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Topic: Hm
So many points, so many questions to answer.
Sadly, I can't post links - I tend not to research from the internet - far too much rubbish to sift through. I am at Staff College at the moment in the middle of an essay on the application of strategic effect through air power so I am in an ideal position so I should be able to quote a few chaps to illustrate my points But you will have to wait until the week because I absolutely refuse to go to the library during the weekend but the first thing I will say is: It critically weakened the Luftwaffe because those aircraft shot down may have been just enough to force the Wehrmacht and the SS into Moscow - that was the centre of gravity for Russia at that precise moment in time. As for the battles you mentioned (Battle of Thermopylae, the Battle of Adrianople, the Battle of Chalons, The Battle of Liegnitz, Pearl Harbor, Stalingrad ) PAH! insignificant side shows (perhaps not Stalingrad) "You said that Hitler's failure to defeat the RAF caused him to go and attack Stalin which is incorrect" I dont recall saying this anywhere. If I did I was wrong and I apologise but I dont remember typing it. My knowledge of the Eastern Front is clearly not as extensive as yours but I try to be cover global issues rather than specific theatres but please bear with me and I will address each point you raise. We can chat over it line by line and then agree I am right |
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I wonder how much the allied help to the Soviets played in the German failure of Barbarossa and the Soviets counterattack with Siberian reserves. Although I don't no for sure, I doubt that there was any thought by either the US or the Uk to give the Soviets supplies before June 22 of 41. The counterattack by the Sovets began a few days before the USA even got in the war. It just doesnt seem likely to me that anyone but the Soveits should be given credit for Russia's early success. I am not trying to say that the westeran allies' help was not of more importance later.
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Spymaster, you obviously need to do more research about the Ostfront. At the beginning of Barbarossa, there were three groups. Army Group North - Mission Leningrad. Army Group Center - Mission Moscow. Army Group South - Mission Ukraine/Kiev. All initially had amazing success, but North and South started to bog down somewhat. Army Group North was making outstanding progress, but Moscow was still a long ways off.
And it was then, in September, that the fate of the war probably was decided by an idiot corporal with a bad moustache. "Army Groups North and Center are to pull back and help take the Ukraine." All of Germany's best generals argued against it, probably none more strongly than Guderian (who had built and trained the Panzergruppen to begin with). What the generals knew about Moscow was key. All roads lead to Moscow. All train tracks lead to Moscow. The very heart of the Soviet Unions logistics for resupply was summed up in a single word: Moscow. It was the heart that would pump the vital blood of supplies and reinforcements speedily to the Northern Front, Central Front, and Southern Front. Moscow kept Leningrad from certain collapse. Moscow deployed the forces critical in the victory at Stalingrad. And the most potent Industrial area in Russia = Moscow. So it was that in late August/early September, Army Group Center (which was over halfway to Moscow) was completely pulled back and sent to the Ukraine. You saw some very impressive one-sided German victories, most notable being Kiev. Finally, in LATE NOVEMBER Army Group Center was allowed to continue its push for Moscow. Most of the ground that they had previously taken had to be retaken again. In Late February, the German's war machine ground to an icy halt only 10 miles from Moscow, some of the fighting coming to within 1 mile of Moscow. So lets rewrite history just a little. Lets say that Army Group Center is allowed to contine to Moscow unhindered by Hitler. They would regain just over 3 non-winter months with which to take their objective. Do you think for one instant that they would not have EASILY over-run Moscow? They almost managed it in the dead of winter with the accompanying mud and ice. If Moscow had fallen, Leningrad would have stood virtually no chance of holding out, brave as they were. The Ukraine would have been lost more slowly at first, but without Moscow pumping reinforcements and supplies, it wouldn't have held out for long. Operation Blau would have been a breakout success because Moscow isn't there to send troops and supplies to stop Paulus at Stalingrad. Germany would have captured the Russian oilfields. Russian resistence would have been potent, but without their Heart at Moscow, they'd never have been able to repel the Germans. ================== Just thought I'd add something. Doppleganger and I may not agree on all points, but I know when I see that he's responded to a topic that I'd better have my research in order. He's got better knowledge about World War II than anyone else who posts here. Most of his understanding is from books, not from online sources. If you want to truly understand World War II then you need to read Actung Panzer - by Heinz Guderian; Panzer Leader - by Heinz Guderian and any Eric von Manstein you can get your hands on. Consider my own perspective. I'm a proud American who's forced to admit that the mighty USA did not ever fight on the front that truly decided the outcome of World War II. We sent as many supplies as could be managed to the Russians, waged an airwar that probably cost more in planes shot down than damage done to German industry, and sat back helplessly for most of the war. Africa was a drop in the bucket. Completely overtaking Italy would not have provided a viable second Front because all roads out of Italy are through mountain passes and the Alps. The United States contribution to World War II (though no fault of our own) was nothing compared to the Soviet Union's sacrifices in blood, steel and human lives. Even after D-Day, Germany kept 75% of its forces and virtually all of its elite on the Ostfront. How do you think it makes me feel? |
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Topic: Re: HmQuote:
Also I would like to add the fact even when the advance stopped that Hitlers refusal to withdraw to a more defensible position was very harmful to future operations on the eastern front. |
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Well, Hitler's "stand or die" policy has been covered, but this has gotten to be a very long thread to have to read through. Bear in mind that arguing against "stand or die" was what got Guderian fired. Best military leader Germany had (probably the best of the 20th century) got sacked because Hitler was just sure he knew what he was doing, but didn't have a clue.
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Topic: Hm
Hm interesting? Do I need to do more research on the Eastern Front? No I dont think I need to. The minutae of the Eastern Front is all well and good, the last book I read on the subject was by Kershaw, cant recall the title but my interest is in the strategic issues of WW2, not worrying about whether Army Group Centre filled in the war diary for 22 Jan 1941.
The issue I am raising is that simply Nazi Germany was the greatest threat to mankind in living memory and maybe of all time. Had the Battle of Britain been lost, the Nazis would have dominated Europe and potentially the world |
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And the point that I'm making is that if Hitler had let his Generals alone and win the war for him, whether the Battle of Britain was won or lost is almost completely irrelevant: Russia almost definitely crumbles. Sure, throwing in some extra planes would be nice, but the Luftwaffe was not what made the German war machine so successful. The Panzer was. The Luftwaffe, though a good air force, is drastically overhyped. Without ground forces engaging enemy ground forces in battle, the Luftwaffe would have had very few targets. Sure Germany had to hold back some troops to guard the western coast of Europe, but the point is that they could have pulled it off anyway. If they had done it, Britain would have been doomed along with the rest of the world. The Battle of Britain was not very significant at all for Operation Barbarossa's failure to take Moscow. Hitler's meddling was.
The problem with the assumption that Operation Sea Lion was scrapped only because of losing the Battle of Britain is simple. The British Navy would have made an invasion a complete nightmare to plan, and it probably would have been scrapped anyway. |
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Quote:
Moreover, the extremely bad winter that year often meant that the Luftwaffe were unable to fly any ground support missions to assist the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Moscow. Also, most German planes were simply not designed to operate in such harsh conditions. So airpower did not play any decisive role in the Battle of Moscow. What did was the lack of logistical supply and combat replacements for the Wehrmacht as the average panzer division for example had lost more than half it's combat strength since June '41. Add to that the fact that most of the Wehrmacht were exhausted, were fighting in summer uniforms in the coldest winter for 140 years and the arrival of 25 fresh Siberian divisions and you have a scenario where German collapse was not only likely, but inevitable. Spyhunter, as I said before, the outcome of the Battle of Britain had no impact on the outcome of Barbarossa. It's true that the Luftwaffe probably would have welcomed the aircraft they lost in the Battle of Britain but had Hitler made the 3 changes to strategy I mentioned previously then this would have been a moot point. As for calling Nazi Germany the greatest threat to mankind in living memory and maybe of all time you are ignoring history. It's true that they were the greatest threat in modern times but there have been equally great, if not greater threats throughout history. I suggest that you read accounts of the Battles of Thermopylae, Chalons and Liegnitz and you'll realise that alternate outcomes of those battles may have lead to a completely different history for Europe and one where Christianity would have had no place at all. |
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