we aren't going to stay, so most of them are hedging their bets with the Taliban...hence the Taliban will win.

We can win every battle against the Taliban and lose the whole war because we didn't fight hard enough for the battleground that was the most important to winning the war...the people.

That's why I said in this post :

You can't win that war with military power. Their madrassas keep spitting out brainwashed suicide bombers and fanatic warriors as long as they excist. The government must prohibit such religious schools. Education is the best weapon to fight religious fanatics. Once people start to think on their own they'll see what a madness the Taliban (and any other religious fanatic gang) really is.​

 

[brinktk]

Now I know what you meant by "actionable intelligence" you meant something local that the Taliban are up to in Afghanistan that the NATO-ISAF can take action against.

OK, but if that is all you do - just the local fight, never the strategic fight - then you never win. You just keep mopping up the Taliban foot-soldiers as the Pakistani ISI keeps creating new recruits for the Taliban.

At some point, you need to see the big picture and tackle the problem at source.

At the moment, you can't see the wood for the trees.

Ironic that you're claiming I don't know what I'm talking about...

Tell me, what's you're degree in? Where is you're professional experience on the matter other than conjecture and extremist views? How many insurgents have you fought face to face with? What makes you think you're qualified to say that I can't see the forest for the trees? Do you even know who Mr. Murphy is? Do you understand that military operations are not a science and that there is no ONE answer? EVERY strategy can be defeated, every enemy can bloody your nose. They have a say in the matter of your plans and their outcome...I REALLY wish I could have taken you to some of the areas I've soldiered in to see what brilliant advice you'd have for controlling those areas...if you had lived long enough to give the advice in the first place...

 

[Peter Dow]

Road-side bombs again. We need a secure perimeter for the supply roads

Bombs Kill 3 NATO Troops, 9 Afghans

By AMIR SHAH Associated Press
KABUL, Afghanistan April 30, 2013 (AP)

Roadside bomb attacks in Afghanistan killed three NATO service members and nine Afghans on Tuesday, officials said, clear evidence that the insurgents' annual spring offensive is underway.

The service members died in southern Afghanistan, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan said in a brief statement that provided no other information.

In another attack in the south of the country, a roadside bomb in the Shah Wali Kot district of Kandahar province killed three civilians and wounded five, said Jawed Faisal, a spokesman for the provincial governor.

The Taliban and other insurgent groups make heavy use of roadside bombs. They are among the deadliest weapons in the Afghan war for civilians.

In the north, in Archi district in the province of Kunduz, a roadside bomb killed two people, including a local police commander who had been credited with reducing the number of insurgent attacks in his area, said Abdul Nazar, a local council member.

Commander Miran and his driver were killed and two other police officers were wounded when the car they were driving toward Kunduz City was destroyed by a bomb hidden on the road, said Nazar. Like many Afghans, Miran only used one name.

On Tuesday evening, a roadside bomb exploded in Uruzgan province in central Afghanistan, killing four civilians in a car and wounding two, said police spokesman Fareed Ayal.

Road-side bombs again guys and it's an attack that works for the Taliban just because we haven't secured the few main highways we must use by building a secure perimeter around the road - barbed wire, guard posts, minefields - and thereby keeping the enemy far away from the road at all times.

Instead, our generals have for years stuck with the same old bad patrolling plan and so the enemy just watches the road and after one patrol has passed and before the next patrol arrives, the enemy times it correctly to sneak up to the road and lay their road-side bombs.

The enemy can sneak up to the road so easily because they don't have to cross a minefield, they don't have to penetrate barbed wire and there isn't guard posts with guards with machine guns watching over the land either side of the road 24/7, defending the approaches to the road the whole length of the road.

Then the next patrol or some other vehicle later on comes along the road and gets blown up by the road-side bomb we failed to stop the enemy planting in the first place.

Here's what my solution to create a secure perimeter for the supply roads might look like.

Secure supply route border defences plan diagram (described in full in posts #4, #5, #6 & #7)

Can you see how that brings the road "inside the wire"? That's a plan that could work to keep the main highways safe to use.

Mine is not a plan for the small side-roads far away from the highways. We don't have to use these side-roads to supply our main bases. We should only have our main bases next to the main supply roads. We should not have isolated bases which are difficult to supply. We need to abandon those isolated bases in bandit territory and fight the enemy there using air-power, aerial bombing, drones, attack helicopters, airborne raids and so on. There's no need to drive to those out-of-the-way hideouts the enemy has.

 

[D.J]

[FONT=&quot]Your [FONT=&quot]strategy [/FONT][FONT=&quot]is to build[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]thousands of small forts to control territory and prevent enemy movement and infiltration. [/FONT][FONT=&quot]Your [/FONT][FONT=&quot]strategy [/FONT][FONT=&quot]is[/FONT][FONT=&quot] focused on controlling terrain and killing the enemy by [/FONT][FONT=&quot]building[/FONT][FONT=&quot] bases throughout the countryside to serve as staging areas for raids, interdictions, and to prevent infiltration. [/FONT][FONT=&quot]This is the best [/FONT][FONT=&quot]way to lose in [/FONT][FONT=&quot]counterinsurgency[/FONT][FONT=&quot]. [/FONT]

[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]This was how[FONT=&quot] that the French lost the war in Indochina, and partly also the United States in Vietnam. [/FONT][FONT=&quot]The French built thousands of small forts to control territory and prevent enemy movement and infiltration. The Viet Minh bypassed these forts, or when able, isolated and destroyed them. The French forces grew in size as their operations grew in scale, but they continuously failed to identify the enemy they were fighting or the reasons it was fighting. [/FONT][FONT=&quot]Ultimately, failure to know their enemy proved fatal.[/FONT]

[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]The US plan in Vietnam was to set up heavily fortified base camps along the coast from where troops would be sent out on what amounted to large raids or “reconnaissance in force”. While believing that they had radically different tactics from those of the French, who had been beaten on the same ground by the enemy ten years earlier, in fact the US simply became as tied to their helicopters as the French had been to the roads.
[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]
In 2001 when the US began the offensive in Afghanistan the [FONT=&quot]tactics [/FONT][FONT=&quot]was [/FONT][FONT=&quot]still the same as [/FONT][FONT=&quot]in[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]Vietnam. Though US strategy was broader in scope, the military strategy remained largely enemy focused, hoping to kill or capture High Value Targets and destroy Taliban, terrorists, and insurgents when engaged. US forces constructed bases throughout the countryside to serve as staging areas for raids, interdictions, and to prevent infiltration. Some units on the ground did conduct population focused counterinsurgency, but as a whole, the military conducted an enemy focused approach.[/FONT] [/FONT][FONT=&quot]Fortunately[FONT=&quot], the Americans have learned the lesson the hard way and have changed their strategy.[/FONT]
[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]
In [FONT=&quot]counterinsurgency you have to be population focused and NOT enemy focused. [/FONT]
[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]You need to put [FONT=&quot]your troops [/FONT][FONT=&quot]out among the populace in Combat Outposts. [/FONT][/FONT][FONT=&quot]Living amongst and for the people, so that relationships and trust can [FONT=&quot]grow[/FONT] and you will see[FONT=&quot] that[/FONT][FONT=&quot] insurgent attacks decreased as the people[/FONT][FONT=&quot] begin [/FONT][FONT=&quot]to turn from the insurgents to your forces. That’s [/FONT][FONT=&quot]how[/FONT][FONT=&quot] you fight the [/FONT][FONT=&quot]Taliban[/FONT].[FONT=&quot]“Clear, build, hold” that´s the doctrine of counterinsurgency. Clear the enemy from an area, create a permanent security presence, and facilitate civil reconstruction and aid.[/FONT]

[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]If you make a sweep from one of your secure bases [FONT=&quot]against[/FONT][FONT=&quot] the Taliban they would fall back after putting up a short “fire-fight”, only to return after you had returned to your safe base. The countryside will remain under Taliban control. [/FONT][/FONT]

 

[VDKMS]

Wouldn't a heavier armed and expanded police force be better to cope with the Taliban? Police forces stay within the population and have more contact with the civilians.

Having a B-1 bomber ready in the air 24/24 to fire a smart weapon at RPG armed Taliban is in my opinion overkill and a waste of money.

 

[D.J]

Police are trained to maintain order and serve and protect the public and enforce criminal law. They are not trained as warriors.

 

[Peter Dow]

Your strategy is to build thousands of small forts to control territory and prevent enemy movement and infiltration.

Look my strategy clearly distinguishes between

• the 3-man guard posts a.k.a. fortified machine-gun nests a.k.a. pillboxes, every 333 meters along the perimeter defence-lines, either side of the route
  
• 40-man mobile reaction depots, every 2 kilometers along the supply road

Those are two quite different kinds of structures and so you really ought to mention which structure you are talking about when you say "forts" - guard posts or depots?

It's the guard posts along the perimeter defence lines, along with the barbed wire, minefields etc. which do the prevention of enemy infiltration towards the roads.

The mobile reaction depots are just really barracks for the troops, yes they probably will be fortified, but even describing them as 40-man forts they don't stop anything! The mobile reaction troops have to deploy from the depots to go do the stopping, for example either routinely to go on their shift to the guard posts or in emergencies to reinforce points on the perimeter defences when they get attacked.

That's the whole idea of a perimeter defensive line. You stop the enemy there. You keep the enemy out and behind the perimeter line. That's how it is supposed to work.

Your strategy is focused on controlling terrain and killing the enemy by building bases throughout the countryside

Oh no, not "throughout the countryside"! Only along the main highways. Most of the countryside is outside of the perimeter defences of the main supply routes.

to serve as staging areas for raids, interdictions, and to prevent infiltration.

Yes the main highways give you a base within easy helicopter travel of any part of Afghanistan so you can mount airborne raids or any other type of aerial attack from your main bases which will be situated along the main supply routes.

This is the best way to lose in counterinsurgency.

Not really. Not in the case of my plan anyway. My plan can win.

This was how that the French lost the war in Indochina, and partly also the United States in Vietnam. The French built thousands of small forts to control territory and prevent enemy movement and infiltration. The Viet Minh bypassed these forts, or when able, isolated and destroyed them. The French forces grew in size as their operations grew in scale, but they continuously failed to identify the enemy they were fighting or the reasons it was fighting. Ultimately, failure to know their enemy proved fatal.

Well like I said, the depots are not the stopping points and you can't just "bypass" guard posts which are 333 metres apart, even if only 1 in 3 is manned 24/7. It's a defensive line which has eyes-on every part of it the whole length of the perimeter defences, either side of the road. If the enemy starts cutting barbed wire and de-mining they are going to get noticed and attract defensive fire from the guards and their reinforcements if necessary.

Now outside the perimeter defences, which is maybe 95% of the country, "bandit country" I call it, yes the enemy will have a degree of freedom to move about, but we don't fuss too much about that. If they are annoying us, or we get good intelligence about where to hit them we call in air power. Otherwise no worries for us though I can see why Afghans might not want to live in that 95% bandit country and might prefer to live in our safe zones beside the road, but live by our security rules if they do so.

The US plan in Vietnam was to set up heavily fortified base camps along the coast from where troops would be sent out on what amounted to large raids or “reconnaissance in force”. While believing that they had radically different tactics from those of the French, who had been beaten on the same ground by the enemy ten years earlier, in fact the US simply became as tied to their helicopters as the French had been to the roads.

I am not sure how helicopters tie anyone down? They do the reverse - they give your raiding forces excellent mobility. They have a somewhat limited range so you need to have a base in range of the area of operations but if you do, then they are ideal for air-mobile raids - 1000 times better than parachute-dropped forces because with helicopters you can withdraw the same way you come in - with a helicopter borne force.

Look these Vietnam examples are all very interesting but I don't think I am applying a repeat of the strategy used though certain features may at first glance seem similar to you, this is purely by chance. This strategy is mine and I didn't copy it from Vietnam!

In 2001 when the US began the offensive in Afghanistan the tactics was still the same as in Vietnam. Though US strategy was broader in scope, the military strategy remained largely enemy focused, hoping to kill or capture High Value Targets and destroy Taliban, terrorists, and insurgents when engaged. US forces constructed bases throughout the countryside to serve as staging areas for raids, interdictions, and to prevent infiltration. Some units on the ground did conduct population focused counterinsurgency, but as a whole, the military conducted an enemy focused approach. Fortunately, the Americans have learned the lesson the hard way and have changed their strategy.

Isolated Forward Operating Bases, for example along the international Afghan / Pakistan border, hard to supply, the roads to them were not secured, they got bombed supplying them, had to supply by air drops eventually.

Yes I know that strategy was all wrong, but for the reason I am pointing out, not for the reasons you are pointing out!

In counterinsurgency you have to be population focused and NOT enemy focused.
You need to put your troops out among the populace in Combat Outposts. Living amongst and for the people, so that relationships and trust can grow and you will see that insurgent attacks decreased as the people begin to turn from the insurgents to your forces.

Look if the population want to live in bandit country with the Taliban that is their choice. If they want shelter from the Taliban, my plan offers that in safe zones next to the secure roads.

We won't defeat the Taliban by separating them from an Afghan population which already hates their guts. We defeat them by separating the Taliban from their state sponsors - Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran.

We win by the offensive part of my strategy by for example targeting Pakistani Taliban sponsoring headquarters, such as the University of Jihad and the ISI HQ. We stop aid payments to Pakistan. We also increase pressure on other state sponsors but Pakistan is the most important.

Pretty soon the state sponsors will disown those in their ranks who are supporting the Taliban and arrest them, hand them over, then the Taliban will run out of supporters and be unable to continue the fight without supplies, without new recruits etc.

That’s how you fight the Taliban.“Clear, build, hold” that´s the doctrine of counterinsurgency. Clear the enemy from an area, create a permanent security presence, and facilitate civil reconstruction and aid.

But the only thing "cleared" in Afghanistan is our own military bases. Cleared but not defended particularly well considering the attacks on our air bases.

Even the supply routes we use have not been cleared. "Cleared" means "secure" means the enemy is not able to sneak onto the road and plant a road-side bomb! So all those road-side bombs are proof positive that even the supply routes we use have not been cleared!

You can't get on to building and holding until you clear and we haven't cleared, hardly at all.

If you make a sweep from one of your secure bases against the Taliban they would fall back after putting up a short “fire-fight”, only to return after you had returned to your safe base. The countryside will remain under Taliban control.

Well my plan doesn't make "sweeps" into bandit country. My plan lives with up to 95% of the country being infested with enemy, but that's OK meantime.

My plan is that we don't rely on being able to clear out the Taliban from the Afghan countryside - that's not my plan - my plan is we beat them in the capital cities of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran by taking the fight to the Taliban's state sponsors.

 

[brinktk]

Look my strategy clearly distinguishes between

• the 3-man guard posts a.k.a. fortified machine-gun nests a.k.a. pillboxes, every 333 meters along the perimeter defence-lines, either side of the route
  
• 40-man mobile reaction depots, every 2 kilometers along the supply road

Those are two quite different kinds of structures and so you really ought to mention which structure you are talking about when you say "forts" - guard posts or depots?

It's the guard posts along the perimeter defence lines, along with the barbed wire, minefields etc. which do the prevention of enemy infiltration towards the roads.

The mobile reaction depots are just really barracks for the troops, yes they probably will be fortified, but even describing them as 40-man forts they don't stop anything! The mobile reaction troops have to deploy from the depots to go do the stopping, for example either routinely to go on their shift to the guard posts or in emergencies to reinforce points on the perimeter defences when they get attacked.

That's the whole idea of a perimeter defensive line. You stop the enemy there. You keep the enemy out and behind the perimeter line. That's how it is supposed to work.


Oh no, not "throughout the countryside"! Only along the main highways. Most of the countryside is outside of the perimeter defences of the main supply routes.


Yes the main highways give you a base within easy helicopter travel of any part of Afghanistan so you can mount airborne raids or any other type of aerial attack from your main bases which will be situated along the main supply routes.


Not really. Not in the case of my plan anyway. My plan can win.


Well like I said, the depots are not the stopping points and you can't just "bypass" guard posts which are 333 metres apart, even if only 1 in 3 is manned 24/7. It's a defensive line which has eyes-on every part of it the whole length of the perimeter defences, either side of the road. If the enemy starts cutting barbed wire and de-mining they are going to get noticed and attract defensive fire from the guards and their reinforcements if necessary.

Now outside the perimeter defences, which is maybe 95% of the country, "bandit country" I call it, yes the enemy will have a degree of freedom to move about, but we don't fuss too much about that. If they are annoying us, or we get good intelligence about where to hit them we call in air power. Otherwise no worries for us though I can see why Afghans might not want to live in that 95% bandit country and might prefer to live in our safe zones beside the road, but live by our security rules if they do so.



I am not sure how helicopters tie anyone down? They do the reverse - they give your raiding forces excellent mobility. They have a somewhat limited range so you need to have a base in range of the area of operations but if you do, then they are ideal for air-mobile raids - 1000 times better than parachute-dropped forces because with helicopters you can withdraw the same way you come in - with a helicopter borne force.

Look these Vietnam examples are all very interesting but I don't think I am applying a repeat of the strategy used though certain features may at first glance seem similar to you, this is purely by chance. This strategy is mine and I didn't copy it from Vietnam!


Isolated Forward Operating Bases, for example along the international Afghan / Pakistan border, hard to supply, the roads to them were not secured, they got bombed supplying them, had to supply by air drops eventually.

Yes I know that strategy was all wrong, but for the reason I am pointing out, not for the reasons you are pointing out!


Look if the population want to live in bandit country with the Taliban that is their choice. If they want shelter from the Taliban, my plan offers that in safe zones next to the secure roads.

We won't defeat the Taliban by separating them from an Afghan population which already hates their guts. We defeat them by separating the Taliban from their state sponsors - Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran.

We win by the offensive part of my strategy by for example targeting Pakistani Taliban sponsoring headquarters, such as the University of Jihad and the ISI HQ. We stop aid payments to Pakistan. We also increase pressure on other state sponsors but Pakistan is the most important.

Pretty soon the state sponsors will disown those in their ranks who are supporting the Taliban and arrest them, hand them over, then the Taliban will run out of supporters and be unable to continue the fight without supplies, without new recruits etc.


But the only thing "cleared" in Afghanistan is our own military bases. Cleared but not defended particularly well considering the attacks on our air bases.

Even the supply routes we use have not been cleared. "Cleared" means "secure" means the enemy is not able to sneak onto the road and plant a road-side bomb! So all those road-side bombs are proof positive that even the supply routes we use have not been cleared!

You can't get on to building and holding until you clear and we haven't cleared, hardly at all.


Well my plan doesn't make "sweeps" into bandit country. My plan lives with up to 95% of the country being infested with enemy, but that's OK meantime.

My plan is that we don't rely on being able to clear out the Taliban from the Afghan countryside - that's not my plan - my plan is we beat them in the capital cities of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran by taking the fight to the Taliban's state sponsors.

:bang::shoothea::cen:


Sigh....

 

[Peter Dow]

Wouldn't a heavier armed and expanded police force be better to cope with the Taliban? Police forces stay within the population and have more contact with the civilians.

That's what will happen eventually with my plan, but it will be the Afghan national police and SWAT and commandos that do that when the Taliban is weak enough after we take their state sponsors out of the war.

Having a B-1 bomber ready in the air 24/24 to fire a smart weapon at RPG armed Taliban is in my opinion overkill and a waste of money.

The heavy bombers or missiles are for high value targets in Pakistan, the University of Jihad, the ISI HQ and anyone else in the Pakistani state who wants to side with the Taliban.

They don't need to be in the air 24/7. We just draw up a target list and the air forces and drones work their way through the list at their leisure.

As for the Taliban RPGs we allow them to get as far as within range of the guards on the perimeter defences of the supply routes or bases then we kill the RPG operators where it is most efficient for us to do so. The guard's scoped M2 machine gun can take out an enemy RPG before he gets close enough to be able to hit the guard post. So the RPG-armed Taliban is most welcome to call to my supply route perimeter defences any time.

My plan says we should not try to go searching the mountain paths of Afghanistan for RPG operators. We ask them kindly to come see us on our perimeter defences.

 

[BritinBritain]

:bang::shoothea::cen:


Sigh....

Told you.

 

[KevinTheCynic]

So if Mr Dow's plan is to not actively engage the enemy at any time (except if the enemy tries to infiltrate his Great Wall of Afghanistan), then I am left to wonder, what exactly is the point of even having military forces there at all?

 

[BritinBritain]

So if Mr Dow's plan is to not actively engage the enemy at any time (except if the enemy tries to infiltrate his Great Wall of Afghanistan), then I am left to wonder, what exactly is the point of even having military forces there at all?

Its better than having them walking the streets getting up to mischief.:-D

I stopped taking Peter Dow seriously after reading his first post.

 

[Peter Dow]

So if Mr Dow's plan is to not actively engage the enemy at any time (except if the enemy tries to infiltrate his Great Wall of Afghanistan),

With respect Kevin, (and please call me "Peter") my plan proposes actively engaging more enemy assets in more ways than do current operations.

Remember my original post, post #1?

My 4-point plan to beat the Taliban and win the war on terror

It's never too late to learn lessons and adopt an alternative competent and aggressive military strategy. I have already mentioned the outline points of my plan but I will explain those in a little more here and then provide a lot more detail in subsequent posts.

Point 1

* The US and Western allies ought to name Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt as "state sponsors of terrorism". We ought to name in addition, the other oil-rich Arab kingdoms who are also financial state sponsors of terrorism. This has implications such as ending bribes and deals with back-stabbing hostile countries and instead waging war against our enemies with the aim of regime change or incapacitating the enemy so that they can do us little more harm. The war could be of varying intensity depending on the enemy concerned and how they respond to our initial attacks, whether they wish to escalate the war or surrender to our reasonable demands.

Point 2

* We need to take the fight to the Taliban leadership wherever they are based in Pakistan. For example, there ought to be drone strikes on the University of Jihad. (Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak, Pakistan) In addition, we ought to employ aerial bombing of all other bases for the Taliban in Pakistan. This may have to be extended to include certain Pakistani state bases which are supporting the Taliban - such as the Pakistani ISI headquarters mentioned a lot in the BBC documentary "SECRET PAKISTAN". If this is not handled very carefully, it could escalate into open war with the Pakistani military. I will explain how to manage Pakistan later.

Point 3

* We ought to seize control of Pakistani, Egyptian, Saudi and Iranian TV satellites and use them to broadcast propaganda calling for the arrest of all involved in waging terrorist war against the West. Often, these satellites are made, launched and maintained by Western companies and should be easy to take over. Other satellites provided to the enemy by non-Western countries could be jammed or destroyed. Air strikes against the enemy's main terrestrial TV transmitter aerials is another option to silence enemy propaganda.

Point 4

* When occupying territory, always ensure secure bases and supply routes from one base to another. I will provide a lot of details about how this can be done militarily.

I did note that initially you didn't seem to be paying any attention to the offensive points 1, 2 & 3 in my plan in an earlier reply, at the end of post #39.

as well as a competent defence we also need a more aggressive attack as well but you don't seem to be asking any questions about the offensive we need.

But later on you certainly seemed to have noticed something of the more aggressive and going-on-the-offensive points 1, 2 & 3 of my plan when in post #51 you asked -

If we attack Pakistan, a country that we are nominally allied with, do you expect them not to use everything in their arsenal to defend themselves? Who is going to make absolutely certain they cannot use their nuclear weapons?

I answered your question about Pakistan in my post #55.

Now your focus seems to have switched back exclusively to one aspect of point 4 of my plan, the defence of the supply routes, which you have called "the Great Wall of Afghanistan" presumably in comparison to the Great Wall of China?

Wikipedia: Great Wall of China

A comprehensive archaeological survey, using advanced technologies, has concluded that the Ming walls measure 8,850 km (5,500 mi).[5] This is made up of 6,259 km (3,889 mi) sections of actual wall, 359 km (223 mi) of trenches and 2,232 km (1,387 mi) of natural defensive barriers such as hills and rivers.[5] Another archaeological survey found that the entire wall with all of its branches measure out to be 21,196 km (13,171 mi).

Well of course the entire Great Wall of China with all its branches at 13,171 miles is much longer than anything I have planned.

But if you consider the actual wall sections of the Ming Walls (only 3,889 miles) alone and consider that the Great Wall of China was, I think, only a single wall whereas my secure route has effectively two distinct defensive perimeter lines, 12 miles apart, one on each side of the supply route then the defensive fortifications are not so different in scale.

Suppose that Afghanistan's Highway 1, the Ring Road, shown in this map, was to be secured according to my plan along its whole length.

Highway 1 or A01, formally called the Ring Road, is a 2,200 kilometre two-lane road network circulating inside Afghanistan, connecting the following major cities (clock wise): Mazar, Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, Farah, and Herat in the west or northwest.

So 2,200 kilometres (1375 miles) of ring road with a defensive line on either side means twice that length of perimeter defences would be 4,400 km (2750 miles) of perimeter defensive line in total.

Emperor Ming's Great Wall of China - 3,889 miles of actual wall.
Peter Dow's Great Wall of Afghanistan - 2750 miles of perimeter defences for the ring road alone.

If that was not enough then more secure perimeter could be added for the highways from the ring road to Afghanistan's international borders.

So yes at its greatest possible extent, I would admit that a comparison between my plan and the Great Wall of China is a valid one, in some respects.

Suggested name

I would like to suggest a name for the secure supply route protection force.

Nato Auxiliary Supply-route PROtection FORce - "NASPROFOR"

Engaging the enemy throughout Afghanistan

The plan assumes that our forces would engage the Taliban and associated enemies throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan equally, with an emphasis on the use of air-power - aerial bombing, attack helicopters, air-borne raids, drones, missiles - making good use of our air-bases which we would defend more thoroughly than at present, and I have suggested in post #10 how to defend a military base..

Engaging the enemy far from the bases and supply lines however depends on surveillance and other intelligence assets providing targets of opportunity against which to launch an air attack against.

My plan employs a much smarter "we know where the enemy is based anyway" strategy. We know where the University of Jihad and the Pakistani ISI HQ are, we know where Pakistani state TV satellites are to be found.

It is not as if my plan is bogged down in the old thinking that "we'd have to sweep the mountains of Afghanistan to find an elusive enemy". :roll:

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FGhGHxw0mSo"]Bin Ladens Cave according to Rumsfeld - YouTube[/ame]

:lol:

We can engage key assets of the enemy that we have known about but not been prepared to target due to a reluctance to face the facts about the enemy. For too long, we've been in denial about Pakistan's role in supporting Al Qaeda and the Taliban. That ends with my plan.

then I am left to wonder, what exactly is the point of even having military forces there at all?

Well the difficulty of launching air raids from great distances is that it can all go horribly wrong - like the attempt to free the Iranian embassy hostages ordered by President Carter.

OK, it seems the raid to get Bin Laden went well enough, even though one helicopter was lost - but it is really very handy to have air-bases not too far from enemy assets in Pakistan we are attacking so that air-flight times are lower, where back-up and emergency landing facilities are available.

So whilst, yes, it would be possible to fight this war without Afghan bases, perhaps to rely more on missiles rather than air-raids, if we have Afghan bases, and we do, it makes sense to use them and to prepare to defend and supply those Afghan bases under all contingencies, such as the Pakistani military adopting a more hostile response to our attacks in Pakistan than we might hope, but we must be realistic about as being a possibility.

 

[Peter Dow]

NASPROFOR Sector assets

NASPROFOR Sector assets - artillery, forward air-controllers, UAVs etc.

I have only really specified in detail the basic infantry aspects of NASPROFOR which are the largest part of the force and the soldiers recruited locally.

There would be other NATO assets in NASPROFOR - artillery, forward air-controllers, UAVs etc.

Details of these are sketchy at the moment but provisionally I am thinking the next tier of command above Reaction Captain I would call Sectors each under the command of a Sector Major who as well as having command of a certain number of Reaction Captains would have sector assets such as an artillery, forward air-controller, UAV operator to use as and when necessary.

So those sector assets could certainly engage in response to enemy attacks from longer ranges on the perimeter defences or supply route, if say the enemy was to fire long range rockets or artillery themselves.

 

[Yossarian]

NASPROFOR Sector assets - artillery, forward air-controllers, UAVs etc.

I have only really specified in detail the basic infantry aspects of NASPROFOR which are the largest part of the force and the soldiers recruited locally.

There would be other NATO assets in NASPROFOR - artillery, forward air-controllers, UAVs etc.

Details of these are sketchy at the moment but provisionally I am thinking the next tier of command above Reaction Captain I would call Sectors each under the command of a Sector Major who as well as having command of a certain number of Reaction Captains would have sector assets such as an artillery, forward air-controller, UAV operator to use as and when necessary.

So those sector assets could certainly engage in response to enemy attacks from longer ranges on the perimeter defences or supply route, if say the enemy was to fire long range rockets or artillery themselves.

Please, I beg you. "Deploy" your wisdom to Afghanistan.

We all here need your "boots" on the ground on this. Fly in to Kabul and build your Wasteland fortress. Man it and command it yourself. Show us how it is done.

So when an group of illiterate locals paid 100 U.S. Dollars who do not even know what running water is. Assassinate you with 20th Century weapons after riding bicycles into your fortress, we can all document and spread the gained wisdom of your groundbreaking strategic thinking to the world.

 

[Peter Dow]

:cen: So :cen: we can all document and spread the gained wisdom of your groundbreaking strategic thinking to the world.

Very amusing .. and ridiculous.

As to my personal role then posting in forums is a better way to explain my strategic thinking to the world but if you are inviting me to volunteer to do a more hands-on job in the implementation of my plan, I would volunteer as follows.

This plan I have described "How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror)" would need someone in a job with a lot of command authority who understood the plan, who knew how to get it to work, who could give the orders to get the plan implemented properly, in full, so that the plan won the war for us.

I don't know of anyone yet but me who could do that job.

So yes, if it has to be me, I would be prepared to do that job, if asked.

Not saying I would be asked, but if asked, yes I would serve and do that job.

Thinking about what level of command authority is necessary I might suggest the job of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Deputy SACEUR) with a job description something like "with special responsibility for the war on terror strategy in Afghanistan and in other war zones where NATO troops are deployed on the ground".

Wikipedia: Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Deputy SACEUR)

The position of deputy head of Allied Command Europe - since 2003 known as deputy head of Allied Command Operations - has been held by the following officers. From January 1978 until June 1993 there were two Deputy SACEURs, one British and one German, but from July 1993 this reverted to a single Deputy SACEUR

1. Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery British Army, From April 2, 1951 to September 23, 1958
...

In the Deputy SACEUR role I would seek to deliver security in safe zones in war on terror countries like Afghanistan where it is practical to do so and eliminate corruption in those secured safe zones as well.

I would not make any big promises about ending corruption outside safe zones except to promise to hit the enemy hard wherever and whenever we find them there.

The next highest command position in NATO is SACEUR which is by convention an American general so, being as that I am Scottish and British and I've no plans to become an American, I've ruled myself out of accepting the SACEUR job. So Deputy SACEUR would be the height of my command ambitions.

For SACEUR, I'd like to see Condoleezza Rice taking up that job, unless she is President by then in which case I am open to suggestions for which American should be my immediate superior in the command chain, should I get the job, which, admittedly, does not look likely at present.

So that's the job I would do, if asked.

I am not saying I would be asked to do the job. I don't expect to be offered the job.

I am volunteering to serve to put my plan into operation more in hope than in expectation.

 

[rattler]

ROFL LMAO, never thought this thread would see a revival...

Rattler

 

[brinktk]

This guys ego is astounding. The narcissism factor is absolutely through the roof.

 

[VDKMS]

How are you going to stop the Taliban from taking over Pakistan once you cut of financial aid?

If you piss off the Pakistanis and they start to work with the Taliban then you get a nuclear armed Taliban and I don't want to know how far those fanatic zealots will go.

If your plan is foolproof it would already have been implemented.

 

[Peter Dow]

How are you going to stop the Taliban from taking over Pakistan once you cut of financial aid?

First off, the Taliban secretly work for the Pakistani state. You'd know that if you had watched these videos.

Secret Pakistan : Documentary by BBC Part 1 (Double Cross)
[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSinK-dVrig"]Secret Pakistan : Documentary by BBC Part 1 (Double Cross) - YouTube[/ame]

Secret Pakistan : Documentary by BBC Part 2 (Backlash)
[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5-lSSC9dSE"]Secret Pakistan : Documentary by BBC Part 2 (Backlash) - YouTube[/ame]

The Taliban could only take over Afghanistan because they were directed and helped to do so by the Pakistani state who wanted Afghanistan run as a Pakistani vassal state.

Now, why would the Pakistani state order the Taliban to take over Pakistan when the Pakistani state already runs Pakistan? It makes no sense.

The fact that you are asking the question means you don't understand who is taking orders from who.

If you piss off the Pakistanis and they start to work with the Taliban

Again, the Taliban work for the Pakistani state and always have done. The Taliban don't work for the Pakistani people, many of whom hate the Taliban for killing their politicians and generally making their lives hell, or killing their friends, family and community leaders and representatives. Most of the Pakistani people hate the Taliban but the ordinary people of Pakistan don't call the shots in Pakistan. The state officials, especially the military high command do call the shots in Pakistan.

The Pakistani state officials who hire the Taliban are Pakistani generals and those who want Pakistan run as a military dictatorship with an empire with Pakistani colonies in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir, Chechnya and so on.

then you get a nuclear armed Taliban and I don't want to know how far those fanatic zealots will go.

The only way that the Pakistani state would give one of their nukes for the Taliban or Al Qaeda to use as a suitcase bomb is if people like you who seem to think that the Taliban don't work for the Pakistani state are ever believed by our governments.

If our enemies running the Pakistani state could nuke us via the Taliban or Al Qaeda and we wouldn't blame the Pakistani state for it, we could get nuked tomorrow, probably.

The most important thing that is stopping the Pakistani state nuking us using terrorist proxies like the Taliban or Al Qaeda, is that our intelligence officials are smart enough to know that the Pakistani state would be fully responsible for any nuking of the USA using Pakistani nukes and our intelligence officials would advise the president to order the US military to nuke Pakistan back in retaliation for nuking us. (The same applies to other NATO countries that could be subjected to threats of being nuked by Pakistani agents)

If you all came to believe the foolish notion that somehow "the Taliban are their own masters" :roll: this would be very dangerous to our own security so please don't think that and don't ask anyone to believe that. It's incorrect.

If your plan is foolproof it would already have been implemented.

It's not foolproof. Our generals are fools therefore they don't put my plan into operation. If we had smart generals they would put my plan into operation and we would defeat those in Pakistan who want to run Pakistan as a military dictatorship.