redcoat said:
"Bombing: The Balance Sheet
The effects of the bombing campaign went far beyond the mere physical destruction of factories and dwelling-houses, although these effects should not be underestimated in a complex and technically sophisticated industrial economy stretched taut by the demands of war. The bombing produced serious social dislocation and a high cost in terms of man-hours (or woman-hours in many cases). Evacuation, rehabilitation and welfare provision were carried out on the largest scale in an economy struggling with serious manpower losses and cuts in civilian production. Bombing also encouraged a strategic response from Hitler which placed a further strain on the war economy by diverting vast resources to projects of little advantage to the German war effort.
The net effect of the many ways in which bombing directly or indirectly impeded economic mobilisation cannot be calculated precisely. But in the absence of physical destruction and dislocation, without expensive programmes for secret weapons and underground production and without the diversion of four-fifths of the fighter force, one-third of all guns and one-fifth of all ammunition to the anti-bombing war the German armed forces could have been supplied with at least 50% more equipment in the last two years of war, perhaps much more. In an environment entirely free of bomb attack the German authorities and German industrial managers would have had the opportunity to exploit Germany’s resource-rich empire in Europe to the full. In 1942 the air force had begun to plan the production of 7000 aircraft a month, yet at the peak in 1944 a little over 3000 were produced, of which one-quarter were destroyed before even reaching the front-line.
Bombing took the strategic initiative away from German forces, and compelled Germany to divert an ever-increasing share of its manpower and resources away from production for the battlefield. As it was, German forces proved a formidable barrier to the end of the war. With more men, more heavily armed, an intact transport system and an uninterrupted flow of industrial resources Germany might well have kept the Allies at bay in 1945. Then the Allies would have faced the agonising decision about whether or not to drop atomic weapons on German cities rather than on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."
Professor Richard Overy
My extremely quick response:
1) Overy's understanding of strategic bombing's impact demonstrates extreme characteristics of banality. Why? Overy's conclusions are trite. It can be reduced to the following: the western Allies fought an air war against Germany that forced Hitler's regime to respond by devoting considerable resources. There was a quantitative and qualitative impact. Wow! Great theory. Next one, please. [nobody is saying that the impact of strategic bombing was zero].
2) [Counterfactual] Investment in tactical airpower, coastal command, and the ground forces would have achieved the same result (with a hypothetically higher drain on German resources). Early preparations for a landing in France (as opposed to longterm investment in an expensive and draining strategic bombing program) would have (1) forced a significant German troop redeployment, (2) taken pressure off of the Soviet Union, (3) brought the Luftwaffe to battle and reduced the size and resource base of the Nazi empire. The benefits of an alternative strategy with relation to coastal command are obvious. In terms of the ground forces, higher investment in basic equipment like better tanks would have reduced Allied losses while bringing more and more German SOLDIERS to battle. What does strategic bombing look like in 1943? Not good. How about late 1944/1945 after the destruction of OB West and the destruction of Army Group Centre? A lot better. Coincidence? Maybe but unlikely.
4) Hitler's wasted "strategic response" was fortunate. (Except for those unlucky souls in Britain/Belgium who were killed by V-1s/2s). A better commander, working in the traditions of the Prussian military, would have followed Galland's advice: to build more fighters in 1940 and not 1944 and actually reduce the civilian casualties. Total war demanded a tough decision-maker and the "Leader" of Germany was a miserable failure in economic/social/geomilitary terms. It all boils down to this highly probable counterfactual hypothesis: an extensive German investment in fighters after 1940 (ie. 44,000 fighters for that year) would have reduced bombing capacities on the eastern front BUT led to the complete failure of strategic bombing. The Allied investment would have been wasted. Lucky Allies. Stupid Nazi Leaders.
3) Strategic bombing -- I CANNOT stress this enough -- did NOT destroy German machine-tools. Only the factory walls. There was dislocation and not significant physical destruction. The Germans were able, time and time again, to recover quickly from the bombing raids--raids that invariably hit civilian targets like churches and hospitals and NOT the factory or even marshalling yard in question. The Germans dug out the tools, dispersed them, and produced their "goods" after a short reorganization period. Overy has come around to this point. How could he not? The work of men like Abelshauser from the 1980s (or Galbraith in 1945) makes an alternative explanation moreorless impossible.
4) Strategic bombing was incredibly immoral. I actually do not care about this "attribute". If the killing of kids is a part of war, so be it. Nobody cared about German kids between 1939-1945 and Germans did not care about non-German kids either. However, Overy has to ask this question: how could the destruction of apartments, churches, etc. help the war effort? I tend to think, and the evidence certainly goes in this direction, that the bombing actually PROLONGED the war. A number of studies demonstrate that bombing rallied Germans around the Nazi flag and produced a serious desire for revenge at the same time. Britain went through a similar process in 1940/1941.
5) One-quarter of all bombs dropped on Germany fell in 1945. [a friend of mine liked to repeat this point...I do not really believe it is correct, however. Just close.] Most of the destruction to the German infrastructure (ie. Solly Zuckerman's "Transportation Plan") occured during the final stages of the war. Did Germany collapse suddenly in 1945 because of this bombing? I do not know. It is a good question. The western Allies were, however, already fighting in Aachen on the German frontier. The Soviets were overruning eastern Germany in Cossack fashion and closing the ring around Berlin. I do not think the fall in production in 1945 had much impact on the war owing to the miserable strategic position of the Wehrmacht.
6) Think about oil. After the loss of the Romanian oil fields, most of the German oil was synthetically produced. Was it enough to run a modern army and economy? No. The hydrogenation plants could not keep up with demand. Hitler had stated in 1941 during a conversation with the Finnish head of state that a full Soviet invasion of Romania prior to June 1941 would have ended the war...then and there. The Haber-Bosch oil synthesis technique could only provide for basic survival. With this in mind, what was more important...the Soviet seizure of the oil fields in 1944 or the Allied bombing of oil synthesis facilities?
There are many other points. I will try to explain Abelshauser's research (he is an economic-historian) at a later date.