Why did Germany lose WW2?

You like own-goals:p HaHa

Who is writing (without reading) :the German messages mentioned seaborne operations ?

Santa Claus,colonel Blimp,or captain Mainwaring?
 
You like own-goals:p HaHa

Who is writing (without reading) :the German messages mentioned seaborne operations ?

Santa Claus,colonel Blimp,or captain Mainwaring?

What on earth are you talking about? You really are getting more and more cretinous everyday.

All I can say is "Thank God you were never in charge of an Army, the poor buggers under your command would be attacking each other instead of the enemy."

I prefer Colonel Blimp, its a higher rank.

If you have nothing sensible to contribute, shut up. Stupid little man.
 
Zzzzz.

In a normal situation,a commander receives 2 pages:

On page A ,the intelligence services are giving the facts

On page B ,they are giving their opinion about the facts : =interpretation,assumption,guesses.
than,the commander discuss the whole thing with his staff,asks for more information,for clarificationetc...
And,finally,he takes his decision .

What happened ?
Freyberg received a mixture of facts and guesses,interpretations,assumptions(and,it was unclear which were the facts,and which were the assumptions),he could not ask BP for clarification,he could not discuss with his staff what he had received .

2 comparisons :

On 15 may 1944,Ike received from an unknown source informations,which,following the analysts of this source,could indicate that 2 PzD and PzL were moving to Ste.Mère-l'Eglise. Ike could not communicate with this source,neither could he discuss the content of the message with his intelligence staff . What could/should Ike do ?

On 15 march 2009,Obama receives from an unknown source i information,which following the analysts of this source,could indicate that Bin Laden was hiding in Iran.Obama could not ask more information to this source,neither could he ask the opinion of his own intelligence staff .What could/should do Obama with this information ?
 
Zzzzz.

In a normal situation,a commander receives 2 pages:

On page A ,the intelligence services are giving the facts

On page B ,they are giving their opinion about the facts : =interpretation,assumption,guesses.
than,the commander discuss the whole thing with his staff,asks for more information,for clarificationetc...
And,finally,he takes his decision .

What happened ?
Freyberg received a mixture of facts and guesses,interpretations,assumptions(and,it was unclear which were the facts,and which were the assumptions),he could not ask BP for clarification,he could not discuss with his staff what he had received .

You are still ignoring the fact that Freyberg had the German order of battle in his hands for God sake which would or should have cleared up any misunderstanding.

2 comparisons :

On 15 may 1944,Ike received from an unknown source informations,which,following the analysts of this source,could indicate that 2 PzD and PzL were moving to Ste.Mère-l'Eglise. Ike could not communicate with this source,neither could he discuss the content of the message with his intelligence staff . What could/should Ike do ?

On 15 march 2009,Obama receives from an unknown source i information,which following the analysts of this source,could indicate that Bin Laden was hiding in Iran.Obama could not ask more information to this source,neither could he ask the opinion of his own intelligence staff .What could/should do Obama with this information ?

We are not talking about Ike or Obama, I am not interested in Ike or Obama, we are talking about Freyberg misinterpreting intelligence from ULTRA and totally ignoring the captured German order of battle, Freyberg knew where his intelligence was coming from. Thats it, simple.
 
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What happened ?
Freyberg received a mixture of facts and guesses,interpretations,assumptions(and,it was unclear which were the facts,and which were the assumptions),he could not ask BP for clarification,he could not discuss with his staff what he had received .

This confusion should not have occurred though as on the 11th of May Brigadier Dorman-Smith was flown to Crete to brief Freyberg on the accumulated intelligence and he left depressed describing him as a "bear of little brain" in other words a man of great courage but little tactical sense.
 
You are still ignoring the fact that Freyberg had the German order of battle in his hands for God sake which would or should have cleared up any misunderstanding.



We are not talking about Ike or Obama, I am not interested in Ike or Obama, we are talking about Freyberg misinterpreting intelligence from ULTRA and totally ignoring the captured German order of battle, Freyberg knew where his intelligence was coming from. Thats it, simple.

The captured order of battle :haha

1)From what I have read,the captured order of battle was the order of battle of the 3th parachute regiment,not the order of battle of Mercury.

2)When was Freyberg receiving this order of battle ?

3)Could he still communicate with the units who were guarding against a seaborne landing?

4)Could these units go to Maleme ?

5)Were these units strong enough to repel the Germans at Maleme ?

6) Was the captured order of battle giving indications about the German intentions ?


Other point :it has been claimed in the Crete historiography that Maleme was the deciding point .

On the other hand,the following FJ were dropped on the following points:

Hania:2460
Hiaraclion :2360
Maleme:1860
Rethymno:138O.

If Maleme was that important,why were not more men dropped on Maleme?
 
This confusion should not have occurred though as on the 11th of May Brigadier Dorman-Smith was flown to Crete to brief Freyberg on the accumulated intelligence and he left depressed describing him as a "bear of little brain" in other words a man of great courage but little tactical sense.

Hm Dorman-Smith was having a negative POV of most British generals,which had as result that he was sacked .
 
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Ultra was an added bonus to the Allies, not their primary source of wisdom. Ultra was only one intelligence source among many. Other sources ranged from reconnaissance, both ground and air, POW interrogation, other SIGINT and reports from contacts on the front line and the relevant commanders history in battle. From analysing their impact upon operations it is possible to assert that they were themselves more significant a factor than was Ultra although again Ultra always had the potential to be decisive. Ultra was never used as an infallible source, but instead it was corroborated with these other sources to gauge its reliability. Since the release of many of the Ultra documents Ultra's role in the Second world War has been greatly exaggerated, being elevated to the rank of a decisive factor. Such an assertion involves the overlooking of the numerous and crippling limitations of this form of intelligence, technically and operationally. Through analysis of such limitations, in relation to its isolated successes, it can be seen that Ultra was no more than a supplementary factor in the allies favour, complimenting their knowledge of the Axis powers and their forces, as it sat in the background sifting through decrypts until it found information worth passing on to a higher authority. Eventually during this sifting process Ultra enabled the Allies to know immensely useful information about its enemy and, although rarely in the short term, due to the slow speed of its distribution.
 
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Although the Ultra-derived intelligence that Freyberg received was very detailed, it was taken out of context and misinterpreted. While emphasis was placed on the airborne assault the German messages mentioned seaborne operations, which seriously affected Freyberg's troop deployment, as he expected an amphibious landing, consequently detracting from the defence of the main German objective of the Maleme airfield.

Dorman-Smith apparently arrogant manner and brusqueness towards people he considered less intelligent than himself made him a number of enemies who would later become highly influential.
 
Ultra was an added bonus to the Allies, not their primary source of wisdom. Ultra was only one intelligence source among many. Other sources ranged from reconnaissance, both ground and air, POW interrogation, other SIGINT and reports from contacts on the front line and the relevant commanders history in battle. From analysing their impact upon operations it is possible to assert that they were themselves more significant a factor than was Ultra although again Ultra always had the potential to be decisive. Ultra was never used as an infallible source, but instead it was corroborated with these other sources to gauge its reliability. Since the release of many of the Ultra documents Ultra's role in the Second world War has been greatly exaggerated, being elevated to the rank of a decisive factor. Such an assertion involves the overlooking of the numerous and crippling limitations of this form of intelligence, technically and operationally. Through analysis of such limitations, in relation to its isolated successes, it can be seen that Ultra was no more than a supplementary factor in the allies favour, complimenting their knowledge of the Axis powers and their forces, as it sat in the background sifting through decrypts until it found information worth passing on to a higher authority. Eventually during this sifting process Ultra enabled the Allies to know immensely useful information about its enemy and, although rarely in the short term, due to the slow speed of its distribution.

Brilliant
 
I did a quick read about the battle of Crete and it said something about an error at Maleme

"Though the New Zealanders were able to hold the hill through the day, an error led to their being withdrawn during the night"

It does not say what caused the error. Was it faulty intelligence or a command error or something else.
 
I did a quick read about the battle of Crete and it said something about an error at Maleme
"Though the New Zealanders were able to hold the hill through the day, an error led to their being withdrawn during the night"
It does not say what caused the error. Was it faulty intelligence or a command error or something else.

Defending the key positions at Maleme was 22nd Battalion. Under the command of First World War Victoria Cross (VC) winner Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie Andrew, the battalion occupied positions along the western edges of the airfield as well the substantial hill – known as Point 107 – overlooking it. By the afternoon the situation was serious enough for Andrew to seek additional support from 23rd Battalion, located to his east. This request was turned down by Brigadier James Hargest, commander of 5th (NZ) Brigade, who mistakenly believed 23rd Battalion was tied up dealing with enemy paratroops in its area.
In desperation Andrew decided to use his meagre reserve – two tanks and an infantry platoon – to drive the Germans back from the edge of the airfield. But the counter-attack petered out when the tanks broke down. Unable to contact his forward companies and fearing that the rest of the battalion would be cut off, Andrew decided to pull back from Point 107 to a nearby ridge. Hargest agreed to the withdrawal – famously replying, ‘if you must, you must’ – before ordering two companies forward to reinforce 22nd Battalion. One of these companies briefly reoccupied Point 107 before falling back, while the other failed to make contact in the dark and also withdrew. Andrew pulled his battalion back to link up with 21st Battalion in the east, leaving behind two forward companies fighting on the western edge of the airfield. Both companies managed to extricate themselves when they found that the rest of the battalion had withdrawn.


http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/the-battle-for-crete/the-battle-day-1-3


from


http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/the-battle-for-crete
 
I've often wondered how things would have changed if the panzers had gotten to Dunkirk before the evacuation. If no army had made it back to Britain the country's morale might well have been shattered. If that had happened, Churchill's speeches may have been entirely different. Lets pretend England sues for peace in June 1940. How would Hitler's plans have changed?
 
The RAF and the Royal Navy were still a force to be reckoned with. There were TA battalions trained and training as well a raw recruits being trained. There were also quite a few WW1 vets who maybe not spring chickens anymore, they still had a lot of fight left in them as well as experience. I doubt if Hitler would have made it across the channel, but if he did he would have had one hell of a fight on his hands.

Morale of the British people might have had a bit of a hammering, but they would have stood up and said "F^%K YOU, WE AINT GIVING IN!" Britain would never have sue for peace.

Even with the troops rescued from Dunkirk it took a long time to replace the equipment lost at Dunkirk and those still in training to get them into some sort of effective fighting force.
 
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To be honest I cant see it making any difference.

- Germany still could not have crossed the channel due to the RAF and RN.
- Germany was always going to go east into Russia, that was always Hitler goal right from the time he bored the world into a slumber with Mein Kampf.

I am extremely doubtful that Britain would have sued for peace even with the loss of the BEF primarily because Britain was never really in any danger of an invasion however had they called it quits I suspect it would have drawn out the war for years as German production would have been left unhindered by Bomber Command thus freeing up a large number of resources from manpower to material production.

However I am not convinced it would have changed the outcome of the war other than perhaps having France speaking Russian as the USSR was just too big of a hurdle for a nation the size of Germany.
 
The troop size against Soviet was to small. Maybe 5 million men was better but whole 6-7 million men was all soldiers in nazi regim of Germany.

Have I right now?
 
I think Germany was simply not up to the task of defeating Russia, it could win on the battlefield but you can not expect a rapid victory when you are marching two thirds of your army across a massive landscape on foot or horse back and when rapid victory was not possible then it became a war of attrition and from that point on Germany couldn't win.
 
Sorry about the what if scenarios but what if Hitler decided to go after the British Empire by taking North Africa, Egypt and Palestine. He still has a treaty with Russia and he is throwing numerous divisions into the desert, not just the one he let Rommel play with. I don't think it would have taken the Germans long to take the Suez canal. He has also stepped up his submarine production and is sinking most of what is coming over from the States and Canada. Where would that leave Britain. Maybe they would sue for peace after a few years of starvation diets. Then again, maybe not.
 
Before you get carried away with the idea of Panzer Army Afrika goose stepping its way from Tunisia to Cairo and beyond can I suggest that you look at the logistics of what you are proposing.

Warsaw to Moscow - 1149km
Tunis to Cairo - 2090km

The problem in North Africa was not getting supplies to Tunisia or Libya but getting those supplies from Tunis or Tripoli to a front that was almost twice the distance the entire Russian campaign was going to require.

With this in mind German problems would have only been worse if they had reinforced the Afrika Korps to the size it needed to be to complete the task.
 
Even when he had stepped up his submarine production,the U Boats never had a chance to starve Britain .The losses by the U Boats always were marginal .
 
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