perseus
Active member
Today, July 1st 2006 is the 90th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, the worst day in British Military History. Out of the 120 000 men who attacked on that day half of them became casualties, and 20 000 were killed, the heaviest loss in a single day of any army in that war. British casualties that day alone exceeded that of the Crimea, Boer and Korean war combined, yet Haig said that he did not consider the casualties high considering the numbers employed. Here are a few questions which come to mind:
- Was the Somme an inevitable consequence of the pressure to do something in an era when military technology was stronger in defence than attack, and the offence lacked the mobility to exploit the few gains achieved.
- Should they have waited to exploit new technology such as the tank in a massed shock attack on suitable ground?
- Was the Somme really a military success for the Western Allies since the Germans couldn’t suffer the same level of attrition?
- Was it pointless anyway since the Defence could always bring up troops faster by rail?
- Did the Somme suffer from the lack of a firm plan with Haig and Rawlinson commander of the British 4th army having different objectives?
- Was Rawlinson to blame more than Haig for lacking the courage to his superior that the barrage had failed?
- Was the location of the offensive inappropriate, the ground providing the Germans with deep dugouts largely impervious to shellfire?
- Were the military tactics of the British at fault, using inexperienced troops in a walking assault? The French in contrast ran over open areas using troops behind to give covering fire obtaining greater success.
- Was the early cessation of the barrage to blame?
- Were the newspapers at fault giving hints in advance that a large offence was on the way, or was the barrage itself (much of it being shrapnel or failing to explode) worse than none at all for the same reason?