Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Inside The Pentagon
August 16, 2007
Pg. 1
Major security gaps created opportunities for terrorists and criminals to obtain Navy pistols, machine guns and grenade launchers, according to an internal audit obtained by Inside the Pentagon.
A review of the Navy’s small arms and weapons program between June 2005 and September 2006 uncovered numerous security weaknesses, according to the 72-page “for official use only” report issued to service leaders three months ago.
The Navy has taken steps to fix the problems, according to the Naval Audit Service report. Inside the Pentagon obtained a redacted copy of the document through the Freedom of Information Act.
The report does not cite specific instances of weapons falling into the wrong hands.
But it faults the Navy for failing to provide the required strict control, physical protection, and accountability of handguns, shotguns, rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers and mortars.
The service eschewed security rules designed to keep the armaments out of the hands of criminals and terrorists, the report says, creating opportunities for misuse and danger to public safety.
Small arms are supposed to be tracked, reported, validated, and registered by serial number.
The Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Crane, IN, is the primary stock point and inventory manager of Navy small arms and weapons. NSWC Crane also maintains the Navy registry of small arms.
The Naval Inventory Control Point in Mechanicsburg, PA, is the designated inventory control point for small arms. Auditors found weak controls in the small arms requisitioning process because this Pennsylvania office had an informal process to make requisitioning easier for warfighters.
“As a result the Navy did not have complete assurance that unauthorized requisitions would be prevented or detected in a timely manner,” the report says, citing a significant security breakdown.
Officials in Mechanicsburg acknowledged there was “no way for them to know if an individual who phoned in or e-mailed a requirement for weapons was authorized to do so,” the report says. The informal process has since been discontinued, according to the audit.
The audit also faults NSWC Crane and other Navy offices for using “unauthorized means” to ship weapons.
“As a result, weapons were shipped below the security standards required by Navy policy increasing the potential for loss or theft,” the report says.
In an effort to save money, service officials deliberately ignored Navy policy and used the U.S. postal service to ship items such as light automatic weapons, grenade launchers and flame throwers, the report says. The officials told auditors they thought Defense Department guidance allowed this practice, but it has since been halted, according to the report.
Further, NSWC Crane did not always notify Navy offices that small arms shipments were on the way, as required, so the offices could prepare to receive the shipments. NSWC Crane also failed to alert officials when improper shipment methods were used, the report says.
In addition, NSWC Crane did not ensure that Navy personnel turned in weapons when they requisitioned replacements. The Navy registry accurately reflected the numbers of weapons on hand at the audited locations, but unserviceable weapons were sometimes incorrectly recorded as serviceable.
As part of the review, the Navy found weaknesses at five field activities: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Three; Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Two; Naval Base San Diego; Naval Base Loma, CA; and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer Preble (DDG-88). Of these five, the base in Loma and the destroyer Preble were the worst offenders.
The problems included storage and access control weaknesses; key control weaknesses; weak accountability; a failure to maintain records of physical inventories; a failure to conduct security surveys; and untimely or undocumented weapons qualification training.
The security gaps were due to “insufficient guidance, management inattention, and inadequate training on the part of command personnel,” the report says.
No weaknesses were found at two other activities: Naval Coastal Warfare Squadron 30 and Special Boat Team Twelve.
Auditors recommended security improvements. These include introducing better controls, boosting oversight to ensure secure methods are used to ship the armaments, issuing better security guidance, improving record keeping and security and establishing clear accountability. Naval officials have since concurred with the findings and implemented many security upgrades, according to the audit.
-- Christopher J. Castelli
August 16, 2007
Pg. 1
Major security gaps created opportunities for terrorists and criminals to obtain Navy pistols, machine guns and grenade launchers, according to an internal audit obtained by Inside the Pentagon.
A review of the Navy’s small arms and weapons program between June 2005 and September 2006 uncovered numerous security weaknesses, according to the 72-page “for official use only” report issued to service leaders three months ago.
The Navy has taken steps to fix the problems, according to the Naval Audit Service report. Inside the Pentagon obtained a redacted copy of the document through the Freedom of Information Act.
The report does not cite specific instances of weapons falling into the wrong hands.
But it faults the Navy for failing to provide the required strict control, physical protection, and accountability of handguns, shotguns, rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers and mortars.
The service eschewed security rules designed to keep the armaments out of the hands of criminals and terrorists, the report says, creating opportunities for misuse and danger to public safety.
Small arms are supposed to be tracked, reported, validated, and registered by serial number.
The Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Crane, IN, is the primary stock point and inventory manager of Navy small arms and weapons. NSWC Crane also maintains the Navy registry of small arms.
The Naval Inventory Control Point in Mechanicsburg, PA, is the designated inventory control point for small arms. Auditors found weak controls in the small arms requisitioning process because this Pennsylvania office had an informal process to make requisitioning easier for warfighters.
“As a result the Navy did not have complete assurance that unauthorized requisitions would be prevented or detected in a timely manner,” the report says, citing a significant security breakdown.
Officials in Mechanicsburg acknowledged there was “no way for them to know if an individual who phoned in or e-mailed a requirement for weapons was authorized to do so,” the report says. The informal process has since been discontinued, according to the audit.
The audit also faults NSWC Crane and other Navy offices for using “unauthorized means” to ship weapons.
“As a result, weapons were shipped below the security standards required by Navy policy increasing the potential for loss or theft,” the report says.
In an effort to save money, service officials deliberately ignored Navy policy and used the U.S. postal service to ship items such as light automatic weapons, grenade launchers and flame throwers, the report says. The officials told auditors they thought Defense Department guidance allowed this practice, but it has since been halted, according to the report.
Further, NSWC Crane did not always notify Navy offices that small arms shipments were on the way, as required, so the offices could prepare to receive the shipments. NSWC Crane also failed to alert officials when improper shipment methods were used, the report says.
In addition, NSWC Crane did not ensure that Navy personnel turned in weapons when they requisitioned replacements. The Navy registry accurately reflected the numbers of weapons on hand at the audited locations, but unserviceable weapons were sometimes incorrectly recorded as serviceable.
As part of the review, the Navy found weaknesses at five field activities: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Three; Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Two; Naval Base San Diego; Naval Base Loma, CA; and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer Preble (DDG-88). Of these five, the base in Loma and the destroyer Preble were the worst offenders.
The problems included storage and access control weaknesses; key control weaknesses; weak accountability; a failure to maintain records of physical inventories; a failure to conduct security surveys; and untimely or undocumented weapons qualification training.
The security gaps were due to “insufficient guidance, management inattention, and inadequate training on the part of command personnel,” the report says.
No weaknesses were found at two other activities: Naval Coastal Warfare Squadron 30 and Special Boat Team Twelve.
Auditors recommended security improvements. These include introducing better controls, boosting oversight to ensure secure methods are used to ship the armaments, issuing better security guidance, improving record keeping and security and establishing clear accountability. Naval officials have since concurred with the findings and implemented many security upgrades, according to the audit.
-- Christopher J. Castelli