Dowding's Costly Blunder in the Battle of France - Page 5




 
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November 22nd, 2011  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by samneanderthal
The Germans had not produced nearly 15,000 88 mm FLAK by 1942 and many were abroad, so the number in Germany has to be closer to half as many in 1942. But you are right, there were never nearly enough 88 mm and 105 mm weapons in the URSS, Africa, Italy, etc, Which only reinforces my low opinion of the Soviet and British generals being defeated by ridiculous numbers of artillery, tanks, etc,

I try to keep as broad a view as possible but find extremely interesting the effect of decades of brain washing on the Russians and British, who pretty much worship Stalin, Zhukov, etc, or Churchill, Dowding, Montgomery, etc, respectively, despite their obviously dismal performance.

Let me put it differently, had Churchill not wasted a fortune building slow, 4 engine bombers, more deadly to the British crews and German children than to German industry, but produced enough fighters and ground support planes, he would have wiped out the axis from Africa and Sicily with minimum tank and personel losses a year before the Americans had to come in to do it for him. He would have also kicked the Japs out of Burma late in 1942, allowing supplies to feed and equip millions of Chinese soldiers, which reinforced by Indian and American troops would have kicked the Japs out of the continent and allowed the Americans to bomb and blockade Japan in 1943 from a short distance, instead of in 1944 from a very long distance and after having to conquer a lot of useless islands. Had Stalin produced much better generals, planes and pilots and half as many tanks, he would have gained air superiority and wiped out the German tanks without having to make 36,000 Sturmoviks. Only the Americans understood the paramount importance of making high quality planes in large numbres to win the war.
A lot of nonsens
November 22nd, 2011  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by samneanderthal
The Polish submarine Orzel sank the first German ship in Norway, the 5,300 ton Rio de Janeiro, killing hundreds of troops and preventing scarce 105 mm AA guns and 20 mm guns and supplies from arriving in Norway. The Nowegian coastal batteries sank the German heavy Cruiser Blücher, etc, I call that help. The Polish had excellent, fast destroyers that performed stirling service throughout the war escorting convoys, etc, Read at least a little before you start barking that everything is false or wrong.
Coastal batteries is not the same as a fleet.
The number of Polish destroyers is negligible
November 22nd, 2011  
Seehund
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by samneanderthal
Bombing never demoralized anybody. The Blitz united the British, as the allied bombing forced the Germans to fight harder (troops preferred to remain at the front, rather than going home to destroyed cities).
"The morale of the German people deteriorated under aerial attack. Fire was most effective in destroying workers dwellings and had the greatest impression on the general morale. The night raids were feared far more than daylight raids. The people lost faith in the prospect of victory, in their leaders and in the promises and propaganda to which they were subjected. Most of all, they wanted the war to end. They resorted increasingly to "black radio'' listening, to circulation of rumor and fact in opposition to the Regime; and there was some increase in active political dissidence -- in 1944 one German in every thousand was arrested for a political offense. If they had been at liberty to vote themselves out of the war, they would have done so well before the final surrender. In a determined police state, however, there is a wide difference between dissatisfaction and expressed opposition. Although examination of official records and those of individual plants shows that absenteeism increased and productivity diminished somewhat in the late stages of the war, by and large workers continued to work. However dissatisfied they were with the war, the German people lacked either the will or the means to make their dissatisfaction evident."

Albert Speer

Quote:
Originally Posted by samneanderthal
Germany produced more in 1943 and 44 during the massive bombing campaigns.
Production during the month following the attacks was actually higher than it had been in the months preceding them. One of the main reasons for the increase in war production was the transfer of all production authority to my ministry. I mobilized unused capacity and undamaged machines, reorganized inefficient managements, reduced the number of models produced, and subdivided production into small units that were virtually immune to attack. The raids on the aircraft industry in early 1944 caused serious anxiety and doubt, however, in this case it became evident that our industry was more elastic than had been assumed and our anxieties lessoned.

Albert Speer

The Allies underestimated the effects that Speer’s reorganization had on production and slighted the impact of substitution. Information was inadequate to produce reliable macroeconomic analysis, let alone the comprehensive microeconomic analysis required for strategic interdiction by precision bombing.

Quote:
Originally Posted by samneanderthal
I shouldn't have written millions, Churchill wasted billions of dollars, thousands of planes and tens of thousands of British crewmen in murderous but strategically useless bombing without escort planes.........
Only the daytime bombings with escort planes in 1944 made any sense.
The city area raids have left their mark on the German people as well as on their cities. Far more than any other military action that preceded the actual occupation of Germany itself, these attacks left the German people with a solid lesson in the disadvantages of war. It was a terrible lesson; conceivably that lesson, both in Germany and abroad, could be the most lasting single effect of the air war. The mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazi control they showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means of production remained. The power of a police state over its people cannot be underestimated.

Strategic bombing remains controversial because of the difficulty in proving its effectiveness. Success cannot be determined simply in terms of physical damage. Evaluating the effect on vital targets requires analysis of the entire enemy system and the impact is not often immediately apparent. The invasion of Europe was the dominant element in the Allies plan. The role of strategic bombing was to establish air superiority before the invasion, and to substantially weaken the enemy’s will and capacity to resist. In this respect, bombing was successful in a complementary role by contributing to winning air supremacy, setting the conditions for an invasion, and assisting in winning land battles.

During the war, Allied military and civilian leaders conceived four strategies to defeat Germany, all of which depended heavily on strategic airpower. The first was the industrial web strategy, which would use precision attacks on key economic bottlenecks to cripple the German economy as a whole, fatally weakening the social and political cohesion needed for resistance. The second strategy, strategic interdiction, would also use precision bombing but would focus on industries critical to war production rather than seek a general economic collapse. The third strategy followed a Douhet pattern of using area incendiary bombing of population centers. All three approaches aimed to break German resistance through airpower alone, so that a cross-Channel invasion would be either unnecessary or a reasonably easy undertaking against an already beaten foe. The fourth strategy aimed at destroying the German army through the combined weight of Soviet and Western ground offensives. Strategic airpower would support this strategy through operational interdiction attacks designed to have a direct and immediate impact on ground operations.

British area bombing strategy came about as an operational necessity and in response to events. The subsequent transition to night operations required large target areas due to the lack of visibility, navigational aides, and accurate bombsights. Additionally, the British government felt pressured to retaliate against German cities for damage suffered during the Battle of Britain.

"The catastrophic losses inflicted on such cities as Cologne, Hamburg, and Dresden shocked the entire German people. The first attack on Hamburg in August 1943 made an extra-ordinary impression,” Albert Speer recalled. “We were of the opinion that a rapid repetition of this type of attack on another six German towns would inevitably cripple the will to sustain armaments manufacture and war production and might bring about a rapid end to the war. However, the raids were not repeated soon enough or with the same weight, and in the meantime it became possible for the civilian population to adapt themselves.”

In summary, the city attacks by the RAF alone did not substantially affect the course of the war. However, one cannot dismiss the direct and indirect effects of the British area bombing offensive quite so easily. The raids on oil facilities helped clear the skies of German aircraft and its contribution to the transportation offensive paved the way for the successful allied invasion and continued push toward Germany. The indirect effects caused changes in the conduct of the German lives and brought the horror of modern war to their doorsteps. It brought about a change in German production requirements that required a shift to an increased emphasis on fighters and the attempt to develop new technologies in the form of the V-2 bombs and jet aircraft to combat the assault. It forced the diversion of a large segment of Germany’s work force to the unending task of reconstruction of bombed factories and public utilities, engaging a million and a half workers. The bombing served to open a second front in the West. Together with the American bomber effort, the British Bomber Command forced the Luftwaffe to keep the bulk of its strength in Germany for defense, thus limiting German airpower on the Russian front and weakening the German army effectiveness. British area bombing then undoubtedly hampered the German effort in much more than a marginal way.
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November 22nd, 2011  
lljadw
 
This is the "strength" of the Polish navy on 1 september 1939
4 destroyers
5 submarines (of which 3 were interned in Sueden)
7 mine layers and mine sweepers .
Some of these ships were lost in september.
If someone is saying that these ships were a big reinforcement for the British Navy,he is talking nonsens .
November 22nd, 2011  
lljadw
 
Another exemple of crap (it seems it is crap time) :Post 27:
only the daytime bombing with escort planes in 1944 made any sense.
This is implying,that,before 1944,there were no daytime bombings with escort planes.
Eagle in flame II(by Hooton ) P 278
Allied DAY operations against Western Europe in 1943
8 AF bombers :7147 sorties
Bomber Command :6578 sorties
Escort fighters :
Fighter Command (Fighters and Bombers) :80.384
USAAF:12749
November 22nd, 2011  
BritinAfrica
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
It is funny that at some point the rivalry between Bader and Park must have ended though as Douglas Bader said of him “the awesome responsibility for this country’s survival rested squarely on Keith Park’s shoulders. British military history of this century has been enriched with the names of great fighting men from New Zealand, of all ranks and in every one of our services. Keith Park’s name is carved into history alongside those of his peers.”

Perhaps he mellowed with age?
From what I understand Bader was arrogant and obnoxious till the end of his life. Not a very nice chap at all.

Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
When you look at the Battle of Britain and how many pilots from the Commonwealth, USA and Occupied territories took part and the impact they made you do have to wonder whether Britain could have done it alone.
As it was, it was a close run thing, I very much doubt if Britain could have done it without the help of those from outside Britain.
November 22nd, 2011  
VDKMS
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by BritinAfrica
As it was, it was a close run thing, I very much doubt if Britain could have done it without the help of those from outside Britain.
I would say it this way : every help was welcome.
November 22nd, 2011  
BritinAfrica
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by VDKMS
I would say it this way : every help was welcome.
Bloody right it was.
November 22nd, 2011  
samneanderthal
 
The red bulbs to which Churchill refers during the attack on 15 September, 1940 showed the planes in the sector under Parks control, not all the planes in Britain. Of course all the few planes in the sector were engaged intercepting the German bombers. However, Dowding always kept at least half the planes in Britain in reserve, whether they were in North or West West Anglia, Wales or Scotland.
November 22nd, 2011  
VDKMS
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by samneanderthal
The red bulbs to which Churchill refers during the attack on 15 September, 1940 showed the planes in the sector under Parks control, not all the planes in Britain. Of course all the few planes in the sector were engaged intercepting the German bombers. However, Dowding always kept at least half the planes in Britain in reserve, whether they were in North or West West Anglia, Wales or Scotland.
You do not go into battle with everything you got unless it is necessary.
Do not forget that they were expecting a German invasion in which case they had to throw everything they got at it.
 


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