Originally Posted by LeEnfield

The six inch rockets ran straight and true, they would flip a Tiger onto it's back even with a near miss. The Typhoon was a very effective ground attack aircraft and also it was very good in the anti shipping role. As far as saying it was a good for it's time then so was the Mustang, they all had their day during WW2 in some form or other.

The six-inch rockets did not really fly "straight and true". The Operations Research reports that I specified indicated that the rocket attacks invariably missed the targets under ideal conditions. Things were much more difficult under battlefield stress and against moving or concealed targets.

The air pundits like to cite the German Mortain offensive as evidence for successful tactical airpower strikes. OR, as another friend of mine likes to point out, found otherwise. The bulk of the German tanks were disabled by the ground forces. The pilots often targetted tanks already abandoned by the Germans.

I do not want to downplay tac air, however. I am just being critical of some of the opinions presented by the media.

Ollie Garchy

Well you have your opinion and I have mine. but as a lad I used to watch the Typhoons train with those rockets just at the back of what is now Gatwick Airport, when it was nothing more than a large grass field and an overflow landing ground for Biggin Hill

Originally Posted by LeEnfield

Well you have your opinion and I have mine. but as a lad I used to watch the Typhoons train with those rockets just at the back of what is now Gatwick Airport, when it was nothing more than a large grass field and an overflow landing ground for Biggin Hill

It is not my opinion. It was the opinion of the British military. Operations Research were those lads, mostly scientists, who studied tactics and equipment in order to improve the fighting capabilities of the British military. I am only being influenced by their work.

Ollie Garchy

Ollie are you saying that all the rockets fired by the Allied planes were a waste of time

Originally Posted by LeEnfield

Ollie are you saying that all the rockets fired by the Allied planes were a waste of time

Not at all. The matter relates to defining the effectiveness of a weapons system. Scientific testing or the evaluation of battlefield data helps answer this question. OR research demonstrated that rocket accuracy was far lower than believed. These tests did not demonstrate that all rockets missed the target, however. Just most of them.

The same was true for the 500-lb general purpose bomb. Analysis taught the strategists to increase the tonnage applied to specific targets. If 20 bombers were not enough, the number was increased to 40, etc. In regards to tactical airpower, statistical realities demanded that more Allied sorties were necessary to knock out the target. This approximates one of the frictions of battle. [Even artillery works according to a similar dynamic].

I would, however, support the argument that the Allied ground forces proved far more important in Normandy than airpower. Hitting targets (even spotting targets) with 1940s technology was quite limited. Airpower even proved incapable of sealing off the landing area and limiting German troop movements. Why? The Germans moved at night. (Sometimes even during the day).

In any case, the rockets were (1) unguided, (2) subject to wind, (3) subject to gravity, (4) subject to the flight path, (5) subject to the pilot's aiming skills, (6) subject to flak interference, etc. A tough job, indeed.

According to my military history professor, strategic bombing played several rolls in WWII

1. It kept the Russians happy. They were invaded in June 1941 and bore the brunt of fighting for 3 years. The Russians demanded that a 2nd front on Europe be opened ASAP. Furthermore, they saw actions in Africa to be non essential to beating the Germans. For England and the US to engage in Strategic bombing was the only indirect way to support the Russians in their fight until a front could be opened up in Europe

2. According to my military professor, over 1 million Germans were sucked into defending German cities from allied bombing. That is 1 million Germans who were not fighting the ground war, a lot of 88mm guns that were not basting the hell out of Allied ground forces and a good many pilots that were attacking bombers rather than ground troops.

3. Strategic bombing allowed for the allies to wear down the Luftwaffe. In the beginning of strategic bombing, the Allies had no long range fighter escorts. The long range bombers were fresh meat for the German fighters. When the Mustangs were introduced, the Luftwaffe was worn down. Thus the reason why by the time Normandy rolled around, the ground forces were not strafed on a regular basis. As pilots were shot down, the Luftwaffe schools were cannibalized to meet the bombers in the air, spelling the doom for the Luftwaffe. By the end of the War, Germany had plenty of planes to fly but no pilots to fly them.

A quick note on my military history proffesor; he talks about in history, the "pendulum" swings back and forth. At the end of WWII, everyone thought that strategic bombing helped the war effort. Then people studied strategic bombing. They saw that millions of civilians were killed and lots of bomber crews shot down. The outpuut of strategic bombing seemed minimal, and the pendulum swings to the strategic bombing was worthless view. In the last few years, once secret documents have been released by the US and other nations. Historians get to see new info. That is where the 1 million figure has come from as well as details on the state of the Luftwaffe. SO now the pendulum swings back off the anti strategic bombing view. Just letting you know where I get all my bs from.

A good synopsis of the pro-strategic bombing argument, Doody.

(1) Strategic bombing had an important political dimension: "It kept the Russians happy".

(2) Strategic bombing diverted German resources: "over 1 million Germans were sucked into defending German cities from allied bombing".

(3) Strategic bombing neutralized the Luftwaffe: "By the end of the War, Germany had plenty of planes to fly but no pilots to fly them".

(4) And, "At the end of WWII, everyone thought that strategic bombing helped the war effort".

Of course, even a quick look at these points (and I know that these are those given by the bombing pundits and their clique of historians) demonstrates that the bombing failed in regards to the list of objectives set during the war itself. Why? Simple.

(1) The major objective was the crippling of German industry. This goal was only achieved in 1945 with the breakdown of transportation in Germany. It was, however, difficult to deny that other factors promoted this "breakdown". (ie. wear and tear, the loss of the German "colonies", the physical loss of German territory, etc.) What did airpower accomplish? Tough to say.

(2) Galbraith and the industrial section of the USSBS did not agree with the airpower pundits. He and his boys pointed to the astronomical rise of German production in 1944 and the low level of machine-tool destruction. Everyone else, it seems, looked at the destroyed German cities and thought: "Germany will take a hundred years to rebuild". This point is important because it helped condition especially American attitudes during the occupation. The view also disappeared by 1947. Marshal and the State Department now argued that German industry should act as the motor of European reconstruction in order to save tax dollars and prevent imminent collapse.

(3) Strategic bombing diverted resources? Well it diverted more Allied resources than German. It was far more difficult and expensive to build bombers. AA was in relative terms cheap. Fighters as well. Was the effort worth it? I do not think so. The returns were political or secondary. Germany was essentially defeated in 1945, anyway.

The "Pendulums", they are a "a'swingin'"...

"Bombing: The Balance Sheet

The effects of the bombing campaign went far beyond the mere physical destruction of factories and dwelling-houses, although these effects should not be underestimated in a complex and technically sophisticated industrial economy stretched taut by the demands of war. The bombing produced serious social dislocation and a high cost in terms of man-hours (or woman-hours in many cases). Evacuation, rehabilitation and welfare provision were carried out on the largest scale in an economy struggling with serious manpower losses and cuts in civilian production. Bombing also encouraged a strategic response from Hitler which placed a further strain on the war economy by diverting vast resources to projects of little advantage to the German war effort.

The net effect of the many ways in which bombing directly or indirectly impeded economic mobilisation cannot be calculated precisely. But in the absence of physical destruction and dislocation, without expensive programmes for secret weapons and underground production and without the diversion of four-fifths of the fighter force, one-third of all guns and one-fifth of all ammunition to the anti-bombing war the German armed forces could have been supplied with at least 50% more equipment in the last two years of war, perhaps much more. In an environment entirely free of bomb attack the German authorities and German industrial managers would have had the opportunity to exploit Germany’s resource-rich empire in Europe to the full. In 1942 the air force had begun to plan the production of 7000 aircraft a month, yet at the peak in 1944 a little over 3000 were produced, of which one-quarter were destroyed before even reaching the front-line.

Bombing took the strategic initiative away from German forces, and compelled Germany to divert an ever-increasing share of its manpower and resources away from production for the battlefield. As it was, German forces proved a formidable barrier to the end of the war. With more men, more heavily armed, an intact transport system and an uninterrupted flow of industrial resources Germany might well have kept the Allies at bay in 1945. Then the Allies would have faced the agonising decision about whether or not to drop atomic weapons on German cities rather than on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

Professor Richard Overy

Originally Posted by redcoat

"Bombing: The Balance Sheet

The effects of the bombing campaign went far beyond the mere physical destruction of factories and dwelling-houses, although these effects should not be underestimated in a complex and technically sophisticated industrial economy stretched taut by the demands of war. The bombing produced serious social dislocation and a high cost in terms of man-hours (or woman-hours in many cases). Evacuation, rehabilitation and welfare provision were carried out on the largest scale in an economy struggling with serious manpower losses and cuts in civilian production. Bombing also encouraged a strategic response from Hitler which placed a further strain on the war economy by diverting vast resources to projects of little advantage to the German war effort.

The net effect of the many ways in which bombing directly or indirectly impeded economic mobilisation cannot be calculated precisely. But in the absence of physical destruction and dislocation, without expensive programmes for secret weapons and underground production and without the diversion of four-fifths of the fighter force, one-third of all guns and one-fifth of all ammunition to the anti-bombing war the German armed forces could have been supplied with at least 50% more equipment in the last two years of war, perhaps much more. In an environment entirely free of bomb attack the German authorities and German industrial managers would have had the opportunity to exploit Germany’s resource-rich empire in Europe to the full. In 1942 the air force had begun to plan the production of 7000 aircraft a month, yet at the peak in 1944 a little over 3000 were produced, of which one-quarter were destroyed before even reaching the front-line.

Bombing took the strategic initiative away from German forces, and compelled Germany to divert an ever-increasing share of its manpower and resources away from production for the battlefield. As it was, German forces proved a formidable barrier to the end of the war. With more men, more heavily armed, an intact transport system and an uninterrupted flow of industrial resources Germany might well have kept the Allies at bay in 1945. Then the Allies would have faced the agonising decision about whether or not to drop atomic weapons on German cities rather than on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

Professor Richard Overy

My extremely quick response:

1) Overy's understanding of strategic bombing's impact demonstrates extreme characteristics of banality. Why? Overy's conclusions are trite. It can be reduced to the following: the western Allies fought an air war against Germany that forced Hitler's regime to respond by devoting considerable resources. There was a quantitative and qualitative impact. Wow! Great theory. Next one, please. [nobody is saying that the impact of strategic bombing was zero].

2) [Counterfactual] Investment in tactical airpower, coastal command, and the ground forces would have achieved the same result (with a hypothetically higher drain on German resources). Early preparations for a landing in France (as opposed to longterm investment in an expensive and draining strategic bombing program) would have (1) forced a significant German troop redeployment, (2) taken pressure off of the Soviet Union, (3) brought the Luftwaffe to battle and reduced the size and resource base of the Nazi empire. The benefits of an alternative strategy with relation to coastal command are obvious. In terms of the ground forces, higher investment in basic equipment like better tanks would have reduced Allied losses while bringing more and more German SOLDIERS to battle. What does strategic bombing look like in 1943? Not good. How about late 1944/1945 after the destruction of OB West and the destruction of Army Group Centre? A lot better. Coincidence? Maybe but unlikely.

4) Hitler's wasted "strategic response" was fortunate. (Except for those unlucky souls in Britain/Belgium who were killed by V-1s/2s). A better commander, working in the traditions of the Prussian military, would have followed Galland's advice: to build more fighters in 1940 and not 1944 and actually reduce the civilian casualties. Total war demanded a tough decision-maker and the "Leader" of Germany was a miserable failure in economic/social/geomilitary terms. It all boils down to this highly probable counterfactual hypothesis: an extensive German investment in fighters after 1940 (ie. 44,000 fighters for that year) would have reduced bombing capacities on the eastern front BUT led to the complete failure of strategic bombing. The Allied investment would have been wasted. Lucky Allies. Stupid Nazi Leaders.

3) Strategic bombing -- I CANNOT stress this enough -- did NOT destroy German machine-tools. Only the factory walls. There was dislocation and not significant physical destruction. The Germans were able, time and time again, to recover quickly from the bombing raids--raids that invariably hit civilian targets like churches and hospitals and NOT the factory or even marshalling yard in question. The Germans dug out the tools, dispersed them, and produced their "goods" after a short reorganization period. Overy has come around to this point. How could he not? The work of men like Abelshauser from the 1980s (or Galbraith in 1945) makes an alternative explanation moreorless impossible.

4) Strategic bombing was incredibly immoral. I actually do not care about this "attribute". If the killing of kids is a part of war, so be it. Nobody cared about German kids between 1939-1945 and Germans did not care about non-German kids either. However, Overy has to ask this question: how could the destruction of apartments, churches, etc. help the war effort? I tend to think, and the evidence certainly goes in this direction, that the bombing actually PROLONGED the war. A number of studies demonstrate that bombing rallied Germans around the Nazi flag and produced a serious desire for revenge at the same time. Britain went through a similar process in 1940/1941.

5) One-quarter of all bombs dropped on Germany fell in 1945. [a friend of mine liked to repeat this point...I do not really believe it is correct, however. Just close.] Most of the destruction to the German infrastructure (ie. Solly Zuckerman's "Transportation Plan") occured during the final stages of the war. Did Germany collapse suddenly in 1945 because of this bombing? I do not know. It is a good question. The western Allies were, however, already fighting in Aachen on the German frontier. The Soviets were overruning eastern Germany in Cossack fashion and closing the ring around Berlin. I do not think the fall in production in 1945 had much impact on the war owing to the miserable strategic position of the Wehrmacht.

6) Think about oil. After the loss of the Romanian oil fields, most of the German oil was synthetically produced. Was it enough to run a modern army and economy? No. The hydrogenation plants could not keep up with demand. Hitler had stated in 1941 during a conversation with the Finnish head of state that a full Soviet invasion of Romania prior to June 1941 would have ended the war...then and there. The Haber-Bosch oil synthesis technique could only provide for basic survival. With this in mind, what was more important...the Soviet seizure of the oil fields in 1944 or the Allied bombing of oil synthesis facilities?

There are many other points. I will try to explain Abelshauser's research (he is an economic-historian) at a later date.

Bombing did have it's affect on Germany but it was cumulative over there years, so towards the end war the effect was far more pronounced. Now the RAF raids on Penumdee did not stop the V1 or V2, but it put back for a while their introduction. After this raid it was decided to build these weapons underground and although some of the tunnels were there it took a vast amount of time and labour to get this project up and running again. Now if this army of slaves had not been doing this work then they would have been working on some other war project. There were many project brought to halt by all this heavy bombing. Just look at at the time labour the Germans poured into their submarine pens making those bomb proof then along comes Barnes Wallis with 22.000 lbs bombs and knocks them all down again. I agree we did not stop the German production lines but we stopped them from expanding to keep up with the increasing demands made upon them, and when you take into account the millions of men and women from all over Europe that had to endure force labour to keep these productions lines going under the pain of death if they failed. Also the millions of Russian POW that were used as slave labour doing much of the heavy work until they died doing it, yet you can say quite happily that bombing did not have an affect, I think if you were one of Germany's slaves during that time you might just look at it in different light