Doppleganger said:
So despite Hitler's arrogance regarding the Nazi industrial footing for war, for I really think it was arrogance, Hitler was winning battle after battle and country after country. Sure he became a cropper in the Soviet Union, but you can blame a faulty, hopelessy over optimistic, racist plan for that as much as his lack of pushing Germany towards a wartime footing.
Doppleganger said:
German technology of arms was significantly superior to the Red Army (we know this to be untrue).
Hi Doppleganger,
thanks for the detailed response and sorry for the delay. The document was particularly insightful. You raise some good points. I would like to offer a bit of my own analysis using some sources including some Clausewitz.
(1)
The Frictions of War (including the Economic): Clausewitz made some interesting comments concerning "frictions" that can be applied to the whole process of preparing for and waging war: "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war...Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. The military machine -- the army and everything relating to it -- is basically very simple and therefore seems easy to manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential of friction".
According to this observation, no precise formula can determine the best tank. Why? Because frictions (weather, luck, individual skill, etc and etc.) will always influence combat as much as firepower or mobility. It almost seems a pointless exercise to judge weapons systems against each other because other factors play a part in determining objective superiority. Clausewitz makes the point that an outnumbered or poorly trained army can invest in firepower to compensate for deficiencies (and vice versa). If we think about the Soviet Union, they substituted mass or numbers for operational quality. [However, as seen below, this WAS and always HAS BEEN Russian/Soviet strategy].
(2)
Soviet Technology & Tactics: I interpreted the document you provided a little bit differently. This difference tends to move my mind in another direction. I would like to hypothesize that German technological superiority might have mattered more than operational skill.
Regarding Soviet weapons systems, the American authors seem to verge on ridiculing the backwardness of Soviet designs. The T-34 and KV-1 were, from their perspective, built using utterly outdated components (transmission, filters, etc.), poorly constructed for the crew, and with less-than-spectacular armour and cannon. These judgements fit with my own hypotheses...ones that I would extend to cover virtually all Soviet weapons systems. I would therefore tend to argue that German technology (a term that includes manufacturing quality) was in fact far superior to comparable Soviet systems.
Concerning Soviet tactics, consider the following statement attributed to Zhukov: "There are two kinds of mines; one is the personnel mine and the other is the vehicular mine. When we come to a mine field our infantry attacks exactly as if it were not there. The losses we get from personnel mines we consider only equal to those we would have gotten from machine guns and artillery if the Germans had chosen to defend that particular area with strong bodies of troops instead of with mine fields. The attacking infantry does not set off the vehicular mines, so after they have penetrated to the far side of the field they form a bridgehead, after which the engineers come up and dig out channels through which our vehicles can go".
The Soviet leadership and general soldiers were apparently more than willing to die en masse. Under these conditions, the Soviet "steamroller" seems to have erased the importance of German operational innovation. The Red Army only needed enough men and enough equipment to blunt German counterattacks, pin other German units in place, and puncture holes in the defensive lines. This Soviet operational policy, especially when we recognize the horrific consequences for the Soviet population, cannot be accurately judged against German systems because the AVERAGE German soldier could not be expected to conduct suicide operations.
(3)
German operational changes during WWII: How could Germany counter the Soviet military philosophy of sacrifice? The German military believed, owing to their understanding of Soviet manpower, that only one response was possible...maximizing the number of Soviet soldiers killed in every engagement. The need for a higher killing ratio lay behind the weight given technological advancement. The typical German soldier needed a higher volume of fire, tanks required greater killing proficiency and artillery needed to lay down more HE in rapid succession. Hence the adoption of the STG-44, Tiger (and later Maus conceptions), and the Nebelwerfer and mortar expansion. This accorded with Clausewitz.
The Americans in particular praised German tactics and the firepower reorientation:
(a) "The tactics used by the Germans in mechanized warfare are of interest to every American in the field. German mechanized tactics are likely to follow certain set patterns. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that German commanders are clever at changing standard tactics to fit the situation at hand". (Intelligence Bulletin, September 1942)
(b) "The significance of the fire fight (Feuerkampf) is fully appreciated. The Germans adhere to the principle of fire superiority on a narrow front chosen as the "critical objective" (Schwerpunkt theory)". (Intelligence Bulletin, April 1943)
It is rather obvious that German technological improvements ultimately failed, but it is equally obvious that the loss ratios work against any claims of Soviet operational or technological parity with Germany...except, that is, if one considers soaking tactics a real (ie. modern) operational policy. In terms of Clausewitz, the Germans should have understood the potential for failure because:
a) "The first rule, therefore, would be: put the largest possible army into the field. This may sound a platitude, but it really is not".
b) "In a battle consisting of a slow and methodical trial of strength, greater numbers are bound to make a favorable outcome more certain. In fact in modern war one will search in vain for a battle in which the winning side triumphed over an army twice its size".
c) "The decisive importance of relative strength increases the closer we approach a state of balance in all the above factors". [Clausewitz mentions education, talent and cultural standards] For example, "Education may still make a considerable difference between technical corps, but what it usually comes down to is that one side invents improvements and first puts them to use, and the other side promptly copies them. Even the senior generals...have, as far as their efficacy is concerned, pretty much the same views and methods".
http://www.bartleby.com/73/2070.html
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz2/glantz2.asp
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=19656850796725
http://www.lonesentry.com/intelbulletin/index.html
Clausewitz, On War (trans. Peter Paret).