Originally Posted by MontyB

Deploying Uboats to the channel in 1940 would have been a really quick way of removing the Uboats threat, it wasn't until August 1942 that Germany could field 100 operational U-boats do you really think it would be a good idea to stick the ones they had in a relatively shallow enclosed space to take on the home fleet?

As a quick comparison:
British and French ships (home fleet) 1940 ~200 (does not include fleets outside British and North Atlantic waters)
German ships and submarines (total) ~90 ( this includes pocket battleships at sea in the Atlantic)

The Uboats don't need to enter the English Channel to create a blockade and make it difficult for the RN to enter the English Channel. If the Luftwaffe had been successful with defeating the RAF, the German invasion force had probably wanted to cross the English Channel at Dover-Calais. The Germans could have used mines as well to disrupting the RN's movements.

Originally Posted by I3BrigPvSk

The Uboats don't need to enter the English Channel to create a blockade and make it difficult for the RN to enter the English Channel. If the Luftwaffe had been successful with defeating the RAF, the German invasion force had probably wanted to cross the English Channel at Dover-Calais. The Germans could have used mines as well to disrupting the RN's movements.

The German transport fleet could transport,land and supply daily only a few thousand men who would be easily eliminated by the British Home Forces;the Canadians alone were stronger than the German invasion force .
It would take the transport fleet more than a day to go to the coasts, to unload men and supplies, to return and to load again men and supplies .

Originally Posted by lljadw

The German transport fleet could transport,land and supply daily only a few thousand men who would be easily eliminated by the British Home Forces;the Canadians alone were stronger than the German invasion force .
It would take the transport fleet more than a day to go to the coasts, to unload men and supplies, to return and to load again men and supplies .

I think I read that they needed something like a 24-36 hour turn around and any significant losses in the landing barges would have made reinforcing almost impossible after a few days.

Originally Posted by lljadw

The German transport fleet could transport,land and supply daily only a few thousand men who would be easily eliminated by the British Home Forces;the Canadians alone were stronger than the German invasion force .
It would take the transport fleet more than a day to go to the coasts, to unload men and supplies, to return and to load again men and supplies .

One thing to take into acount here was the poor state of the British Army after Dunkirk, while a large force of Canadians had arrived I doubt they would have faired any better than a BEF rifle division at that stage, almost all heavy equipment and transport had been lost in France (I think there were less than 50 medium and heavy tanks in the UK and most of the 22 infantry divisions were at less than half strength).


I am not going to under estimate the role of the RAF but I am convinced that the only thing that stood between the Germans and London was the channel and the Royal Navy's control of it.


A book on the topic worth reading is:Hitlers Armarda: The Royal Navy & the Defence of Great Britain April-October 1940 by Geoff Hewitt


Where he concludes that the RN's forces in southern England alone were " a force many times larger than the ships that the Germans had available as naval escorts", my only criticism of his work is that he doesnt go into great depth the German laying of protective minefields.

Originally Posted by MontyB

One thing to take into acount here was the poor state of the British Army after Dunkirk, while a large force of Canadians had arrived I doubt they would have faired any better than a BEF rifle division at that stage, almost all heavy equipment and transport had been lost in France (I think there were less than 50 medium and heavy tanks in the UK and most of the 22 infantry divisions were at less than half strength).


I am not going to under estimate the role of the RAF but I am convinced that the only thing that stood between the Germans and London was the channel and the Royal Navy's control of it.


A book on the topic worth reading is:Hitlers Armarda: The Royal Navy & the Defence of Great Britain April-October 1940 by Geoff Hewitt


Where he concludes that the RN's forces in southern England alone were " a force many times larger than the ships that the Germans had available as naval escorts", my only criticism of his work is that he doesnt go into great depth the German laying of protective minefields.

After Dunkirk if I remember correctly, there was only one complete division, commanded I believe by Bernard Montgomery.

Yes I agree the RN ad the English Channel were a major obstacle, but I firmly believe the RAF in the BoB was the first victory over the Germans, who up to that point had it all their own way, thereby putting Hitler on notice that Britain was not going to roll over and give in, therefore any attempt to invade would be futile. On top of that it proved Joe Kennedy was very wrong about the tenacity and the survivability of the British and its commonwealth.

Originally Posted by BritinBritain

After Dunkirk if I remember correctly, there was only one complete division, commanded I believe by Bernard Montgomery.

Yes I agree the RN ad the English Channel were a major obstacle, but I firmly believe the RAF in the BoB was the first victory over the Germans, who up to that point had it all their own way, thereby putting Hitler on notice that Britain was not going to roll over and give in, therefore any attempt to invade would be futile. On top of that it proved Joe Kennedy was very wrong about the tenacity and the survivability of the British and its commonwealth.

I don't disagree with the points you make as they are all factually correct but I tend to think the conclusion is borne more from the propaganda of WW2 than an objective overview of realities of the German position.

My belief is that the BoB was a battle the Germans had no chance to win without ground forces landing in Britain as they were always going to be fighting over hostile territory at the extent of their range, they could not recover downed pilots or machines, even had they driven the RAF from the skies they still would be losing machines and crews without being able to do enough damage to subdue the enemy as they didn't have aircraft to do the job.

The best case scenario for the Germans in the air was a stalemate and they could have achieved that without flying over the channel at all and kept their air force intact in the process.

Originally Posted by MontyB

I don't disagree with the points you make as they are all factually correct but I tend to think the conclusion is borne more from the propaganda of WW2 than an objective overview of realities of the German position.

My belief is that the BoB was a battle the Germans had no chance to win without ground forces landing in Britain as they were always going to be fighting over hostile territory at the extent of their range, they could not recover downed pilots or machines, even had they driven the RAF from the skies they still would be losing machines and crews without being able to do enough damage to subdue the enemy as they didn't have aircraft to do the job.

The best case scenario for the Germans in the air was a stalemate and they could have achieved that without flying over the channel at all and kept their air force intact in the process.

After the RAF bombed Berlin, Hitler wanted revenge, Goring boasted he could destroy the RAF in a matter of days. He was wrong. The Luftwaffe were far more experienced and better trained then the RAF, but RAF pilots began to learn and along with Hugh Dowding and Keith Parks handling of the Battle, the tide began to turn. The Luftwaffe began to lose experienced crews, crews that couldn't be replaced.

Originally Posted by MontyB

One thing to take into acount here was the poor state of the British Army after Dunkirk, while a large force of Canadians had arrived I doubt they would have faired any better than a BEF rifle division at that stage, almost all heavy equipment and transport had been lost in France (I think there were less than 50 medium and heavy tanks in the UK and most of the 22 infantry divisions were at less than half strength).


I am not going to under estimate the role of the RAF but I am convinced that the only thing that stood between the Germans and London was the channel and the Royal Navy's control of it.


A book on the topic worth reading is:Hitlers Armarda: The Royal Navy & the Defence of Great Britain April-October 1940 by Geoff Hewitt


Where he concludes that the RN's forces in southern England alone were " a force many times larger than the ships that the Germans had available as naval escorts", my only criticism of his work is that he doesnt go into great depth the German laying of protective minefields.

You are ignoring the strength of he Home Forces, and as long as these were stronger than what the Germans could land, Sea Lion was doomed to fail .
Churchill said that in the second half of September 1940,Britain had 13 ID and 3 armoured divisions .
On June 10 Britain had 292 Light Tanks and 74 Infantry Tanks .
On July 1 :265 LT, 118 Cruisers and 119 IT.
On August 4 : 336 LT, 173 Cruisers and 189 IT .
On August 27 :295 LT, 138 Cruisers and 185 IT .
On September 15 ( most probable Sea Lion start day ) :306 LT, 154 Cruisers and 224 IT .
Germany could never land even a hundred tanks .
Even with less tanks,the Home Forces would have crushed the Germans .

Originally Posted by lljadw

You are ignoring the strength of he Home Forces, and as long as these were stronger than what the Germans could land, Sea Lion was doomed to fail .
Churchill said that in the second half of September 1940,Britain had 13 ID and 3 armoured divisions .
On June 10 Britain had 292 Light Tanks and 74 Infantry Tanks .
On July 1 :265 LT, 118 Cruisers and 119 IT.
On August 4 : 336 LT, 173 Cruisers and 189 IT .
On August 27 :295 LT, 138 Cruisers and 185 IT .
On September 15 ( most probable Sea Lion start day ) :306 LT, 154 Cruisers and 224 IT .
Germany could never land even a hundred tanks .
Even with less tanks,the Home Forces would have crushed the Germans .

I looked at those numbers and to a large degree I think they can be ignored.
One of the problems with them is that I don't believe they take into account armour being sent to other parts of the empire specifically Egypt

They don't take into account the combat effectiveness of the light tanks being listed especially given that those tanks were extremely lightly armoured and equipped with machine guns only on top of this every German rifle regiment came with 27 x AT rifles and 12 x 37-50mm which were more than capable of dealing with a 1940 light tank.

Lastly it does not take into account this is the scenario that the Luftwaffe did excel at, it was a force designed to support a fast moving army.

I am confident that had the wehrmacht been able to land in significant numbers and be supplied adequately they could have defeated Britain and it is only that even the Germans knew it was the resupply part that made an invasion impossible.

Originally Posted by lljadw

Germany could never land even a hundred tanks .
Even with less tanks,the Home Forces would have crushed the Germans .

One scenario not taken into account is the battle for Crete, the Germans landed and supported a much smaller force than the defenders at the maximum range of the Luftwaffe in the face of a stronger British Naval presence.