I realize this article is going to raise some eyebrows. However it does but an interesting spin on the situation at Prochorovka and the Psel River. I also realize that Whitman was a top ace, but not the top German tank ace as stated by the article.

www.historynet.com/battle-of-kursk-germanys-lost-victory-in-world-war-ii.htm

There area lot of people(of which Zetterling) who will object to G.Nipe ,because,what Manstein may have claimed : Citadelle was no lost victory for Germany .

From Germany and World War II (tome VIII) (German edition) P 171:
"Das Scheitern des deutschen Angriffes bei Kursk bedeutete innerhalb des deutsch-sovjetischen Krieges keinen Wendepunkt,sondern nur eine virtuelle Wende."

Rough translation :

"The failure of the German attack at Kursk did not mean a turning point in the German-Russian war,it was only a virtual turning point ."

For Hitler,Citadelle was only a limited offensive, to prevent and forestall a big Soviet attack .

Some people are even claiming that the big Soviet losses at Kursk prevented a collaps of the Eastern Front in 1943 and an end of the war in may 1944.

Hitler and his generals wanted 2 things :

1) Shorten the front


2) Weaken the Soviet mobile forces .

Originally Posted by lljadw

There area lot of people(of which Zetterling) who will object to G.Nipe ,because,what Manstein may have claimed : Citadelle was no lost victory for Germany .

From Germany and World War II (tome VIII) (German edition) P 171:
"Das Scheitern des deutschen Angriffes bei Kursk bedeutete innerhalb des deutsch-sovjetischen Krieges keinen Wendepunkt,sondern nur eine virtuelle Wende."

Rough translation :

"The failure of the German attack at Kursk did not mean a turning point in the German-Russian war,it was only a virtual turning point ."

For Hitler,Citadelle was only a limited offensive, to prevent and forestall a big Soviet attack .

Some people are even claiming that the big Soviet losses at Kursk prevented a collaps of the Eastern Front in 1943 and an end of the war in may 1944.

Hitler and his generals wanted 2 things :

1) Shorten the front


2) Weaken the Soviet mobile forces .

Had Germany won even a limited victory at Kursk all it could have accomplished would be been to shorten the front making it more defensible for Germany (likely prolonging the war).

I would say a limited victory at Kursk could have maintained the Ostheers spirits. Remember after Kursk it wasn’t long before the Soviets were at the Dnieper and the Osteer was defiantly not in high spirits. Before Kursk the last major action in the east was a German victory at Kharkov which raised their spirits after Stalingrad. Although the Ostheer fought with tenacity back to Berlin confidence does have it's effect.

It is important to note that all German movements in the east were west after Kursk and the article talks about a hypothetical case. I mentioned raise an eyebrow.

Should Kursk have been fought at all by the Germans ? , German intelligence should have been able to determine that the odds were not in their favor far from it , Hitler of course was against retreats anywhere which I can identified with retreating Army's don't win wars but there's nothing wrong with regrouping which the Germans badly needed to do .

Originally Posted by tetvet

Should Kursk have been fought at all by the Germans ? , German intelligence should have been able to determine that the odds were not in their favor far from it , Hitler of course was against retreats anywhere which I can identified with retreating Army's don't win wars but there's nothing wrong with regrouping which the Germans badly needed to do .

I agree entirely in my opinion they should have either attacked with the aim breaking the Russian lines and heading east or scrapped the whole thing and begun an elastic defense program of withdrawals using the extra armoured forces they had at their disposal to attack Russian spearheads.

Even had Kursk been a success there was nothing in it for the Germans outside a slightly shorter defense line, had they cut off Russian forces in the Kursk salient it is doubtful they could destroyed the pocket before it broke out due to the shear numbers of Russians involved.

In the end I believe Manstein was misguided in his assumption that victory was within his grasp at any stage of the battle.

Had they cutoff the Kursk bulge and eliminated the 5 Soviet armies within it, their plan was to continue the offensive with a repeated strike towards Moscow. This was the ultimate plan.

For the Germans to use the elastic (mobile) defensive which they were so skilled at was likely their best option at this point on the eastern front. Certainly not to attack the Kursk salient with ½ the Red army stuffed inside it and I believe at least 7 major defense lines surrounding it. Also the Soviets were well aware of the German intentions even to the day that the attack would occur. So as Hitler waited for his tigers all this did was allow the Soviets more time to strengthen their defenses. It’s quite a feat that Hausser’s panzers got as far as they did considering the defenses he came up against.

As for whether or not Manstein could have achieved a partial victory or shook up the Soviet armies enough to take the steam out of their planned summer offensive we will never know.

As Russia knew just what the Germans were planning then any change of their plans would have been known to the Russians. With amount of Russians forces in reserve this battle was only going to go one way. The Germans threw them self's at well prepared positions and even though they made head way their loses were huge which they could no sustain. The Russians had more men, Guns and tanks. which they used to great effect.

Originally Posted by JOC

Had they cutoff the Kursk bulge and eliminated the 5 Soviet armies within it, their plan was to continue the offensive with a repeated strike towards Moscow. This was the ultimate plan.

For the Germans to use the elastic (mobile) defensive which they were so skilled at was likely their best option at this point on the eastern front. Certainly not to attack the Kursk salient with ½ the Red army stuffed inside it and I believe at least 7 major defense lines surrounding it. Also the Soviets were well aware of the German intentions even to the day that the attack would occur. So as Hitler waited for his tigers all this did was allow the Soviets more time to strengthen their defenses. It’s quite a feat that Hausser’s panzers got as far as they did considering the defenses he came up against.

As for whether or not Manstein could have achieved a partial victory or shook up the Soviet armies enough to take the steam out of their planned summer offensive we will never know.

Steve Newton in "Kursk:the German View P 407) :"Zetterling and Frankson declare that it is not" possible to claim that[ Citadel] produced an outcome that was decisive to the war in the east ."


M.Mulvin in "Manstein,Hitler's greatest general " (note 50):On 1 june 1943,Manstein said :"the battle in the east (=Citadelle) in view of the enemy's reserves could not be won with the present level of forces . It would require further reserves from OKH."

Originally Posted by LeEnfield

As Russia knew just what the Germans were planning then any change of their plans would have been known to the Russians. With amount of Russians forces in reserve this battle was only going to go one way. The Germans threw them self's at well prepared positions and even though they made head way their loses were huge which they could no sustain. The Russians had more men, Guns and tanks. which they used to great effect.

It wasn’t so much the reserves. When they were throw in at Prochorovka the results were inconclusive. The Osteer had defeated larger Soviet forces before. They had just done so several months earlier at Kharkov. The defenses which the Osteer had to overcome were virtually insurmountable and wore the Germans down via attrition. Model in the North only penetrated 7 miles. The Germans had never before sent their cream of the crop blitzkrieg into virtually insurmountable barriers of land mines, fortifications, pre-sighted artillery fire zones, tank traps and trenches which extended approximately 190 miens in depth. Yes the Red army had more men and equipment and won the battle, but their losses were much higher which was the case for most eastern front actions.

1) Model commander of the northern forces: described the elaborate defensive preparations and argued that the offensive was exactly what the Soviets were prepared to meet.
2) Manstein commander of the southern forces: stated due to the defensive preparations the moment of opportunity had passed.

As for the battle of Kursk, it is likely WW2 most controversial battle. Some claiming Germany was still in in a position to win the war up until the Kursk defeat. Others saying it was just a major bump for Germany on the way back to Berlin.

Originally Posted by JOC

Had they cutoff the Kursk bulge and eliminated the 5 Soviet armies within it, their plan was to continue the offensive with a repeated strike towards Moscow. This was the ultimate plan.

For the Germans to use the elastic (mobile) defensive which they were so skilled at was likely their best option at this point on the eastern front. Certainly not to attack the Kursk salient with ½ the Red army stuffed inside it and I believe at least 7 major defense lines surrounding it. Also the Soviets were well aware of the German intentions even to the day that the attack would occur. So as Hitler waited for his tigers all this did was allow the Soviets more time to strengthen their defenses. It’s quite a feat that Hausser’s panzers got as far as they did considering the defenses he came up against.

As for whether or not Manstein could have achieved a partial victory or shook up the Soviet armies enough to take the steam out of their planned summer offensive we will never know.

Just to rekindle this thread:
The one problem in this whole process is that even had the Germans cut off the Russian armies in the bulge they could not have secured them within it and there were still significant Russian forces outside to counterattack what would have been a very weak encirclement.

The only hope for Citadel was to think big and attack further to the North and South of the bulge to bypass the defences and encompass reserve forces.