Best Axis Army Commander of WW2

Best Axis Army Commander of WW2

  • Walther Model

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Hasso von Manteuffel

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Frederick Paulus

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Paul Hausser

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Hermann Hoth

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Albert Kesselring

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • General Tomoyuki Yamashita

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Lieutenant-General Masaharu Honma

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • General Mitsuru Ushijima

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    12
Probably nothing but then what did he do that was worse, on top of this isn't it true that his counter attacks around Karkov in 1943 are considered as one of the most brilliantly executed and successful plans of recent military history?

Nothing special about cutting off over-extended units down in tanks and supplies.
 
Nothing special about cutting off over-extended units down in tanks and supplies.
The special part is knowing when to do it and actively planning to do it. What happened in early 1942 when Army Group Centre stabilized is entirely different. The Soviet counterattack had "reached its limit of strategic consumption", to quote Clausewitz, just as Army Group Centre had in December. We never got to see whether Manstein could have repeated it at the Sea of Azov but at that time a doctrine of 'elastic defence', which Manstein's backhand stroke essentially was, could have paid dividends for Germany.
 
The special part is knowing when to do it and actively planning to do it. What happened in early 1942 when Army Group Centre stabilized is entirely different. The Soviet counterattack had "reached its limit of strategic consumption", to quote Clausewitz, just as Army Group Centre had in December. We never got to see whether Manstein could have repeated it at the Sea of Azov but at that time a doctrine of 'elastic defence', which Manstein's backhand stroke essentially was, could have paid dividends for Germany.

Those are at least three general statements thrown together. Planning an operation is what commanders are trained to do, cutting off an overextended enemy unit is nothing special, should I repeat myself again? Soviet forces were advancing with open flanks, there is only one thing that that can be done in that situation. This happened again and again in the winter of 1941/1942, why aren't you praising those commanders who did it then?
 
You have no need to repeat yourself again Kunikov. For whatever reason, you do not consider the Third Battle of Kharkov to be anything other than an ordinary military victory. I disagree, as do many others.

The difference I would say between the above mentioned battle and say the 2nd Battle of Kharkov or the First Rzhev-Vyazma Offensive is the relative strengths and abilities of each army between late 1941 and early 1943, in both manpower/equipment, doctrine and tactics. Monty also hit the nail on the head when he mentioned that German forces in the southern sector were in headlong retreat in early 1943 after Stalingrad, whereas in Winter 41/42 they were often dug-in or partially dug-in due to Hitler's standfast orders. It's one thing to attack enemy flanks when your own forces are digging in, quite another to do it when your forces are in general, and often headlong, retreat. Finally, Hitler's standfast order probably did stop the German forces in the Moscow area from routing but I'm sure he issued that directive for political rather than military reasons.

I think the Third Battle of Kharkov stood out because a) it was the last successful German offensive in the East and b) it demonstrated what the Germans probably should have done next instead of trying to revert to WW1 tactics as they did at Kursk.
 
You have no need to repeat yourself again Kunikov. For whatever reason, you do not consider the Third Battle of Kharkov to be anything other than an ordinary military victory. I disagree, as do many others.

The difference I would say between the above mentioned battle and say the 2nd Battle of Kharkov or the First Rzhev-Vyazma Offensive is the relative strengths and abilities of each army between late 1941 and early 1943, in both manpower/equipment, doctrine and tactics. Monty also hit the nail on the head when he mentioned that German forces in the southern sector were in headlong retreat in early 1943 after Stalingrad, whereas in Winter 41/42 they were often dug-in or partially dug-in due to Hitler's standfast orders. It's one thing to attack enemy flanks when your own forces are digging in, quite another to do it when your forces are in general, and often headlong, retreat. Finally, Hitler's standfast order probably did stop the German forces in the Moscow area from routing but I'm sure he issued that directive for political rather than military reasons.

I think the Third Battle of Kharkov stood out because a) it was the last successful German offensive in the East and b) it demonstrated what the Germans probably should have done next instead of trying to revert to WW1 tactics as they did at Kursk.

So I'll say it once more. Germans retreated in the winter of 1941/1942 and plenty of commanders, following Hitler's orders, brought their men back into the line and cut off various Soviet forces, armies and corps, all along the front lines. Why do these men not get the recognition that Manstein gets? Secondly, it can be argued that Manstein was only able to stop his forces from retreating because Soviet forces had outrun their supply lines and couldn't keep up with retreating German forces. But, that isn't as distinguished for the Wehrmacht as saying that their troops and wonderful commander inflicted yet another loss on the Red Army. Added to this is the fact that throughout all of 1941, after the Soviet Union was invaded, Soviet forces were on the retreat and inflicted quite a few defeats on the Wehrmacht, yet one hardly hears equal recognition of Soviet commanders for their feats, they are mostly forgotten or never heard about. And lastly, just because it was the 'last' successful offensive doesn't make it special, it should, rather, make it the norm.
 
So I'll say it once more. Germans retreated in the winter of 1941/1942 and plenty of commanders, following Hitler's orders, brought their men back into the line and cut off various Soviet forces, armies and corps, all along the front lines. Why do these men not get the recognition that Manstein gets?

Well, if German commanders were bringing their men back into the line they were not explicitly following Hitler's orders, which only called for pulling back to previously agreed defensive positions, or if they were already in defensive positions to standfast. In fact, later Hitler ruled out even limited withdrawals. Secondly, why do you think these commanders do not get the credit that Manstein does? Why should they? Manstein as a commander is not solely judged on one battle - it is his performance from 1939-1944 that is being assessed. Perhaps Manstein benefits from his 'fame' but Guderian also called him "our finest operational mind". Surely Manstein, or Guderian for that matter, earned their plaudits more than say Rommel did.

Secondly, it can be argued that Manstein was only able to stop his forces from retreating because Soviet forces had outrun their supply lines and couldn't keep up with retreating German forces. But, that isn't as distinguished for the Wehrmacht as saying that their troops and wonderful commander inflicted yet another loss on the Red Army.

I'm sensing just a little sarcasm here regarding Manstein. You clearly don't think he deserves his post-war reputation.

Added to this is the fact that throughout all of 1941, after the Soviet Union was invaded, Soviet forces were on the retreat and inflicted quite a few defeats on the Wehrmacht, yet one hardly hears equal recognition of Soviet commanders for their feats, they are mostly forgotten or never heard about. And lastly, just because it was the 'last' successful offensive doesn't make it special, it should, rather, make it the norm.

What defeats did the Red Army inflict on the Wehrmacht before December 5th 1941? Certainly none that can be classed as meaningful. Whilst you're right that many fine Soviet commanders do not get anything like the recognition they deserve, one of them, namely Zhukov, gets far too much IMO.

The 3rd Battle of Kharkov is recognized because it is a fine operational example of a numerically inferior enemy retreating to suck in a numerically superior enemy and then going on the offensive and inflicting a decisive defeat. It is a great example of elastic defence in action.
 
Well, if German commanders were bringing their men back into the line they were not explicitly following Hitler's orders, which only called for pulling back to previously agreed defensive positions, or if they were already in defensive positions to standfast. In fact, later Hitler ruled out even limited withdrawals. Secondly, why do you think these commanders do not get the credit that Manstein does? Why should they? Manstein as a commander is not solely judged on one battle - it is his performance from 1939-1944 that is being assessed. Perhaps Manstein benefits from his 'fame' but Guderian also called him "our finest operational mind". Surely Manstein, or Guderian for that matter, earned their plaudits more than say Rommel did.

First off, this is solely one example and the Moscow Counter-offensive made a chaotic situation out of the front lines, so commanders acted differently, the point being they would eventually annihilate a good amount of Soviet forces which had penetrated and were trying to keep open supply lines, etc.


I'm sensing just a little sarcasm here regarding Manstein. You clearly don't think he deserves his post-war reputation.

Not even close, he is very much over-hyped as is the Wehrmacht in general.

What defeats did the Red Army inflict on the Wehrmacht before December 5th 1941? Certainly none that can be classed as meaningful. Whilst you're right that many fine Soviet commanders do not get anything like the recognition they deserve, one of them, namely Zhukov, gets far too much IMO.

Yelnya by Zhukov in the center and the various operations around Smolensk bleed the Germans and halted their offensive. Vatutin trapped two German Corps in the North in an encirclement and held up the Germans for three weeks. In the south the Germans were thrown out of Rostov. These are just the widely known examples.

The 3rd Battle of Kharkov is recognized because it is a fine operational example of a numerically inferior enemy retreating to suck in a numerically superior enemy and then going on the offensive and inflicting a decisive defeat. It is a great example of elastic defence in action.

I can say the same about the entire operation Barbarossa but I'm not that gullible. The Kharkov operation was half being at the right place and at the right time and half the fact that the Soviets over stretched themselves, that's all.
 
Not even close, he is very much over-hyped as is the Wehrmacht in general.
A harsh and unjustifiable assessment IMO.

Yelnya by Zhukov in the center and the various operations around Smolensk bleed the Germans and halted their offensive. Vatutin trapped two German Corps in the North in an encirclement and held up the Germans for three weeks. In the south the Germans were thrown out of Rostov. These are just the widely known examples.
I'm not sure how significant the actions in the Yelnya bend really were. True it was a local success for the Soviet forces but did it really have any meaningful impact? It did not delay the start of Operation Typhoon for example.

I was under the impression that Vatutin's trapping of 2 German corps at Demyansk occurred in January 1942. As far as Rostov goes it was too far south to have any strategic impact on the main axis of Barbarossa, which ended up being Kiev then Moscow. No doubt that it was a legitimate Soviet victory though.

I can say the same about the entire operation Barbarossa but I'm not that gullible. The Kharkov operation was half being at the right place and at the right time and half the fact that the Soviets over stretched themselves, that's all.
A simplistic and unsatisfactory explanation. We'll have to agree to disagree on this matter.
 
A harsh and unjustifiable assessment IMO.

Unjustifiable is the fact that German commanders and the German Army have become mythical figures in the realm of WWII history.

I'm not sure how significant the actions in the Yelnya bend really were. True it was a local success for the Soviet forces but did it really have any meaningful impact? It did not delay the start of Operation Typhoon for example.

Umm...all these actions have one thing in common, they delayed the inevitable. Manstein did nothing different from that.

I was under the impression that Vatutin's trapping of 2 German corps at Demyansk occurred in January 1942. As far as Rostov goes it was too far south to have any strategic impact on the main axis of Barbarossa, which ended up being Kiev then Moscow. No doubt that it was a legitimate Soviet victory though.

No strategic impact? Guarding Army Group Center's flanks is a strategic necessity and the taking of Rostov meant that the Germans would have to take it once more when Operation Blau began.

A simplistic and unsatisfactory explanation. We'll have to agree to disagree on this matter.

I'm not writing a book. If you're not satisfied I suggest you do more research on the topic.
 
Unjustifiable is the fact that German commanders and the German Army have become mythical figures in the realm of WWII history.
For many yes. One could also argue though that Zhukov has also been accorded this level of 'demigod' status. If the post-war Soviet regime had not seen fit to 'alter' some facts and had been more forthcoming regarding certain matters perhaps some deserving Soviet commanders such as Vatutin, Rokossovsky and Yeremenko would be more widely known in the west.

Umm...all these actions have one thing in common, they delayed the inevitable. Manstein did nothing different from that.
With hindsight we can say that but at the time any Soviet attacks during the time frame of Barbarossa were unable to deflect the advance of German forces. Delay yes, deflect no.

No strategic impact? Guarding Army Group Center's flanks is a strategic necessity and the taking of Rostov meant that the Germans would have to take it once more when Operation Blau began.
Centre's flanks were secure during the time period in question, regardless of whether Rostov had been held or not.

I'm not writing a book. If you're not satisfied I suggest you do more research on the topic.
I've done reasonable research thank you and it seems clear our opinions are not going to converge any time soon.
 
For many yes. One could also argue though that Zhukov has also been accorded this level of 'demigod' status. If the post-war Soviet regime had not seen fit to 'alter' some facts and had been more forthcoming regarding certain matters perhaps some deserving Soviet commanders such as Vatutin, Rokossovsky and Yeremenko would be more widely known in the west.

We're not talking about Soviet commanders or myths, we're discussing German oriented ones.

With hindsight we can say that but at the time any Soviet attacks during the time frame of Barbarossa were unable to deflect the advance of German forces. Delay yes, deflect no.

What does 'deflect' have to do with anything? Delaying the other side's forces was all that Red Army forces could hope to accomplish in 1941, Manstein did nothing different from that.

Centre's flanks were secure during the time period in question, regardless of whether Rostov had been held or not.

That's hindsight and those flanks were not secure since Army Group Center was almost destroyed.

I've done reasonable research thank you and it seems clear our opinions are not going to converge any time soon.

Just like most in the West, I'm sure your research is lacking. As with many other aspects of the Eastern Front, Manstein's counterattack has been mystified with great pomp because that's all the Germans could do to save face after losing their largest army, 2-3 allied armies, and almost an entire Army Group.
 
We're not talking about Soviet commanders or myths, we're discussing German oriented ones.
You know, there are plenty of German WWII fanboys around but you appear to be a Russian one which makes you just as bad as they are.

What does 'deflect' have to do with anything? Delaying the other side's forces was all that Red Army forces could hope to accomplish in 1941, Manstein did nothing different from that.
They did not delay them enough. In my view, the main reason why Germany lost at the end of 1941 was due to their strategic plan being faulty in the first place, rather than anything the Red Army did in the field. What happened after December 5th was almost inevitable.

That's hindsight and those flanks were not secure since Army Group Center was almost destroyed.
The temporary loss of Rostov in November 1941 had very little to do with Centre's near destruction.

Just like most in the West, I'm sure your research is lacking. As with many other aspects of the Eastern Front, Manstein's counterattack has been mystified with great pomp because that's all the Germans could do to save face after losing their largest army, 2-3 allied armies, and almost an entire Army Group.
So, my research is lacking simply because I don't agree with you?
 
You know, there are plenty of German WWII fanboys around but you appear to be a Russian one which makes you just as bad as they are.

Why do you feel a constant need to go off on tangents?

They did not delay them enough. In my view, the main reason why Germany lost at the end of 1941 was due to their strategic plan being faulty in the first place, rather than anything the Red Army did in the field. What happened after December 5th was almost inevitable.

They delayed them enough to launch the Moscow Counter-Offensive and throw the Wehrmacht back from the gates of Moscow at the same time almost destroying Army Group Center. As for your opinion of the Red Army, it isn't based on much it seems. Once again, you go off on tangents. The argument was simply that Manstein delayed the Red Army as the Red Army delayed the Werhmacht in 1941, why is it that you cannot stick the topic at hand?

The temporary loss of Rostov in November 1941 had very little to do with Centre's near destruction.

Actually, if it was a failure then Zhukov might have convinced Stalin to concentrate on Army Group Center instead of Stalin thinking the entire front could be attacked and the entire German force in the USSR could be pushed back.

So, my research is lacking simply because I don't agree with you?

No, it's lacking because 1) you go off on tangents, 2) cannot back up what you profess.
 
They delayed them enough to launch the Moscow Counter-Offensive and throw the Wehrmacht back from the gates of Moscow at the same time almost destroying Army Group Center. As for your opinion of the Red Army, it isn't based on much it seems. Once again, you go off on tangents. The argument was simply that Manstein delayed the Red Army as the Red Army delayed the Werhmacht in 1941, why is it that you cannot stick the topic at hand?.

The Red Army did delay the Wehrmacht on occasion but I could point to the Lotzen Decision being the main reason why Operation Typhoon was delayed. I haven't expressed my opinion of the Red Army in this thread so your assumption is a little off the mark. In fact, I have a great deal of respect for what the Red Army did in WW2. Manstein in 1941 began as a corps commander and it wasn't until he got an army command that he could really demonsrate his ability. As for going off on a tangent or not sticking to the topic it's only because of my need to reply to you in a somewhat helpful manner, rather than get bogged down in a futile argument.

If you want to denigrate the achievement of Manstein's at the Third Battle of Kharkov it's up to you. However, seeing as this thread is about the Best Axis Army Commander of WW2 who would be your choice and why? I know it's not going to be Manstein. ;)
 
The Red Army did delay the Wehrmacht on occasion but I could point to the Lotzen Decision being the main reason why Operation Typhoon was delayed.

Those are two different things.

I haven't expressed my opinion of the Red Army in this thread so your assumption is a little off the mark. In fact, I have a great deal of respect for what the Red Army did in WW2.

This has nothing to do with what we're discussing.

Manstein in 1941 began as a corps commander and it wasn't until he got an army command that he could really demonsrate his ability.

You mean taking the Crimea? That was less skill than ineptitude on the part of Mekhlis and the use of engineers and vast amounts of artillery which facilitated Manstein FINALLY taking Sevastopol with the help of the Romanians.

As for going off on a tangent or not sticking to the topic it's only because of my need to reply to you in a somewhat helpful manner, rather than get bogged down in a futile argument.

Sorry, I don't see going off on tangents being 'helpful' in this case.

If you want to denigrate the achievement of Manstein's at the Third Battle of Kharkov it's up to you. However, seeing as this thread is about the Best Axis Army Commander of WW2 who would be your choice and why? I know it's not going to be Manstein. ;)

Hard question to answer, the initial army group commanders did a fine job, for the most part, which means von Bock and Rundstedt would get my 'vote' at the same time Hoth did an excellent job as did quite a few others. But I am no expert on German commanders so my opinion in this matter is pointless. But I do not regard either Manstein, Rommel, or Guderian as being those who were 'great' or the 'best.'
 
Hard question to answer, the initial army group commanders did a fine job, for the most part, which means von Bock and Rundstedt would get my 'vote' at the same time Hoth did an excellent job as did quite a few others. But I am no expert on German commanders so my opinion in this matter is pointless. But I do not regard either Manstein, Rommel, or Guderian as being those who were 'great' or the 'best.'
I can understand Rommel but why wouldn't Guderian be one of those you'd consider? BTW, you do not have to be an expert for your opinion to be considered non-pointless.
 
I can understand Rommel but why wouldn't Guderian be one of those you'd consider? BTW, you do not have to be an expert for your opinion to be considered non-pointless.

Guderian is simply 'famous' because of his book, he last saw action in 1941...that means what he did with his Panzer Group is on par with what the other 4 Pz Group commanders could do since all 4 made excellent progress, for the most part. Although Guderian's plunge to the south to help secure the Kiev pocket is something to look at, it was a desperate risk that he took and it paid off as only one of his divisions could make it in time to close the pocket and it was advancing with no cover for its flanks. There were other Pz commanders to look at; Balck, Hube, Hoth, Kleist, etc.
 
Guderian is simply 'famous' because of his book, he last saw action in 1941...that means what he did with his Panzer Group is on par with what the other 4 Pz Group commanders could do since all 4 made excellent progress, for the most part. Although Guderian's plunge to the south to help secure the Kiev pocket is something to look at, it was a desperate risk that he took and it paid off as only one of his divisions could make it in time to close the pocket and it was advancing with no cover for its flanks. There were other Pz commanders to look at; Balck, Hube, Hoth, Kleist, etc.
Of the other commanders you mentioned, I would personally discount Kleist (the others are good choices though). It took him a long time to fully realize the possibilities of armour and his performances in France and initially in Russia were not outstanding. Coming back to Guderian bear in mind that he also:

a) was instrumental in creating the panzerwaffe and the tactics used by the German Army in WW2
b) had a major role in the 'Manstein Plan' and also was at the heart of the German successes in France
c) along with Speer made a major difference in AFV development and production 1943 onwards
d) had a hand in major strategy on the Ostfront although severely hampered by Hitler in this regard

So yes Guderian is famous but he does deserve that fame. Commanders like Balck, Hoth, Manteuffel, Hausser, Rommel and Manstein would have been different men without Guderian's influence.
 
Back
Top