What 5 - 10% Lend Lease Meant to USSR in WWII - Page 3




 
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September 16th, 2004  
Doppleganger
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by PE_Sushi
S ! all

Very interesting thread indeed.
Hereís what I read about some parts of lend lease to the USSR (will quote my sources later, havenít got them at hand yet).

Lend leased armored vehicules and airplanes were not significant, more or less 10-15 % of Soviet production. In addition, lend leased aircrafts and tanks were not significantly better or better at all that their Russian counterparts, except for some aircrafts at the begining of lend lease program.

BUT, lend lease was very significant in at least 2 domains (+ other domains which I donít know about, so I donít say that these were the only 2 domains) :

- Motorized transport : this was a huge flaw of societ army, which was poorly motorized at the begining of Barbarossa and Soviet production alone could not rise in this domain because weapons were the priority. In this domain, the vehicules supplied thru lend lease equal in numbers the whole soviet production !!

- Radios. One Russian tank out of ten was equipped with radio of poor quality, aircraft were also poorly equipped. US supplied many many radios to the soviets, and these were way better than Soviet radios.

So at least in the motorized transport area we can say that lend lease was very very important, both in impact on operations and in relative numbers also (when compared to indigenous production)

of course, it didnít changed the outcome of the war : just check the numbers or pure soviet tanks or aircraft produced, germans were far behind and eventualy had to be crushed . Russians won with Russian tactics, Russian hardware and, most of all, Russian manpower.
Well y'see I think it did change the outcome of the war. The 2 types of aid you mentioned, along with locomotives, were absolutely critical to the Red Army's ability to fight. Without trucks and locomotives it would have been very difficult for the Red Army to mobilize properly. It would have been next to impossible to move the necessary amounts of supplies to one location, meaning no big massive Soviet offensives of the manner they mounted in 43/44. For example, without locomotives and trucks supplied by Lend-Lease, the Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions would have been largely trudging it on foot, as most of the horses had either been killed or eaten.

Without radios, it would have been very difficult for their armored units to function effectively. It was hard enough for the Red Army Tank Divisions to fight their panzer equivalents at the best of times never mind being without an effective way to coordinate and respond to local changes quickly enough as only radio communication could have achieved.

It's true that Russians won largely with Russian hardware and manpower but never forgot they learned their tactics the hard way from the Wehrmacht. And even then they lacked the tactical skill and finesse of their German opponents, instead relying on brute force to power past the Germans. Zhukov was a great Marshall for the Soviet Union, but he was no Guderian or Manstein. Everything he learned he copied from his enemies.
September 16th, 2004  
godofthunder9010
 
 
The Ostfront started out fairly equal and the Russians did turn the tide, but many of them have no gratitude for any of the help they received from the West. That small 10% contribution may have been just enough of an edge for them to turn the tide. I don't know if they possessed the means to over come the German Armies going it completely alone. Maybe, but at best it would have taken years and years longer


Conversely, the West tends to lack in gratitude for what Russia did. Much of that is more to do with politics and the Cold War than anything else.
September 18th, 2004  
PE_Sushi
 
S! Doppelganger

I don't agree with your conclusion, but I know this question can be discussed because there is no definitive answer and your points and reasoning make much sense

about details I'm not sure that russian still used the very large Rifle units after 43, I thought they were scaled down to the benefit of more combined forces, but I agree that anyway transports availability were crucial : Soviet thrust usualy lasted only the time of one or two fuel loads their tanks had, after that they would be refueled (thx to transports) and carry on

about tactics, I totaly agree : they learnt the hard way from germans.
One German general (or whatever) said "they were first class fighters from the begining, in the course of the war, they learnt and became first class soldiers"

They got the upper hand on strategics but germans had tactical advantage because of smaller units being able to operate of their own and show initiative and flexibility.
Which leads me to your last point : Zhuvkov was excelent in front scale operations, Manstein more or less the same. Guderian was more in the operational or even tactical range, he is not known for overall strategical matters and, for example in july-sept 1941, he showed very narrow minded on his own situation and disregarded overall situation.
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September 18th, 2004  
Doppleganger
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by PE_Sushi
S! Doppelganger

I don't agree with your conclusion, but I know this question can be discussed because there is no definitive answer and your points and reasoning make much sense

about details I'm not sure that russian still used the very large Rifle units after 43, I thought they were scaled down to the benefit of more combined forces, but I agree that anyway transports availability were crucial : Soviet thrust usualy lasted only the time of one or two fuel loads their tanks had, after that they would be refueled (thx to transports) and carry on

about tactics, I totaly agree : they learnt the hard way from germans.
One German general (or whatever) said "they were first class fighters from the begining, in the course of the war, they learnt and became first class soldiers"

They got the upper hand on strategics but germans had tactical advantage because of smaller units being able to operate of their own and show initiative and flexibility.
Which leads me to your last point : Zhuvkov was excelent in front scale operations, Manstein more or less the same. Guderian was more in the operational or even tactical range, he is not known for overall strategical matters and, for example in july-sept 1941, he showed very narrow minded on his own situation and disregarded overall situation.
Well did he? He was ordered to wheel his Panzergruppe south to assist Army Group South to take Kiev. He protested vehemently but he obeyed orders. Do you think Hitler was right to secure the Ukraine first before launching Operation Typhoon? Certainly there's arguments both for and against. Had Army Group Centre just driven to Moscow IMO it would have fallen, although there would have been much stronger Soviet forces in/around Moscow to contend with. There was also the danger of a massive encirclement of said Army Group by those same forces captured and destroyed historically.

Guderian is best known as being an operational level commander but he was involved in the planning process. This became more true when he was reinstated in 1943 as he was heavily involved in Operation Zitadelle, where for example he desperately tried to persuade Hitler to call it off when it became clear that the element and momentum of surprise was lost. Being Inspector General of Panzertruppen was definitely a post where a great deal of strategic ability was called for and Guderian did a pretty good job under the circumstances.

There's many occasions where Guderian demonstrated great strategic awareness. For example his Panzerkorps dash to the Atlantic, his protest at being diverted south in August 1941. Just because he never had the chance to command an Army Group that doesn't mean to say he wasn't up to the job. Had he been a little less brash and been more of an sycophant he definitely would have at some point IMO.

Coming back to Zhukov yes he was a good strategist and he adapted combined arms tactics very quickly but he alone was responsible for the disaster that was Operation Mars. Manstein, Bock and the other German Army commanders had the constant meddling of Hitler to contend with and so their failures were not all of their own doing.
September 19th, 2004  
PE_Sushi
 
short because off topic : I consider he was narrow minded because of , in other things, he's obstructive attitude and didn't obeyed orders at first (he pushes to Roslavl). At operational level he was probably the best tank / mec commander of WWII.

And Citadel was a all narrow minded story since the planning


to get back to the subject, one interesting thing about US lend leased trucks is that they were the best available, especialy on rough Russian conditions. Way better than their German 2 drive wheels counterparts.
October 5th, 2004  
david_the_positive
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Mark Conley
heres to the defeat of the common enemy in WWII...it was a shame that the lat 60 years afterward were so painful for both countrys.

I find that to be a solid attitude, Mark Conley.
There are sour apples all over, I don't let them define what lend-lease was for me.

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A good book on lend-lease I got in Russia, fairly recently, was "tanks of lend-lease" printed in 2000. It profiles the weaponsystems sent over, a lot of new photos, not do the sword rattling, and gives info to work with on what units had lend-lease, what they wrote about it, etc.

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I would like to find data on Lend-lease (what was sent over to the USSR) to compare it with data of what Russia received (from Russian documents). Let me know if anyone has ideas where to get such data.

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USSR and USA stalled on the repayment issue, at some point. I saw this data in different places, although never saw the actual talks. Right now Russia is repaying the debt on the terms Yeltsin signed off on.
October 5th, 2004  
godofthunder9010
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by PE_Sushi
short because off topic : I consider he [Guderian I assume] was narrow minded because of , in other things, he's obstructive attitude and didn't obeyed orders at first (he pushes to Roslavl). At operational level he was probably the best tank / mec commander of WWII.

And Citadel was a all narrow minded story since the planning


to get back to the subject, one interesting thing about US lend leased trucks is that they were the best available, especialy on rough Russian conditions. Way better than their German 2 drive wheels counterparts.
Lets remember - the man was never made Field Marshall and never given a chance to prove himself on that level of command, at least in the form that history tends to expect.

If being disagreeable and disobeying orders at times makes you a bad commander, then Patton was a lousy commander.
November 14th, 2004  
Kirill K
 
I know its a little late reply but earlier you, John, said only 20 million people died in the USSR, but that wasnt it. I know that over 28 million people died and many more were missing.
November 14th, 2004  
USAFAUX2004
 
 
Mark I cannot believe you did not list the amount of JEEPs given to the USSR.
May 21st, 2010  
fuser
 
 
The importance of Land Leese is often overrated in USA and underrated in Russia....

Any way No doubt land leese helped reed army a lot but it never was a decisive factor....Before much of the shipment arrived Battle of Stalingrad was already won...
If there would have been no land leese, it could have prolonged the war but never could decide it... What we would have seen :
1-2 more summer retreats for red army and winter counter offensive resulting in breaking of wehrmacht ..

The west highly underrestimate the eastern front where 3/4th of the fighting went.. They made a documentry about it and named it "The Unknown war".. C'mon the front who faced the most of war is Unknown

As Churchill said "It was the red army who bored the gut out of german war machine"....
Without destruction of wehrmacht in east (around 75%) ofcourse there would have been no Normandy...........