Didn't know where to put this- want to bounce some ideas around

[deerslayer]

I wasn't quite sure where to post this, I'm back and doing more writing as I find the time. I've been meaning to finish this for awhile and never quite got around to it, I was wondering if anyone had any ideas to bounce around. The thesis is that we need either a. more operational security or b. better PR.

Culture of Defeat
Defining Socio-political Factors As They Pertain to Fourth Generation Warfare

Introduction: The Military and Societal Roots
It is the generally accepted definition that fourth generation warfare “transcends sociopolitical and transnational boundaries”. When a gathering of Marine colonels and outside consultants penned “The Changing Face of War” in 1989, they made chillingly accurate predictions which were ignored in the higher levels of military decision-making. When the article ran in the October 1989 issue of the USMC Marine Corps Gazette, its audience was primarily the special operations units of the various armed forces. Where the authors failed to alter the views of the attrition-geared military system of the day, it found a rapt audience in the Marine Corps MEU(SOC) units and its counterparts in the Army and Navy.
Of particular interest is the single line which states “the distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ will disappear.” The junior officers of the U.S. military, attempting to put the ignominy and loss of the Vietnam War behind them, found the document thought-provoking. As the ideas of reformers such as co-author William Lind filtered down through the military hierarchy, the concept of second-generation attrition warfare became a thought of the distant past. Modern restatements of old ideas, such as “maneuver theory”, began to permeate the officer corps of the various services. This was an extension of the Military Reform Movement of the 1970s, and it is probable that the bitterness resulting from the reform movement and the Congressional Reform Caucus of that time resulted in the ignorance of the piece.
Besides the animosity between reform-minded men and the status quo higher echelon officers, the document was possibly ignored because it was also in large part taboo and guesswork with regards to its information. While the vast majority of the original ideas espoused in the article eventually proved to be true, they were at the time too advanced for current leaders. The thought that the next conflict would become a Vietnam-esque guerilla conflict was absurd. Yet the next years saw the US becoming an increasingly viable target for terrorism- the perfect soil to cultivate such a conflict.
President George W. Bush first said after Sept. 11, 2001, that our country was never the victim of terrorism. However, the current government definition of terrorism proves that statement false. Terrorism is defined by our current military administration as “wanton or gratuitous violence against civilians or noncombatants.”
Cases in point include:
• American airline hijacks in the 70s-80s
• the Grenada conflict, involving the rescue of US students
• the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
• the Boston Massacre, kick-starting the American Revolution
• and most recently, the September 11th attacks in 2001.
Such errors are excusable here. The purpose of this writing is not to criticize the faux pas current administration but rather to define the societal factors on the home front that today invariably affect any type of military operation. Its direction is societal, not military. However, his words mark a forgetfulness which seems to become more prevalent in the Western world as time wears on. The faux pas is simply a case for illustrating how little we as a society understand the definition of terrorism as our own system defines it. We display a tendency to ignore the past and at the same time attempt to prepare for the future. This is one of the dangerous societal factors which decreases our country’s effectiveness in fighting a fourth-generation war.
September 11, 2001 largely changed all of this for America, at least during the first phases of the GWOT. The media’s focus on the hunting of terrorists keeps the subject sharp in the public eye and forces us to remember the reasons for our involvement the military. At the same time, those same news networks sensationalize the actions of antiwar advocates such as Cindy Sheehan. This seems hypocritical; however, the smart military can play those actions directly into their hands. Public relations is, possibly unfortunately, becoming an ever-present and constantly growing factor in military success.
But our military is still reeling from reforms, from the actions of thirty years past. When Franklin C. (“Chuck”) Spinney presented his infamous “Spinney Report” on Air Force budgeting, those present were forced to fall back on personal attacks and mudslinging to kill the briefing. One general actually collapsed during one recitation and had to be evacuated. We do not have as a combined military force any other method to react to the antics of Sheehan and her camp.

Specific Societal Factors Affecting American Capability

The necessities of a 4GW capable army are made up of eight umbrella groups of factors. The first six are explained in “Perpetuating Destruction: Application of Thermodynamics to 4GW”. Those variables defined the actual military side of the equation. Here the final two are explained in detail. They are:
• Home support for sustaining a war effort
• Political connections, commitment, and relations
The purpose of homeland support for war is obvious in today’s politically correct society. Without a stable base for conflict war cannot in today’s military sustain itself. Western culture has been largely spoiled by an absence of terrorism. Our children did not grow up in a culture of fear. We have not lived in terror of weekly suicide bombings or widespread ethnic cleansing. In fact, aside from the Troubles in Ireland, terrorism has had a very slight influence on the Western world as a whole, confined to mostly isolated incidents which failed to garner any kind of international military mobilization other than the type of support necessary to protect foreign interests and ensure good public relations and diplomacy. This relative feeling of security does not do well to support broad operations on an undefinable front. Americans feel safe in their homes- we do not expect a car bomb to go off outside our kitchen door and as a result fail to grasp the entire point of a conflict to suppress terrorism. We are too far removed from the current situation to know as civilians how to effectively cope with it. In short, we need a good, politically justifiable reason that sits well with the populace to go to war. The difference in the politically correct democracy of America is that there must be an exceedingly good reason for conflict, and one that won’t offend anybody.
The United Nations did not refer to the Korean War as such- it was, in the UN’s own politically correct way, a “police action”. According to the 1999 Collegiate Edition of Webster’s Dictionary, the former, more common definition is absolutely right.

 

[deerslayer]

and I got cut off by the character cap.

To fully understand the capabilities of a 4GW-conditioned military group it is imperative to understand that there are degrees of conflict. In its purest form, war is in fact terrorism. Terrorism, with its desire for complete and total submission of an established foe, fulfills the accepted neo-Clausewitzian definition of war while satisfying the current fourth-generation situation. Terrorism is a gratuitous action- it is wanton destruction, a senseless struggle that happens to contain political ambitions. Once warfare enters the realm of a society which is either unused to such commitments or is advanced in its political structure, the motives and cause for the proliferation of conflict become increasingly clouded in the murky waters of ambition and public opinion.
That is not to say that we are not at war- the coalition are simply fighting a less-distilled form of conflict, while in general our principal opponents are waging a pure and simple violence, with a simple purpose- to kill and maim infantrymen in order to force their removal from their country. This has already been covered in “The Bureaucratic Bungle”.
Because of the constantly shifting political winds, we are not able to conduct a pure conflict- the goal of which is total destruction or subjugation of an enemy. So in order to use violent means to achieve a more palpable political end, we change both semantics and operating procedures to fit the current scenario. It’s essentially business language applied to combat. It helps appeal to the American public (A war for “freedom of the Iraqi people”, rather than “a war to depose and dispose of Saddam Hussein and his cronies”) and create a public sense of moral purpose and pride in partaking in the conflict. This is the creation of a public support base for engaging an enemy- it is the first step towards a secure operational environment, and therefore tantamount for complete success of an operation.
Once a clear majority support is established, it must be sustained. This is all assuming that the political powers are pleased with the current case for war- if the ruling governmental powers are not in relative agreement with the cause, then the political system is unstable and will collapse upon itself, creating a quagmire.
The connotation of “political connections” refers here to the ability of our current administrative and military assets to function in unison with the necessary foreign powers to sustain war efforts- banks, governments, other militaries, and the like. Take, for example, the political finagling required to use Turkey’s airfields during the early stages of the second Iraq conflict. These kind of political actions are the ones that need to occur for success. The constant media deluge on leaks, spoiled operations, and other government fallout affect the operational status of the army at home and abroad. Therefore, careful political actions are required to keep operational security and morale high for all concerned.
Simply put, if we have a support base for war but cannot acquire the necessary political objectives prior to engaging in combat, we are a combat-ineffective system. If we lack home support but have support abroad, we are still combat ineffective. The concrete goals of the operation must be stated; the decision-making bodies must be able to act unilaterally to ensure mission success. Minor differences are relatively inconsequential to operational integrity provided that they have little political bearing or effect on operations abroad. Severe fissures in the chain of command or political bodies create massive problems for an army conducting any kind of operation abroad.
Because of such factors as mass media and the natural tendency within higher levels of political authority to promote power struggles and possibly extreme partisanship, the communication and political tools available today do little to ensure a complete form of operational success. Relative superiority must be achieved in two places- abroad and at home. Otherwise, de-stabilization becomes almost an absolute certainty at some point of a military procedure.
Civilian Reaction to War: The Mixed Blessing of Mass Media
Under fourth-generation procedures, the media has been a boon to both the US and its contemporary enemies. Each day we are kept up to date with CNN reports of combat deaths, new operations, and other developments. We also are assaulted with images of battle footage, interviews with infantrymen, and the occasional appearance of Osama bin Laden or underling, or that of another, less notorious cell.
Mass media keeps the public appeased with combat successes; by merit of human nature, it can also show us skewed versions of the conflict being reported. Objective reporting in a pure form is absolutely impossible in today’s society. In its base, purest form, it’s easy to find such writing bureaucratically styled, dry, and not of interest to the layman. Newspapers and magazines have to print and sell to an audience- hence subjective reporting, no matter how slight it is.
It is not difficult to sympathize with a terrorist once we are given a good literary picture of him. The psychological term for such empathetic behavior towards terrorists or an enemy is “Stockholm Syndrome”, and often becomes a great muddier of battlefield waters. Having been desensitized on all fronts by mass media, might the American public as a whole be displaying a form of Stockholm Syndrome in its ever-decreasing support for necessary preventative operations abroad? The prospect is frightening. This is the result that a subvertive group wants- empathy for its cause. A terrorist leader would want the general public to say “ The man’s been reduced to living in a cave, hole, etc.; let him be.” One of the defining aspects of any form of warfare is that one side wants total subversion of the other. This has proven, in low-intensity conflict, to be way to go about doing it. In a nutshell, this attitude is the modern application of Ghandi’s protest, only the nonviolent effect stems from the populace on the homefront- spurred by the struggle of the insurgency.
The media is, of course, the engine which helps to produce these negative results in the modern army. Consider that the media’s purpose in reporting news items is to attract viewers, readers, and money. It was remarked to the author recently that the media can and sometimes will attempt deliberately to vilify a subject to garner ratings and sales- as long as the truth is told, all’s fair in love and war.
Imagine that a home owner uses deadly force to defend his family and himself from a home invasion by two men, killing one and wounding the other. Two or more very different headlines can develop on the incident afterwards.
• One Dead, Another Injured in Shooting
• Man Shoots Two in Self Defense
Notice the connotations that may be drawn from either of these possible headlines. The great chance is that the headlines is all a passerby will see. The average American’s attention span is exceedingly short- nearly every facet of our everyday life manipulates this, and the media therefore can cast the story in whatever subjective light it desires, get the message out there, and have the bulk of said message either misinterpreted or misused as the author and his superiors see fit. The first headline quickly draws negative connotations towards the shooter, while the second lionizes him- and “self-defense” doesn’t often garner as much attention as a verbal depiction of a death which is seemingly random at first glance .
However, either can draw further, unsubstantiated negative conclusions. Why was the owner a victim of a home invasion? Was there some other criminal activity gone awry (a large percentage of home invasions are drug-related crimes)? Was deadly force legitimate under the circumstances? The possible conclusions or unsubstantiated claims that can result from either headline are unlimited.