I dont think its true that the British where not innovative in WWI, the problem was that A) The British did not have the culture of citizen soldiery,With the exception of WWI and WWII and untill 1962 the British have almost from ancient times, and i'm talking 1006AD have had a professional military.B)The British by nature are a defensive fighting man being an island race C) Having massive experience of colonial and not European(Modern that is!) warfare,this produced a selection of Officers which by and large thought small size or limitedD) Yet again it was fighting an enemy that had ben preparing for some time for a show down,and had therefore massive advantages in its Army and operational planning abilities(Thank god for the Old Contemptables!).That it was able within a short time to come to grips with and become almost an exclusively Offensive fighting force(Less the 1918 Micheal Offensive!) It shows how truely innovated it became within a short period of time with the massive obsticles it had to over come. And as for 'The German Army was not defeated it just gave up!" i believe that that ollie is a classic piece of understatement if i ever saw one! Almost along the lines of we won Jutland.......Who ran to who's own port and safety and who's Battle fleet was at sea looking for another scrap the following day? enough said mate!
British military tactics during WWI
perseus
Active member
"The m/c gun is a much overrated weapon, 2 per battalion is more than sufficient" (Haig 1915).
As early as 1909 Haig saw the m/c gun as a defensive weapon and clashed with the progressive thinking of the likes of Fuller. During WW1 Haig (and French) refused to release men for m/c training and 890 lay idle in Feb 1915 for lack of people who could use them.
Whilst some individual commanders were devoid of imagination it is difficult to believe that everyone was, yet on all sides the war ground to a stalemate and this charge was widely used. I think the stalemate was a consequence of the effectiveness of modern technology for defence, partly the m/c gun, but also the railway system which allowed rapid movement of troops to a threatened sector behind the front. Perhaps aerial surveillance may have played a part as well.
As early as 1909 Haig saw the m/c gun as a defensive weapon and clashed with the progressive thinking of the likes of Fuller. During WW1 Haig (and French) refused to release men for m/c training and 890 lay idle in Feb 1915 for lack of people who could use them.
Whilst some individual commanders were devoid of imagination it is difficult to believe that everyone was, yet on all sides the war ground to a stalemate and this charge was widely used. I think the stalemate was a consequence of the effectiveness of modern technology for defence, partly the m/c gun, but also the railway system which allowed rapid movement of troops to a threatened sector behind the front. Perhaps aerial surveillance may have played a part as well.
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Ollie Garchy
Active member
poacher63 said:
Greetings,
(1) Historians looking at the "stab in the back" notion often forget to remember that defeat is more than just losing a certain percentage of men or equipment. Defeat is also an attitude of mind.
Britain did not pack it in after Dunkirk in 1940. The Soviets did not pack it in after losing 5 million men and most of their equipment in 1941. The massive loss of men and/or material in these cases did not necessarily imply defeat. Why? The reasons are quite complex. I would only like to suggest that Britain in 1940 could not defeat Nazi-Germany yet continued the struggle in the manner of Friedrich II. The same was probably even true of Stalin. The decision to continue the fight was what mattered.
The reasons for German defeat in 1918 have to include the extreme defeatism that gripped Ludendorff and German society in 1918. And (God protect me) the actions of men and women like Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg who successfully agitated against the continuation of the war. The fact that historians generally dislike this idea is related to Hitler and not just the assembly and analysis of the facts.
(2) Combined operations represented the great military innovation of the years 1914-1945. Individual British military strategists certainly worked at the forefront of this revolution. The military institutions however lagged behind. We know from the Battle for France in 1940 that the mere possession of tanks, artillery, mechanized infantry, tactical aircraft, etc. did not save western Europe from a numerically outnumbered aggressor. It is wrong to assume that accepted British WWI tactical developments (like the rolling barrage or the bulk use of tanks) led directly to the combined operations revolution.
(3) (On the side) The British are "defensive"? I guess the defensive IS superior to the offensive. Clausewitz was right. According to you, the English governments just defended English soil in Asia, Africa, North & South America. Right. How about the English invasions of Scotland, Wales, Ireland, France..."defensive", right? The "defensive" seems an exceptional way to effect territorial aggrandizement.
perseus
Active member
Greetings Ollie, glad to see you are back firing on all turrets!
I certainly agree that Britain and Russia could do little to defeat Germany in their direst hour, but it was by no means clear at that time that Germany could defeat them, so why surrender? At the end of WW1, Germany was clearly facing defeat it was just a matter of time.
Britain in June 1940 had nearly all of her population, land and industry still intact, with a superior navy defending a strong sea barrier.
Russia in the autumn of 1941 still had a vast land mass to retreat into with much of its industry being reformed behind the Urals. She had fresh and victorious Siberian divisions in reserve, knowledge that the German army was being rendered useless by dust, mud then freezing temperatures, and that the last mass invader which had got this far was defeated by the elements. A potential Ally was also waiting in the wings with vast military potential. True, underlying all this was a psychopathic leader who would kill anyone with the slightest hint of defeatism.
What did Germany have towards the end of WW1? Worse than useless allies, insufficient means to feed itself, a limited landmass to retreat into, a drained army and population suffering from a flu pandemic and 3 powerful foes of vastly greater strength. It was a similar situation in WW2 but they also had a psychopathic leader and had to carry on to the bitter end!
As a consequence, though Germany agreed an armistice in WW1 whilst most of her territory was still intact, I don’t think she could have lasted for long. Consider this quote from Wikepedia. "By the start of October, it was evident that Germany could no longer mount a successful defence, let alone a counterattack. Numerically on the frontline they were increasingly outnumbered, with the few new recruits too young or too old to help much. Rations were cut for men and horses because the food supply was critical. Ludendorff had decided, by October 1, that Germany had two ways out of the War—total annihilation or an armistice. He recommended the latter to senior German officials at a summit on that very same day"
Didn't the events of May 1940 turn this theory on its head or was it because the defence lacked mobility?:tank:
I certainly agree that Britain and Russia could do little to defeat Germany in their direst hour, but it was by no means clear at that time that Germany could defeat them, so why surrender? At the end of WW1, Germany was clearly facing defeat it was just a matter of time.
Britain in June 1940 had nearly all of her population, land and industry still intact, with a superior navy defending a strong sea barrier.
Russia in the autumn of 1941 still had a vast land mass to retreat into with much of its industry being reformed behind the Urals. She had fresh and victorious Siberian divisions in reserve, knowledge that the German army was being rendered useless by dust, mud then freezing temperatures, and that the last mass invader which had got this far was defeated by the elements. A potential Ally was also waiting in the wings with vast military potential. True, underlying all this was a psychopathic leader who would kill anyone with the slightest hint of defeatism.
What did Germany have towards the end of WW1? Worse than useless allies, insufficient means to feed itself, a limited landmass to retreat into, a drained army and population suffering from a flu pandemic and 3 powerful foes of vastly greater strength. It was a similar situation in WW2 but they also had a psychopathic leader and had to carry on to the bitter end!
As a consequence, though Germany agreed an armistice in WW1 whilst most of her territory was still intact, I don’t think she could have lasted for long. Consider this quote from Wikepedia. "By the start of October, it was evident that Germany could no longer mount a successful defence, let alone a counterattack. Numerically on the frontline they were increasingly outnumbered, with the few new recruits too young or too old to help much. Rations were cut for men and horses because the food supply was critical. Ludendorff had decided, by October 1, that Germany had two ways out of the War—total annihilation or an armistice. He recommended the latter to senior German officials at a summit on that very same day"
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Ollie Garchy
Active member
perseus said:
Hi Perseus,
(1) My reference to Clausewitz was sarcasm. The fact that Britain defended itself towards empire is a joke. I do, however, agree with Clausewitz/Manstein. That is, a defensive system built on an adequate mobile reserve can give the defender the advantages of inner lines, the standard 3:1 defense-attacker ratio, and the subsequent opportunity for a decisive counterstrike. Britain and France failed in 1940 owing partly to the movement into Belgium and more importantly the lack of sufficient reserves.
(2) and (3) Germany at the end of WWI faced a series of problems similar to that of Stalin in 1941. Serious losses questioned the capacity to continue, industry suffered from important raw material bottlenecks and a lack of civilian commodities lowered morale. Like Stalin, Germany was essentially alone. Ludendorff could have however brought in more troops from other fronts, have mobilized a "Volkssturm", and tried to continue the struggle in search of a diplomatic solution...all of which Stalin did or tried.
Even a militarily defeated society does not have to surrender in spirit. Quite frankly, a society that does not accept defeat forces the occupier to either adopt Mongolian repression or leave. In the first case, guerilla or partisan tactics can turn an occupation into a nightmare for all participants. This represents one of the major lessons of the 20th Century. Only a society that accepts defeat in toto is in fact defeated.
The critical differences in Germany were cultural and political. The Germans of the WWI period were not like Stalin's Slavs and Germany was not a dictatorship (forget Fritz Fischer or his acolyte Volker Berghahn). The Slavs demonstrated a heroism that far surpassed that of their WWI German neighbours. The German people in fact revolted against the old order for a variety of reasons that included food shortages. The old order could not muster the same repressive machinery that Stalin and Hitler used to keep the people under control. Sounds tough. Versailles was tougher.
Irregardless of theoretical musing, German surrender led to a whole series of extreme hardships that questioned the sweeping popular desire for peace. Not only did the Allies screw the German state (a normal thing), but the British continued the blockade of Germany long into the postwar. This blockade, like the French, Polish and Lithuanian invasions between 1918 and 1923, caused tremendous loss of life and of material wealth. "Surrender" in this case failed to significantly improve German prospects.
REGARDING WWI BRITISH TACTICS: My posts are getting too far from the subject. Sorry guys. It worked like this: (1) I questioned British tactical innovation, (2) the argument was used that Britain's tactics were by implication innovative because Britain won the war, (3) I tried to explain that British military operational skills only played a minor role if any owing to factors such as German domestic revolt, (4) the argument returned to a negation of my negation and the view that Britain defeated Germany owing to military factors. I should have focused on the view that mass and attrition do not by implication mean superior operational tactics. And, Britain operated as part of a massive coalition. The outnumbered Germans were still able to pound Russia into the ground, but attrition took its toll. Britain and France and the United States defeated Germany. Look, 20 million Mongol horsemen could probably destroy the American 1st Armoured Division. The Americans would run out of ammunition after killing 19 million Mongols. Numerical superiority does not imply technological or doctrinal superiority. (I still argue that German society collapsed owing to political agitation, but this should be addressed in another thread.)
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Ollie Garchy
Active member
LeEnfield said:
Super question...will anyone handle that issue? I won't because I can't.
As for the British blockade, how do we assess the real impact? Perseus' point concerning starvation is a good one, but how do we judge the impact of German fertilizer shortages, manpower shortages, and insufficient imports? Dd the Germans start making mass seizures in the East after Russia surrendered (or before)? How serious were the food shortages? Disease? Deaths? Morale?
