Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Defense News
February 25, 2008 Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq
U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus won plaudits for his command of the 101st Airborne Division during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, subsequent reconstruction and counterinsurgency efforts, and efforts to train Iraqi soldiers. He was appointed commander of coalition forces in Iraq in February 2007, one month after U.S. President George W. Bush announced plans to deploy 30,000 more troops in a so-called “surge.”
The surge is retreating on schedule — of the five brigade combat teams sent in the surge, three are back home. Now Petraeus, other U.S. commanders and Bush administration officials are debating whether and when to allow the U.S. force to sink below the 15 teams that were there before the surge.
He spoke by telephone from Baghdad on Feb. 18.
Q. Is there a need for a pause once the surge brigades have left? When would that pause occur, and for how long?
A. All of us have discussed this — by that I mean the [Secretary of Defense Robert Gates; Adm. William Fallon, commander of U.S. Central Command; Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and others].
The consensus is that when you have withdrawn over one-quarter of your combat forces it would be sensible and prudent to have a period of consolidation, perhaps some force adjustments and evaluation, before continuing with further reductions.
There’s every intent to reduce additional forces — reduce further — after this drawdown is complete in July. And there’s consensus that the reductions should be conditions-based, so there should be some decision points, once the dust has settled from all those reductions, at which you assess the situation and determine recommendations for additional reductions.
This is a bit more complex than you might think because with conditions-based reductions, you’re staring in the face a variety of different factors, including the prospect now of elections in the early fall — as well as, having done the reductions, see what’s going on with the enemy, see if there are further local and national political or economic developments that can help cement some of the security gains.
There will be a transition of tasks, of course, over time to Iraqi security forces; there will be a transition of the so-called Concerned Local Citizens or Sons of Iraq [citizen groups opposed to the insurgency] into Iraqi security forces or jobs programs, or perhaps civil service elements.
There will be detainee releases on both the coalition and the Iraqi side. They just passed an amnesty bill last week along with their 2008 budget and the provincial powers law. It will be a very active period.
It is much more complex than might be seen, because the way you reduce is you actually delay a unit from coming in at the same time that you decide to send another unit home. In other words, you’re not going to take a unit that’s been here for two months and send it home.
But you won’t just take a brigade out of an area completely and leave nothing; you’ll do replacement with smaller forces. That’s what we’ve been working on for a couple of months, and that’s what we’ll continue working on through the spring and into the summer.
Q. The surge was intended to buy time for Iraqi leaders to reach some form of reconciliation. Has that worked?
A. They have passed three benchmark laws on amnesty, provincial powers, and accountability and justice. To be sure, you have to see how they are implemented. Accountability and justice needs to be implemented in the spirit of reconciliation that motivated its passage.
Q. You credit Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno and III Corps with helping create conditions for political reconciliation.
A. He did a brilliant job as my operational-level wingman, the operational-level architect, together with his staff and some tremendous division commanders, brigade commanders, battalion commanders and leaders at all levels.
Let’s never forget the troopers who are out there in 125 degrees in body armor, Kevlar and other gear, walking point for the effort. They made a very critical contribution and deserve a considerable amount of the credit for what has been accomplished.
It is sometimes overlooked, but the Iraqi surge was over three times our surge. They added over 100,000 Iraqi security force members. That’s an enormous generation of additional Iraqi forces.
Beyond that was the emergence of Concerned Local Citizens, now called Sons of Iraq, which have now reached about 90,000, with some nearly 20,000 having already transitioned to Iraqi security force elements.
Q. How many al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) fighters are now left in Iraq?
A. We’ve just been working on that to submit it as part of a report, but I’m afraid it’s a classified portion. The best way to describe what has happened would be to say that al-Qaida in Iraq has lost a significant number of its leaders, including some of its most important foreign leaders — a number of their media emirs and operators, and that’s very important because that’s how they communicate.
Q. How would you characterize AQI’s numbers now?
A. I’d say two things: that there has been significant damage done to al-Qaida in Iraq, but they remain a very lethal organization and they are adaptive. They have lost control of a number of areas, and just surviving in many of those areas now is a challenge for them.
Q. How much of AQI’s force is foreign?
A. We think it’s a good bit less than 10 percent, but it tends to be the senior leaders, a number of the most skilled in improvised explosive devices, explosives, car bomb manufacture, media operations, and they typically play a big role in the foreign-fighter network.
Although the number of foreign fighters is down by as much as half, there is still that half coming in, and a significant percentage of that, we believe, is suicide bombers.
Q. How many Iranian paramilitary Quds Force operators are in Iraq?
A. The only Quds Force members that we know of are those in diplomatic positions with diplomatic immunity. The Iranian ambassador to Iraq is a Quds Force member.
Clearly there is a continuing concern with the Quds Force-supported special group elements; those have been the biggest concern when it comes to elements violating the cease-fire declared by Moqtada al-Sadr.
It is the special groups that appear to be the ones who carry out the most significant violations of the cease-fire. They are the principal users of the explosively formed projectiles that had been such a dangerous weapon. The numbers of those used in January were up significantly, although they’ve been very erratic this month.
Q. How hard do you have to work to keep the cease-fire with al-Sadr’s militia, Jaysh al-Mahdi, in place? What’s the long-term plan to remove them from the security equation?
A. A number of engagement efforts are ongoing, from local efforts by individual battalion commanders on up — in some cases, company commanders — who have engaged militia members and leaders, who have in some cases reached local accommodations with them, which basically mean they can’t carry out criminal activity, and if they do, they are obviously vulnerable to being detained.
This is done, in most cases, with the involvement of Iraqi security force leaders, local Iraqi leaders. ... That really goes on at all levels, all the way up to the level of the force headquarters and the embassy.
What everyone would like to do across the spectrum is to get various elements to lay down their weapons and become members of the political process.
Q. Is that a realistic possibility?
A. We’ve seen some progress. I’m not sure that a year ago that many folks would have anticipated or predicted the progress that would have been made against al-Qaida Iraq. There are innumerable challenges, there are numerous threats and issues to be dealt with, but the level of violence is down, the level of civilian deaths are down even more, and when we incorporate Iraqi data, the reduction in civilian deaths is very, very significant.
Q. Is there any incentive for Sadr to give up his private army?
A. The challenge for Moqtada al-Sadr is to avoid the further tarnishing of the reputation of the Sadr movement, which traces itself to the martyr Sadr, his father, and is founded on a principle of service to the least fortunate. But what has happened is because of the exposure of militia involvement in precipitating the violence, the public is not as inclined to welcome the militia the way they used to.
Q. There seems to be a sense in Washington that the debate over force levels in Iraq is increasingly pitting you against the Pentagon.
A. I think that’s a vast oversimplification. I very much understand the strain and sacrifice that these long deployments have required. Between 2001 and the time of the testimony, I’ll have been deployed for 52 months, so I am keenly aware of that, as is my family, and we all want to reduce that strain and increase dwell time. And I think that the Army will be able to make announcements in the next few months. ...
But in recent weeks, the secretary of defense has described his thinking — again — that when there have been significant reductions, that it would be prudent to have a period of evaluation and consolidation. Others that I’ve talked to certainly are of the same mind. So I think that that may be a bit overstated. We don’t even start the serious briefings until some time in March, leading up to the testimony in April.
--Sean D. Naylor in Washington
February 25, 2008 Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq
U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus won plaudits for his command of the 101st Airborne Division during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, subsequent reconstruction and counterinsurgency efforts, and efforts to train Iraqi soldiers. He was appointed commander of coalition forces in Iraq in February 2007, one month after U.S. President George W. Bush announced plans to deploy 30,000 more troops in a so-called “surge.”
The surge is retreating on schedule — of the five brigade combat teams sent in the surge, three are back home. Now Petraeus, other U.S. commanders and Bush administration officials are debating whether and when to allow the U.S. force to sink below the 15 teams that were there before the surge.
He spoke by telephone from Baghdad on Feb. 18.
Q. Is there a need for a pause once the surge brigades have left? When would that pause occur, and for how long?
A. All of us have discussed this — by that I mean the [Secretary of Defense Robert Gates; Adm. William Fallon, commander of U.S. Central Command; Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and others].
The consensus is that when you have withdrawn over one-quarter of your combat forces it would be sensible and prudent to have a period of consolidation, perhaps some force adjustments and evaluation, before continuing with further reductions.
There’s every intent to reduce additional forces — reduce further — after this drawdown is complete in July. And there’s consensus that the reductions should be conditions-based, so there should be some decision points, once the dust has settled from all those reductions, at which you assess the situation and determine recommendations for additional reductions.
This is a bit more complex than you might think because with conditions-based reductions, you’re staring in the face a variety of different factors, including the prospect now of elections in the early fall — as well as, having done the reductions, see what’s going on with the enemy, see if there are further local and national political or economic developments that can help cement some of the security gains.
There will be a transition of tasks, of course, over time to Iraqi security forces; there will be a transition of the so-called Concerned Local Citizens or Sons of Iraq [citizen groups opposed to the insurgency] into Iraqi security forces or jobs programs, or perhaps civil service elements.
There will be detainee releases on both the coalition and the Iraqi side. They just passed an amnesty bill last week along with their 2008 budget and the provincial powers law. It will be a very active period.
It is much more complex than might be seen, because the way you reduce is you actually delay a unit from coming in at the same time that you decide to send another unit home. In other words, you’re not going to take a unit that’s been here for two months and send it home.
But you won’t just take a brigade out of an area completely and leave nothing; you’ll do replacement with smaller forces. That’s what we’ve been working on for a couple of months, and that’s what we’ll continue working on through the spring and into the summer.
Q. The surge was intended to buy time for Iraqi leaders to reach some form of reconciliation. Has that worked?
A. They have passed three benchmark laws on amnesty, provincial powers, and accountability and justice. To be sure, you have to see how they are implemented. Accountability and justice needs to be implemented in the spirit of reconciliation that motivated its passage.
Q. You credit Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno and III Corps with helping create conditions for political reconciliation.
A. He did a brilliant job as my operational-level wingman, the operational-level architect, together with his staff and some tremendous division commanders, brigade commanders, battalion commanders and leaders at all levels.
Let’s never forget the troopers who are out there in 125 degrees in body armor, Kevlar and other gear, walking point for the effort. They made a very critical contribution and deserve a considerable amount of the credit for what has been accomplished.
It is sometimes overlooked, but the Iraqi surge was over three times our surge. They added over 100,000 Iraqi security force members. That’s an enormous generation of additional Iraqi forces.
Beyond that was the emergence of Concerned Local Citizens, now called Sons of Iraq, which have now reached about 90,000, with some nearly 20,000 having already transitioned to Iraqi security force elements.
Q. How many al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) fighters are now left in Iraq?
A. We’ve just been working on that to submit it as part of a report, but I’m afraid it’s a classified portion. The best way to describe what has happened would be to say that al-Qaida in Iraq has lost a significant number of its leaders, including some of its most important foreign leaders — a number of their media emirs and operators, and that’s very important because that’s how they communicate.
Q. How would you characterize AQI’s numbers now?
A. I’d say two things: that there has been significant damage done to al-Qaida in Iraq, but they remain a very lethal organization and they are adaptive. They have lost control of a number of areas, and just surviving in many of those areas now is a challenge for them.
Q. How much of AQI’s force is foreign?
A. We think it’s a good bit less than 10 percent, but it tends to be the senior leaders, a number of the most skilled in improvised explosive devices, explosives, car bomb manufacture, media operations, and they typically play a big role in the foreign-fighter network.
Although the number of foreign fighters is down by as much as half, there is still that half coming in, and a significant percentage of that, we believe, is suicide bombers.
Q. How many Iranian paramilitary Quds Force operators are in Iraq?
A. The only Quds Force members that we know of are those in diplomatic positions with diplomatic immunity. The Iranian ambassador to Iraq is a Quds Force member.
Clearly there is a continuing concern with the Quds Force-supported special group elements; those have been the biggest concern when it comes to elements violating the cease-fire declared by Moqtada al-Sadr.
It is the special groups that appear to be the ones who carry out the most significant violations of the cease-fire. They are the principal users of the explosively formed projectiles that had been such a dangerous weapon. The numbers of those used in January were up significantly, although they’ve been very erratic this month.
Q. How hard do you have to work to keep the cease-fire with al-Sadr’s militia, Jaysh al-Mahdi, in place? What’s the long-term plan to remove them from the security equation?
A. A number of engagement efforts are ongoing, from local efforts by individual battalion commanders on up — in some cases, company commanders — who have engaged militia members and leaders, who have in some cases reached local accommodations with them, which basically mean they can’t carry out criminal activity, and if they do, they are obviously vulnerable to being detained.
This is done, in most cases, with the involvement of Iraqi security force leaders, local Iraqi leaders. ... That really goes on at all levels, all the way up to the level of the force headquarters and the embassy.
What everyone would like to do across the spectrum is to get various elements to lay down their weapons and become members of the political process.
Q. Is that a realistic possibility?
A. We’ve seen some progress. I’m not sure that a year ago that many folks would have anticipated or predicted the progress that would have been made against al-Qaida Iraq. There are innumerable challenges, there are numerous threats and issues to be dealt with, but the level of violence is down, the level of civilian deaths are down even more, and when we incorporate Iraqi data, the reduction in civilian deaths is very, very significant.
Q. Is there any incentive for Sadr to give up his private army?
A. The challenge for Moqtada al-Sadr is to avoid the further tarnishing of the reputation of the Sadr movement, which traces itself to the martyr Sadr, his father, and is founded on a principle of service to the least fortunate. But what has happened is because of the exposure of militia involvement in precipitating the violence, the public is not as inclined to welcome the militia the way they used to.
Q. There seems to be a sense in Washington that the debate over force levels in Iraq is increasingly pitting you against the Pentagon.
A. I think that’s a vast oversimplification. I very much understand the strain and sacrifice that these long deployments have required. Between 2001 and the time of the testimony, I’ll have been deployed for 52 months, so I am keenly aware of that, as is my family, and we all want to reduce that strain and increase dwell time. And I think that the Army will be able to make announcements in the next few months. ...
But in recent weeks, the secretary of defense has described his thinking — again — that when there have been significant reductions, that it would be prudent to have a period of evaluation and consolidation. Others that I’ve talked to certainly are of the same mind. So I think that that may be a bit overstated. We don’t even start the serious briefings until some time in March, leading up to the testimony in April.
--Sean D. Naylor in Washington