Japan and Germany co-operation in WW2 - Page 2




 
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February 9th, 2005  
Whispering Death
 
 
"The German submarine U-234, which surrendered to US forces in May 1945, was found to be carrying 560 kilograms of Uranium oxide destined for Japan's own atomic program."
February 9th, 2005  
Zucchini
 
It makes sense. The Japanese physicists were trying to explain why Hiroshima couldn't duplicated by the Americans even after Nagasaki. Perhaps they believed nobody could be farther along in development of an atom bomb than the Germans.

Whatever, it is one of the things that buttressed the Japanese Generals and Admirals in their stubborn resistance to immediate acceptance of the allies surrender terms.
February 9th, 2005  
redcoat
 
 
Quote:
The allies sunk a sub or more but they missed the most important one. I believe the Japanese were confused with the surrender and they took the Germans as POW's while on the sub.
Its the other way round. The German crew took the Japanese passengers prisoner, they then surrendered their sub to US forces

Quote:
Originally Posted by Whispering Death
"The German submarine U-234, which surrendered to US forces in May 1945, was found to be carrying 560 kilograms of Uranium oxide destined for Japan's own atomic program."
No.

Its yet another WW2 myth

The Uranium Oxide wasn't sent to help Japan's atomic program, but Japan's synthetic fuel production.
The uranium oxide was to be used by the Japanese as a catalyst for the production of synthetic methanol used for aviation fuel, not a bomb.

Let's not forget, the Germans had themselves given up any attempt to make an atom bomb by 1943

ps, of the German scientists on board U-234 none were nuclear scientists, but aviation and electronic experts.
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February 11th, 2005  
Missileer
 
 
I believe there were three Japanese liaison officers aboard the German sub which rendevoused with a large Japanese sub to unload the supplies when an American torpedo plane hit the Japanese sub and sunk it. The Germans escaped for a while but the Japanese wanted to be put ashore in friendly territory but the sub commander refused and decided to surrender to the Americans. They later found the Japanese officers had committed suicide rather than surrender.
May 22nd, 2010  
AVON
 

Topic: Re: Japan and Germany co-operation in WW2


Quote:
Originally Posted by Zucchini
The Japanese physicists were trying to explain why Hiroshima couldn't duplicated by the Americans even after Nagasaki. Perhaps they believed nobody could be farther along in development of an atom bomb than the Germans.
Yes, the Japanese badly underestimated the US's capabilities and the nuclear program was among their worst under-estimations. The day before Japan surrendered, President Truman signed the document to drop the third atomic bomb! Also the USA planned to use another 'nine' atomic bombs during the invasion of the Japanese home islands.
May 22nd, 2010  
LeEnfield
 
 
Germany had sent to Japan information on Radar, Jet Engines, Rockets and many other things. They also sent them a load of nuclear material on U234 now Japan could not build an atomic bomb but planned to build a dirty bomb where they exploded this material in an air burst making miles of the surrounding area uninhabitable.
Japan had planned to use their aircraft carrying submarines to get close enough to the USA to carry out this attack. U234 was on its way to Japan when Germany surrendered instructing all ships to hand them selfs over to the first allied ship they they see.
May 22nd, 2010  
-- Dusty
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Whispering Death
The sub thing is true, I don't remember if it was sunk or captured but the nazis did send a U-Boat full of nuclear material and scientists to japan.

They also shared technology, but the Japanese never really could make anything out of the jet propulsion and missile technology before the end of the war.
Which is why Japan was selected and not Germany. The German surrender had a tremendous role, but the German Atomic Research Program was far more advanced than the Japanese were at that time capable of.


Quote:
Originally Posted by Zucchini
It makes sense. The Japanese physicists were trying to explain why Hiroshima couldn't duplicated by the Americans even after Nagasaki. Perhaps they believed nobody could be farther along in development of an atom bomb than the Germans.
The original atomic bombs tested July 1945 (device name, Gadget; test name, Trinity) and dropped on Japan August 6th 1945 (Little Boy, over Hiroshima) and August 9th 1945 (Fat Man, over Nagasaki) were pure fission weapons.

Little Boy was completely different from Gadget/Fat Man. It used the gun assembly method that had originally been proposed for the plutonium bomb. Little Boy was 126 inches long, was 28 inches in diameter and weighed 8900 lb. Little Boy used the same air burst detonator system as Fat Man but used U-235. The burst height was set at 1850 ft, and the burst yield was 15 kt +-20%.

Fat Man used a plutonium core and initiator (Pu-239) and the blast (21 kt) is estimated to be 40% larger than Little Boy. Fat Man was 60 inches in diameter, was 12 feet long, and weighed 10,300 lb. and the burst height was around 1,850'.

Though larger, Fat Man had less damage than Hiroshima, though blast yield was 40% due to inclimate weather interfering with targeting.

Quote:
Originally Posted by AVON
Yes, the Japanese badly underestimated the US's capabilities and the nuclear program was among their worst under-estimations. The day before Japan surrendered, President Truman signed the document to drop the third atomic bomb! Also the USA planned to use another 'nine' atomic bombs during the invasion of the Japanese home islands.
There were a total of five Little Boy and three Fat Man assemblies made. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the only two shots made with either design.
May 25th, 2010  
Naddođur
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Shadowalker
How close did germany and japan communicate, and work together to defeat britain, USA etc. or didnt they really?
Cooperation between Japan and Germany dealt mostly with supporting each other in their treaty (as when the United States declared War on Japan on Dec. 8, 1941. Germany and Italy responded with declarations against the US on Dexc. 10th) and technology, most of that going from Germany to Japan (Japan was given components for the Me-262 and 163, as well as blueprints for the Me-109 and Daimler-Benz engines).

However, as far as strategy went, there was no cooperation at all, save for a few forays into the Atlantic by the Japanese subs and small craft and vice-versa for Germany. The main reason is because of the distance between them, but also becuase of two losses that the Japanese suffered in the late-1930s against the Russians in the Kalkin-Gol and Manchurian incursions by the Japanese Army into Russia (both times the Japanese suffered massive losses to the Russians). Because of those two defeats at the hands of superior Russian armour and soldiers, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression treaty, which likely saved Russia from annihilation against the Germans.
May 25th, 2010  
Naddođur
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by Doppleganger
They didn't. And moreover, really had no way to co-operate in a practical sense. In fact, I'm not even sure why they were 'allies'.
Germany and Japan created the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 because both, in their quest for expansion, stumbled into conflict with Russia. Another motivating factor was that both nations felt left out of the newly divided up colonies spread across the globe. Germany who had been recovering from its World War I damage was never given a chance to take control and develop an empire like the rest of the western nations. Japan was left alone in the east, but was forced to watch as the western nations came in and took control over her surrounding countries, leaving them nothing left to colonize, except China. Hitler looked to Japan to be that ally, because when Japan started to expand into China in 1931, the Russians provided resistance, supporting their Communist partners, thus ending Japan and Russia's years of cooperation.

All negotiations for the Anti-Comintern Pact were handled by Joachim von Rippentrop for Germany and the Japanese military, with Rippentrop initiating discussions between himself and Oshima, Japan's military attaché in Berlin. The text of the actual agreement was finalized on September 25. Premier Hirota and Privy Councillor Arai spoke to the Japanese cabinet on November 20, 1936, to ease any tension about the pact, saying that the purpose was to "protect the common interests of both Japan and Germany against the armed pressure exerted by the Soviet Union." Aria also said in a speech to the Privy Council on November 25 saying that should Russia decide to act against Japan they would also have to deal with Germany thanks to this agreement, and thus Japan would be able to expand further into China without a problem. Mushakoji, the Ambassador to Berlin and Rippentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact later that day. The final copy included a published treaty and a secret agreement between the two sides, which read as follows:

"…the secret attached agreement provides that the two governments (Japan and Germany), recognize that the Soviet Union is working towards the realization of the goal of the Comintern, and wanting to use its army for that cause, perceive that this fact threatens the existence of the parties and world peace in general and agree that should one of the parties be unprovokedly attacked or threatened by the Soviet Union the other party agrees not to carry out any measure which will relieve the position of the Soviet Union, but will immediately consult on measures to preserve their common interests. The parties will not during the period of this agreement and without mutual consent conclude political treaties with the Soviet Union which do not conform to the spirit of this agreement."

The results of the Pact paid off on both ends, especially for Japan who was granted more freedom to move around and take territory in China. The problems only began to arise when in 1938, Germany began to demand more involvement on Japan's behalf in European affairs.

With the rise and fall of the Abe cabinet from August 1939 until January 1940, and the Yonai cabinet from January 1940 until July 1940, no new agreements were made with Germany until the Konoye cabinet was established in July 1940. The decision was made by the cabinet to take advantage of the German victories in Europe with an expansion south into the territories held by the western powers. This expansion would be a great change from the previous foreign policy making England and the US the two main enemies of Japanese interest. With Japan attacking Allied forces in the Pacific, Hitler would face less resistance from England in conquering Europe. The hope was that a Japan-Axis alliance would hold America back from interfering in Europe. Heinrich Stahmer, Rippentrop's right-hand man contacted the Japanese embassy on August 13, 1940 to officially declare Germany ready for discussion of the new alliance.

On September 4, Matsuoka drew up the preliminary arrangement for the Tripartite Pact, which would involve the alliance of the three main Axis powers, Japan, Germany, and Italy. The main term of the Pact was, America had to remain neutral. For Germany it was to provide a quick victory against England and allow them to carry out their plans to attack Russia, and for Japan it meant they were able to expand south without American interference. Japan also hoped to gain from this alliance improved relations with Russia through German mediation. Hitler already had his plans in place to attack Russia and wanted to avoid an early conflict so a claus was placed in the Tripartite Pact that stated the political relations between Germany, Italy, or Japan and Russia would go unchanged by the signing of the Pact and that the goal was directed toward the US. On September 25, 1940 Germany approved the final copy of the Pact written by Matsuoka, was later that day accepted by Italy, and was approved by Japan on the 26th.

The Tripartite Pact was signed by Rippentrop, for Germany, Ciano, Italy's Minister of Propaganda, for Italy, and Kurusu, for Japan, on September 27, 1940 in Berlin. The military alliance of the Axis powers was now final.

The Pact itself contained six articles stating its purpose and goals. The six articles stated as follows:

1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new world order in Europe.

2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new world order in Greater East Asia.

3. Japan, Germany, and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

4. In order to effect this alliance, joint specialized committees composed of members appointed by each power shall meet as early as possible.

5. Japan. Germany, and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting powers and Soviet Russia.

6. This alliance shall become effective on the day of signature and shall remain in force for the period of ten years.

Along with these six articles, a secret set of terms was given and not released to the public. They included the following conditions:

1. Joint Military and Naval commissions, and a joint economic commission were to be organized at Tokyo and Berlin.

2. It was agreed that the three governments would determine by consultation whether or not a party to the treaty had been attacked, and what measures of mutual assistance were to be adopted.

3. Germany and Italy agreed to use their good offices to improve relations between Japan and Russia, and to induce the Soviet Union to act along the policy of the Tripartite Pact.

4. Exchange of military supplies, technical skill, raw materials, machinery, etc., was to be regulated.

5. Mutual preferential economic treatment was to be created at once.
May 25th, 2010  
Naddođur
 
 

Topic: U-234


The actual loading of U-234 and the type of cargo she was to carry was determined by a special commission formed in December, 1944. At this time, it was made known to the officers of U-234 that they were to go to Japan. The special commission known as the “Marine Sonder Dienst Auslands”, headed by K.K. Becker, was in charge of all details and determined what cargo was to be carried. Klt. Longbein from this commission was the actual loading officer. Loading containers were designed of the same diameter as the vertical mine shafts and were loaded in the shafts and held in place by the original mine releasing mechanism. The four compartments, two on either side, were loaded with horizontal tubes, (these tubes were originally above deck torpedo containers and were merely shortened somewhat and used as cargo containers). U-234 then carried six cargo containers in the mine shafts forward and amidships; six vertical containers in the mine shafts on either side, and in each of the four cargo spaces were eight horizontally placed cargo tubes. Four cargo containers, two on either side, were carried topside. The ship’s officers estimated that 240 tons of cargo were aboard in addition to fuel and provisions for a six to nine month’s trip.

After the loading was completed, some additional trials were carried out in the vicinity of Kiel. One was a silent run test near Apenrade at which time grounding rings were fitted to the propeller shafts. She returned to Kiel at which time most of her passengers came aboard. These were primarily technicians and GAF officers, in addition to Lt. Cdr. Hideo Tomonaga and Lt. Cdr. Genzo Shoji from the Japanese Navy.

During the late evening hours of 25 March, 1945, U-234 left Kiel with U-516 and a VII-C boat. They arrived in Horten two days later and during the following eight days, carried out Schnorchel trials. During the trials and while proceeding at Schnorchel depth, U-234 rammed a VII-C boat also carrying out Schnorchel trials. Neither boat was badly damaged, diving tank No. 1 and fuel oil tank No.1 of U-234 were holed but she was able to continue her trials. The other boat suffered very minor damages. U-234 arrived in Kristiansand in Norway on about 5 April where repairs were made and she topped up with provisions and oil.

U-234 left Kristiansand on 15 April, 1945, with a conviction among all hands that Japan would never be reached. In fact, the commanding officer was stated to have told his crew that although they were officially destined for Japan, he was firmly convinced in his own mind that their destination would never be reached. U-234 proceeded submerged and at Schnorchel depth for the first 16 days and surfaced for the first time shortly before the Rosengarten, because of a severe storm. From then on she usually ran two hours on the surface at night and spent the balance of the time submerged to depths between 40 – 100 meters. She had orders not to make any attacks, so about the only incident before news of German’s surrender came was when she almost rammed a large steamer, but U-234 herself was not observed. The first ominous sign was when the Goliath station fell out and shortly after passing the Rosengarten no further signals were received from Nauen. From then on, all signals received were short wave. They had no radio contact for several days after the last message was received from Nauen. The U-boat series had been changed over to “Distel” series of which U-234 was ignorant. Then on the 4th of May, she got a fragmentary repeat from English and American stations about Dönitz’s elevation to supreme command in Germany. She was finally forced to surface in order to receive complete signals.

On 10 May, U-234 picked up the order for all U-boats to surrender and to proceed to an Allied port depending on their position at that time. Upon receipt of this message, considerable discussion arose among the officers and passengers as to what course they should follow. Eire was first mentioned and this proposal was enthusiastically received by the two Japanese officers aboard. The discussion was particularly heated because at the time the surrender signal was received U-234 was exactly on the dividing line which determined whether she should proceed to England or to an American port. During the following two or three days after the surrender order was received, she proceeded southerly, surfacing at night and submerging during the daytime. Messages from other U-boats obeying the surrender order were picked up by U-234 and led her to report her position. She first tried the international short wave band but her signals apparently were not received so she switched to the 600 meter wave band and it was several hours before an answer was received to this signal. U-234’s first direct orders were from England on short wave, received on the 12 of May at about 0800. Then late that evening, she received orders from Halifax to report her position and speed hourly

When it became apparent to the Japanese officers that FEHLER intended to obey surrender orders, they informed the commanding officer of their resolve to commit suicide. FEHLER made some attempt to dissuade them from this, particularly by citing the surrender of Gen. Oshima and his staff as an example. But the pair requested that they be allowed to remain undisturbed in their cabin, which was granted. Previously, numerous gifts had been distributed among the officers and passengers. FEHLER received a Samurai sword, which he later threw overboard, and a sizeable sum in Swiss francs. A guard was placed outside their compartment, and the two took a dose of Luminol. They were still alive some 36 hours later, much to the disgust of the crew, and efforts on the part of the ship’s doctor to revive them failed. They were buried at sea on 11 May. Letters of thanks and appreciation addressed to FEHLER were found afterwards, also a request that an enclosed signal be sent to Japan. FEHLER did not comply with this request.

The first report made by U-234 as to her position and speed was accurately given but from then on she gave her speed as eight miles when she actually was doing between 12 and 15 and she was proceeding more westerly than indicated. Observation of her position by an airplane apparently resulted in the order from Halifax that she was to report hourly. The commanding officer of U-234 assumed that none of his hourly reports reached Halifax. At 2300Z on 14 May, U-234 was contacted by the USS SUTTON and a prize crew was placed aboard. She arrived in Portsmouth on 17 May.

U-234 was sunk by a torpedo from USS Greenfish during trials approximately 40 miles north-east off Cape Cod, on the US east coast on 20 November, 1947.