Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Wall Street Journal
December 26, 2006
Pg. 1
By Greg Jaffe
As the debate over U.S. policy in Iraq rages among top officials in Baghdad and Washington, lower-level American commanders preparing for tours of duty in that country are developing their own strategies for tamping down the violence there.
Their efforts are unrelated to the review of U.S. military strategy the Bush administration has pursued over the past two months amid growing public frustration with the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. In contrast to the wider rethinking of the war, military commanders preparing for Iraq are focused far more intently on local and regional problems in the deeply fragmented country.
Their approach spotlights the reality on the ground in Iraq, where U.S. troops, depending on where they are stationed, can face radically different challenges -- and even different enemies. The shifting mix defies cookie-cutter strategies and solutions, U.S. commanders say.
The Bush administration's review in Washington has focused, among other things, on whether to flood as many as 20,000 to 30,000 new U.S. troops into Baghdad and restive al Anbar province in an effort to stem sectarian bloodshed. Administration officials are also weighing whether to shift the main focus of U.S. troops from direct combat and patrols to advising and training Iraqi security forces.
Preparations at Camp Lejeune, N.C., show how the lower-level reviews are putting greater emphasis on some of the local and regional woes American troops will confront in the field.
U.S. Marines at the base are targeting economic and governance problems that have helped make al Anbar province in western Iraq a major haven for insurgents. Their goals for the province include building a better regional police force, jump-starting the economy, restarting a few key factories, improving utilities and fashioning a functioning provincial government in an area where members of the governing council have been too intimidated by insurgents to meet.
"We see the fight as much bigger than just the military and security piece," says Brig. Gen. John Allen, a deputy commander with the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, which includes about 29,000 Marines.
Sunni-dominated al Anbar remains the country's most volatile province and produces more U.S. casualties than almost any other area. In contrast to Baghdad, which has been roiled by sectarian fighting between Sunnis and Shiites, most of the violence in al Anbar involves Sunni attacks on U.S. forces, and Iraqi soldiers and police. It has been the primary haven for al Qaeda in Iraq.
Now, American officials in Washington and Iraq think they may be seeing some initial signs that Sunni leaders in al Anbar are growing weary of the violence, and are starting to push their people to cooperate with -- and even join -- local police forces. Success in this area would be a significant bright spot in an otherwise dreary Iraq picture.
Senior American military officials in Washington and Baghdad have given commanders in the field great freedom to chart their own course in their sector of Iraq. "There has got to be significant latitude for commanders to adjust as it makes sense," says Gen. Allen.
The Marine strategy for al Anbar is an outgrowth of the deep distrust most of the province's one million Sunnis feel toward the Shiite-led government in Baghdad. Locals see the national government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, as little more than a puppet of Shiite-dominated Iran.
One Marine official says that al Anbar residents often complain that Mr. Maliki has visited Iran but has never visited al Anbar in his own country. Many in the province view the Sunni insurgents and even al Qaeda in Iraq as their only defense against Shiite militias and the central government in Baghdad.
To try to win over the populace, the Marines have been working hard with the local tribal leaders to build a police force made up of local residents. That strategy is in marked contrast to the one U.S. officials are pursuing in the Iraqi capital. In Baghdad, officials have shifted attention and resources away from building up the police -- which have been infiltrated by Shiite militias and death squads -- in favor of beefing up the Iraqi army.
The Marines in al Anbar say they have gained some ground in recruiting Sunnis for the police. However, their progress has been slowed by a severe shortage of U.S. military advisory teams that are supposed to live with and train police, a Marine official says.
The Marines also are looking for new ways to help the war-ravaged local economy. Most of al Anbar's business leaders have fled to neighboring Jordan and Syria, and unemployment in the province is well above 60%.
In recent weeks, the Marines preparing to go to al Anbar have brought in economic-development experts to talk with them about microlending as a means of jump-starting small businesses. Microlenders provide small loans to would-be entrepreneurs who can't secure traditional financing. Loan recipients typically open shops or craft businesses, helping to bolster the local economy.
"The legitimate economy in al Anbar is dominated by local businesses that employ eight to 15 people," says Col. John Koenig, who is overseeing economic development and governance planning. Only about $250,000 has been allocated from the U.S. government's multibillion-dollar Iraq reconstruction budget for microlending efforts in al Anbar, but Marine officials are hopeful that will grow.
Marine commanders also have brought in experts from the Agriculture Department to teach them about date farming, the honey industry and wheat, three of the province's agricultural mainstays.
One of the Marines' priorities in al Anbar will be getting a phosphate plant that has been idle since the 2003 invasion up and running, potentially providing hundreds of new jobs. To prepare for that challenge, Gen. Allen toured a major phosphate plant in North Carolina last month.
Other Marine officials have spent November and December visiting electrical and sewage plants in the state to better understand their workings. "We have tested the outer limits of applying a military solution in al Anbar," says Col. Koenig. "We need to make progress in economic development and governance to succeed."
The Marines' focus on economic development in al Anbar reflects the Army and Marine Corps' new counterinsurgency doctrine, which stresses that in such wars 80% of the effort should be along political and economic lines and only 20% should be military.
Their efforts, however, come at a time when money for rebuilding increasingly is drying up. The U.S. has set aside $38 billion for reconstruction in Iraq. Most of that money has been spent. And although the Bush administration's emergency supplemental budget request for Iraq and Afghanistan is likely to dwarf last year's $120 billion request, the sum available for reconstruction isn't likely to grow much.
"We certainly recognize there is less money than in the past, and that is going to have to make us more selective," Col. Koenig says.
The Marines also recognize that figuring out a solution in al Anbar rests largely on their ability to work with the people of western Iraq and their local leaders. "There is no single integrated master plan. It is all on us working together with the Iraqis," Col. Koenig says. "Stabilizing a country like Iraq is long, slow hard work."
December 26, 2006
Pg. 1
By Greg Jaffe
As the debate over U.S. policy in Iraq rages among top officials in Baghdad and Washington, lower-level American commanders preparing for tours of duty in that country are developing their own strategies for tamping down the violence there.
Their efforts are unrelated to the review of U.S. military strategy the Bush administration has pursued over the past two months amid growing public frustration with the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. In contrast to the wider rethinking of the war, military commanders preparing for Iraq are focused far more intently on local and regional problems in the deeply fragmented country.
Their approach spotlights the reality on the ground in Iraq, where U.S. troops, depending on where they are stationed, can face radically different challenges -- and even different enemies. The shifting mix defies cookie-cutter strategies and solutions, U.S. commanders say.
The Bush administration's review in Washington has focused, among other things, on whether to flood as many as 20,000 to 30,000 new U.S. troops into Baghdad and restive al Anbar province in an effort to stem sectarian bloodshed. Administration officials are also weighing whether to shift the main focus of U.S. troops from direct combat and patrols to advising and training Iraqi security forces.
Preparations at Camp Lejeune, N.C., show how the lower-level reviews are putting greater emphasis on some of the local and regional woes American troops will confront in the field.
U.S. Marines at the base are targeting economic and governance problems that have helped make al Anbar province in western Iraq a major haven for insurgents. Their goals for the province include building a better regional police force, jump-starting the economy, restarting a few key factories, improving utilities and fashioning a functioning provincial government in an area where members of the governing council have been too intimidated by insurgents to meet.
"We see the fight as much bigger than just the military and security piece," says Brig. Gen. John Allen, a deputy commander with the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, which includes about 29,000 Marines.
Sunni-dominated al Anbar remains the country's most volatile province and produces more U.S. casualties than almost any other area. In contrast to Baghdad, which has been roiled by sectarian fighting between Sunnis and Shiites, most of the violence in al Anbar involves Sunni attacks on U.S. forces, and Iraqi soldiers and police. It has been the primary haven for al Qaeda in Iraq.
Now, American officials in Washington and Iraq think they may be seeing some initial signs that Sunni leaders in al Anbar are growing weary of the violence, and are starting to push their people to cooperate with -- and even join -- local police forces. Success in this area would be a significant bright spot in an otherwise dreary Iraq picture.
Senior American military officials in Washington and Baghdad have given commanders in the field great freedom to chart their own course in their sector of Iraq. "There has got to be significant latitude for commanders to adjust as it makes sense," says Gen. Allen.
The Marine strategy for al Anbar is an outgrowth of the deep distrust most of the province's one million Sunnis feel toward the Shiite-led government in Baghdad. Locals see the national government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, as little more than a puppet of Shiite-dominated Iran.
One Marine official says that al Anbar residents often complain that Mr. Maliki has visited Iran but has never visited al Anbar in his own country. Many in the province view the Sunni insurgents and even al Qaeda in Iraq as their only defense against Shiite militias and the central government in Baghdad.
To try to win over the populace, the Marines have been working hard with the local tribal leaders to build a police force made up of local residents. That strategy is in marked contrast to the one U.S. officials are pursuing in the Iraqi capital. In Baghdad, officials have shifted attention and resources away from building up the police -- which have been infiltrated by Shiite militias and death squads -- in favor of beefing up the Iraqi army.
The Marines in al Anbar say they have gained some ground in recruiting Sunnis for the police. However, their progress has been slowed by a severe shortage of U.S. military advisory teams that are supposed to live with and train police, a Marine official says.
The Marines also are looking for new ways to help the war-ravaged local economy. Most of al Anbar's business leaders have fled to neighboring Jordan and Syria, and unemployment in the province is well above 60%.
In recent weeks, the Marines preparing to go to al Anbar have brought in economic-development experts to talk with them about microlending as a means of jump-starting small businesses. Microlenders provide small loans to would-be entrepreneurs who can't secure traditional financing. Loan recipients typically open shops or craft businesses, helping to bolster the local economy.
"The legitimate economy in al Anbar is dominated by local businesses that employ eight to 15 people," says Col. John Koenig, who is overseeing economic development and governance planning. Only about $250,000 has been allocated from the U.S. government's multibillion-dollar Iraq reconstruction budget for microlending efforts in al Anbar, but Marine officials are hopeful that will grow.
Marine commanders also have brought in experts from the Agriculture Department to teach them about date farming, the honey industry and wheat, three of the province's agricultural mainstays.
One of the Marines' priorities in al Anbar will be getting a phosphate plant that has been idle since the 2003 invasion up and running, potentially providing hundreds of new jobs. To prepare for that challenge, Gen. Allen toured a major phosphate plant in North Carolina last month.
Other Marine officials have spent November and December visiting electrical and sewage plants in the state to better understand their workings. "We have tested the outer limits of applying a military solution in al Anbar," says Col. Koenig. "We need to make progress in economic development and governance to succeed."
The Marines' focus on economic development in al Anbar reflects the Army and Marine Corps' new counterinsurgency doctrine, which stresses that in such wars 80% of the effort should be along political and economic lines and only 20% should be military.
Their efforts, however, come at a time when money for rebuilding increasingly is drying up. The U.S. has set aside $38 billion for reconstruction in Iraq. Most of that money has been spent. And although the Bush administration's emergency supplemental budget request for Iraq and Afghanistan is likely to dwarf last year's $120 billion request, the sum available for reconstruction isn't likely to grow much.
"We certainly recognize there is less money than in the past, and that is going to have to make us more selective," Col. Koenig says.
The Marines also recognize that figuring out a solution in al Anbar rests largely on their ability to work with the people of western Iraq and their local leaders. "There is no single integrated master plan. It is all on us working together with the Iraqis," Col. Koenig says. "Stabilizing a country like Iraq is long, slow hard work."