Ollie Garchy
Active member
A// The German Zeppelin Raids as the Origins of Strategic Bombing
"On January 19, 1915...two zeppelin airships of the German Navy crossed the Norfolk coast and dropped bombs ("explosive devices" would be a better description) whenever they saw a cluster of lights". (Terraine, p. 9). This rather minimal attack was followed by an additional 52 zeppelin raids and then replaced by the Gotha bomber. The German raids ultimately killed a few thousand people and damaged a few buildings.
While these extremely crude operations represented "the first strategic air offensive in history", the historiography does not prescribe the operations with much more than symbolic importance. (Terraine, p. 9) The texts I looked at pointed to the inadequacy of German equipment and a total lack of doctrine. Terraine and Friedrich point out that a proper analysis of the operation would have discouraged postwar investment in the strategic bombing concept. Friedrich plainly states that all the wrong lessons were learned. (Friedrich, p. 65) Weigley even alludes to the fact that the British response to the attacks (the creation of a strategic bombing force) disrupted the previous British policy aimed at "military targets not far behind German lines". (Weigley, p. 225).
Despite evidence to the contrary, Trenchard and other British strategic bombing pundits pursued the concept in the 1920s. Much of the thinking concerning the weapon remained extremely crude. "Most major air powers were aware of the terroristic nature of bombing but only the RAF believed that it would seriously act as a deterent or, in the event of war, so undermine enemy morale that it would force capitulation or the demoralization of the enemy armed forces. (Overy, p. 13).
I would completely ignore WWI for reasons stated by Overy: "By the 1930s the lessons of the earlier conflict [WWI] had been turned from a hasty empiricism into a refined doctrine. By 1939 even the refined doctrine was becoming obsolescent, overtaken by scientific and strategic events". (Overy, p. 5)
B//The British Fascination with Strategic Bombing.
The second last point above is important. Only the British and Americans pursued strategic bombing in a rigorous fashion. Here are a few conclusions made by Overy:
1) LACK OF GERMAN PREPARATION: "The equipment and preparation of the Luftwaffe was hardly adequate since such a campaign had not been an important part of German air planning. There was no heavy bomber capable of carrying large loads over long-range". (Overy, p. 31) and "Although Hitler used the terror bombing threat to gain diplomatic concessions, neither he nor the Luftwaffe staff planned seriously for its use against a major military power once war had actually broken out". (Overy, p. 13).
2) LONGTERM BRITISH PLANNING (irrespective of Germany): "Rearmament...in the British case...had begun even before Hitler came to power". (Overy, p.19) and "The growing threat of Japan to British and United States interests in the Pacific, the fear in Russia that at any time the capitalist west or east might try to destroy the Bolshevik state, and the growing instability of Europe with the rise of fascist military power all contributed to the desire to arm in strength everywhere" (Overy, p. 19).
3) RESULTS OF LONGTERM ACTIVITIES: "...The Allies had more first-line aircraft than Germany and considerably larger reserves. German first-line aircraft were of a higher technical quality than those of the Allies, but the great disparity of forces believed to have existed in the air was a myth". (Overy, p. 23)
4) LONGTERM PLANNING: "Despite its ineffectiveness Bomber Command had taken the opportunity of the defeat of France to begin to launch a strategic air offensive along the lines planned in the preceding years". (Overy, p. 30). [ie. Bombing NOT a response to Rotterdam]
c//Why the German (London) Blitz?
1) "Germany was itself being bombed more and more regularly by Bomber Command, at night and at with increasing lack of discrimination in choosing targets. Hitler took the opportunity of a heavier raid on Berlin to announce in the Reichstag on 4 September 'Just now...Mr. Churchill is demonstrating his new brainchild, the night air raid...When they declare that they will increase their attacks on our cities, then we will raze their cities to the ground. We will stop the handiwork of these night air pirates, so help us God!' This mounting concern at the kind of war that was developing and which he, among other war leaders had sought to avoid before 1939, persuaded him of the need for reprisals and inclined him towards the night air raid, an inclination confirmed by the disastrous results of the early attempts to bomb London by day". [factories, etc.] (Overy, pp. 34-35)
CONCLUSIONS:
1) WWI is unimportant. The Zeppelin and Gotha attacks are a point of trivia.
2) The historians I looked at hardly emphasize early German bombing. Overy does not mention Warsaw, Rotterdam, etc. Terraine, as pointed out, writes that these attacks were secondary since the policy was already developed. (Terraine, p. 262) Friedrich points out that Rotterdam did help spawn a demand for retaliation, but he adds that "strategic bombing was a product of the industrial age" and not just emotion. (transl. Friedrich, p. 76). Anyway, the British concept remained fixed on victory and not merely retaliatory killing (Terraine p. 262).
3) The historians examined had generally negative comments concerning British strategic bombing. (Overy less so) Terraine was the most damning. They focused on "morale bombing": "'Morale' is a cosmetic word. Attacking morale, whatever phrases it may be dressed up in, really means one thing: putting the fear of death in individuals. On a collective scale, it means threatening a massacre". (Terraine, p. 261).
4) The historians refrain from the journalistic or moralistic "they started it" approach. Why? It is obviously untrue and is a road to nowhere.
The books consulted: (Relatively old, I know.)
Jörg Friedrich, Der Brand
Richard Overy, The Air War
John Terraine, A Time for Courage
Weigley, The American Way of War
"On January 19, 1915...two zeppelin airships of the German Navy crossed the Norfolk coast and dropped bombs ("explosive devices" would be a better description) whenever they saw a cluster of lights". (Terraine, p. 9). This rather minimal attack was followed by an additional 52 zeppelin raids and then replaced by the Gotha bomber. The German raids ultimately killed a few thousand people and damaged a few buildings.
While these extremely crude operations represented "the first strategic air offensive in history", the historiography does not prescribe the operations with much more than symbolic importance. (Terraine, p. 9) The texts I looked at pointed to the inadequacy of German equipment and a total lack of doctrine. Terraine and Friedrich point out that a proper analysis of the operation would have discouraged postwar investment in the strategic bombing concept. Friedrich plainly states that all the wrong lessons were learned. (Friedrich, p. 65) Weigley even alludes to the fact that the British response to the attacks (the creation of a strategic bombing force) disrupted the previous British policy aimed at "military targets not far behind German lines". (Weigley, p. 225).
Despite evidence to the contrary, Trenchard and other British strategic bombing pundits pursued the concept in the 1920s. Much of the thinking concerning the weapon remained extremely crude. "Most major air powers were aware of the terroristic nature of bombing but only the RAF believed that it would seriously act as a deterent or, in the event of war, so undermine enemy morale that it would force capitulation or the demoralization of the enemy armed forces. (Overy, p. 13).
I would completely ignore WWI for reasons stated by Overy: "By the 1930s the lessons of the earlier conflict [WWI] had been turned from a hasty empiricism into a refined doctrine. By 1939 even the refined doctrine was becoming obsolescent, overtaken by scientific and strategic events". (Overy, p. 5)
B//The British Fascination with Strategic Bombing.
The second last point above is important. Only the British and Americans pursued strategic bombing in a rigorous fashion. Here are a few conclusions made by Overy:
1) LACK OF GERMAN PREPARATION: "The equipment and preparation of the Luftwaffe was hardly adequate since such a campaign had not been an important part of German air planning. There was no heavy bomber capable of carrying large loads over long-range". (Overy, p. 31) and "Although Hitler used the terror bombing threat to gain diplomatic concessions, neither he nor the Luftwaffe staff planned seriously for its use against a major military power once war had actually broken out". (Overy, p. 13).
2) LONGTERM BRITISH PLANNING (irrespective of Germany): "Rearmament...in the British case...had begun even before Hitler came to power". (Overy, p.19) and "The growing threat of Japan to British and United States interests in the Pacific, the fear in Russia that at any time the capitalist west or east might try to destroy the Bolshevik state, and the growing instability of Europe with the rise of fascist military power all contributed to the desire to arm in strength everywhere" (Overy, p. 19).
3) RESULTS OF LONGTERM ACTIVITIES: "...The Allies had more first-line aircraft than Germany and considerably larger reserves. German first-line aircraft were of a higher technical quality than those of the Allies, but the great disparity of forces believed to have existed in the air was a myth". (Overy, p. 23)
4) LONGTERM PLANNING: "Despite its ineffectiveness Bomber Command had taken the opportunity of the defeat of France to begin to launch a strategic air offensive along the lines planned in the preceding years". (Overy, p. 30). [ie. Bombing NOT a response to Rotterdam]
c//Why the German (London) Blitz?
1) "Germany was itself being bombed more and more regularly by Bomber Command, at night and at with increasing lack of discrimination in choosing targets. Hitler took the opportunity of a heavier raid on Berlin to announce in the Reichstag on 4 September 'Just now...Mr. Churchill is demonstrating his new brainchild, the night air raid...When they declare that they will increase their attacks on our cities, then we will raze their cities to the ground. We will stop the handiwork of these night air pirates, so help us God!' This mounting concern at the kind of war that was developing and which he, among other war leaders had sought to avoid before 1939, persuaded him of the need for reprisals and inclined him towards the night air raid, an inclination confirmed by the disastrous results of the early attempts to bomb London by day". [factories, etc.] (Overy, pp. 34-35)
CONCLUSIONS:
1) WWI is unimportant. The Zeppelin and Gotha attacks are a point of trivia.
2) The historians I looked at hardly emphasize early German bombing. Overy does not mention Warsaw, Rotterdam, etc. Terraine, as pointed out, writes that these attacks were secondary since the policy was already developed. (Terraine, p. 262) Friedrich points out that Rotterdam did help spawn a demand for retaliation, but he adds that "strategic bombing was a product of the industrial age" and not just emotion. (transl. Friedrich, p. 76). Anyway, the British concept remained fixed on victory and not merely retaliatory killing (Terraine p. 262).
3) The historians examined had generally negative comments concerning British strategic bombing. (Overy less so) Terraine was the most damning. They focused on "morale bombing": "'Morale' is a cosmetic word. Attacking morale, whatever phrases it may be dressed up in, really means one thing: putting the fear of death in individuals. On a collective scale, it means threatening a massacre". (Terraine, p. 261).
4) The historians refrain from the journalistic or moralistic "they started it" approach. Why? It is obviously untrue and is a road to nowhere.
The books consulted: (Relatively old, I know.)
Jörg Friedrich, Der Brand
Richard Overy, The Air War
John Terraine, A Time for Courage
Weigley, The American Way of War