Could Greece have been defended in 1941?

perseus

perseus

Active member
I've always assumed Greece was undefendable against a competent modern army such as what Germany possessed at that stage of the war. However, after looking at the terrain I'm not so sure. A serious strategical blunder was to attempt to defend the entire country.

In addition to fighting the Italians in Albania they had to cover a long defence line in Northern Greece or Macedonia in a futile to cover their second city Thessaloniki. This also gave the Germans the opportunity to outflank them via Yugoslavia.

442px-Battle_of_Greece_-_1941.png


Topological map here

However, the Greek terrain must have been a serious challenge to the most competent aggressor. The mountain passes on the way to Athens include the famous Thermopylae pass (of earlier Spartan fame). If the Greek army would have focussed on these, perhaps later supported by Commonwealth forces could they have held on in Southern Greece and Athens?

I'm not suggesting it was a good idea for the Commonwealth not to secure North Africa first, but using this strategy perhaps they might have held the Germans off for long enough, so both objectives could be achieved? Long term this would have given the allies air bases in Southern Greece in range of the Ploiesti Oilfields in Rumania.
 
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The Greek Army did well holding the Italians at bay, but I think we would have done better keeping all our forces in North Africa and taking the whole of North Africa before Rommel could take part in the fighting there. I feel by stripping the North African Army of its men and equipment just to lose it in Greece and Crete was a mistake
 
Indeed I agree as as indicated in the last paragraph, but this distracts from the question I ask. Just considering the defence of Greece (and the adjoining countries) in isolation, could the Greeks have adopted better tactical positions to stop invasion by blockading the few key passes to the Southern half of the country?

It seems to me they made the mistake of attempting to defend the entire country like Poland did.

The invasion was also reminiscent of France, in that the armoured divisions bypassed the main defensive lines by both invading a neighbouring country, Yugoslavia in this case. It was also heavily reliant on the use of vulnerable narrow communication arteries. Both these tactics outflanked the main body of the Greek army and key positions such as the Commonwealth forces around Mt Olympus.

The more practical barriers of defence was suggested by the British, but they refused to listen and didn't even prepare the necessary defences as agreed with them.
 
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Personally I don't think Greece was defendable both the Metaxas and Allakmon lines were too far north and prone to flanking, the only area that may have been defendable was the Peloponnese but what would have been the point as by then you had given away 80% of the country anyway.

In my opinion they should have continued operation compass and driven the axis from North Africa before Rommel arrived and if they felt like tying up a few Germans perhaps defended Crete for use as a potential jumping off point to assault Greece at a later date and as a air base for attack German oil supplies.
 
Yes I thought of the Peloponnese first, but that sea barrier is just a wide river which can be protected by air. I was thinking a mountain barrier, from Mt Olympus West (which the Commonwealth forces eventually chose) focussing on defending the two or three narrow valleys would have been a better bet. This would have kept Athens under the Allied occupation. Panzers, can't cross mountains air power or not.
 
Some info:

III. Strategic Factors

According to military doctrine the mountainous terrain of Greece would seem ideally suited for defense. The high ranges of the Rhodope, Epirus, Pindus, and Olympus Mountains offer many possibilities to stop an invader. However, the defender must have sufficient air power, if the many defiles are not to become traps for his ground forces.

Whereas an invader thrusting from Albania can be stopped with relatively small forces in the high Pindus Mountains, the northeastern part of the country is difficult to defend against an attack from the north. Eastern Macedonia and western Thrace are narrow strips of land that can be cut off from the rest of Greece by an advance following the course of the Vardar River. Salonika, the only efficient port in northern Greece, is situated within this vulnerable area. The supply system of the Greek forces fighting in Albania was based on Salonika. The capture of the port would cut their supply lines and isolate them in their exposed positions. Since a voluntary withdrawal of the Greek forces in Albania was not feasible and Salonika was practically indefensible, the Greek and British commands resigned themselves to fighting a delaying action in the northeastern part of the country.

The British fully realized the vulnerability of the Greek border defense system; it was bound to collapse in the event of a German thrust between the Strimon and Vardar Rivers. However, they let the Greeks have their way without taking the logical step of moving their forces up to the frontier into the sector west of the Metaxas Line. General Maitland Wilson, the commander of the British expeditionary force, was of the opinion that his forces were too weak to hold such an extended front line. Instead, he established a shorter position some forty miles west of the course of the Vardar. Running along the northern slopes of Olympus and Pieria Mountains and following the eastern slopes of the Vermion Range northward to the Yugoslav frontier, this position extended over approximately seventy miles. There were only four major gaps in this mountain position: one on each side of Mount Olympus, one through the Aliakmon Valley, and one at Edhessa. Almost everywhere else along the so-called Vermion Position the lower forward slopes were steep and rugged, forming a natural obstacle to attacking forces. The two main objectives in establishing this position were to maintain contact with the Greek First Army in Albania and to deny the (Germans access to central Greece. The possibility of a rapid disintegration of the Yugoslav Army and a German thrust into the rear of the Verrnion Position was not taken into consideration.
 
Our troops would have had to been supplied by sea and I think the U Boats and German Air Force would have played havoc with the resupply.
 
LeEnfield said:
Our troops would have had to been supplied by sea and I think the U Boats and German Air Force would have played havoc with the resupply.
Click to expand...

I am not sure I agree the Allies managed to keep Malta afloat which was in a far worse location for sea supply I don't think Crete would have been any harder to supply and given that the Med is rather shallow U-Boats would have had a rough time especially once within range of aircraft from Crete.

Greece could not be saved in my opinion however I think Crete was defensible had they had the resources that were wasted in Greece.
 
Yes the Allies kept Malta open but at one hell of cost, out of a convoy of 16 ships I think that just two got through, and that does not count the Royal Navy Losses
 
I think you are all focussing far too much on the us. What I'm really thinking about is how the Greeks themselves could have redeployed to make a tougher defence in April 1941. What if they could have held out for an extra month until North Africa was cleared? Once North Africa was cleared, Malta would become easy to supply and strategically irrelevant to the Germans, so Southern Greece would have been the focus of the campaign.

Examining the text I linked, it seems the Germans advanced through those key passes by using specialised Mountain divisions and attacking slopes, not through head on armour. This is something the Greeks should have been able to tackle if the troops hadn't been wasted up North on the undefendable Bulgarian border. Indeed they even managed to put up something of a fight even there.
 
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From what I have read,the claim that Tripoli could be captured if Greece was abandoned,is a myth:the Germans were already in NA,before the British were going to Greece.
 
Every thing that we say on these forums all revolve around the word IF and in saying that I still IF we had pushed on to take Tripoli and rolled along and taken the rest of North Africa-and allowing De Gaulle to lead his troops into the Major French Cities then we may have just away with it, but by cutting our force in North Africa by some 60% and scattering it around the Med, then we left ourselves undermanned to hold what we had taken.
 
lljadw said:
And,the importance of Malta was marginal .
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Absolute nonsense. In December 1942, air and sea forces operating from Malta went over to the offensive. By May 1943, they had sunk 230 Axis ships in 164 days, the highest Allied sinking rate of the war. The Allied victory played a major role in the eventual Allied success in North Africa.
 
Absolute nonsens:what happened in 1943 was irrelevant :from the beginning of 1941 till the end of 1942,more than 90 % of the ships that were going to NA,arrived unhurt and only a small % of the losses were caused by aircraft/submarines operating from Malta.
Besides:Malta or no Malta,the fate of the Axis in NA was sealed .
The whole Malta story is a typical WWII myth.
 
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Italy to Libya
1940 (starting from june) 244 ships with 1.24 million GRT
Lost:7 ships with 24000 GRT
1941:903 ships wit 4.83 million GRT
lost:79 ships,370000 GRT
1942:656 ships with 2.42 million GRT
lost :62 ships with 240000 GRT
1943(only january) :16 with 32000 GRt
lost:3 ships with 12000 ton .
 
lljadw said:
Absolute nonsens:what happened in 1943 was irrelevant :from the beginning of 1941 till the end of 1942,more than 90 % of the ships that were going to NA,arrived unhurt and only a small % of the losses were caused by aircraft/submarines operating from Malta.
Besides:Malta or no Malta,the fate of the Axis in NA was sealed .
The whole Malta story is a typical WWII myth.
Click to expand...

I would expect that from you. Again you talk nothing but absolute bollocks.
Only a small percentage was sunk by aircraft/submarines operating from Malta. If Malta was as insignificant as you claim, then why did the Luftwaffe and Italian Air Force go all out to bomb the Island into submission with a prelude to invasion?

Malta played a key part in the Mediterranean campaign in World War Two. In September 1941, German bombers flew into Sicily and a gradual build-up continued. The Luftwaffe made no major raids on Malta up to the end of the year. The raids that they made were merely to test out the island’s defences.

By the end of the year, Field Marshal Kesselring took over command of the Luftwaffe in Italy and he made his plans for Malta very clear and public – that he wanted the island to be taken and that his ‘Fliegerkorps II was more than capable of achieving this. His rationale was very simple. While the Royal Navy had a major base on the island, the German and Italian supply routes to North Africa were always under threat.

The mere presence of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean Sea also gave the impression that Axis power in that area was not complete – which, indeed, it was not. If Malta was taken out of the equation, then the Royal Navy only had Gibraltar as a major base right at the western tip of the Mediterranean Sea and the Axis powers could transport supplies to North Africa with much greater ease.

I suppose the resupply convoys to Malta were not of importance but simply an exercise in logistics?

Did you serve in Malta, did you ever talk to people who were there? Obviously not, I however, did serve on Malta and I talked to people who were there at that time.

The only myth here is you.
 
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As usual,only blahblah .
There was no major base of the RN on Malta :the only important base was Alexandria.
Malta out or not:this would change nothing on the outcome of the war in NA.
The big problem for the Germans was not the convoys,but,once the supplies arrived in NA,to bring them to the front .And,the few aircraft and submarines operating from Malta were doing little harm to the Axis .
If Malta was that important for Britain,more ships and aircraft would be stationed at Malta .
BTW:Your attempt to bluf me with the argument :I was (years later) on Malta,and,I have spoken with Malta veterans,will not succeed:it is totally irrelevant .
 
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