Intelligence Service - Page 2




 
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July 28th, 2015  
I3BrigPvSk
 
 
There was a German agent active in the UK prior the Normandy operation. Or rather I would say the Germans believed he worked for them, he convinced the Germans the landings in Normandy was a diversion. The real invasion was planned to occur at Calais

I think his code name was Garbo, but I might be wrong.
July 28th, 2015  
MontyB
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by I3BrigPvSk
So Stalin was correct when he ignored the warnings about the German attack, because the warnings were unreliable. That doesn't make any sense. The Germans attacked so the warnings were reliable. If Stalin had believed the warnings about it, he might have reacted differently and acted on it. The performance of the Soviets in the early stage can be explained by other factors.
I suspect that he meant that the source was unreliable, when receiving information a large proportion of its validity comes from the source for example few women will tell you their real age or weight and there are no guilty people in prison if you ask the inmates.

In the case of Barbarossa the information was correct but the Stalin clearly did not believe the person passing on the information further to that the information itself has to make sense to the recipient and fit in with their line of thinking, take Crete for example where the battle plans were captured prior to the invasion yet Freyberg still believed that it was going to be a seaborne invasion.


Quote:
So the presence of armor and mechanized forces around Arnhem had no significance for the 1st Airborne Division? What happen when light infantry units like an airborne unit face a mechanized unit?
This is a pretty standard assessment of Market Garden (Arhnem in particular) but I think it overlooks several points namely that Intelligence had done its job and shown what was in the area however because of British distrust of the Dutch resistance and a general belief that the German soldier was a defeated one that would not put up a fight it was largely ignored.

What the argument also fails to take into account is that the it was a bad plan right from the start to rely on a single road lined by trees and surrounded by swamps and Dutch Generals and resistance told them so, if anyone failed it was 30 Corps inability to reach the bridge and that was caused by bad planning as the airborne troops held it for more time than it was expected that they would have to.
July 29th, 2015  
JOC
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
What the argument also fails to take into account is that the it was a bad plan right from the start to rely on a single road lined by trees and surrounded by swamps and Dutch Generals and resistance told them so, if anyone failed it was 30 Corps inability to reach the bridge and that was caused by bad planning as the airborne troops held it for more time than it was expected that they would have to.
Major Brian Urguhart obtained information in Belgium from the Dutch resistance that German armor was present around Arnhem. This was backed up by aerial reconnaissance. Unfortunately the information was dismissed. This doomed the British 1st Airborne division to failure with ~ 2000 dead and ~ 6000 POW's. The British 1st Airborne division made quite a good showing for themselves considering they were out numbered and taking on the 10th SS Panzer division. Monty ultimately has to take responsibility for the disaster at Arnhem, as it was he who convinced Allied command that this plan could shorten the war.
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July 29th, 2015  
MontyB
 
 
I disagree, 1st Airborne basically achieved its goal the failure was in the plan to relieve the airborne troops.

In fact I would argue that at no stage in the planning of Market Garden was there an intelligence failure, the failure of the operation was purely one of leadership.

Intelligence was spot on in almost every aspect of the operation it was senior command namely Montgomery that screwed up.
July 29th, 2015  
JOC
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
I disagree, 1st Airborne basically achieved its goal the failure was in the plan to relieve the airborne troops.

In fact I would argue that at no stage in the planning of Market Garden was there an intelligence failure, the failure of the operation was purely one of leadership.

Intelligence was spot on in almost every aspect of the operation it was senior command namely Montgomery that screwed up.
Disagree with what?

I proved the specific intelligence data that was provided to allied command. To repeat: Major Brian Urguhart obtained information in Belgium from the Dutch resistance that German armor was present around Arnhem. This was backed up by aerial reconnaissance.

I never stated that the British 101st airborne didn't initially and initially only achieve their goal. Which couldn’t be maintained for long due to the strong German forces pitted against them. An airborne division can only hold out for so long against an armored division as well as other German forces. The plan to relieve them was flawed as well, however that wasn't the main reason for the surrender. The British 101st airborne was still being supplied by air in an ever shrinking pocket. They were outgunned and outnumbered.

My final statement was as follows: Monty ultimately has to take responsibility for the disaster at Arnhem, as it was he who convinced Allied command that this plan could shorten the war. In hindsight it was foolhardy for Monty to have sent a Airborne division into an area containing strong enemy forces at the end of shoestring.
July 29th, 2015  
MontyB
 
 
Weird somehow I completely missed most of your post, seems we pretty much agree although I think it "could" have worked however I think had Montgomery looked at the data he had objectively he may have planned the relief operation differently.

Still hindsight is a wonderful thing.

I would point out that they did hang on to the end of the bridge for five days which is two more than they were meant to have which is why I believe it was the relief plan that failed.
July 29th, 2015  
George
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
I suspect that he meant that the source was unreliable, when receiving information a large proportion of its validity comes from the source for example few women will tell you their real age or weight and there are no guilty people in prison if you ask the inmates.

In the case of Barbarossa the information was correct but the Stalin clearly did not believe the person passing on the information further to that the information itself has to make sense to the recipient and fit in with their line of thinking, take Crete for example where the battle plans were captured prior to the invasion yet Freyberg still believed that it was going to be a seaborne invasion.




This is a pretty standard assessment of Market Garden (Arhnem in particular) but I think it overlooks several points namely that Intelligence had done its job and shown what was in the area however because of British distrust of the Dutch resistance and a general belief that the German soldier was a defeated one that would not put up a fight it was largely ignored.

What the argument also fails to take into account is that the it was a bad plan right from the start to rely on a single road lined by trees and surrounded by swamps and Dutch Generals and resistance told them so, if anyone failed it was 30 Corps inability to reach the bridge and that was caused by bad planning as the airborne troops held it for more time than it was expected that they would have to.
Quote:
Originally Posted by JOC
Major Brian Urguhart obtained information in Belgium from the Dutch resistance that German armor was present around Arnhem. This was backed up by aerial reconnaissance. Unfortunately the information was dismissed. This doomed the British 1st Airborne division to failure with ~ 2000 dead and ~ 6000 POW's. The British 1st Airborne division made quite a good showing for themselves considering they were out numbered and taking on the 10th SS Panzer division. Monty ultimately has to take responsibility for the disaster at Arnhem, as it was he who convinced Allied command that this plan could shorten the war.
Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
Weird somehow I completely missed most of your post, seems we pretty much agree although I think it "could" have worked however I think had Montgomery looked at the data he had objectively he may have planned the relief operation differently.

Still hindsight is a wonderful thing.

I would point out that they did hang on to the end of the bridge for five days which is two more than they were meant to have which is why I believe it was the relief plan that failed.
Quote:
Originally Posted by JOC
Disagree with what?

I proved the specific intelligence data that was provided to allied command. To repeat: Major Brian Urguhart obtained information in Belgium from the Dutch resistance that German armor was present around Arnhem. This was backed up by aerial reconnaissance.

I never stated that the British 101st airborne didn't initially and initially only achieve their goal. Which couldn’t be maintained for long due to the strong German forces pitted against them. An airborne division can only hold out for so long against an armored division as well as other German forces. The plan to relieve them was flawed as well, however that wasn't the main reason for the surrender. The British 101st airborne was still being supplied by air in an ever shrinking pocket. They were outgunned and outnumbered.

My final statement was as follows: Monty ultimately has to take responsibility for the disaster at Arnhem, as it was he who convinced Allied command that this plan could shorten the war. In hindsight it was foolhardy for Monty to have sent a Airborne division into an area containing strong enemy forces at the end of shoestring.
Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
I disagree, 1st Airborne basically achieved its goal the failure was in the plan to relieve the airborne troops.

In fact I would argue that at no stage in the planning of Market Garden was there an intelligence failure, the failure of the operation was purely one of leadership.

Intelligence was spot on in almost every aspect of the operation it was senior command namely Montgomery that screwed up.
Actually from what was in the book "A bridge too far" is the Dutch weren't asked how to invade their own Country. A Dutch General after it was over told them the Final Exam at their War College(what ever it's called) is to invade from the same direction as The Allies did, anyone trying to do it like Market Garden fails the exam.
July 29th, 2015  
lljadw
 
MG was a gamble,and a justified one : if it succeeded,there was a big chance that the war could be over before Christmas,if it failed,nothing was lost .But if there was no MG,one thing was certain : the war would not be over before Christmas .
July 29th, 2015  
lljadw
 
About Barbarossa: Stalin was justified to not believe the informations he received,especially those from Sorge :Sorge lived in Tokyo : HOW could a Soviet spy living in Japan have reliable informations about something that would happen in Eastern Europe ? Hitler had expressily forbidden to inform Japan about Barbarossa .

And the informations coming from European sorces were not better : ONLY if suddenly the German Pz and Mot Divisions appeared at the border with the SU,could there be a reason for anxiety :at the start of june 1941,there were only 5 PzD and 2 Mot D at the border with the SU ,thus no reason for anxiety .
The other (12 PzD and 12 Mot D) were going to the east only between 3 and 23 june (and remained 60/80 km from the border) and when they were detected,it was to late for counter-measures .
July 29th, 2015  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
Weird somehow I completely missed most of your post, seems we pretty much agree although I think it "could" have worked however I think had Montgomery looked at the data he had objectively he may have planned the relief operation differently.

Still hindsight is a wonderful thing.

I would point out that they did hang on to the end of the bridge for five days which is two more than they were meant to have which is why I believe it was the relief plan that failed.
I must disagree : the only chance for MG to succeed was if at the day of the landing,the Germans would yell:Kamerad and raise their arms .

In the period immediately before MG,the Hun was on the run,and the assumption was that one more push and he would fall definitively .But there was not much time :the longer the allies would wait,the less chance MG would have to succeed .Thus,improvisation and pray that everything would work .
 


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