Some more information ( from the historian Richard Hammond )

Axis Convoy routes in the Mediterranean
Naples -Tripoli : length (in miles ) 502
:: transit time (at 8 kts ) :2 days, 15 hours
Messina-Tripoli :339 miles, 1 day,19 hours
Tripoli- Benghazi :352 miles, 1 day ,20 hours
Brindisi-Benghazi : 532 miles,2 days, 19 hours
Athens-Benghazi :400 miles, 2 days,2 hours
Taranto-Tobruk :608 miles, 3 days,4 hours
Athens-Tobruk :389 miles, 2 days
Benghazi-Tobruk :255 miles, 1 day, 8 hours
Palermo-Bizerte : 181 miles, 1 day
Palermo-Tunis :179 miles , 1 day
Brindisi-Athens : 473 ,2 days,8 hours
This means that the transit time for a convoy sailing from Tripoli to Tobruk was 3 days and 4 hours , to be multiplied by 2 ,and without the time needed to load in Tripoli and unload in Tobruk .

Originally Posted by lljadw

Some more information ( from the historian Richard Hammond )

Axis Convoy routes in the Mediterranean
Naples -Tripoli : length (in miles ) 502
:: transit time (at 8 kts ) :2 days, 15 hours
Messina-Tripoli :339 miles, 1 day,19 hours
Tripoli- Benghazi :352 miles, 1 day ,20 hours
Brindisi-Benghazi : 532 miles,2 days, 19 hours
Athens-Benghazi :400 miles, 2 days,2 hours
Taranto-Tobruk :608 miles, 3 days,4 hours
Athens-Tobruk :389 miles, 2 days
Benghazi-Tobruk :255 miles, 1 day, 8 hours
Palermo-Bizerte : 181 miles, 1 day
Palermo-Tunis :179 miles , 1 day
Brindisi-Athens : 473 ,2 days,8 hours
This means that the transit time for a convoy sailing from Tripoli to Tobruk was 3 days and 4 hours , to be multiplied by 2 ,and without the time needed to load in Tripoli and unload in Tobruk .

The other consideration here is the size and capacity of these ports, I doubt they would have had the capacity to deal with the requirements of Rommel's 3 divisions let alone an expanded army.

There were only 2 serious ports : Alexandria ( of which nothing is known ) and Tripoli ( much smaller than Alexandria ) . The other ones were irrelevant . The Axis used even Tunis as port .
The unload capacity of Tripoli was mostly some 1500 tons a day, that of Benghazi mostly less than 1000.Nothing is known about their storing capacity .
Source : the Crusader Project .

Originally Posted by lljadw

There were only 2 serious ports : Alexandria ( of which nothing is known ) and Tripoli ( much smaller than Alexandria ) . The other ones were irrelevant . The Axis used even Tunis as port .
The unload capacity of Tripoli was mostly some 1500 tons a day, that of Benghazi mostly less than 1000.Nothing is known about their storing capacity .
Source : the Crusader Project .

I found this rather interesting.

https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/20...-of-logistics/

I have serious reservations about the content of the article
1 It is not serious to say that anti-fascist Italian naval officers sabotaged the transport of supplies to NA
2 It is not so that the NA campaign could be decisive for the outcome of the war .
3 To say that logistics were decisive is a big exaggeration : Britain also had logistic problems, but still won .
4 Rommel did not lose because of the Italians,whatever the Rommel lobby may tell .
5 The article is hiding the role of the British forces,it is as if they not existed . For the campaign in Normandy there are a lot of sources about the logistic problems and possibilities of both sides . For the campaign in NA nothing is known about British logistics .

Originally Posted by lljadw

I have serious reservations about the content of the article
1 It is not serious to say that anti-fascist Italian naval officers sabotaged the transport of supplies to NA
2 It is not so that the NA campaign could be decisive for the outcome of the war .
3 To say that logistics were decisive is a big exaggeration : Britain also had logistic problems, but still won .
4 Rommel did not lose because of the Italians,whatever the Rommel lobby may tell .
5 The article is hiding the role of the British forces,it is as if they not existed . For the campaign in Normandy there are a lot of sources about the logistic problems and possibilities of both sides . For the campaign in NA nothing is known about British logistics .

I probably should have been clearer, I found the statistics in the article interesting as many people talk about an expanded Afrika Korps going all the way through the middle east to link up with Operation Barbarossa in the Caucasus, the reality is that the Axis could barely support the seven German and Italian divisions they had there.

I agree .
The geography of Libya prevented a stronger Axis force than there was in the HTL even if more supplies were available, even if more supplies could be transported to Naples, even if more supplies could be transported to NA .
Between 1940-1943 981000 men were transported to the Balkans and the Aegean and 262000 to NA .From these 981000 900 were lost during their transport, from the 262000 23000 were lost .
The reasons are
1 It was easier to transport men and material to the Balkans
2 Stronger forces could operate in the Balkans than in NA .
3 The Balkans were more important .
4 More men were needed in the Balkans .
For the supplies : the Balkans got 1,965,000 tons of which 7000 were lost . NA got 2,235,000 tons of which 440,000 were lost .

I expect the British campaign of 1942 would have also suffered supply problems had it not been for the Torch landings.

It took Monty 2 months to go to Tripoli,notwithstanding Torch .
Reasons were : logistics ad the Axis resistance .