It was a doomed effort that denied the Germans all their typical war winning tactics and mobility as they became bogged down in the 9 concentric rings of Red defensives. The Kurst bulge was bristling with countess land mines, anti tank traps, hidden armor and artillery. All waiting for the German attack by the time July rolled around. The Soviets had known the German battle plan and played their card right. The spy ring Lucy gave them intelligence as well as other sources so they were confident of the German offensive battle plan. The Soviets had months to build up the Kurst Bulge. The Soviets started the buildup in spring. By the time of the attack in July the Soviets had including reserves 1.6 million men 3,400 tanks and 2,700 planes in the Kursk bulge. The Germans had 900,000 men 2,700 tanks 2000 planes. So they were outnumbered going against strong well prepared - entrenched defensives.
In the North despite viscous battles Models forces quickly became bogged down after very small gains. However in the South in a larger battle Mansteins forces broke through and had the Red army was on the run. Hausser continued his advance onto Prokhorovka. Zhukov had to call in Rotmistrov 5th Guards tank army which was being held in reserve. They meet Haussers SS panzer divions at Prokhorovka. Here an epic armor clash took place with the Germans. Germans lost > 300 tanks and the Soviets > 700 that day with no clear cut winner. Hitler called off the offensive and stripped the Panzers of tanks for the invasion of Sicily. Manstein claims he could have given the Soviet army enough of a beating as to delay - eliminate their ability to go on the offensive that summer if allowed to continue. Not the initial goal but an alternate partial victory. That’s speculation however and the Soviets did go on the offensive. They won back what they lost and went back on the offensive and immediately retook the cities of Belgorod and Orel. The Germans and Soviets were both highly motivated as Hitler made known t the troops “you are taking part in a battle that can alter the course of the war” which it did.
The problem was the Germans waited too long to attack (July). As they waited for the new panther tanks and Ferdinand’s. Both had teething issues and played but a small role in the battle.
This allowed for the above mentioned buildup that proved virtually insurmountable and didn’t allow the Germans to fight in a manner that typically resulted in victory
Some corrections:
1)The Germans did not wait to long,because this is implying they could attack earlier,which is not so : the SS PzK was committed,although it had in july only 50 % of its tanks :the second Pz batallion of the divisions still was in Germany .
2) the time of the war winning tactics was over : in fact : these never existed
3) The role of the Lucy spyring is mostly a post war myth
4)your strength figures are inflated and incomplet:
SU:1.425.000 men,4900 tanks and StuG,artillery:31000,aircraft :3600
Germany:625000,2700 tanks and STuG,artillery:9500,aircraft : 1350
Source of these rough figures : Germany and WWII Tome VIII
5)There was NOTHING special on Prokhorovka ,the importance of which has been deliberatedly inflated by both parties after the war ; it was a Soviet attack,which failed,with considerable losses,because of the incompetence of the Soviet commander .But,it had no influence on the outcome of Citadelle .
The Germans committed 2 divisions with 186 Pz and StuG and lost 235 men and a few tanks.
The Soviets committed 838 tanks and lost 522 tanks and 3563 men .
There was nothing epic on Prokhorovka.
6 )Already during Citadelle,the Soviets started their counter-offensives,and,this caused the abandonment of Citadelle : not the landing on Sicily
7)Citadelle did not alter the course of the war:the German losses were marginal,the Soviet losses were higher,but they could afford them easily .