Enigma Machines

2) This is not a fact : it is your interpretation,which is wrong :at the end of the war the losses were virtually zero because the escots were to strong and it would be suicidal to attack a convoy .

I REALLY don't know if you are deaf, daft or stupid.

On February 1, 1942, the Kriegsmarine switched the U-boats to a completely new Enigma key (TRITON), which used special upgraded Enigma machines. This new key could not be read by codebreakers; the Allies no longer knew where the U-boat patrol lines were. This made it far more difficult to evade contact, and the wolf packs ravaged many convoys. This state persisted for ten months. To obtain information on submarine movements the Allies had to make do with HF/DF fixes and decrypts of Kriegsmarine messages encoded on earlier Enigma machines. These messages included signals from coastal forces about U-boat arrivals and departures at their bases in France, and the reports from the U-boat training command. From these clues, Commander Rodger Winn's Admiralty Submarine Tracking Room[50] supplied their best estimates of submarine movements, but this information was not enough.

Then on October 30, crewmen from HMS Petard salvaged Enigma material from German submarine U-559 as she foundered off Port Said. This allowed the codebreakers to break TRITON, a feat credited to Alan Turing. By December 1942, Enigma decrypts were again disclosing U-boat patrol positions, and shipping losses declined dramatically once more.

THEREBY PROVING THE LINK BETWEEN CONVOY LOSSES AND ENIGMA
 
I REALLY don't know if you are deaf, daft or stupid.

On February 1, 1942, the Kriegsmarine switched the U-boats to a completely new Enigma key (TRITON), which used special upgraded Enigma machines. This new key could not be read by codebreakers; the Allies no longer knew where the U-boat patrol lines were. This made it far more difficult to evade contact, and the wolf packs ravaged many convoys. This state persisted for ten months. To obtain information on submarine movements the Allies had to make do with HF/DF fixes and decrypts of Kriegsmarine messages encoded on earlier Enigma machines. These messages included signals from coastal forces about U-boat arrivals and departures at their bases in France, and the reports from the U-boat training command. From these clues, Commander Rodger Winn's Admiralty Submarine Tracking Room[50] supplied their best estimates of submarine movements, but this information was not enough.

Then on October 30, crewmen from HMS Petard salvaged Enigma material from German submarine U-559 as she foundered off Port Said. This allowed the codebreakers to break TRITON, a feat credited to Alan Turing. By December 1942, Enigma decrypts were again disclosing U-boat patrol positions, and shipping losses declined dramatically once more.

THEREBY PROVING THE LINK BETWEEN CONVOY LOSSES AND ENIGMA

Wrong,of topic and irrelevant : you said that AT THE END OF THE WAR convoy losses were very low because of ULTRA.The exemple of 1942 (which is also wrong) has nothing to do with what happened in 1945 .

The exemple (or your interpretation) is also wrong because the shipping losses declined NOT in december,but already in october /november: the Torch convoys reached NA without losses .
 
Breaking of the code does not mean low shipping losses :

Shipping losses

december 1942 :76 ships

january 1943: 49 ships

february 1943:88

march 1943 : 132

If the low shipping losses in january were caused by the breaking of the code,how to explain the high shipping losses from february and march ?


The same for 1944 and 1945

In the first 4 months of 1944 82 ships were lost, in the first 4 months of 1945 92 : no one will pretend that in 1945 the Germans had a new code which was not broken at the end of the war .

Thus the explanation for high/low losses must be sought elsewhere .
 
Breaking of the code does not mean low shipping losses :

Shipping losses

december 1942 :76 ships

january 1943: 49 ships

february 1943:88

march 1943 : 132

If the low shipping losses in january were caused by the breaking of the code,how to explain the high shipping losses from february and march ?


The same for 1944 and 1945

In the first 4 months of 1944 82 ships were lost, in the first 4 months of 1945 92 : no one will pretend that in 1945 the Germans had a new code which was not broken at the end of the war .

Thus the explanation for high/low losses must be sought elsewhere .

Your really are a waste of space and my time. Quite frankly, if you had brains you would be dangerous.:bang:
 
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1)Battle does not mean victory

2) Wrong question : what you need to do is not determined by what you know of the enemy's intention, but by what you have available and by what you need to do ,by what you must protect .

Wrong : you can only outmanoeuver him if you have the forces to do it .

This is nonsense.

You'd be a very poor military strategist/commander with "knowledge" like this.

I always thought military intelligence and reconnaissance was key to winning wars, but what do I know!
 
And how will you know where to deploy your forces? Admit it now, you don't know anything about this.

This proves that your knowledge about WWII is limited to some articles in Wikipedia .

FYI:

the following three exemples prove that deployment did NOT depend on information about the enemy intention, but where a successfull enemy attack would be more dangerous.

May/june 1940 : the French were convinced rightly that the main German attack would happen north of the Ardennes,they sent the majority of their mobile divisions in that direction, not because they were convinced that there would be the German Schwerpunkt,but because a successfull German attack north of the Ardennes would be catastrophic .


May/june 1944 : the Germans stationned the majority of their mobile divisions south of the Seine, not because they expected an Allied landing in Normandy, but because a landing in Normandy had more chances to succeed than a landing on the Pas de Calais .

June 1944 in the East : the majority of the German mobile divisions was stationed behind AG North Ukraine, not because the Germans expected there the main Soviet attack,but because a successfull attack against AG North Ukraine was more dangerous than a successful attack against AC Center .

Thus ,in these three cases,the strategy of the defender did NOT depend on informations about what the attacker would do .
 
May/june 1940 : the French were convinced rightly that the main German attack would happen north of the Ardennes,they sent the majority of their mobile divisions in that direction, not because they were convinced that there would be the German Schwerpunkt,but because a successfull German attack north of the Ardennes would be catastrophic .
Yes and the Germans poured in thru the Ardennes soundly defeating the French. The French refused to believe the Germans could bring AFV thru the forest.

May/june 1944 : the Germans stationned the majority of their mobile divisions south of the Seine, not because they expected an Allied landing in Normandy, but because a landing in Normandy had more chances to succeed than a landing on the Pas de Calais .
Yes and this greatly assisted the allies in taking of the Normandy beaches. “For which you should be grateful”. In the case of Normandy an elaborate disinformation scheme was created to convince the Germans the attack would occur in the Pas de Calais. General Patton himself was keep in reserve to head up these much forces along with mock AFV jeeps etc.

June 1944 in the East : the majority of the German mobile divisions was stationed behind AG North Ukraine, not because the Germans expected there the main Soviet attack,but because a successfull attack against AG North Ukraine was more dangerous than a successful attack against AC Center .

Hitler and OKH ignored all the intelligence (what else is new) and decided the Reds would attack the Romanian oil fields despite the massive buildup.

Thus ,in these three cases,the strategy of the defender did NOT depend on informations about what the attacker would do .

So what’s your point these are all cases where the defenders lost by either ignoring intelligence or being deceived by intelligence.
 
We can turn it around, if the German intelligence had been better, the Allied had lost much more ships and men. If the German intelligence had worked and had the knowledge about Normandy before it happened. The Russians might have acted differently if they had believed the warnings about the attack in June 1941. if the Americans had known about the attack in December 1944, the outcome and the losses might have been different, but they didn't. The intelligence regardless if it's Humint or signal makes the difference. During the Second world war, the communication equipment was not that good in comparison with today. There was a delay between receiving the intel, evaluate the intel and send it to the field commanders. At the same time not telling the enemy their communications are compromised.
 
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Intelligence did NOT make the difference,whatever the lobby of BP may say .

"Many factors are involved in the final outcome of the war and Ultra is only one of them ."

Jerry Russell in "Ultra and the campaign against the U -Boats in WWII."
 
We can turn it around, if the German intelligence had been better, the Allied had lost much more ships and men. If the German intelligence had worked and had the knowledge about Normandy before it happened. The Russians might have acted differently if they had believed the warnings about the attack in June 1941. if the Americans had known about the attack in December 1944, the outcome and the losses might have been different, but they didn't. The intelligence regardless if it's Humint or signal makes the difference. During the Second world war, the communication equipment was not that good in comparison with today. There was a delay between receiving the intel, evaluate the intel and send it to the field commanders. At the same time not telling the enemy their communications are compromised.

The B Dienst of the KM was good, but good intelligence does not mean that the Allies would lose more ships .

If the German intelligence had been better about D Day, the outcome would have been identical : better intelligence does not produce more divisions .

If US had more information about Wacht am Rhein, the outcome would have been the same : Eisenhower was not a magician who could bring out new divisions with a snap of his fingers : his strategical reserve consisted of 2 divisions : 82 and 101.

For Barbarossa, it was the same : the situation of the Red Army was that bad,that a serious early warning would make no difference .There was no reason for the Stavka to believe anything the Soviet spies were telling: most of it was unreliable gossip .
 

Yes and the Germans poured in thru the Ardennes soundly defeating the French. The French refused to believe the Germans could bring AFV thru the forest.


Yes and this greatly assisted the allies in taking of the Normandy beaches. “For which you should be grateful”. In the case of Normandy an elaborate disinformation scheme was created to convince the Germans the attack would occur in the Pas de Calais. General Patton himself was keep in reserve to head up these much forces along with mock AFV jeeps etc.



Hitler and OKH ignored all the intelligence (what else is new) and decided the Reds would attack the Romanian oil fields despite the massive buildup.



So what’s your point these are all cases where the defenders lost by either ignoring intelligence or being deceived by intelligence.

1) NO : the French did not refuse to believe that the Germans could move AFV through the Ardennes.They expected the Germans to go through the Ardennes,and they expected that they could stop them at the Meuse.

2) NO : Fortitude had no influence on German strategy :the German mobile divisions were stationned south of the Seine, because with what Normandy had, it could not prevent a landing .Thus, the Pas de Calais would have to do with was available .


3) NO : FHO was convinced of an attack against AGNU,not against the Romanian oil fields,which were protected by AG South Ukraine .

But , it were not the informations of FHO which decided the Germans to "give" the mobile divisions to AGNU,but,because a successful attack against AGNU was more dangerous than an attack against AGC .Such an attack,with direction north,would be more dangerous than an attack against AG C.

See Germany and WWII Tome VIII P 514 .
 
Intelligence did NOT make the difference,whatever the lobby of BP may say .

"Many factors are involved in the final outcome of the war and Ultra is only one of them ."

Jerry Russell in "Ultra and the campaign against the U -Boats in WWII."

We are now discussing the intelligence and its contribution to the final outcome, but you don't understand the significance of having the intelligence working for you, I guess you never will. If you had any training you would be able to draw your own conclusions from what you read.
 
The B Dienst of the KM was good, but good intelligence does not mean that the Allies would lose more ships .

If the German intelligence had been better about D Day, the outcome would have been identical : better intelligence does not produce more divisions .

If US had more information about Wacht am Rhein, the outcome would have been the same : Eisenhower was not a magician who could bring out new divisions with a snap of his fingers : his strategical reserve consisted of 2 divisions : 82 and 101.

For Barbarossa, it was the same : the situation of the Red Army was that bad,that a serious early warning would make no difference .There was no reason for the Stavka to believe anything the Soviet spies were telling: most of it was unreliable gossip .

This is a confirmation; you don't understand anything. If the commanders and the leaders get the information about certain events, they will react on it.
 
This is a confirmation; you don't understand anything. If the commanders and the leaders get the information about certain events, they will react on it.

Meaningless and questionable answer .

If commanders get information about certain events, they will react IF they believe the information and as far as possible : their reaction will depend on what they can do and this will depend on the strength of their forces .

For Barbarossa,there was no reason to believe the informations, and,besides there was nothing the Soviets could do .

Thus the informations were not important .
 
You are an idiot, Froggy is an ex active service Royal Marine Captain who knows more regarding intelligence work then you will ever know, unlike you, he's seen the elephant where proper intelligence is important to carry out the operation being tasked with, and saving the lives of those under one's command.

You are talking like a complete and total knob head.

As usual you miss the point (the opposite would be a surprise) : we are not discusing what he was saying, but something totally different : the importance of Ultra on the U-Boat war and the claim from a poster that the importance was decisive,that Ultra shortened the war .
 
1) NO : the French did not refuse to believe that the Germans could move AFV through the Ardennes. They expected the Germans to go through the Ardennes,and they expected that they could stop them at the Meuse.
2) NO : Fortitude had no influence on German strategy :the German mobile divisions were stationned south of the Seine, because with what Normandy had, it could not prevent a landing .Thus, the Pas de Calais would have to do with was available .


3) NO : FHO was convinced of an attack against AGNU,not against the Romanian oil fields,which were protected by AG South Ukraine .

But , it were not the informations of FHO which decided the Germans to "give" the mobile divisions to AGNU,but,because a successful attack against AGNU was more dangerous than an attack against AGC .Such an attack,with direction north,would be more dangerous than an attack against AG C.

See Germany and WWII Tome VIII P 514 .
1) Wrong: Yes he French expected a repeat of the Von Shlieffen plan, not an attack thru the rugged Ardennes forest.

2) Wrong: yes the mock allied army (Operation Fortitude) setup in the south of England helped to convince Hitler that the attack would occur in the Pas de Calais. This was an elaborate plan and highly successful plan of disinformation for the enemy. As a result most of the German forces were either stated at the Pas de Calais or held in reserve. This was called Patton’s phantom army and was one of history’s prime examples of disinformation being used successfully for intelligence. The Germans fell for hook line and sinker.

3) Wrong: Yes This is why a greater number of panzer and SS divisions were moved to AGS thus stripping AGC of vitally needed resources while they faces the blunt of operation Bagration. General Busch was woefully under equipped to meet the Red offensive. By the time the reinforcements arrived and Field marshal Model was in charge it was too late the momentum was lost as was the battle.
 
I disagree that it would definitively change things :there are no proofs in WWII from battles were intelligence changed the outcome .There were battles where A knew the intentions of B and lost,and there were battles where A did not know the intentions of B and won .





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Worth a try....
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