The German campaign of conquering Britain

MightyMacbeth

I am Honor
What about this topic, can you say? give or enlighten?

Let me be more specific. I am interested in knowing all about it. The beginning, till the faliure of the German forces. From the beginning I mean from the German conquest of France and reaching to the western coast.

Also, why did the Germans lose? How they were powerful at the beginning, but as time progressed, how they slowly started to be defeated etc..

Hope some one is willing to help here. Might be long, but I hope someone can help :)

Thanks :salute2:
 
What about this topic, can you say? give or enlighten?

Let me be more specific. I am interested in knowing all about it. The beginning, till the faliure of the German forces. From the beginning I mean from the German conquest of France and reaching to the western coast.

Also, why did the Germans lose? How they were powerful at the beginning, but as time progressed, how they slowly started to be defeated etc..

Brutally tough questions, Mighty Macbeth. The many reasons for the Allied defeat of Germany are still hotly debated 60 years after the war ended. I do not think that forum members will offer anything enlightening. Historians have not for decades. The problem is related to the complexity of the issue. Some Holocaust historians have even suggested that the German killing program directed important resources away from the war effort and helped seal Germany's fate. It this is true, and I am not in a position to answer yes or no, then almost any factor that you can dream up is equally true. A sensible answer is crushed under the weight of possibilities. A good answer would have to cover military, economic, industrial, social, political and individual attitudes, achievements and actions. Truly massive.

One thing, though. There was no German campaign to conquer Britain. London declared war on Germany...not the other way around. The Battle of Britain and Sea Lion were responses to the British declaration of war and military actions against Germany. As in other forum discussions, all of this comes back to the Polish question and your own subjective stand on "German World Domination". You need a lot of imagination to believe that the Germans threatened Britain prior to September 1939. It is sort of biased (or insane) to believe that the Germans would have surrendered to Britain after defeating them in France. The momentum of the war moved the Germans to think about a cross channel invasion. This was true of many German actions such as the invasion of Denmark and Norway, Yugoslavia, Greece or even Italy later in the war. But the war was either started by (1) Germany and the USSR for invading Poland or (2) Britain and France for declaring war on Germany. I lean towards the latter because invasions characterized the 1920s and 1930s and were moreorless tolerated. The simultaneous Soviet invasion of Poland was tolerated by the same governments who declared war on Germany and later handed Warsaw to the communist thugs in 1945.

(I apologize for bringing up this lame issue...again)
 
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You need a lot of imagination to believe that the Germans threatened Britain prior to September 1939. It is sort of biased (or insane) to believe that the Germans would have surrendered to Britain after defeating them in France. The momentum of the war moved the Germans to think about a cross channel invasion. This was true of many German actions such as the invasion of Denmark and Norway, Yugoslavia, Greece or even Italy later in the war. But the war was either started by (1) Germany and the USSR for invading Poland or (2) Britain and France for declaring war on Germany. I lean towards the latter because invasions characterised the 1920s and 1930s and were more or less tolerated.


Ollie

I think you mean Insane to believe Britain surrendering to Germany?

The difference in the case of Poland is that this was an ultimatum with a threat of war. At what point should unopposed German expansion have been stopped? In the case of Austria, the Rhineland and the Sudetenland it is difficult to justify since the population of these areas genuinely wanted to be part of Germany (OK probably only a significant part in the case of the Sudentanland). Only after the rest of Czechoslovakia fell was war actually threatened. Leave it any longer and the Soviet sphere would have been attacked. Given the impression of Russian strength at the time it would have been assumed they would have been easily defeated, leaving Hitler with an enormous empire and resources to economically and if necessary militarily dominate the world. True the League of Nations did little in Abyssinia and Manchuria, but then the League was dominated by nations with a European interest. I have no problem admitting that every nation acted out of self interest rather than morality, in Britain’s case there was an imbalance of power growing in Europe and as in Napoleons time it was convenient to support the other side.

On the other hand you are almost being unfair to Germany regarding the other countries you mention. They were actions precipitating the invasion of Norway, strong British connections in Norwegian politics, the searching of the Altmark, as well as strategic naval interests and the obvious threat of a blockade. The invasion of Greece was a direct result of Mussolini’s bungling, the last thing Hitler wanted was to invade at that stage. I think Hitler would have preferred some of these nations to remain on the sidelines, and become eventual puppet or at worst neutral states.
 
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First , thanks all, your contribitions are much appreciated :)

Anyway, I understand that its hard to come up with reasons for the defeat of Germany in trying to take Britain, but I ask, what are the reasons that are shared and agreed by many?
And what strong motive made the German military heads think of conquering Britain?

I also read the web pages provided. It sure was plenty, but I also want other points. Simpler and shorter ones.

I thank you again:salute2:
 
MightyMacbeth

I think you are confusing two issues, the campaign of conquering Britain with the defeat of Germany. You are talking as if Britain was the dominant force in the defeat of Germany, but it was really a quite minor factor.

Before 1944 in terms of resources and manpower it was dominated by the battle between the Soviets and Germany, and whoever won this stuggle would have dominated the European continent. Britains main asset was its strategic position as a jumping of and supply point from which the massive arsenal of American industry could be deployed. Britain was more of an annoyance which caused Germany to diversify into areas such as naval bulding and air defence and distributed some ground forces.
 
MightyMacbeth

I think you are confusing two issues, the campaign of conquering Britain with the defeat of Germany. You are talking as if Britain was the dominant force in the defeat of Germany, but it was really a quite minor factor.

Before 1944 in terms of resources and manpower it was dominated by the battle between the Soviets and Germany, and whoever won this stuggle would have dominated the European continent. Britains main asset was its strategic position as a jumping of and supply point from which the massive arsenal of American industry could be deployed. Britain was more of an annoyance which caused Germany to diversify into areas such as naval bulding and air defence and distributed some ground forces.

So what do you think would have happened in North Africa had Britain been taken out of the war in 1940 and most importantly how would the war with Russia have gone had the Germans been able to open a second front into the Caucasus in 1941?

I really think people under estimate the mistake Germany made in not having a plan to secure Britain in 1940.
 
So what do you think would have happened in North Africa had Britain been taken out of the war in 1940 and most importantly how would the war with Russia have gone had the Germans been able to open a second front into the Caucasus in 1941?

I really think people under estimate the mistake Germany made in not having a plan to secure Britain in 1940.


I dunno MontyB. Being British myself I think we have a tendency to overstate our strategic importance in WW2. True our island status gave us a geographical importance that was necessary for the eventual liberation of Europe. Aside from that though, we did not really influence Germany enough to make a major impact to the outcome of the war. In fact, our island status served to hinder us in that regard for the same reasons it protected us. Military speaking, the fighter losses the Luftwaffe sustained in the Battle of Britain did mean that over the skies of Moscow these same fighters were not available when they were sorely needed. Africa was a sideshow compared to the Eastern Front and the Germans never would have had the resources to open a 2nd Caucusus front anyway, not without freeing up resources further North which could only have happened with either a defeat of, or armistice with, Russia. The implications of the latter were that the European war would have been effectively over anyway.
 
okay sorry for not being cery clear.

-What I mean is, what motivated(caused) the German military leaders to try on conquering Britain? What made them begin raids etc..
What did they try to achieve from getting Britain?
Was it because they got France and so were high spirited and tried to take Britain too? etc..

-Then, why or what were the causes that made the Germans fail in getting Britain and what they hoped for. I am not talking about the whole war, but just specifically in the begining years when Germany tried to take Britain. The introduction of the spitfire and the Radar for example. The simple causes and the more significant ones.

-And also, the effect it had on the Germans (aftermath). Like the cause and effect. What did the failure cost the Germans? losing some of their best pilots for example, etc..

Thanks
 
On the other hand you are almost being unfair to Germany regarding the other countries you mention. They were actions precipitating the invasion of Norway, strong British connections in Norwegian politics, the searching of the Altmark, as well as strategic naval interests and the obvious threat of a blockade. The invasion of Greece was a direct result of Mussolini’s bungling, the last thing Hitler wanted was to invade at that stage. I think Hitler would have preferred some of these nations to remain on the sidelines, and become eventual puppet or at worst neutral states.

Sorry for making my last post so unclear. I tried to make exactly your point. That is, the momentum of the events after September 1939 moved the Nazi administration towards contemplating and then actually attempting military operations against Britain. All of that stank of opportunism and was characterized by extremely poor strategic judgement. In Hitler's mind, only the invasion of the Soviet Union mattered. It was this attitude, in my opinion, that killed the chances for a logical and consistent Nazi military policy...if such a thing was ever possible.

Turning to Britain, the same could be said of diplomatic efforts to stop Germany from regaining the territories lost after 1918. They were haphazard, poorly planned and poorly executed. British policy was directed by utopian beliefs. London wanted to impose a brutal treaty on a country that had the intrinsic power to strike back...and hard. Caught between the need to accomodate German interests and yet salvage Versailles to "keep Germany down", London ultimately chose war. Poland was just as unimportant as Bohemia. London and Paris wanted something more revolutionary in 1939. They wanted to hold fast to an outdated Versailles system that Germans no longer had to accept. That is, London and Paris wanted to hold onto their own system of European domination and denied the realities of German power. Catastrophic is the only word that can describe this mindset.

Remember, all of Germany's actions during the 1930s were linked to Versailles. The Sudetenland was German. Danzig was German. Anyway, Hitler's brand of nationalism did not accept the right of Bohemia to exist as an independent state. Sound funny? Not really. The French state continually questioned the right of Prussian to exist until it was abolished in 1946 or 1947. And Prussia was around for a lot longer. London could not know that Hitler was bent on attacking the Soviet Union...especially after the non-aggression pact. And why would London care about Moscow, anyway? Until the invasion of the Soviet Union, German policy was hardly revolutionary or even aggressive. 1930s German territorial claims and Berlin's response to the Allied declaration of war were normal and mild...to say the least.

WWII started as an Allied operation against Germany...not the other way around. The fact that the British often see themselves as victims of Nazi aggression is just an illusion constructed to justify a general policy of German repression. London could not know how bad Hitler's gang actually was...and should have reached a settlement with Streseman during the 1920s instead of trying to control Hitler during the Depression.
 
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OK lets have 3 conversations at once and see how it goes!

Mighty MacBeth

What I mean is, what motivated(caused) the German military leaders to try on conquering Britain? What made them begin raids etc

Fear of an hostile base on the doorstep, particularily for bombing. They hoped to force Britain into a political settlement, perhaps hoping for the overthrow of Churchill caused by the loss of morale, due to the air raids. Of course the impact of bombing at that stage was overestimated and it didn’t work. Later it was because of retaliation for British bombing raids, and the belief Germany could cut of Britain’s supplies by sinking her merchant fleet.

-Then, why or what were the causes that made the Germans fail in getting Britain and what they hoped for. I am not talking about the whole war, but just specifically in the beginning years when Germany tried to take Britain.

I have already expressed my views regarding the Battle of Britain at the end of this thread.
http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/navy-won-batle-britain-t24483.html

Failure for Germany at sea was due to lack of investment in a modern navy with aircraft carriers and suitable aircraft. Think what the impact of the German battleships and pocket battleships would have been in the Atlantic if this steel had been made into 12 medium 20 000 tonne sized carriers with bases off France. U-boat building was too scarce in the early stages, by the time they had sufficient numbers Britain had developed short range radar and America had supplied escort carriers which rendered them useless. Reading their codes via Ultra didn’t help either.

Ollie

What are your views regarding A J P Taylor’s book The Origins of the Second World War? It’s a long time since I read it but I think his view was similar to yours regarding the Versailles treaty at least, i.e. the Versailles settlement of 1919 was an artificial absurdity that was bound to unravel. This unraveling could have been done rationally, as in the early stages of British and French appeasement over the Rhineland, Germany's anschluss with Austria, and so on; but after Munich, in 1938, it was increasingly bungled. Having appeased Berlin over more-contestable territorial issues, the British changed their stance and decided to fight over Danzig and the Polish Corridor, where the German case for revision was stronger. The result, Taylor maintained, was a war in Europe that nobody wanted and that personally dismayed Hitler. World War II was simply an accident: Hitler never imagined that the democracies would actually go to war over Poland, especially because London and Paris could do almost nothing to defend the Poles. Great Britain and France had in the past vacillated between policies of appeasement and resistance.

http://www.age-of-the-sage.org/history/historian/A_J_P_Taylor.html
Taylor's initially 'outrageous' revisionism was increasingly, but not fully, accepted by British historians and by a majority amongst the rising generation of German historians.


Taylor's own statements such as "in principle and doctrine, Hitler was no more wicked and unscrupulous than many a contemporary statesman" were highly controversial. Perhaps only someone of his standing could get away with that sort of statement without getting into serious trouble. I think what spoils this thesis was the blatant attack on the Soviet Union, it’s difficult to imagine anything as selfish and ruthless.


Monty

Yes perhaps I have gone a bit too far,

Perhaps Britain did influence the result of the war, but only because the war was finely balanced in the Soviet Union. Without Arctic convoys, the diversions of resources and manpower I spoke about, and the lack of bombing (I don’t think it was totally insignificant) it may have tipped the balance. Perhaps this would have been the hinge factor at a critical time. However, I was attempting to place Britain’s military strength, particularly on land, in perspective for Mighty MacBeth.

The issue of invading the Soviet Union from the south is an interesting one. Do you think this would have been practical in view of the Caucasus Mountain barrier and the long supply line? Perhaps if Turkey came into the war it would have helped Germany regarding these issues.
 
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Thank you there Perseus.

And please, anyone tell me what they think too :) Everyone is welcomed.

Thanks
 
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Monty

Yes perhaps I have gone a bit too far,

Perhaps Britain did influence the result of the war, but only because the war was finely balanced in the Soviet Union. Without Arctic convoys, the diversions of resources and manpower I spoke about, and the lack of bombing (I don’t think it was totally insignificant) it may have tipped the balance. Perhaps this would have been the hinge factor at a critical time. However, I was attempting to place Britain’s military strength, particularly on land, in perspective for Mighty MacBeth.

The issue of invading the Soviet Union from the south is an interesting one. Do you think this would have been practical in view of the Caucasus Mountain barrier and the long supply line? Perhaps if Turkey came into the war it would have helped Germany regarding these issues.

The thing is that with the UK out of the war Germany would not have needed Turkey either as access to Russia through the south could have been achieved via Iran which would have put the Russian oilfields out of comission early on and more than likely into German hands.

As far as the practicality of the second front goes I cant see why it wouldnt have been an option especially since they damn near captured the area in late 1942.

While I dont believe that militarily the UK was a huge threat militarily I do believe that the failure to take it out (or have well established pre-war plans and logistics to defeat Britain) cost Germany the war.
 
Monty, if you look at this map you will see what I mean. Surely Captain Mannerings platoon could defend this route. It looks worse than getting to Germany via Italy to me

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/caucasus_region_1994.jpg


You would think so but history indicates otherwise because on August 21 1942 a Nazi flag was installed on the Elbrus peak, the highest point of Caucasus and if you look at that map you will see the peak in question.

Now take the troop, training and equipment disparity of the opening stages of barbarossa and I suspect it would be private Jones that got it "up him (and he wouldnt like it)" and not Fritz.
:)
 
Hehe we are on topic I thought, we are looking at just how important Britain staying really was.
 
The thing is that with the UK out of the war Germany would not have needed Turkey either as access to Russia through the south could have been achieved via Iran which would have put the Russian oilfields out of comission early on and more than likely into German hands.

As far as the practicality of the second front goes I cant see why it wouldnt have been an option especially since they damn near captured the area in late 1942.

While I dont believe that militarily the UK was a huge threat militarily I do believe that the failure to take it out (or have well established pre-war plans and logistics to defeat Britain) cost Germany the war.

As Perseus pointed out that region is a godsend for a defender and a nightmare for an attacker. The Germans did manage to get to the top of Mount Elbrus but that was an elite mountain warfare division and the actions at Stalingrad meant that Soviet attention was diverted elsewhere. The Germans didn't really capture the region at all; they only occupied some of the area whilst the Soviets withdrew. The Wehrmacht never got near to Baku, one of the main objectives of Fall Blau. The only way they could hope to occupy the region more permanently would be to deal with the 2 very large blocks of Soviet reserves sitting near Moscow and Stalingrad respectively. And that effectively meant winning the war against the USSR.

What cost Germany was going to war with a nation that had more men than they did and almost as importantly, had men who were willing to die for a cause. Hitler's plan to capture the Caucasus for oil and gas resources was flawed as it ignored the mistakes made by Napoleon some 130 years before - that to beat a country the sheer size of Russia you must destroy her armies in the field when the opportunity exists. Otherwise they will simply retreat into the hinterland and counter-attack on their terms. Britain didn't enter into the equation. The 2nd World War was lost for Germany in Russia.
 
Indeed however I believe that the Russian army would have been destroyed had the Germans had the capacity to carry out an invasion of Russia on two fronts as indicated.
I accept these are purely hypothetical scenarios but with the loss of the southern oilfields in the first weeks of the war along with a drive from Poland I think the Soviets would have collapsed in weeks however none of these things would have (or were) been possible with Britain still fighting.

As I have said previously I think the failure to plan for a complete victory in the west was a huge mistake that eventually cost Germany the war.
 
Ollie

What are your views regarding A J P Taylor’s book The Origins of the Second World War? It’s a long time since I read it but I think his view was similar to yours regarding the Versailles treaty at least, i.e. the Versailles settlement of 1919 was an artificial absurdity that was bound to unravel. This unraveling could have been done rationally, as in the early stages of British and French appeasement over the Rhineland, Germany's anschluss with Austria, and so on; but after Munich, in 1938, it was increasingly bungled. Having appeased Berlin over more-contestable territorial issues, the British changed their stance and decided to fight over Danzig and the Polish Corridor, where the German case for revision was stronger. The result, Taylor maintained, was a war in Europe that nobody wanted and that personally dismayed Hitler. World War II was simply an accident: Hitler never imagined that the democracies would actually go to war over Poland, especially because London and Paris could do almost nothing to defend the Poles. Great Britain and France had in the past vacillated between policies of appeasement and resistance.

http://www.age-of-the-sage.org/history/historian/A_J_P_Taylor.html
Taylor's initially 'outrageous' revisionism was increasingly, but not fully, accepted by British historians and by a majority amongst the rising generation of German historians.

Taylor's own statements such as "in principle and doctrine, Hitler was no more wicked and unscrupulous than many a contemporary statesman" were highly controversial. Perhaps only someone of his standing could get away with that sort of statement without getting into serious trouble. I think what spoils this thesis was the blatant attack on the Soviet Union, it’s difficult to imagine anything as selfish and ruthless.

I fully agree with you that my views seem very similar to those of Taylor. There are more similarities than differences. It however seems equally true that Taylor's views have had less impact on dominant cultural opinions than historians might like to believe. That is, the general public does not really exhibit any signs of exposure to Taylor's line of argumentation. Thanks for giving my argument some historiographical context. I think I will re-read Taylor's text (I have it somewhere). I should point out that Versailles has come under fire over the past years as the dominating force behind Hitler's rise and the outbreak of WWII. This argument, as you point out, begins with Taylor.

Taylor, for all of the good points raised, dismissed the revolutionary nature of French and English attitudes towards Germany after 1918. The war had deepened the view that Germans acted in unison. Taylor could not understand that the Germans were anything but a collective mass that shared similar values. While Taylor made a real attempt to understand standard German grievances and argued that most Germans would naturally fight against Versailles, his "Hitler was normal" theory dissolved the important differences between democratic, socialist and Nazi Germans. His book glossed over the de facto German civil war that ended with Nazi victory. Allied support of German democracy during the 1920s and 1930s could have thwarted Hitler. As it was, the inner conviction that Germans opposed democracy shaped Allied policy and radicalized European politics. Ultimately, many of the interwar problems sprang from the simple fact that neither London nor Paris politicians really accepted the German right to exist as a sovereign entity. It can be argued that many of these politicians even questioned the right of the German state to exist. That was anything but normal.

In general, I think that Taylor's mindset prohibited a better appreciation of the dangers of Stalin. Not only did he fail to explore the Soviet Union in sufficient depth, his attitudes toward Moscow betray the type of thinking alluded to in the first paragraph. He treated Moscow like a "real" state with a "real" foreign policy. Most contemporary socialists were of course guilty of the same warped analysis. Stalin became a normal politician working for normal political ends. Taylor never really described the horrors of Stalinist Russia. 1920s German democrats are never accorded the dignified treatment granted Stalin. Stresemann, for example, is viewed as a typically German Versailles revisionist. Stalin's interwar actions on the other hand were characterized as defensive or aiming at collective security.

Was Taylor's "Origins" really an attempt at explaining the outbreak of WWII using a fair framework? Taylor wrote elsewhere that "Germany is not a typical European nation, nor even a typical Great Power; shaped by history, it has acquired a unique character and played a unique role, a role almost entirely aggressive and destructive, an alien body in the structure of European civilization". [Taylor, The Course of German History, p. 7]. These types of statements betray the real Taylor. In my opinion, Taylor really believed that "Hitler ist Deutschland". This was the true message of "Origins"...although hidden using incredible sophistication.
 
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