Ollie Garchy
Active member
Another quick response to two points:
(1) According to Abelshauser, bombing only decreased an expanding German industrial base by a few percentages. If you look at another post of mine (I forget where it was...I think in Germany's WWII mistakes), I point out that German machine-tool stocks (like their American counterparts) doubled over this period. In terms of the industrial base, strategic bombing was a complete failure. That is, the intended goal of destroying productive capacities was never met. On the contrary, German capacities grew as remarkably as in other countries.
I could send a few documents including Galbraith's industry report (1945). I will try to compile some stuff by next Friday. Until then, think about the comments made by General Lucius D. Clay: Clay, who during the war worked in American procurement as Military Director and later took control of the American occupation forces in Germany, wrote the following comments:
Clay's Conclusion: "This is one thing we learned about Germany. With all our bombing and whatnot, we didn't make very serious inroads on their military production. And when the damned war ended and they surrendered, their military production -- inspite of the bombing and everything else -- had been very little reduced". (p. 151)
Why?: "But on the production front, the Germans didn't make anywhere near the all-out effort we made until the last year of the war. And then it was too late". (p. 151)
(2) The slave remark is a good one. But...see where this argument is going. Instead of addressing the goal of strategic bombing (ie. cutting German armaments production), we are moving into a whole area of secondary issues: (1) slaves, (2) civilian industrial dislocation, etc.
I have stressed this point enough. One more time. [And remember, we are not just talking about output, we are talking about PRODUCTIVE CAPACITIES] If Galbraith and Clay argue that strategic bombing failed to destroy the sinews of German armaments production, and they supply the documents to prove it, how can anyone argue otherwise? What evidence do you use?
The USSBS (United States Strategic Bombing Survey) was composed of a group of specialists who toured Germany in 1945. They looked at the thousands of factories involved and examined the equipment. They then judged the destruction caused by the bombing. These guys wrote all of the reports historians today use to determine the outcome of the bombing. Did you know that they were the first people who collected German GNP statistics. The Germans had no centralized office doing such work. I just do not see how anyone can argue against their work. (The British boys came to the same conclusions).
Yet, it happened immediately. The Air Force generals gasped when they saw Galbraith's results. They knew that bombing faced a tough future if it was proven that strategic bombing had failed. The introductory summaries of the USSBS therefore played down Galbraith's results and looked at secondary factors like communications breakdown, etc. The air pundits wanted to save their jobs and forestall any cuts to the military budget. Galbraith among others felt cheated. He pointed out that the military was trying to hide behind serious lies. For this reason, the USSBS and the manipulated document record, causes a lot of problems for historians. Politics is a part of life.
That is why it is still necessary to consult the work of men like Abelshauser. That boy sifted through the German records. He counted prewar stocks, collected information concerning equipment built during the war, and judged all of this against bombing damage reports. This is a hell of a lot of work. It is NOT enough to look at Berlin (or whatever city you want), see a destroyed civilian housing area, and then argue that the German military-industrial SYSTEM fell to pieces. It is tempting, sure, but not good work. That is "History Channel" stuff. Not serious research.
(1) According to Abelshauser, bombing only decreased an expanding German industrial base by a few percentages. If you look at another post of mine (I forget where it was...I think in Germany's WWII mistakes), I point out that German machine-tool stocks (like their American counterparts) doubled over this period. In terms of the industrial base, strategic bombing was a complete failure. That is, the intended goal of destroying productive capacities was never met. On the contrary, German capacities grew as remarkably as in other countries.
I could send a few documents including Galbraith's industry report (1945). I will try to compile some stuff by next Friday. Until then, think about the comments made by General Lucius D. Clay: Clay, who during the war worked in American procurement as Military Director and later took control of the American occupation forces in Germany, wrote the following comments:
Clay's Conclusion: "This is one thing we learned about Germany. With all our bombing and whatnot, we didn't make very serious inroads on their military production. And when the damned war ended and they surrendered, their military production -- inspite of the bombing and everything else -- had been very little reduced". (p. 151)
Why?: "But on the production front, the Germans didn't make anywhere near the all-out effort we made until the last year of the war. And then it was too late". (p. 151)
(2) The slave remark is a good one. But...see where this argument is going. Instead of addressing the goal of strategic bombing (ie. cutting German armaments production), we are moving into a whole area of secondary issues: (1) slaves, (2) civilian industrial dislocation, etc.
I have stressed this point enough. One more time. [And remember, we are not just talking about output, we are talking about PRODUCTIVE CAPACITIES] If Galbraith and Clay argue that strategic bombing failed to destroy the sinews of German armaments production, and they supply the documents to prove it, how can anyone argue otherwise? What evidence do you use?
The USSBS (United States Strategic Bombing Survey) was composed of a group of specialists who toured Germany in 1945. They looked at the thousands of factories involved and examined the equipment. They then judged the destruction caused by the bombing. These guys wrote all of the reports historians today use to determine the outcome of the bombing. Did you know that they were the first people who collected German GNP statistics. The Germans had no centralized office doing such work. I just do not see how anyone can argue against their work. (The British boys came to the same conclusions).
Yet, it happened immediately. The Air Force generals gasped when they saw Galbraith's results. They knew that bombing faced a tough future if it was proven that strategic bombing had failed. The introductory summaries of the USSBS therefore played down Galbraith's results and looked at secondary factors like communications breakdown, etc. The air pundits wanted to save their jobs and forestall any cuts to the military budget. Galbraith among others felt cheated. He pointed out that the military was trying to hide behind serious lies. For this reason, the USSBS and the manipulated document record, causes a lot of problems for historians. Politics is a part of life.
That is why it is still necessary to consult the work of men like Abelshauser. That boy sifted through the German records. He counted prewar stocks, collected information concerning equipment built during the war, and judged all of this against bombing damage reports. This is a hell of a lot of work. It is NOT enough to look at Berlin (or whatever city you want), see a destroyed civilian housing area, and then argue that the German military-industrial SYSTEM fell to pieces. It is tempting, sure, but not good work. That is "History Channel" stuff. Not serious research.