British military tactics during WWI

Ted

Active member
I've done some reading on World War I and it amazed me that the British high command was so slow on the uptake of new tactics. You would expect that after 4 years of mass slaughter and the German adaption with their "Stosstrupen", that they would change like wise. After 4 years of getting mowed down by the thousands you expect a bit more participation or imagination.

So can anybody tell me if there was a certain reason why Kitcheren, Haig and compagny were so unimaginative or unwilling to change?
 
I feel most likely they were like France in WWII, their militaries were controlled by oldmen who didn't trust new tactics and decided to stick with the tactics that worked in the past.

That's just my opinion however.
 
Ted said:
I've done some reading on World War I and it amazed me that the British high command was so slow on the uptake of new tactics. You would expect that after 4 years of mass slaughter and the German adaption with their "Stosstrupen", that they would change like wise. After 4 years of getting mowed down by the thousands you expect a bit more participation or imagination.
The "Stosstrupen" only became a major feature in German attacks in the spring of 1918, before then, German attacks had been similar to the Allied ones.
Also while the " Stosstrupen" was an effective tactic, it was still costly in human terms. The German army suffered nearly a million casualties in the last year of the war
So can anybody tell me if there was a certain reason why Kitcheren, Haig and compagny were so unimaginative or unwilling to change?
They weren't.
Don't forget, it was the Allies who introduced the tank into the battlefield, while the German High Command dismissed it as a toy, until it was too late.
The allies also became far more effective in the use of artillery during WW1, especially the British. In fact at the end of WW1, British artillery was considered the best of all the nations involved.
While Haig can be rightfully criticized for his attacks in 1916-17, his handling of the British forces in the German spring attack in 1918, and the British counter attack in the 'Hundred Days Campaign' was excellent.

This is why modern historians have such a difficult time with Haig. In 1916-17 he was indeed a 'Donkey leading Lions', but in 1918, he actually lead the British army quite skillfully.
 
Do you have any books that you can recommend Redcoat? I keep finding out that I am short on my knowledge of the WWI.
 
By the end of the of WW1 the new tactics had started to come through. If read about the British assault in the Hindenburg Line, then you can see the start of the modern day tactics. Things would start of with a rolling barrage with the troops advancing about 50 to 100 yards behind the barrage. They would be supported with tanks, while squadrons of aircraft would also be strafing the trenches to wards the rear and attacking any reserve troops being sent up to reinforce the front lines. In two weeks the British troops had completely smashed through these lines which were supposed to be impregnable. When these lies fell Germany then sued for peace.
During the first few years of the war, there was not the tanks available , nor had any new tactics been thought out of dealing with this stalemate. Due to length of the front you could not flank it and had to attack it it head on, more often or not this was done to relieve the pressure on the French
 
A couple of issues:

1) German WWI tactics were based heavily on Bruchmüller's effective use of controlled artillery bursts and amalgamated with the fluid use of reserves...ie. a flexible defensive system.

2) The tank only played a propaganda role in WWI. They were too slow, broke down too quickly, and artillery or standard infantry tactics ripped them to shreds. That is the primary reason why the German high command decided against their usage.

3) The rolling barrage is not part of modern tactics. Controlled short artillery bursts are.

4) The British did not defeat the German military in WWI (or WWII). They were part of a massive alliance. One battle (even Amiens) did not decide matters. In WWI, Ludendorf decided to pack it in because of the impossibility of defeating the Allies over the long run. Over 3/4 of the German military however remained intact on the western front at the time of armistice. The war would have dragged on for a few more years given (a) German determination to continue the fight, (2) an end to starvation in Germany, (3) the transfer of all German troops from eastern Europe.

Ollie Garchy
 
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The Tank was an effective weapon, it failed on the Somme due to the mud, but in Cambrai it showed what it could do. The German tanks were far to heavy with to many guns and were even slower than the English tanks which made them an easy target. Also just because the German Army threw in the towel in 1918, it did this because it could no longer hold it's position. Yes it was not only Britain that had brought this about, it was a full Allied effort.
 
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Ollie Garchy said:
4) The British did not defeat the German military in WWI (or WWII).
No one has claimed they did. They merely mentioned Britains involvement in defeating the German Spring offensive of 1918, and Britains leading role in the allied attacks during the 'Campaign of a Hundred Days'
They were part of a massive alliance. One battle (even Amiens) did not decide matters. In WWI, Ludendorf decided to pack it in because of the impossibility of defeating the Allies over the long run.
Not quite true. Ludendorp packed it in, not because he knew thay couldn't defeat the Allies, but because he knew they were incapable of stopping the Allied advance
Over 3/4 of the German military however remained intact on the western front at the time of armistice. The war would have dragged on for a few more years given (a) German determination to continue the fight, (2) an end to starvation in Germany, (3) the transfer of all German troops from eastern Europe.
Ollie Garchy
Not years, months at the most.
At the time of the Germans asking for the armistice they had already lost all of their allies. Turkey and A/H had already collapsed and sued for peace. With the American army coming on to the battlefield in greater numbers each passing day, Germany was doomed.
 
My quick response:

(1) Ludendorf considered Amiens to have been catastrophic. He was however referring more to the collapse of German morale within the ranks and in Germany itself. I do not really want to touch this subject, but I will. It would make for a good thread. The postwar German stab-in-the-back "myth" always included the military component. That is, it is obvious that the war would have continued had German troops not surrendered in large numbers. Troop morale counts. The issue is why German soldiers surrendered.

(2) The Allies had pushed Turkey to the limit. The A-H Empire caved in for political reasons. Remember however that the Germans had defeated Russia in 1917. And the French military experienced the mutinies of 1917/1918. France, like the A-H Empire, was essentially neutralized. These points are often overlooked. The Allies did NOT have overwhelming power in 1918. That is why politicians chose to end the war with an armistice. After 1918, Germany (now the stab-in-the-back got really bloody) went through a civil war that permitted the Allies (particularly the French losers) to extract maximum concessions. German conservatives looked on these events and were convinced that the socialists had defeated Germany or completely eroded any platform on which to negotiate. (Hitler, mainly due to his twisted "education" in Vienna, blamed the Jews...God, what a "sorry-ass" conclusion to a complex question).

[On the side: This last subpoint makes me sick! If any of the neo-nazi freaks actually looked into the subject, they would realize that the Jewish-Germans fought with valour and fervour. Jewish scientists like Fritz Haber actually let their nationalism get the better of their logic. The chemist pressured the German military to unleash the first chlorine gas attack during the war and remained a hard supporter of chemical warfare until his death. Jewish support for Germany during WWI speaks volumes about Prussia/Germany.]

To get back to the subject, I have a hard time writing anything positive about British tactics during the WWI/WWII era. The country did not attach enough importance to the academic methodology of a general staff. Nor did London really sponsor the study of operations until WWII -- at least not in the German sense. The Germans, who profitted from the development of the staff concept during the Napoleonic wars, used historical data to develop and refine their tactics and operational art. They studied war like chemistry or engineering. They developed models, wargamed, and used simulations to extrapolate a solution. The British (in my opinion) fought war in a manner that mirrored the rigid class structures that so hampered every aspect of their society during the latter phases of industrialization. The affluent studied literature and the classics or Latin instead of chemistry or war. The workingmen were considered uneducated oafs. These men, the "simple" guys developing and maintaining factory equipment, proved more important that a million snobs with a good knowledge of Homer or Shakespeare.

Ollie Garchy
 
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To get back to the subject, I have a hard time writing anything positive about British tactics during the WWI/WWII era. The country did not attach enough importance to the academic methodology of a general staff. Nor did London really sponsor the study of operations until WWII -- at least not in the German sense. The Germans, who profitted from the development of the staff concept during the Napoleonic wars, used historical data to develop and refine their tactics and operational art. They studied war like chemistry or engineering. They developed models, wargamed, and used simulations to extrapolate a solution. The British (in my opinion) fought war in a manner that mirrored the rigid class structures that so hampered every aspect of their society during the latter phases of industrialization. The affluent studied literature and the classics or Latin instead of chemistry or war. The workingmen were considered uneducated oafs. These men, the "simple" guys developing and maintaining factory equipment, proved more important that a million snobs with a good knowledge of Homer or Shakespeare.

This was my initial stance and the reason for starting this thread. Thanks for voicing my thoughts in a more coherent way.
 
Ollie Garchy said:
(2) The Allies had pushed Turkey to the limit. The A-H Empire caved in for political reasons. Remember however that the Germans had defeated Russia in 1917. And the French military experienced the mutinies of 1917/1918. France, like the A-H Empire, was essentially neutralized. These points are often overlooked. The Allies did NOT have overwhelming power in 1918. That is why politicians chose to end the war with an armistice. After 1918, Germany (now the stab-in-the-back got really bloody) went through a civil war that permitted the Allies (particularly the French losers) to extract maximum concessions. German conservatives looked on these events and were convinced that the socialists had defeated Germany or completely eroded any platform on which to negotiate. (Hitler, mainly due to his twisted "education" in Vienna, blamed the Jews...God, what a "sorry-ass" conclusion to a complex question).
I don't entirely agree that the A-H Empire caved in for political reasons- ethnic strife within A-H was one reason but Imperial Russia had inflicted a great number of defeats on them and the main reason that A-H was still around in 1918 was that Germany was propping her up. Once Germany could no longer do this, with her defeat in the West, A-H crumbled. I think the French mutinies of 1917 are overblown- they were quite serious at the time but by 1918 the French army had recovered to a large extent. They took a large part in the fighting of 1918 as their casualty figures show.

When German deligation saw the armistace terms the Allies prepared for them they declared that itamounted to unconditional surrender. Thus, it's unsuprising that the Allied pols took it- what would further bloodshed bring?

To get back to the subject, I have a hard time writing anything positive about British tactics during the WWI/WWII era. The country did not attach enough importance to the academic methodology of a general staff. Nor did London really sponsor the study of operations until WWII -- at least not in the German sense. The Germans, who profitted from the development of the staff concept during the Napoleonic wars, used historical data to develop and refine their tactics and operational art. They studied war like chemistry or engineering. They developed models, wargamed, and used simulations to extrapolate a solution. The British (in my opinion) fought war in a manner that mirrored the rigid class structures that so hampered every aspect of their society during the latter phases of industrialization.
I don't agree. Tactics for the entire WWI/WWII era is a huge subject so I don't really know where to start. I will say that by late 1916 the British were generally as good as the Germans tactically; and the Hundred Days certainly shows that the Brits must have gotten something right.

The affluent studied literature and the classics or Latin instead of chemistry or war. The workingmen were considered uneducated oafs. These men, the "simple" guys developing and maintaining factory equipment, proved more important that a million snobs with a good knowledge of Homer or Shakespeare.

Ollie Garchy
This is probably unfair on the "snobs". They fought just as hard and died just as readily as anyone else.
 
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I think it's difficult to be objective when looking at WW1

Industrial strength gave the World devastatingly new Weapons but not battlefield transport or communications.

The Germans had merely hold on to it's gains and the Allies were forced to try to remove them.

The early battles had long barrages against a well dug in German line... then the slow walk across the battle field in full kit ...

Latter came the rolling barrage and troops in light kit moving as fast as the barrage.

From the Moment the Germans Dug in it was always going to be a War of attrition, in Men, arms and materials

I read somewhere that the British high command were appalled at the tactics used by the Americans when they entered the War... So distrustful were they of the Allied tactics and Command they chose to use their own...

And lead their Men to their deaths in just the same way as the the Allies had in the earlier battles.

Tony
 
Haig was not completely unimaginative, I view him more of a person who distrusted modern technology. We all know his quote "The Machine Gun is a greatly over rated weapon, it will serve no significant purpose in any future warefare", not word for word, but that was the gist of it.
Haig progressivly learned that the new 20th Century weapons made 19th Centruy Tactics Obsolete, but was not completely convinced.

The Victory at Hamel were General Monash had proved that High casualties were avoidable, that Tanks, Air Power and Machine Guns were not over rated but almost the oppiset, would prove to be an influencing battle for the Hundred Days Offensive were the tactics used by Monash, Haig applied to the BEF, Pershing to the AEF and Foch the French Army.

Its not so much that they were unimaginative, but that it was 19C tactics with 20C weapons, and they had to be shown what these new weapons were capable of doing.
 
I am under the impression that the British tactics, per the history I have been told by Aussies of late, were to put the "colonials" up front ala Galipoli.

Bory I would be interested in the source for your claim that Pershing's tactics were derived from Monash's success. Not saying your wrong but this is new information and you will forgive me as what I have read heretofore lays the Mexican American war as the source for the tactics and strategy responsible for Pershing's success on the battlefield. He was known as Blackjack long before the AEF.
 
Sorry, bad wording on my part here.
Pershings tactics on the western front were not dervived from Monash's success, but as I was meant to say, Hamel influenced how the AEF would operate after the Battle, which AEF Personnel were invovlved in.

I should have been more clear in regards to Pershing, for as you said Bulldog, he did gain a reputation in Mexico.

But, Pershing, like all other Senior Allied Generals on the Western Front, would have viewed Hamel, though not a major battle, as extremly significant breakthrough technology wise and would Hundred Days Campaign was fought. It showed that the Tank and Airplane were not overrated weapons, and if applied correctly can greatly minimise allied casualties, while causing significant casualties to the Germans.

Monash's tactics at Hamel were mainly copied by the BEF, the French who's tactics would have in some way or another also have been influenced by Hamel.
 
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Ok, that sounds more in line with what I have previously learned. Thanks for the clarification.
 
Bory said:
Haig was not completely unimaginative, I view him more of a person who distrusted modern technology. We all know his quote "The Machine Gun is a greatly over rated weapon, it will serve no significant purpose in any future warefare", not word for word, but that was the gist of it.

Haig was an advocate of the tank. From what I have read, he was very interested in new technology.

I dont know when he made the quote you refer to and context.

I am somewhat torn at the moment from the traditional donkey view, to a more balanced view. On the whole I think he deserves more credit than given to him after he died.

...to also quote from WW1 "If you mean, Are we all going to get killed? Yes. Clearly, Field Marshal Haig is about to make yet another gargantuan effort to move his drinks cabinet six inches closer to Berlin."
 
I don’t see much evidence of Haig's understanding of modern technology. He said as late as 1926 " I believe that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future are likely to be as great as ever. Aeroplanes and tanks are only accessories to the men and the horse, and I feel sure that as time goes on you will find just as much use for the horse - the well-bred horse - as you have ever done in the past"

Haig played a significant role in delaying the introduction and limiting the production of the m/c gun. He also hindered development of the tank after war, supporting horse cavalry instead, which could have led to deficiencies in WW2. Ironically his mistake was to use the tank too soon in WW1, not waiting until sufficient numbers and appropriate terrain were present. In fact it was Winston Churchill who thought its use should be delayed!

Haig’s biggest battlefield mistake was possibly at Passchendaele. He failed to give consideration to low-lying terrain, which was prone to waterlogging, and made it far worse by the massive barrage he put up, despite being warmed of the drainage problem.

Overall I think the general view of him being unimaginative and remote is true, perhaps a classic case of the British class system which Ollie speaks about. However, perhaps criticism of Haig for the Somme massacre is overdone since he received incorrect reports from his subordinate Rawlinson.

On the positive side he realised that a strategy of attrition would eventually win for the allies, and seemed to get an effective offensive working in the later stages of the war. I remember one historian remarking that he was a master of railway timetables, these were logistically very important at this time.
 
perseus said:
I don’t see much evidence of Haig's understanding of modern technology. He said as late as 1926 " I believe that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future are likely to be as great as ever

The horse was still used by most if not all European armies at the start of WW2. I read that the British army was one of first to become fully motorised. The German army used horses throughout WW2 in a support role.

I would have been amazed if Haig had said anything else. He was a product of his time.

My understanding is that Haig was open to considering new weapons that would offer an advantage. It must be pointed out that the Armies which Haig commanded had more tanks than anyother. Indeed the Germans had few, many of them were captured British tanks. By 1918 tanks had been incorporated successfully into 100 days offensive.

perseus said:
Haig played a significant role in delaying the introduction and limiting the production of the m/c gun.

Could you provide some information to support your statement? The British Army adopted the maxim gun in 1889. Haig entered Sandhurst in 1884. He became a captain in 1891. How did he hinder it and in what capacity?

I think it is worth pointing out that the Germans had the topographic advantages in WW1. From a ground conditions point Passchendaele, was not the ideal place for an offensive.

The Haig Diaries: The Diaries of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters - 1914-1918 - Is an interesting book.
 
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