Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Washington Times
March 24, 2009
Pg. 4
Analysis/Opinion
By Daniel Serwer, Special To The Washington Times
In his announcement last month at Camp Lejeune, President Obama combined his plan for military withdrawal from Iraq with strong words about intensifying diplomatic and political engagement with both Baghdad and its neighbors. This is the right approach in order to safeguard substantial gains and prevent catastrophe, but is it happening?
Washington's focus is turning unequivocally toward what is now known as AFPAK. Funding, staffing, high-level discussion and policy decisions are naturally focused on what the new president says is the top threat to American national security, al Qaeda's presence in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Iraq, however, is still a work in progress, one in which the political and diplomatic challenges are now significantly greater while military challenges have declined. Little has been done so far to beef up the civilian capability.
The U.S. Embassy, never known for its outreach to Iraqi society, is ever more hunkered down now that Iraqis rather than Americans guard the Green Zone.
The U.N. mission - vital to resolving Kurdish/Arab conflict over territory in Iraq's north - is still under-resourced. The U.S. civilian/military provincial reconstruction teams that once dotted the Iraqi map are being reconfigured and drawn down. Nongovernmental organizations and contractors who conduct so much of the civilian effort in Iraq are more likely to be moving out than moving in.
Funding is scarce for vital political efforts needed as Iraq heads into a year of multiple elections and severe budgetary constraints because of the world economic situation and lower oil prices. The president wisely chose to maintain relatively high levels of troops in Iraq until the end of the year, but without civilian counterparts they will have only limited effect, especially as they are to be withdrawn from population centers by the end of June.
There is a similar lack of visible effort on the diplomatic front, where the relations between Iraq and its neighbors are stalled, awaiting clear signals from the U.S. Saudi Arabia, after many promises, has still not sent an ambassador. Suicide bombers still sneak across the Syrian border. Iran, keeping its powder dry since the January provincial elections in which its favorites did not do well, still maintains substantial influence in Iraq's southern provinces.
What is needed is a major surge of civilian political and diplomatic effort to accompany the military drawdown.
Within Iraq, this civilian effort should prioritize the relatively few remaining issues that could lead to instability and disrupt the American withdrawal. These include U.N. efforts to settle territorial disputes between Iraq's Kurdistan and the surrounding Arab-majority provinces, U.S. assistance in setting up effective provincial governments and ensuring political reconciliation, improving the capacity of the national and provincial governments to provide services to the population, negotiation of a permanent regime for oil production and revenue sharing, and providing a safe and secure environment for December's national elections.
With Iraq's neighbors, the emphasis should be on ensuring that each of them avoids destabilizing moves as the U.S. withdraws.
The temptation to fill the vacuum the U.S. leaves behind will be enormous - but if one neighbor does it, the others will counter, causing Iraq to break down if not break up. Fragmentation of Iraq is the neighbors' greatest fear, because the sectarian and ethnic conflicts that would ensue would be difficult to contain. There is at least some reason to hope that the neighbors - properly consulted on U.S. plans - can reach an understanding that enables mutual restraint.
U.S. political and diplomatic efforts during the Bush administration were notably ineffective. A sporadic dialogue with Iraq's neighbors limited to a relatively few subjects of more interest to Iraq than the neighbors produced few results. Efforts to encourage political reconciliation within Iraq had mainly superficial outcomes.
The now planned and announced U.S. withdrawal provides a new strategic backdrop that increases the potential for results, but only if the political and diplomatic effort is intensified. Washington would do well to challenge its European allies to join the enterprise - they are increasingly interested in gaining commercial advantages in Iraq and should be willing to provide expanded civilian assistance.
The next year will be an important test of whether the Obama administration can demonstrate that the U.S. would do well to rely on diplomacy as well as military power to serve its national interests. Iraq is where one of the crucial experiments will be conducted.
Daniel Serwer is vice president for peace and stability operations at the United States Institute of Peace.
March 24, 2009
Pg. 4
Analysis/Opinion
By Daniel Serwer, Special To The Washington Times
In his announcement last month at Camp Lejeune, President Obama combined his plan for military withdrawal from Iraq with strong words about intensifying diplomatic and political engagement with both Baghdad and its neighbors. This is the right approach in order to safeguard substantial gains and prevent catastrophe, but is it happening?
Washington's focus is turning unequivocally toward what is now known as AFPAK. Funding, staffing, high-level discussion and policy decisions are naturally focused on what the new president says is the top threat to American national security, al Qaeda's presence in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Iraq, however, is still a work in progress, one in which the political and diplomatic challenges are now significantly greater while military challenges have declined. Little has been done so far to beef up the civilian capability.
The U.S. Embassy, never known for its outreach to Iraqi society, is ever more hunkered down now that Iraqis rather than Americans guard the Green Zone.
The U.N. mission - vital to resolving Kurdish/Arab conflict over territory in Iraq's north - is still under-resourced. The U.S. civilian/military provincial reconstruction teams that once dotted the Iraqi map are being reconfigured and drawn down. Nongovernmental organizations and contractors who conduct so much of the civilian effort in Iraq are more likely to be moving out than moving in.
Funding is scarce for vital political efforts needed as Iraq heads into a year of multiple elections and severe budgetary constraints because of the world economic situation and lower oil prices. The president wisely chose to maintain relatively high levels of troops in Iraq until the end of the year, but without civilian counterparts they will have only limited effect, especially as they are to be withdrawn from population centers by the end of June.
There is a similar lack of visible effort on the diplomatic front, where the relations between Iraq and its neighbors are stalled, awaiting clear signals from the U.S. Saudi Arabia, after many promises, has still not sent an ambassador. Suicide bombers still sneak across the Syrian border. Iran, keeping its powder dry since the January provincial elections in which its favorites did not do well, still maintains substantial influence in Iraq's southern provinces.
What is needed is a major surge of civilian political and diplomatic effort to accompany the military drawdown.
Within Iraq, this civilian effort should prioritize the relatively few remaining issues that could lead to instability and disrupt the American withdrawal. These include U.N. efforts to settle territorial disputes between Iraq's Kurdistan and the surrounding Arab-majority provinces, U.S. assistance in setting up effective provincial governments and ensuring political reconciliation, improving the capacity of the national and provincial governments to provide services to the population, negotiation of a permanent regime for oil production and revenue sharing, and providing a safe and secure environment for December's national elections.
With Iraq's neighbors, the emphasis should be on ensuring that each of them avoids destabilizing moves as the U.S. withdraws.
The temptation to fill the vacuum the U.S. leaves behind will be enormous - but if one neighbor does it, the others will counter, causing Iraq to break down if not break up. Fragmentation of Iraq is the neighbors' greatest fear, because the sectarian and ethnic conflicts that would ensue would be difficult to contain. There is at least some reason to hope that the neighbors - properly consulted on U.S. plans - can reach an understanding that enables mutual restraint.
U.S. political and diplomatic efforts during the Bush administration were notably ineffective. A sporadic dialogue with Iraq's neighbors limited to a relatively few subjects of more interest to Iraq than the neighbors produced few results. Efforts to encourage political reconciliation within Iraq had mainly superficial outcomes.
The now planned and announced U.S. withdrawal provides a new strategic backdrop that increases the potential for results, but only if the political and diplomatic effort is intensified. Washington would do well to challenge its European allies to join the enterprise - they are increasingly interested in gaining commercial advantages in Iraq and should be willing to provide expanded civilian assistance.
The next year will be an important test of whether the Obama administration can demonstrate that the U.S. would do well to rely on diplomacy as well as military power to serve its national interests. Iraq is where one of the crucial experiments will be conducted.
Daniel Serwer is vice president for peace and stability operations at the United States Institute of Peace.
