Enigma Machines - Page 4




 
--
 
January 6th, 2016  
lljadw
 
Intelligence did NOT make the difference,whatever the lobby of BP may say .

"Many factors are involved in the final outcome of the war and Ultra is only one of them ."

Jerry Russell in "Ultra and the campaign against the U -Boats in WWII."
January 6th, 2016  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by I3BrigPvSk
We can turn it around, if the German intelligence had been better, the Allied had lost much more ships and men. If the German intelligence had worked and had the knowledge about Normandy before it happened. The Russians might have acted differently if they had believed the warnings about the attack in June 1941. if the Americans had known about the attack in December 1944, the outcome and the losses might have been different, but they didn't. The intelligence regardless if it's Humint or signal makes the difference. During the Second world war, the communication equipment was not that good in comparison with today. There was a delay between receiving the intel, evaluate the intel and send it to the field commanders. At the same time not telling the enemy their communications are compromised.
The B Dienst of the KM was good, but good intelligence does not mean that the Allies would lose more ships .

If the German intelligence had been better about D Day, the outcome would have been identical : better intelligence does not produce more divisions .

If US had more information about Wacht am Rhein, the outcome would have been the same : Eisenhower was not a magician who could bring out new divisions with a snap of his fingers : his strategical reserve consisted of 2 divisions : 82 and 101.

For Barbarossa, it was the same : the situation of the Red Army was that bad,that a serious early warning would make no difference .There was no reason for the Stavka to believe anything the Soviet spies were telling: most of it was unreliable gossip .
January 6th, 2016  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by JOC
Yes and the Germans poured in thru the Ardennes soundly defeating the French. The French refused to believe the Germans could bring AFV thru the forest.


Yes and this greatly assisted the allies in taking of the Normandy beaches. “For which you should be grateful”. In the case of Normandy an elaborate disinformation scheme was created to convince the Germans the attack would occur in the Pas de Calais. General Patton himself was keep in reserve to head up these much forces along with mock AFV jeeps etc.



Hitler and OKH ignored all the intelligence (what else is new) and decided the Reds would attack the Romanian oil fields despite the massive buildup.



So what’s your point these are all cases where the defenders lost by either ignoring intelligence or being deceived by intelligence.
1) NO : the French did not refuse to believe that the Germans could move AFV through the Ardennes.They expected the Germans to go through the Ardennes,and they expected that they could stop them at the Meuse.

2) NO : Fortitude had no influence on German strategy :the German mobile divisions were stationned south of the Seine, because with what Normandy had, it could not prevent a landing .Thus, the Pas de Calais would have to do with was available .


3) NO : FHO was convinced of an attack against AGNU,not against the Romanian oil fields,which were protected by AG South Ukraine .

But , it were not the informations of FHO which decided the Germans to "give" the mobile divisions to AGNU,but,because a successful attack against AGNU was more dangerous than an attack against AGC .Such an attack,with direction north,would be more dangerous than an attack against AG C.

See Germany and WWII Tome VIII P 514 .
--
January 6th, 2016  
I3BrigPvSk
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
Intelligence did NOT make the difference,whatever the lobby of BP may say .

"Many factors are involved in the final outcome of the war and Ultra is only one of them ."

Jerry Russell in "Ultra and the campaign against the U -Boats in WWII."
We are now discussing the intelligence and its contribution to the final outcome, but you don't understand the significance of having the intelligence working for you, I guess you never will. If you had any training you would be able to draw your own conclusions from what you read.
January 6th, 2016  
I3BrigPvSk
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
The B Dienst of the KM was good, but good intelligence does not mean that the Allies would lose more ships .

If the German intelligence had been better about D Day, the outcome would have been identical : better intelligence does not produce more divisions .

If US had more information about Wacht am Rhein, the outcome would have been the same : Eisenhower was not a magician who could bring out new divisions with a snap of his fingers : his strategical reserve consisted of 2 divisions : 82 and 101.

For Barbarossa, it was the same : the situation of the Red Army was that bad,that a serious early warning would make no difference .There was no reason for the Stavka to believe anything the Soviet spies were telling: most of it was unreliable gossip .
This is a confirmation; you don't understand anything. If the commanders and the leaders get the information about certain events, they will react on it.
January 6th, 2016  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by I3BrigPvSk
This is a confirmation; you don't understand anything. If the commanders and the leaders get the information about certain events, they will react on it.
Meaningless and questionable answer .

If commanders get information about certain events, they will react IF they believe the information and as far as possible : their reaction will depend on what they can do and this will depend on the strength of their forces .

For Barbarossa,there was no reason to believe the informations, and,besides there was nothing the Soviets could do .

Thus the informations were not important .
January 6th, 2016  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by BritinAfrica
You are an idiot, Froggy is an ex active service Royal Marine Captain who knows more regarding intelligence work then you will ever know, unlike you, he's seen the elephant where proper intelligence is important to carry out the operation being tasked with, and saving the lives of those under one's command.

You are talking like a complete and total knob head.
As usual you miss the point (the opposite would be a surprise) : we are not discusing what he was saying, but something totally different : the importance of Ultra on the U-Boat war and the claim from a poster that the importance was decisive,that Ultra shortened the war .
January 6th, 2016  
Capt Frogman
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
You thought wrongly .
No I don't think so.....

What's your military experience?
January 6th, 2016  
JOC
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
1) NO : the French did not refuse to believe that the Germans could move AFV through the Ardennes. They expected the Germans to go through the Ardennes,and they expected that they could stop them at the Meuse.
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw

2) NO : Fortitude had no influence on German strategy :the German mobile divisions were stationned south of the Seine, because with what Normandy had, it could not prevent a landing .Thus, the Pas de Calais would have to do with was available .


3) NO : FHO was convinced of an attack against AGNU,not against the Romanian oil fields,which were protected by AG South Ukraine .

But , it were not the informations of FHO which decided the Germans to "give" the mobile divisions to AGNU,but,because a successful attack against AGNU was more dangerous than an attack against AGC .Such an attack,with direction north,would be more dangerous than an attack against AG C.

See Germany and WWII Tome VIII P 514 .
1) Wrong: Yes he French expected a repeat of the Von Shlieffen plan, not an attack thru the rugged Ardennes forest.

2) Wrong: yes the mock allied army (Operation Fortitude) setup in the south of England helped to convince Hitler that the attack would occur in the Pas de Calais. This was an elaborate plan and highly successful plan of disinformation for the enemy. As a result most of the German forces were either stated at the Pas de Calais or held in reserve. This was called Patton’s phantom army and was one of history’s prime examples of disinformation being used successfully for intelligence. The Germans fell for hook line and sinker.

3) Wrong: Yes This is why a greater number of panzer and SS divisions were moved to AGS thus stripping AGC of vitally needed resources while they faces the blunt of operation Bagration. General Busch was woefully under equipped to meet the Red offensive. By the time the reinforcements arrived and Field marshal Model was in charge it was too late the momentum was lost as was the battle.
January 7th, 2016  
Sara
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
I disagree that it would definitively change things :there are no proofs in WWII from battles were intelligence changed the outcome .There were battles where A knew the intentions of B and lost,and there were battles where A did not know the intentions of B and won .






Worth a try....
 


Similar Topics
Why did Germany lose WW2?
Everything you wanted to know about voting machines
The Story of U-250...
Nazi Enigma code finally cracked after 60 years
Beijing to Install Condom Machines to Fight AIDS