General Sir Brian Horrocks.... - Page 2




 
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August 20th, 2004  
David Hurlbert
 
General Sir Brian Horrocks and other commanders at the operational level had sufficient evidence to merit a serious rethinking of the airborne portion of this operation, but chose not to believe the data to be reliable and worthy. Although there are numerous other examples especially noted in history books regarding this operation as well as others, I thought this report from a professor at the United States Air War College might provide the reader with some insights. Nonetheless, despite the fact that even Dutch Generals tried to persuade him to take another route, Horrocks chose to ignore the warnings placing his men in unnecessarily harm’s way. In addition, this historical research report also eloquently notes what an egotistical hardhead General Montgomery was and how Eisenhower sided with him over Patton in this particular situation.

http://www.iwar.org.uk/sigint/resour...en/bradley.pdf

I do hope this proves helpful for those of you who are interested in researching this topic a little more thoroughly?
August 20th, 2004  
Mark Conley
 
 
thats why we asked for it...

okay after studying the document...the only mention of horricks was of his own uneasiness at ordering an attack by his own corps on the dike type roads. It would seem that the general was fully aware of the danger his troops might encounter..but since the plan rolled, so did he. He merely followed his orders.

Now, i really dont understand..is your whole testament on horricks based simply on this intelligence report? or is it more directed towards a faulty plan, made in seven days, that ignored the dutch intelligence and photographic evidence that showed, to the contrary, that Mongomery and His American counterparts really did try to go a bridge to far on this one?

i will defitnetly look more at the horricks question...
August 21st, 2004  
SLR owner
 
Mark ,
After reading the article , I have come to the same conclusion.....there is simply nothing in it which berates Horrocks ability as a General.....if anything it proves that he had good instincts.

JHR
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August 24th, 2004  
David Hurlbert
 
Perhaps this article was not a great example as the focus was on intelligence, but there is a great deal of information on his mistakes including his own memoirs. Okay, each to his own opinion, but I still think Horrocks rates poorly in my opinion and is right up there with Generals Sherman and Grant of the American Civil War. Nonetheless, as a commander, he failed to yield to the intelligence. In what I would consider a costly blunder, Horrocks proposed to use all of this manpower and high explosives in a sudden, massive attack by three British divisions, each of which would concentrate its energies on an exceptionally narrow front. The Guards Armoured Div. and 43 (Wessex) Div. were in reserve, ready to pass through and exploit south in the early stages of the attack. This account of the Canadian role in Veritable should not obscure the fact that the overwhelming majority of men involved in the battles were British troops fighting under Horrocks’ leadership of XXX Corps. Casualties to the British forces were four times higher than the Canadian total. The road to Cleve was the focal point of his attack and their main task was the seizure of the curved ridge overlooking the ruined city. With the road flooded to depth of two feet, operations were at a standstill when Horrocks decided, on the basis of information that part of the ridge had been captured, to order the 43 (Wessex) Division to pass through the 15th Scottish and burst out onto the plain beyond. In his own memoirs, Horrocks admits that this decision was "one of the worst mistakes I made in the war" because the arrival of 43 Div. "caused one of the worst traffic jams of the war" and made the Scottish Division's task even more difficult costing a great number of lives. With this being said, I am not removing a great deal of blame from Montgomery either. Furthermore, I think it is important to note that a great many soldiers lost their lives in WW-II due to overly eager generals too quick to attack with little efforts aimed at softening their targets. Although Market-Garden is considered a strategic failure, I think all the men of the airborne units could say that they had done their part admirably.
August 24th, 2004  
Mark Conley
 
 
I see..okay.
August 25th, 2004  
SLR owner
 
I see then David .

Your opinion seems to differ from most.....who in your opinion was the top 'overall' English general , since you don't seem to like most any of the Allied commanders?

JHR
September 24th, 2004  
spymaster
 

Topic: Hm


What a ridiculous comment to make. Who makes a judgement about anyone from watching a film? You certainly dont judge history from any Hollywood film (Titantic, The Patriot, U-571, Saving Private Halfwit, Braveheart need I go on?)

The best judge of Horrocks was Horrocks himself. He very honestly states in his autobiography that he failed to swing left to cut off a German army in the estuary and also failed to clear the approaches to the port of Antwerp.

And by the way, Horrocks was seriously ill during MARKET GARDEN which may have impaired his judgement