perseus said:
(1) Didn't the events of May 1940 turn this theory on its head or was it because the defence lacked mobility?
(2) "What did Germany have towards the end of WW1? Worse than useless allies, insufficient means to feed itself, a limited landmass to retreat into, a drained army and population suffering from a flu pandemic and 3 powerful foes of vastly greater strength. It was a similar situation in WW2 but they also had a psychopathic leader and had to carry on to the bitter end!"
(3) "By the start of October, it was evident that Germany could no longer mount a successful defence, let alone a counterattack. Numerically on the frontline they were increasingly outnumbered, with the few new recruits too young or too old to help much. Rations were cut for men and horses because the food supply was critical. Ludendorff had decided, by October 1, that Germany had two ways out of the War—total annihilation or an armistice. He recommended the latter to senior German officials at a summit on that very same day"
Hi Perseus,
(1) My reference to Clausewitz was sarcasm. The fact that Britain defended itself towards empire is a joke. I do, however, agree with Clausewitz/Manstein. That is, a defensive system built on an adequate mobile reserve can give the defender the advantages of inner lines, the standard 3:1 defense-attacker ratio, and the subsequent opportunity for a decisive counterstrike. Britain and France failed in 1940 owing partly to the movement into Belgium and more importantly the lack of sufficient reserves.
(2) and (3) Germany at the end of WWI faced a series of problems similar to that of Stalin in 1941. Serious losses questioned the capacity to continue, industry suffered from important raw material bottlenecks and a lack of civilian commodities lowered morale. Like Stalin, Germany was essentially alone. Ludendorff could have however brought in more troops from other fronts, have mobilized a "Volkssturm", and tried to continue the struggle in search of a diplomatic solution...all of which Stalin did or tried.
Even a militarily defeated society does not have to surrender in spirit. Quite frankly, a society that does not accept defeat forces the occupier to either adopt Mongolian repression or leave. In the first case, guerilla or partisan tactics can turn an occupation into a nightmare for all participants. This represents one of the major lessons of the 20th Century. Only a society that accepts defeat in toto is in fact defeated.
The critical differences in Germany were cultural and political. The Germans of the WWI period were not like Stalin's Slavs and Germany was not a dictatorship (forget Fritz Fischer or his acolyte Volker Berghahn). The Slavs demonstrated a heroism that far surpassed that of their WWI German neighbours. The German people in fact revolted against the old order for a variety of reasons that included food shortages. The old order could not muster the same repressive machinery that Stalin and Hitler used to keep the people under control. Sounds tough. Versailles was tougher.
Irregardless of theoretical musing, German surrender led to a whole series of extreme hardships that questioned the sweeping popular desire for peace. Not only did the Allies screw the German state (a normal thing), but the British continued the blockade of Germany long into the postwar. This blockade, like the French, Polish and Lithuanian invasions between 1918 and 1923, caused tremendous loss of life and of material wealth. "Surrender" in this case failed to significantly improve German prospects.
REGARDING WWI BRITISH TACTICS: My posts are getting too far from the subject. Sorry guys. It worked like this: (1) I questioned British tactical innovation, (2) the argument was used that Britain's tactics were by implication innovative because Britain won the war, (3) I tried to explain that British military operational skills only played a minor role if any owing to factors such as German domestic revolt, (4) the argument returned to a negation of my negation and the view that Britain defeated Germany owing to military factors. I should have focused on the view that mass and attrition do not by implication mean superior operational tactics. And, Britain operated as part of a massive coalition. The outnumbered Germans were still able to pound Russia into the ground, but attrition took its toll. Britain and France and the United States defeated Germany. Look, 20 million Mongol horsemen could probably destroy the American 1st Armoured Division. The Americans would run out of ammunition after killing 19 million Mongols. Numerical superiority does not imply technological or doctrinal superiority. (I still argue that German society collapsed owing to political agitation, but this should be addressed in another thread.)