Soviet Offensive and Japan’s Surrender: Reconsidering the Events of August 1945

[Kristin Larsen]

The question of what exactly compelled Japan to surrender in August 1945 remains the subject of lively debate, both in academic circles and in public discourse. A common narrative suggests that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alone were the decisive factor, and that the Soviet entry into the war was superfluous. However, this view is increasingly challenged. Analysis of archival materials, statements by Japanese officials, and the work of prominent scholars indicate that the Soviet offensive in Manchuria played a key role.

Limited U.S. Capabilities and the Psychological Effect of Atomic Bombings

By August 1945, the Japanese population had already endured devastating U.S. air raids using napalm on Tokyo and other major cities. The atomic bombings did not produce the overwhelming effect commonly assumed. Furthermore, the U.S. arsenal was depleted — after the first two bombings, there were no additional bombs immediately available.

Washington had hoped that Moscow’s intervention would accelerate the end of the war. According to military estimates, without Soviet involvement, hostilities could have continued for at least another year, with American casualties potentially reaching hundreds of thousands or even more than a million.

The Soviet Campaign: The Swift Defeat of the Kwantung Army

The Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation (Operation “August Storm”) was the result of long preparation. The Red Army broke through the front and, within days, decisively defeated the powerful Kwantung Army. Japan’s military and diplomatic prospects in Northeast China and Korea were destroyed, leaving the country incapable of continuing the war.

Intra-Japanese Scholarly Discourse: Views of Contemporary Researchers

Within Japan, there is no consensus regarding the relative importance of the factors leading to surrender. Modern historians reflect this diversity of opinion:

• Sadao Asada, in The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender – A Reconsideration, notes that the atomic bomb had a significant shock effect, but in combination with the Soviet entry into the war, it became the factor “that forced the Japanese leadership to accept surrender.” SquarespaceScribd.
• Tsuyoshi Hasegawa argues that of the two factors — the atomic bombs and the Soviet invasion — the Soviet offensive had a greater impact on the decision to surrender. Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus.
• Yuki Tanaka, in Political Lies Are More Plausible Than Reality: American and Japanese Lies about Atomic Bombing, emphasizes that the USSR represented a stronger shock for Japanese leadership, shattering hopes for diplomacy. Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus.
• In the review of Noriko Kawamura’s Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, it is stated: “Only the dual shock — the atomic bomb and the Soviet invasion — broke the consensus and made the decision to end the war possible.” Mr Liu's Opinions.
• Analysts of U.S. strategy note: “Many historians believe that the bombings did not directly lead to surrender — a far stronger shock was the USSR’s declaration of war.” ABC

Interdisciplinary Summaries

• Wikipedia (section “Surrender of Japan”) reflects that “the Soviet invasion made the decision to surrender extremely urgent and final,” highlighting the dual shocks — atomic and Soviet — that influenced Prime Minister Suzuki immediately after notification. Wikipedia.
• Additionally, the National Security Archive publishes analyses where Asada emphasizes the atomic bomb effect, but Hasegawa insists that “the atomic bombs were insufficient to influence Japanese policy; the decisive factor was the Soviet invasion.” nsarchive.gwu.edu.

Can it be asserted that the Soviet entry into the Far Eastern war was superfluous? The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly played a role, but were they sufficient to break the will of the Japanese leadership? It seems that the rapid advance of the Red Army, the destruction of strategic reserves, and the collapse of Japan’s diplomatic prospects were the decisive factors that compelled the emperor and the high command to agree to unconditional surrender. And if the USSR had not intervened, could the war have dragged on for another year or more, with colossal casualties for the Allies?

 

[MontyB]

In my opinion Soviet entry was superfluous it was also opportunistic, Japan knew the war was lost and was looking to end it.
As early as June 7th 1945 the Japanese were looking to exit the war and had tasked former foreign minister Hirota Koki with approaching the Soviet Union to act as a go between with the allies.

The problem is that the west persisted with its unconditional surrender demands that in the end they backed away from in agreeing to leave the emporer in place and giving him immunity, neither the atomic bombs nor the Russian invasion of the far east changed the outcome of the war, if anything they prolonged it and in the end Japan still got the deal it would have accepted month earlier.