Operation Market Garden - Was it a Tactical Disaster?
Made a simular comment on this somewhere in these Forums. At the end of the book "A bridge too far" A Dutch Gen. makes the comment I see you failed the final exam, then goes on to explain that the Final exam @ the Duttch military academy at the time was to plan an invasion from the direction that The Allies came from. Any one trying it like we did fails the exam. Seems we never bothered to ask the Dutch Gen.s in England how to invade thier own Country.
GreatestAlive
Active member
Yeah really, good intel but Monty wanted the glory. They were expecting too much for a horribly planned invasion led by (and this is just my opinion) an incomptent general who didnt know how to use Airborne forces properly.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
I disagree clearly the airborne forces took their objectives and held them for longer than was expected which to me means that despite the presence of strong German forces in the area there was nothing wrong with the airborne planning, where it all went wrong was XXX Corps trundling at the speed of a retarded snail failed to achieve its goals.
There are some fairly strong arguments to say that Market Garden would have been a resounding success had they use and American armoured corps instead of XXX corps.
03USMC
Active member
Given the terrian , the bad intel that resulted in 30 Corps dealing with ambushes and making a fighting advance on the first day in an area where they were confined to improved roads and virtually unable to breakout in a classic armor advance. The Son River Bridge not being captured intact at Eindhoven. The 82nd failing to take the Nijmegan Bridge on that resulted in the boat assault. The Guards Division was actually might have reached Arnhem had the 82nd secured the bridge at Nijmegan on time, but then what? The 231st Infantry Brigade (50th Northumbrians) and the 4th Armour Brigade had been detached around Eindhoven due to continuing german assaults the resulting "fire brigade fighting caused the 231st & 4th's vehicles to clogg the roads and delay 30 Corps follow on units and reinforcements, so the Guards would have been on their own and without log trains and reinforcements themselves.I don't see, given the circumstances a US Armor Division doing any better, alot of the delay's suffered by 30 Corps were not of their own doing but can be laid back on the planning and intel.
Seems to me that that theory maybe more anti-Montgomery and pro-Patton than anything else.
Airborne forces given what airborne forces were and are, light infantry with minimal support dropped in to hold ground until follow on forces arrive did remarkably well, especially the 1st British Airborne, Glider Pilot Regt, and Polish Airborne in and around Arnhem. It was a proper use of Airborne Assets, what was improper was the follow-on support, whether hamstrung by intel, planning or weather.
A Can of Man
Je suis aware
I can't remember the proper term for it but when dealing with roads and routes knowing the volume of traffic the road can take and just how much traffic it can take before it is reduced to a strip of mud is essential. Taking what was in many places a one lane road all the way up to Arnhem was just a bad idea overall.
Considering the disaster the airborne troops faced in Arnhem (loss of communications, loss of transport) their achievement was nothing short of remarkable.
Considering the disaster the airborne troops faced in Arnhem (loss of communications, loss of transport) their achievement was nothing short of remarkable.
GreatestAlive
Active member
The forces were depleted though, as he kept them on the front line when the infantry was supposed to relieve them after the op...
LeEnfield
Active member
Okay we took a pasting at Arnhem, and yes there were planning errors not by Montgomery but by the people in the Airborne forces. Two things went wrong and biggest thing was that a few days before the drop an Armored Division of SS soldiers were brought to Arnhem for a period of rest and to re equipped. The other big error was the RAF as they would only drop the troops well out of town about 10 miles away in fact which allowed the Germans a chance the get their men into position. You could go on for ever with ifs and buts but that fickle finger of fate decided to help the Germans this time, had this raid taken place two weeks earlier then it would have been a walk over.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
Yes but despite all of the problems that faced the British Airborne forces at Arnhem they still managed to capture and hold one end of the bridge for the planned amount of time (longer in fact) so any failings in planning can not have been from the deployment of the Airborne forces, the problem had to be in the planning and execution of the relieving forces.
This to me means that either XXX Corps did not carry out its orders quick enough or that the planning for the relief of 1st Airborne was inadequate which is where the operation failed.
I think people have focused too much on the German forces at Arnhem as being the reason market garden failed and I do not think this is accurate.
Partisan
Active member
In my opinion there were numerous factors which hindered the complete success of Op Market Garden, but then success is never guaranteed - especially in war.
The intial idea was a lightning strike through the Netherlands to reach the Rhine & directly threaten Germany. Originally the concept was to be a push across a broad front, exploiting gaps in the German defences. But the Allies didn't have the resources, so both Patton & Monty came up with their own plans to achieve the strategic objective. For many reasons Monty's plan was chosen and all the available resources were allocated to him.
The plan was based on speed and momentum, with what I consider a daring and visionary use of airbourne forces. Where it fell down was that the attack was over 60 miles on a very narrow front, with a mission completion based upon success at every stage of the operation - with no latitude for error or the fog of war.
Unfortunately there weren't taken into account or discarded as minimal threat - not an unusual situation nowadays. The end result was a mission that failed to achieve its objective, cost many lives, but did in fact further the strategic objective to end the war. It also led to many other lessons which have been taken forward by modern military forces - Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, wargaming an attack, MSR control, resupply alternatives and staff tables for resupply in different phases of operation.
We have the benefit of 20:20 hindsight, also coloured by our experience and knowledge, thinking in terms of modern capability. Think back to WWII, yes if I was there and I know what I know now - I'm sure I'd kick arse, but the true commander is one who has a vision and enables his subordinates to execute it. Remember failure isn't an end, it just enables you to find another way to achieve (badly paraphrased, but I'm on a roll).
Summary - Market Garden failed to achieve its objective, however it did enable an Allied advance, siezed the intitiative and highlighted deficiencies in equipment, planning and staff work - all of which got corrected, a costly lesson indeed. Do I blame Monty for the failure - yes because he was the commander and signed off on the plan, will I pillory him for it - no, it was war, commanders are paid to be aggressive and think outside the box and take risks, because we never have all the assets we want to achieve what we want, the true test is how we use what we've got.
The intial idea was a lightning strike through the Netherlands to reach the Rhine & directly threaten Germany. Originally the concept was to be a push across a broad front, exploiting gaps in the German defences. But the Allies didn't have the resources, so both Patton & Monty came up with their own plans to achieve the strategic objective. For many reasons Monty's plan was chosen and all the available resources were allocated to him.
The plan was based on speed and momentum, with what I consider a daring and visionary use of airbourne forces. Where it fell down was that the attack was over 60 miles on a very narrow front, with a mission completion based upon success at every stage of the operation - with no latitude for error or the fog of war.
Unfortunately there weren't taken into account or discarded as minimal threat - not an unusual situation nowadays. The end result was a mission that failed to achieve its objective, cost many lives, but did in fact further the strategic objective to end the war. It also led to many other lessons which have been taken forward by modern military forces - Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, wargaming an attack, MSR control, resupply alternatives and staff tables for resupply in different phases of operation.
We have the benefit of 20:20 hindsight, also coloured by our experience and knowledge, thinking in terms of modern capability. Think back to WWII, yes if I was there and I know what I know now - I'm sure I'd kick arse, but the true commander is one who has a vision and enables his subordinates to execute it. Remember failure isn't an end, it just enables you to find another way to achieve (badly paraphrased, but I'm on a roll).
Summary - Market Garden failed to achieve its objective, however it did enable an Allied advance, siezed the intitiative and highlighted deficiencies in equipment, planning and staff work - all of which got corrected, a costly lesson indeed. Do I blame Monty for the failure - yes because he was the commander and signed off on the plan, will I pillory him for it - no, it was war, commanders are paid to be aggressive and think outside the box and take risks, because we never have all the assets we want to achieve what we want, the true test is how we use what we've got.
First and foremost--bad intelligence...The allies thought the Germans were nothing more than kids and old men--not divisions of SS. Secondly, it relied on everything going according to plan. The airborne had to seize all of these bridges and hold them--they did their best--but they were just completely outgunned. Of course, it doesn't help that the enemy gets a copy of the battle plan. Daring? Yes. Possible? Yes. But, as someone said earlier---they didn't prepare for contingencies or the fog of war.
Panzercracker
Active member
Market Garden was a huge tactical and strategical success, Monty understood full well that meaningless death of hundreds of elite soldiers would galvanize the troops, he also knew how crucial was stopping all operations and redirecting resources to his failed offensive for allied victory.
The operation was masterfully planned and carried out, the men died on schedule and as ordered.
@Gman.
There was no bad intelligence, allies knew there's armor in the region, Sosabowski was raising hell about piecemeal transport being a death sentence but Monty being a dysfunctional primadonna wouldnt see the light.
His briliant idea could salvage his reputation damaged in Normandy, it was his baby and he wouldnt let a few minor details like Tiger tanks get into his beatifull picture.
Cost for effect the operation was an absolute disaster on every possible level.
The operation was masterfully planned and carried out, the men died on schedule and as ordered.
@Gman.
There was no bad intelligence, allies knew there's armor in the region, Sosabowski was raising hell about piecemeal transport being a death sentence but Monty being a dysfunctional primadonna wouldnt see the light.
His briliant idea could salvage his reputation damaged in Normandy, it was his baby and he wouldnt let a few minor details like Tiger tanks get into his beatifull picture.
Cost for effect the operation was an absolute disaster on every possible level.
Damaged?
Damaged by what exactly?
His destruction of the German Army?
The loss of 95% of her armour and vehicles?
The Liberation of Northern France and Belgium in the fastest and longest advance in the West?
The way he kept all the German Panzers busy whilst George fell forward into empty space?
What Tigers were based at Arnhem?
Panzercracker
Active member
High losses, weak results, unplanned success of Americans which he later claimed he planned for all along
You mean the American destruction of the German army?
Due to Americans, Canadians and Poles?
II SS panzer korps, Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg divisions
))Basically Monty was warned there's armor in the area although no one knew its an entire corps but that alone should be enough to flush the operation immidietaly, he didnt, he knowingly and willingly sent his soldiers to death in the name of his own ambition.
By the way, will you quote non-existing sources to prove your point here and refuse to provide online version of them in this topic too? Or will you refrain from lying this time?
Please post US losses and show how the UK losses were 'higher'.
Obviously the concept of an 'ALLIED' Army seems to have gone over your head. It was clearly laid out before D-Day what the plan was.
Due to the ALLIED army consisting on many nationalities.
If you say so. I just wonder why 2 ordinary Pz. Divisions had Tiger tanks in their TOE.
You are referring to the 4 sources I gave that completely demolished your fabrication that only 10% of the German Army fought in the West.
I gave a book and page number and you claim you got the book but the information was not there.
One might ask why you did not post the information on the page and expose my claimed invention.
You did not do that did you? I wonder why?
If you dont have a scanner then you must have a mobile phone camera. Use that and show what is in
Müller-Hillebrand, Heer 3, p. 173
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Panzercracker
Active member
To be specific the Tigers arrived later, but the point is moot however since the important thing is that armor was around.
http://www.alanhamby.com/unithist.shtml
22-24 September.
Monty knew this but failed to react.
I'm referring to this one source, i have aquired the book and there is NOTHING of what you quote there, you have lied about the content of the book to support an unsupportable argument and when cought lying you just kept repeating yourself.
Again you're ready to lie so you've got a link (unlike you i dont make up literature content i provide online sources) the tigers did arrive into the area and were present at the fighting, long before that there were 2 panzer divisions not even hidden.
Another online link so unllike you i dont support my arguments by lies.
http://www.jamescookecoaching.com/content/understanding-leaders/drivers/military-blunders-arnhem/
There were pictures of armor, Montgomery was presented with them but Montgomery, as always let his vanity get ahead of welfare of his men regarded them as ridiculous and sent the men to their deaths.
Another fact underlying the utter incompetence and disregard of human life in favor of his own spotlight is when Sosabowski objected to piecemeal landings pointing out (which turned out to be true) that with this kind of operations its either land in full force or not at all.
Virtually all of the substantial risks which jeopardized the operation to a point where success was an unlikely option were known to Montgomery but again, his plan was more important than hundreds that his incompetence and vanity condemned to death.
And yet you still can not supply a scan or photo of page 173 from Volume 3(I presume you were aware there were 3 volumes)
Hmm........I wonder why you do not show us what you say is on page 173.
Can you just give us some of the text on that page. What is it about?
Cue multitude of reasons why this can not be done..........
2 Panzer Divisions.
One with no tanks.............
The other with 20...........
Panzercracker
Active member
Just to make sure Kenny, you're claiming Germans had only 20 tanks in the region?